If the nominalist is coherent/consistent, then s/he cannot even talk about this sentence for it would have changed and would be another one as a result of change(similar to Heraclitus' river). — creativesoul

You can talk about P at T1, and I can talk about P at T1, and P at T1 is identical to P at T1--so what we're talking about can be identical. You're confusing that with our thinking, our utterances, etc. at T2, T3, etc. As always, what we're pointing to isn't the same thing as our pointing.

You can talk about P at T1, and I can talk about P at T1, and P at T1 is identical to P at T1--so what we're talking about can be identical. You're confusing that with our thinking, our utterances, etc. at T2, T3, etc. As always, what we're pointing to isn't the same thing as our pointing. — Terrapin Station

I was wondering, Terrapig, since it took time for you to speak those words inside your mind, and a duration of time to speak each individual word, how is it that you were able to use a single word that pointed to a single meaning even though that meaning had already changed before you finished thinking about it? It seems odd that you were still able to use a single word with a single unchanging meaning and then combine a multiplicity of them to make a coherent sentence with meaning even though the meanings of each word and also the meaning of the paragraph as a whole ha e already changed. In doing so, aren’t you disapproving the validity of your own theory, in real time? that is, contradicting yourself while you speak the words?

even though that meaning had already changed before you finished thinking about it — TheGreatArcanum

Meaning isn't something different than thinking, so what you're asking here makes no sense. You're talking about meaning as if it's something independent of thinking.

Meaning isn't something different than thinking, so what you're asking here makes no sense. You're talking about meaning as if it's something independent of thinking. — Terrapin Station

no, I’m not saying that meaning and thinking are mutually exclusive, only that thinking, that is, a particular set of words with a particular set of sounds, is not equal to the meaning, or that meaning is a subset of those words and sounds, but that those words and sounds are subsets of meaning, meaning, that their meaning precedes their existence in time.

I think that you should just give up, because you’re in over your head here and you just keep digging yourself deeper into the ground. Your inability to rationally address the whole of a statement, and nitpick a single part only, is keeping the conversation from progressing. It was over with the first post, a post which you still haven’t addressed thoroughly. Which of the numbers in the OP does your conception of nominalistic fall under, 1,2, or 3?

no, I’m not saying that meaning and thinking are mutually exclusive, only that thinking, that is, a particular set of words with a particular set of sounds, is not equal to the meaning — TheGreatArcanum

I wasn't saying "mutually exclusive" either. Meaning is a mental event. It's a type of thought.

Why does everything have to be transmogrified by human imagination into an ism, do we do this to convince ourselves of an intellect we don't actually possess?

The "ism" is just a name representing the views in question. It's easier to say "Jaws" than it is to explain all of the characters, the whole plot, etc. every time.

Which makes it possible for someone to refer to a topic in general terms without either knowing or understanding specifics.

wasn't saying "mutually exclusive" either. Meaning is a mental event. It's a type of thought. — Terrapin Station

either meaning and thought are mutually exclusive, which is impossible, meaning is a subset of thought, in which case, the existence of the thought precedes the existence of the meaning of the thought in time. For example, the meaning of the word “horse” preceded the existence of the word “horse,” in time. Now, I could make up a word or sentence in real time like “Terrapin is a duncerou” and the meaning of the word would come after the word, but if it is true that you’re a duncerou, it was true that you were a duncerou before I made up the word to point at it; meaning that meaning is contained within the words and the words not contained within meaning only when the words are made up and don’t stand for a verifiable truth but an imaginary falsehood, in which case those words have no valuable meaning and for all intents and purposes words are conceptually contained in their meaning, and meanings precede words.

Sure, that's possible, but I don't know how we'd avoid that wholesale, as every word we use represents something someone might be unfamiliar with or something they might not understand very well. Maybe we can get the folks who use words anyway to just stop talking. ;-)

meaning is a subset of thought, in which case, the existence of the thought precedes the existence of the meaning of the thought in time, — TheGreatArcanum

Meaning is a subset of thought. In other words, not all thoughts are meaning, but some are. The existence of the thought in question (the thought that is meaning) doesn't precede the existence of the thought in question in time. (And that should be pretty obvious. Your comment shows, however, that you're having a problem understanding the idea that meaning is (identical to) a mental event, a specific (type of) thought.)

so the meaning of the word “horse” which means, ‘that’ animal existing in the world, came after the existence of the word “horse”? That means that the existence of the horse itself came into being after the word “horse,” and that horses magically popped into existence when we created a word for them? I think you’re confused. your position holds that words create things magically out of thin air. how is it that you can possibly hold this position and believe it to be true?

so the meaning of the word “horse” which means, ‘that’ animal existing in the world, — TheGreatArcanum

Meaning isn't an object external to us. Meaning is the act (or event) of making mental associations.

If I'm saying that meaning is identical to a mental event, you wouldn't respond with "so the meaning of the word 'horse' which means, 'that' animal existing in the world" unless you either don't understand or you're ignoring the view that I had just expressed.

...what we're talking about can be identical. — Terrapin Station

Incoherence anyone?

Meaning is the act (or event) of making mental associations. — Terrapin Station

Ah. You're learning... almost. Thinking/believing is the act. Meaning is the result.

Incoherence anyone? — creativesoul

We can be both referring to A (or P or whatever) at time T1.

