Then how did you arrive at this conclusion?

I realize that words can be interpreted in many different ways.

By mind-independent world I mean a world that exists even if there are no minds in it, in which everything behaves according to laws including the minds. If we assume that in a mind-independent world minds follow such laws, then minds have an influence on the world in the sense that they are a part of the world that follows laws that act upon other parts of the world, but they don't have an influence on the world in the sense that they can't act outside of these laws.

So the fundamental question is, can we do things that doesn't follow these laws or not? I'm saying that if we are assuming we are part of an objective reality (which implicitly assumes that everything behaves according to unchanging laws, even if these laws include some randomness, and we're just observing parts of it), then it immediately follows that we are assuming we can't do anything outside of these laws, we can't even act on the randomness in these laws, we don't have free will.

And so if we assume instead that we have free will, then there can't be such a thing as an objective reality, we are the ones shaping through our will what we and others experience, and even physical laws would be limits we impose on ourselves rather than limits existing out there independently of us.

I don't see how we could assume objective reality and free will at the same time.

Then how did you arrive at this conclusion? — leo

Innately. All my life I haven't learned a thing, at most I've just remembered things.

By mind-independent world I mean a world that exists even if there are no minds in it, in which everything behaves according to laws including the minds. If we assume that in a mind-independent world minds follow such laws, then minds have an influence on the world in the sense that they are a part of the world that follows laws that act upon other parts of the world, but they don't have an influence on the world in the sense that they can't act outside of these laws.

So the fundamental question is, can we do things that doesn't follow these laws or not? I'm saying that if we are assuming we are part of an objective reality (which implicitly assumes that everything behaves according to unchanging laws, even if these laws include some randomness, and we're just observing parts of it), then it immediately follows that we are assuming we can't do anything outside of these laws, we can't even act on the randomness in these laws, we don't have free will. — leo

Well, regardless if these minds are free or not - they can't act outside of these laws.
Which is to say, regardless if they are independent of something, they will follow its laws when interacting with it - if they don't, the laws change and the object transmutes.

To summarise: There is flux and flux allows you to not follow laws. Flux is objective and so a law. Hence the mind is ambivalent. Hence you have free will - and your free will has borders.

I don't see how we could assume objective reality and free will at the same time. — leo

I don't see how they're mutually exclusive - I see one arising from the other.

Innately. All my life I haven't learned a thing, at most I've just remembered things. — Shamshir

How would you respond to someone who would claim they know innately that the world is not mind-independent?

There is flux and flux allows you to not follow laws. Flux is objective and so a law. Hence the mind is ambivalent. Hence you have free will - and your free will has borders. — Shamshir

Are you saying the mind can choose to not follow laws?

I don't see how they're mutually exclusive - I see one arising from the other. — Shamshir

You see objective reality as arising from free will? But then if that reality was willed it does not exist independently of us, it is not objective, which is why I don't see how they are not exclusive.

in which everything behaves according to laws including the minds. — leo

"Mind-independent world" doesn't imply realism about laws, and it doesn't imply strong determinism.

How would you respond to someone who would claim they know innately that the world is not mind-independent? — leo

Anyone who'd know that innately, would know what I know innately and would validate my claim.
I wouldn't need to respond.

Are you saying the mind can choose to not follow laws? — leo

It can transmute laws, and by that process not follow them.

You see objective reality as arising from free will? But then if that reality was willed it does not exist independently of us, it is not objective, which is why I don't see how they are not exclusive. — leo

Free will persists thanks to an objective reality and objective reality persists thanks to freedom.
If it's subjective, it can't be truly free - as it's always an aspect.

So, an objective reality exists independently of the mind.
It's existence permits and persists the capacity for free will.
Free will in turn allows a mind to draw upon the objective reality and persist the objective reality.
If freedom ceases, there's no room for objectivity and so it too ceases.

It would actually be harder, nigh impossible, to influence a subjective reality.
An objective reality is not only easily influenced, it is influenced by what are independent parts of it.
It's hard for Chess to influence itself; it's easy for chess pieces and chess players, who are independent to Chess, to influence Chess. Same with a mind-independent objective reality.

There's a cat, like it or not.

"There is a mind-independent world" is another way of saying that there are things that exist aside from our minds. It's not saying that we can't influence the mind-independent world. — Terrapin Station

"Mind-independent world" doesn't imply realism about laws, and it doesn't imply strong determinism. — Terrapin Station

There are a few things to clarify here otherwise we will just keep talking past each other.

