absolutely no case — schopenhauer1

Absolutely?

In the scenario in question the choice is between 100% chance of severe suffering (and death) or a slight chance of severe suffering for someone else. In this case it is permissible to procreate.

The way I read it, he is saying there is absolutely no case he can find where someone should put another in a situation where they are more at risk than a less risky alternative when there is no consent to be had (I would have said maybe "impossible" to have). You don't have to answer the question, but that is his claim. I guess the challenge is more like, "Hey, I'll entertain your exception if you have one, but this is the case". — schopenhauer1

So an argument from incredulity. Even if I decide not to contemplate possible exceptions, his premise would remain unwarranted. This isn't even something that I am burdened with. I'm holding all the cards here, and to be honest, I can't be bothered to think about it anymore than I have to right now. Maybe I'll come back to it, maybe not. Either way, thus far, his argument is unsuccessful, because one of the premises in it lacks justification.

Even if I decide not to even contemplate possible exceptions, his premise would remain unwarranted. — S

Well, he is claiming this is a hard and fast rule it seems. Don't put people in riskier situations if there is an alternative when you have no consent. That seems reasonable. If you think not, then explain why. If not, then you can't think of anything at the moment. However, your admonition that he is being unreasonable by allowing you to retort with a counterargument or an exception or what have you, is to me, unfounded. It seems perfectly reasonable in any debate for the other person to say something like, "Do you disagree? If so, let me know how." That is what I see going on here. Nothing more.

Well, he is claiming this is a hard and fast rule it seems. Don't put people in riskier situations if there is an alternative when you have no consent. That seems reasonable. If you think not, then explain why. — schopenhauer1

Because under consequentialism that's irrelevant. If the riskier situation is the better option consequentially, then that's the one you should go for. It's easy to refute in theory. And it's easy to refute in practice too, come to think of it. There are lots of things that children can't consent to, and which carry risks, some of which are severe, like with almost any medication or surgery. It can be open to argument which course of action is the bigger risk in these situations, but anyway, the legal guardian should make that call, and that's not simply right or wrong just because of the risk involved or because they can't obtain consent (which is irrelevant, anyway!). There are important considerations entirely missing from that analysis. It hasn't been thought through properly, and it hasn't come from a place of impartiality, it's skewed in an attempt to support an anti-natalist argument.

Because under consequentialism that's irrelevant. — S

Perhaps it is not consequential, but even if it is.. I'll look at the rest of the argument here..

There are lots of things that children can't consent to, and which carry risks, some of which are severe, like with almost any medication or surgery. It can be open to argument which course of action is the bigger risk in these situations, but anyway, the legal guardian should make that call, and that's not simply right or wrong just because of the risk involved or because they can't obtain consent. There are important considerations entirely missing from that analysis. — S

I am not sure khaled's view on this so I'll let him answer if this counts for what he was talking about. I would say there has to be a distinction between the notion of "risky", like a "risky surgery" versus "more risky situation". Clearly, if the parent wants to do what's best for their child, they are actually not doing the riskier option. The riskier option, it would seem in this case, would be to not do the surgery. It may be a risky surgery, but the alternative would be even more catastrophic. Of course, an antinatalist aside to all of this, is any of this harmful situation could have been prevented..but of course that is off tangent from this exact argument.

No, you can't artificially make it out to be that simple, I'm afraid, because life isn't that simple. There are situations where it's extremely difficult to decide whether or not to undergo a major surgery, because there are great risks either way. Another example would be undergoing chemotherapy. There might be a slim chance that it would be relatively successful, but it would be a hellish experience, and it might not pay off, whereas no chemotherapy would most likely mean a reduced life expectancy. Even if the legal guardian ends up opting with the "riskier" option, it's right that that's their decision to make. Khaled's analysis is overly simplistic, not thought through properly, and it is definitely not necessarily true of all cases. It is also not an impartial analysis, which is important in terms of method, and explains why it's hardly a surprise to find that there are problems with it.

Another example would be undergoing chemotherapy. There might be a slim chance that it would be relatively successful, but it would be a hellish experience, and it might not pay off, whereas no chemotherapy would most likely mean a reduced life expectancy. Even if the legal guardian ends up opting with the "riskier" option, it's right that that's their decision to make. Khaled's analysis is overly simplistic, not thought through properly, and it is definitely not necessarily true of all cases. It is also not an impartial analysis, which is important in terms of method, and explains why it's hardly a surprise to find that there are problems with it. — S

Again, I will let khaled answer this because it is his argument. However, again, the riskier option as presented to the parents is obviously letting the disease slowly eat away at the child. However, this is really a debate about consent. The child is already born. This changes things, as I see it. Prior to birth, it was impossible to get consent and no one is alive to be harmed. Now that the child is born, there is actually a person's life at stake. It is too late. Unfortunately, we cannot go into the future and ask an adult version of the person, thus guardianship is given to the parents. Thus in this situation, the guardians now have to make a decision of the least risky outcome. Usually this means weighing the statistical options outlined by the doctor.

However, again, the riskier option as presented to the parents is obviously letting the disease slowly eat away at the child. — schopenhauer1

No, that's an oversimplification, it's worded in an emotionally charged way, and it's neither obviously the riskier option, nor obviously the worse course of action to take. People opt against chemotherapy and major surgery for a reason. It can be worse than the alternative for some, not that that's always clear at the time, which is kind of the point.