Ah. You're learning... almost. — creativesoul

It's the same view I've had for decades. If it seems like I'm "learning" your view must be evolving.

nothing is identical through time. — Terrapin Station

...what we're talking about can be identical.
— Terrapin Station

Incoherence anyone? — creativesoul

:lol: :lol: :lol:

@TheGreatArcanum, perhaps essentialism, no?

"We can be both referring to A (or P or whatever) at time T1"

As I explained above, "what we're pointing to isn't the same thing as our pointing."

We can both point at A (or P) at time T1. That's what we're pointing to. A at T1 is identical to A at T1, right? It's the same thing, at the same time.

That's not the same thing as our pointing. My comment (made at T2, say) about A at T1 isn't identical to your comment (whether made at T2 or some other time) about A at T1.

Here's a very simple way to look at it:

You and I are both standing in a room. At the same time, we both point to a chair in the corner of the room. We're both pointing at the same chair. The chair I'm pointing to at that moment is identical to the chair you're pointing to at that same moment. That is, the chair at the moment is identical to that chair at that moment. "It is itself."

But my hand isn't identical to your hand, is it? Otherwise you'd better be worried when I go to wipe my ass.

What we're pointing to--the chair (at time T1) isn't the same thing as our pointing (our extended arms and fingers).

Less literally, we could both refer, propositionally, say, to the chair at T1. We're linguistically "pointing at" that chair at time T1. The chair at time T1 is still identical to the chair at time T1.

But our pointing--the prositions we're uttering, aren't identical. Just like my arm isn't the same as your arm.

perhaps essentialism, no? — Wallows

I don't believe that all essences are eternal, so I'm not an essentialist, or a platonist in the truest sense of the word. However, I do believe that the Law of Identity and the Law of Non-Contradiction are eternal, and I've assigned both of these logical identities, ontological values that are eternal as well, which is something that no one else has done. I call this aspect of Existence, "Absolute Objectivity." All essences besides these are not eternal, going back into the past, but are eternal going forwards into the future because of the nature of Existence, all essences are preserved indefinitely after coming into existence.

Incoherence anyone?
— creativesoul

We can be both referring to A (or P or whatever) at time T1. — Terrapin Station

Ever heard of time dilation?

Exactly. Glad someone else was also paying attention.

Yes, the idea of a real T1 is meaningless in view of the fact that the present is not a dimensionless point, but a moment containing both past and future (retention and protention) whose degree of "dilation" cannot be precisely specified since it is context-dependent. The point is that no purported T1 can be altogether without change. @Terrapin Station mistakenly reifies the dimensionless present, which goes towards explaining the incoherence of his position.

Also, more generally, the absurd notion that there is no shared meaning, if accepted, would render all discourse futile, because interlocutors could never be doing anything other than talking past one another. A lamentably useless position to hold!

Also, more generally, the absurd notion that there is no shared meaning, if accepted, would render all discourse futile, because interlocutors could never be doing anything other than talking past one another. A lamentably useless position to hold! — Janus

I would concur. Good point on the matter of dilation as well.

What flavour of Nominalism do you find attractive? I am assuming that you don’t regard it as a doctrine to live by merely a useful perspective you have inclinations toward.

What flavour of Nominalism do you find attractive? I am assuming that you don’t regard it as a doctrine to live by merely a useful perspective you have inclinations toward. — I like sushi

It's not that I find it attractive, or a useful perspective or anything.

It's what the world happens to be like. My like or dislike of that is irrelevant. It's factually what the world is like, even if I wish it weren't like that, even if I think it would be better or more useful, etc. for it to be some other way.

Re the variety of positions under nominalism and what I think is the case with respect to them:
* There are no real (that is, extramental) abstracts
* Types/universals are concepts (that is, ways of thinking about particulars) (this is basically the conceptualist version of nominalism)
* Things are not identical through time (we think of them that way as an abstraction)
* Properties are real but they're unique particulars
* My view has some similarities to resemblance and trope nominalism, as I think that things are objectively more or less similar to each other while never being identical to each other as long as they're numerically distinct.

Yes, the idea of a real T1 is meaningless in view of the fact that the present is not a dimensionless point, but a moment containing both past and future (retention and protention) whose degree of "dilation" cannot be precisely specified since it is context-dependent. The point is that no purported T1 can be altogether without change. Terrapin Station mistakenly reifies the dimensionless present, which goes towards explaining the incoherence of his position. — Janus

You should probably learn the details of my view first.

At any rate, say that T1 is a span rather than a point. (If you would been honest enough to think that one should know another's view prior to critiquing it--know it at least well enough that you could paraphrase it successfully in the opinion of the person in question--you would have known that I don't buy any real points, period.)

The span in question would be identical to the span in question, no?

Ever heard of time dilation? — creativesoul

We're can't refer to something in its own frame of reference? Again, you seem to not be able to grok the difference between our pointing and what we're pointing to. Time dilation would be relevant to our pointing, no?

if accepted, would render all discourse futile, because interlocutors could never be doing anything other than talking past one another. — Janus

Oh no, I dread to think what that would be like... If only there were some kind of Internet forum where that happened literally all the time... It could act as a warning to avoid such a horror at all costs!

The point is that there is no definite limit on any span; which means that an entity is always itself; and so we can indeed speak of the same entity at different times, because the times' being different is itself arbitrary as soon as you get away from the precise notion of a point instant.