Do you agree with the idea that in a mind-independent world, minds are part of that world?

Then do you agree with the idea that in a mind-independent world, there are constraints to how things can move and what minds can do?

Do you agree with the idea that in a mind-independent world, minds are part of that world? — leo

Minds aren't technically part of the mind-independent world, but they're part of a world that mostly consists of mind-independent stuff.

That's like saying that refrigerators aren't part of a refrigerator-independent world, but they're part of a world that mostly consists of refrigerator-independent stuff.

Then do you agree with the idea that in a mind-independent world, there are constraints to how things can move and what minds can do? — leo

Yes, but I'm not actually a realist on physical laws; at least not as physical laws are usually characterized.

This is the Cartesian issue that never does and never will go away. It is in and of itself the primary argument for rejecting Cartesian dualism.

Even if people can make the conundrum seem a little less absurd by claiming you can interact with a mind independent world, they will nonetheless end up being unable to explain adequately the process by which such interaction is even possible. (they have been trying for 400 years and yet here we are.).

In the end, they will give the process some sort of label such as "transcendence" and then proceed as if the label explains all when of course it explains nothing. And when push comes to shove, they will do the Husserlian thing and point out how truly wonderful is the "magic" of transcendence.

The only reason you can interact with other entities is because they are within the world that you are in.

Even if people can make the conundrum seem a little less absurd by claiming you can interact with a mind independent world, they will nonetheless end up being unable to explain adequately the process by which such interaction is even possible. (they have been trying for 400 years and yet here we are.). — Arne

I don't believe there's anything difficult to it. As I explained earlier, you have a thought that amounts to wanting to type the word "word," and so your brain, via the rest of your nervous system, sends a signal that activates tendons/muscles that enable you to move your arm to the keyboard and move your finger to push the "w" key.

"I don't believe there's anything difficult to it. As I explained earlier, you have a thought that amounts to wanting to type the word "word," and so your brain, via the rest of your nervous system, sends a signal that activates tendons/muscles that enable you to move your arm to the keyboard and move your finger to push the "w" key."

All that does is beg the question as to where the "magic" occurs. Rather than describing the "transcendence" as between yourself and the physical world external to you, you have chosen to describe the "transcendence" as between your thought and the physical world.

None of what you say comes even close to explaining how a non-physical thought somehow creates physical activity in the brain. Unless you are suggesting that your thoughts are physical, in which case you are rejecting the notion of an external reality and are now outside of the original post.

Simply put, the point at which the supposed magic of "transcendence" occurs is not an explanation of how the transcendence occurs. How does that "thought" (of a thinking substance) cause a physical (extended substance) "signal".

And please keep in mind that for the Cartesians, a substance is self-sufficient.

A natural world doesn't necessarily entail determinism. Even though natural laws exist, they are excruciatingly difficult to find. For every attempt to formulate them we need to apply endless scrutiny to make sure that we are right. Subsequently, the future is uncertain which logically discards determinism.

All that does is beg the question as to where the "magic" occurs. — Arne

There's no "magic." Mentality is simply a subset of brain functions from the reference frame of being the brain in question. There's no "transcendence."

None of what you say comes even close to explaining how a non-physical thought — Arne

There's no such thing as a nonphysical anything. The very notion of that is incoherent. Thoughts are physical. They're brain states.

Unless you are suggesting that your thoughts are physical, in which case you are rejecting the notion of an external reality — Arne

Say what? Thoughts are physical. They're brain states. There are things external to brain states. That's external reality.

As I said above, "[It's] like saying that refrigerators aren't part of a refrigerator-independent world, but they're part of a world that mostly consists of refrigerator-independent stuff." It's just instead of refrigerators, we're talking about brains. We could talk about suitcases, bookshelves, guitar amplifiers--anything else instead. There's that thing and then there are the things that are outside of that thing.

you are missing my point and the point of the original post.

1. The very notion of "objective" is rooted in substance ontology, i.e., the subject/object distinction.

2. The subject/object distinction is the Cartesian distinction between two self-sufficient substances, i.e., thinking substances (having non physical attributes) and extended substances (having physical attributes).

3. Being self-sufficient, thinking substances (minds) are completely independent of extended substances (physical things). Similarly and being self-sufficient, extended substances (physical things) are completely independent of thinking substances (minds). After all, self-sufficient does mean self-sufficient.