However, this is really a debate about consent. — schopenhauer1

No it's not, though! Because consent is irrelevant. How many times...

It can be worse than the alternative for some, not that that's always clear at the time, which is kind of the point. — S

I would imagine that is the caveat that makes this still valid.

No it's not, though! Because consent is irrelevant. How many times... — S

Even if it is, that is not khaled's argument. His argument is that one should not put someone in a riskier situation if they cannot consent. That is why I bring up guardianship in this case and the asymmetry of no one being born and someone being born and having their life at stake.

What you're doing doesn't get us anywhere either. Refusing this statement but not providing an alternative. I can't convince you of this premise. It's a premise for a reason. If you don't share it then at least you wouldn't be a hypocrite for having children. — khaled

The alternative I am offering is, essentially, that future people have no moral weight at all. I don't like the implications of that, but I'd like to know if anyone can offer a convinving argument that they do.

I'm pretty sure one can say that consciously deciding to get pregnant and have a baby is "determining" the existence of the baby. And I'm saying we shouldn't do that. Also I don't get what determinism has to do with this. — khaled

But this is, as I pointed out before, self-contradictory. If we can decide to get pregnant, it follows that the existance of future humans is not determined. Which is to say, they don't exist, not even in the future. At most, their (future) existance starts the exact second the decision to have children is made. That means that while we are still deciding, we have to treat the future child as non-existant in the present and future.

I don't see a reason why that would be the case. Can you think of any othere scenarios when this "special case" comes into play? Or are you just treating birth differently? — khaled

The special case is creating new moral subjects in the first place. We could apply the same logic to the question of whether or not it is moral to create human-level-intelligence AIs for menial tasks (essentially as slaves).

That if an action results in harming someone in the future, it doesn't matter whether or not that person existed at the time the action took place. Example: Implanting a bomb in a fetus and setting it to blow up when the baby reaches 18 is just as bad as bombing an 18 year old (the age is besides the point here). — khaled

Even if I concede that point for the purposes of this argument, this still leaves the question of how future people can exist while we are still deciding whether we are going to create them.

I can't "convince you" of this. There is no logical argument for it. It's a starting premise. Although if you don't believe in it you'd have to say that implanting a bomb in a fetus and killing someone that way is ok or at least less wrong than just killing someone, which I find to be ridiculous — khaled

I cannot say what is right or wrong without some information on the motivations. I don't ascribe to consequentialist morals.

However, this is really a debate about consent.
— schopenhauer1

No it's not, though! Because consent is irrelevant. How many times...
— S

Even if it is, that is not khaled's argument. His argument is that one should not put someone in a riskier situation if they cannot consent. — schopenhauer1

How can you say that that's not his argument, and then go on to mention consent in your description of his argument? That's a contradiction. Clearly if it's in his argument, then he thinks that it's of relevance. I'm saying that it's not, because obtaining consent isn't even a possibility.

And his assertion about putting someone in a riskier situation not only lacks justification, but has been refuted by counterexample.

That is why I bring up guardianship in this case and the asymmetry of no one being born and someone being born and having their life at stake. — schopenhauer1

Your inconsistency, you mean. If life were that bad, then there would be nothing at stake.

But life is pretty bad, actually. Especially if youre poor and sick.

It's not pretty bad actually, on average. Cherry picking the bad parts, or the bad cases, doesn't make life bad, it makes your analytical skills bad.

There are many, many people who are extremely impoverished in the world. It may get better, but its still pretty bad.

What do we actually mean when we say life is "good" or "bad"? Are we comparing? Is there some sort of objective standard?

There are many, many people who are extremely impoverished in the world. It may get better, but its still pretty bad. — Baskol1

Yes, but not anywhere near as many who aren't. You can't win this one in terms of the numbers.

Yes, suffering is always bad, obvously.

Actually, there are more poor people than rich people. And everyone can become potentially poor, and disabled, or sick.

Suffering is a choice.

Actually, there are more poor people than rich people. And everyone can become potentially poor, and disabled, or sick. — Baskol1

Don't move the goalposts. You didn't say poor, and you certainly didn't say potentially poor. You said extremely impoverished. My counterpoint stands.

No, everyone will suffer in life. Some people suffer more, others less. But suffering is invetiable, and certainly not a choice.

You dont understand, antinatalists are against existence because existence means suffering. You cant deny that.

No, everyone will suffer in life. — Baskol1

No one is going to dispute that. But that's not enough by any reasonable assessment to make life not worth living.

You dont understand, antinatalists are against existence because existence means suffering. You cant deny that. — Baskol1

How stupid. Of course I won't deny that. But unfortunately for you, your conclusion doesn't follow. And stop trying to mislead all of the time. It's not just suffering, is it? It's joy, happiness, bliss, ecstasy... but you don't mention that. That's dishonest.

Not for everyone maybe, but for many it actually does.

Not for everyone maybe, but for many it actually does. — Baskol1

You're being dishonest by cherry picking. The many you refer to do not outnumber or outweigh the much larger number of people for whom life is worth living. In proper context, the "many" you refer to are not many at all. They're few.

I simply think it is immoral to knowingly create more life, therefore more suffering.

Good for you. Your opinion means nothing.

Unsurprisingly your impatience leads you astray.

Suffering is a choice. Many choose to sulk and complain, yet there are others who are grateful and appreciative.

And grateful for what exactly?