Therefore, when you claim that there are only physical things, you are rejecting substance ontology.

And that is okay. But you need to recognize that you are doing that.

Otherwise, you end up trying to resolve a problem from within a paradigm you have rejected.

Welcome to contemporary man's Cartesian nightmare.

"There's no "transcendence.""

I disagree.

Though I do reject the notion that transcendence is from "subject" to "object."

Instead, transcendence is from "self" to "world."

1. The very notion of "objective" is rooted in substance ontology, i.e., the subject/object distinction. — Arne

Whether it's historically/etymologically rooted in that or not doesn't matter. The distinction can (and typically does) simply refer to mental versus nonmental phenomena, which is a distincrion between a subset of brain function and things that aren't a subset of that particular brain function.

I disagree. — Arne

Okay . . . If only that were any help in making anything "transcendent." ; -)

"Whether it's historically/etymologically rooted in that or not doesn't matter. The distinction can (and typically does) simply refer to mental versus nonmental phenomena, which is a distincrion between a subset of brain function and things that aren't a subset of that particular brain function."


It matters not how you frame the distinction (mental/non-mental or external/internal or subject/object). Instead, the deeper issue is the relationship between the entities you are trying to distinguish. And you have already rejected the notion of the relationship as being between two self-sufficient substances.

Unless I am missing something, you avoid the Cartesian nightmare by being a non-Cartesian, i.e., you are a materialist.

And you have already rejected the notion of the relationship as being between two self-sufficient substances.

Unless I am missing something, you avoid the Cartesian nightmare by being a non-Cartesian, i.e., you are a materialist. — Arne

Correct. I'm a materialist/physicalist.

Correct. I'm a materialist/physicalist. — Terrapin Station

But you are still alive, so there is still hope for you.

:razz:

Well, if someone can figure out a way to make the notion of a nonphysical something/anything coherent, that would be a start. ;-)

Minds aren't technically part of the mind-independent world, but they're part of a world that mostly consists of mind-independent stuff. — Terrapin Station

Yes, but I'm not actually a realist on physical laws; at least not as physical laws are usually characterized. — Terrapin Station

Ok, so in that view both minds and things that aren't mind are part of a world, and both are constrained in how they can behave.

Even if you're not a realist on physical laws, you're a realist on laws that apply to the world (even if we don't know them exactly), because what we call laws are precisely constraints that dictate how things behave or how they can behave.

After some thought, I agree that in such a world there can be some free will if the constraints are fundamentally indeterministic, albeit that's a limited free will that cannot go beyond these constraints.

For instance, if we were to assume that quantum mechanics is fundamentally indeterministic and is a correct description of the world at very small scales, it doesn't leave much place for free will: the mind might act freely on the indeterministic part, but it has to do that in a way that the spatial and temporal probabilities in the laws remain respected, and it isn't clear that we could have an effective free will that way, the mind might only have an imperceptible effect that would hardly qualify as free will.

So objective reality does not necessarily imply absence of free will, but it does imply limited free will at best.

Well, if someone can figure out a way to make the notion of a nonphysical something/anything coherent, that would be a start. ;-) — Terrapin Station

The above allowed for the possibility of limited free will if the mind has a non-physical part that can act freely on the indeterministic part of laws, but now it seems to me that if you assume there is no such non-physical part then there can be no free will in such an objective reality.

If you assume physicalism is true then it's obvious you would see anything non-physical as false, but otherwise why would you say anything non-physical is incoherent?

One doesn't have to believe that physical things are deterministic.

The free will I care about is the ability to choose between a tuna and a turkey sandwich, or between which of a handful of movies to watch, etc.

One doesn't have to believe that physical things are deterministic. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but if your mind is physical and follows indeterministic laws, then it doesn't have the ability to choose anything. There is a given probability that your mind will be in such or such state, and that's it, your mind is not making the choice, the indeterministic law is making the choice, the choice is not determined, it is selected randomly while following a given probability distribution.

Basically, there needs to be an additional ingredient for your mind to actually select wilfully one possibility among those that fit the indeterministic law. If your mind is physical, there is no such ingredient, everything simply follows the indeterministic law, and outcomes are selected randomly with various probabilities.

The free will I care about is the ability to choose between a tuna and a turkey sandwich, or between which of a handful of movies to watch, etc. — Terrapin Station

But do you believe you are choosing freely, or that some (in)deterministic law made the choice for you and you are becoming aware of it after the fact?

Sure, but if your mind is physical and follows indeterministic laws, — leo

Aside from "indeterministic laws" being a questionable idea in general, why would one have to believe in indeterminstic laws?

In any event, it could work that you're able to bias probabilities.

Aside from "indeterministic laws" being a questionable idea in general, why would one have to believe in indeterministic laws? — Terrapin Station

If one assumes there is an objective reality in which there are constraints, how could one believe in anything else than deterministic or indeterministic laws to describe these constraints?

By the way when I talk about indeterministic laws I refer to laws such as in quantum mechanics, in which things do not have a definite trajectory but rather there is only a specified probability of finding them in such or such volume of space.

In any event, it could work that you're able to bias probabilities. — Terrapin Station

If physical things behave according to laws, and you're able to bias the probabilities in these laws, then you're not following these laws, so there is some part of you that is not physical.

If you want to remain physical, then the best you can do is select outcomes so that the probabilities remain the same (which means that in some instances you won't have any freedom to choose).

What is a physical object? We know how to use the phrase when we aren't doing philosophy. But I'm 'spicious of its potential for untangling the mind-matter knot.

I found the quotes below illuminating.

Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch ... Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?
...
But can’t it be imagined that there should be no physical objects? I don’t know. And yet “there are physical objects” is nonsense. Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?—And is this an empirical proposition: “There seem to be physical objects”?
...
“A is a physical object” is a piece of instruction which we give only to someone who doesn’t yet understand either what “A” means, or what “physical object” means. Thus it is instruction about the use of words, and “physical object” is a logical concept. (Like colour, quantity, …) And that is why no such proposition as: “There are physical objects” can be formulated. Yet we encounter such unsuccessful shots at every turn. — On Certainty

Is it not similar with 'mind-independent reality'? Let's make it mundane. I think my wet shoes were downstairs for the last few hours, even though I haven't thought of them until now. I guess I can try to imagine how they exist in the absence of life as I've known it (human and animal.) But I'd be slow to build a system on such questionable imaginings.

Isn't it the case that as soon as we assume there is such a thing as an objective reality, a mind-independent world we are a part of, then we are necessarily assuming the absence of free will already?

Because if we assume we belong to a mind-independent world, then that world doesn't depend on our minds, so our minds don't have an influence on it, and so we don't have free will.

Is there anything wrong in this reasoning? — leo

I'll agreethe assumption that there is a mind-independent objective reality arguably entails that there are objective limits to the freedom of individual sentient agents. But I see no reason to suppose that freedom must be somehow absolute or in every conceivable respect unlimited in order to count as freedom.


What does it mean to say the world is "mind-independent"? Surely not that this world of ours is a world without any minds in it.

Why should we expect that "a mind has no influence on the world" just because "the world doesn't depend on that mind"?

Should we say the world depends on this hammer? No it does not. But does the hammer have some influence in the world? So it seems.

The world cannot decide to do away with hammers, nor with minds, nor to ignore their efforts and their effects. Minds participate in the world, like everything that exists in the world.

To all appearances, the world does not decide anything. Only minds decide. Minds participate in the world by perceiving and acting in the world. I suppose the freedom of free agents is grounded in that participation.

If one assumes there is an objective reality in which there are constraints, how could one believe in anything else than deterministic or indeterministic laws to describe these constraints? — leo

I want to try to keep this relatively simple (with an emphasis on "relatively"), but as I mentioned, I'm not a realist on laws. I'm not a realist on any abstracts, actually. That's one facet of my nominalism.

I see what is usually parsed as laws as something similar to trope nominalism. Particulars are neither "completely random" nor subject to laws per se, but instead simply have ways they at least tend to "behave." This means that not just any arbitrary thing is going to (be able to) occur--so there are constraints in that sense, but it also means that things don't work akin to strong determinism, they don't literally "follow laws" in any sense. There are similarities of "behavior" tendencies akin to other property similarities, and particularly that fact is what leads to interpreting things in terms of laws.

If anyone reading this is unfamiliar with nominalism in general or with trope nominalism, it's worth reading at least the Wikipedia entry on those topics (the basics of trope nominalism will be described in the overall nominalism article) to get the gist of it.