↪S
"Ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things."
I assume it wouldnt surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed. — Joshs

If only we could figure out exactly what it's supposed to have to do with that stuff. :joke:

" If only we could figure out exactly what it's supposed to have to do with that stuff."

I'm happy to give my take on it, but don't know if I'm up for the massive headaches and hostility it will trigger.

"Ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things."
I assume it wouldn't surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed. — Joshs

It would surprise me, in a sense, because I don't really venture into philosophy of mathematics or contemporary philosophy. But from what I know, and from my point of view, the two seem fundamentally different in rather obvious ways.

But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it.

“....For the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology. It is true that moral laws (...) are spoken of in the general moral philosophy. But this is no objection, for in this respect also the authors of that science** remain true to their idea of it; they do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the empirical motives which the understanding raises to general conceptions merely by comparison of experiences; but, without noticing the difference of their sources, and looking on them all as homogeneous, they consider only their greater or less amount. It is in this way they frame their notion of obligation, which, though anything but moral, is all that can be attained in a philosophy**** which passes no judgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts, whether they are a priori, or only a posteriori....”
(**psychologists, anthropologists, moral sentimentalists in general, re: Hume, THN, 1738)
(****psychology was still an informal philosophical doctrine at the time of this writing)

there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it. — S

This should be on the home page. Or better still, the site strap line -

"The Philosophy Forum - there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it"

You’re struggling with it because you can’t see how arbitrarily taking a life could possibly be good, or that even assigning a truth value to a moral proposition which says taking a life could possibly be good. The best way to get over that struggle is to become the object of some other moral agent believing it is true that taking a life is good. Being that object doesn’t help you understand how someone could believe it, but you certainly will be forced to know they do. — Mww

Tried, can't get there. Understand some do, I just still get to they are objectively false.

I don’t struggle with it because I have determined it couldn’t possibly be good in fact and the proposition that contains it is morally bankrupt. It is my own morality with which I concern myself, and from there, I don’t care how someone can come to believe something I find abhorrent. You, on the other hand, are on your own. This is subjective relativism writ large and how it works is entirely metaphysical. How it originates in the beginning, and how it manifests in the end, is something else indeed, for these are both empirically conditioned. Morality itself is in the middle. — Mww

Understand, disagree. Not with the explanation, but that such a rationalization has any meaning in any evaluation of a truth.

They seem so, but can be reconciled a priori by means of pure reason. It is these reconciliations from which distinct forms of morality arise, and makes objective morality as a doctrine, impossible.

Notice also, the things we agree on are not the root of the moral debate, but rather it is the things we disagree on. If the former is significantly greater than the latter, we have an ethical community. Where the latter does come to the fore, we have administrative justice to handle the disagreement. Morality, again, in the middle, describes how the differences obtain. — Mww

Just can't get to point where I see this type of resoning has value


If we go down this path we need to allow for such things as relative truth and subjective truth.

This should be on the home page. Or better still, the site strap line -

"The Philosophy Forum - there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it" — Isaac

Agreed. Cicero would've approved, I reckon. And maybe, "Anything that can be said at all can be said clearly" - Wittgenstein.

Quoting from your bible again? I know, I know, cat's got your tongue. You are trying to "rise above" one such as me, it seems. Giving me the cold shoulder.

we need to allow for such things as relative truth and subjective truth. — Rank Amateur

Either that, or condense it into subjective relative truth. That way, truth meets its logical criterion of a sound conclusion but with different premises. I mean, in effect, we’re doing that very thing right here. We agree the leaders of the Crusades understood their sojourns to save Jerusalem were moral.....but we wouldn’t do it in a million years. We might notwithstanding all that, disagree on how the Crusaders came by their moral justifications from which their actions developed.

You know, truth, per se, really doesn’t have much to do with a philosophical moral system. I use logical truth to signify how it is possible to arrive at non-contradictory subject/predicate propositions, which are required for explaining why one morally acts the way he does under the auspices of a particular moral theory. Truth explains how the theory works, but doesn’t enter into the moral actions themselves.

What do you think morality actually is? What can you reduce it to?

Really, this is just another chat room and the same people are here. It’s a shame.

Really, this is just another chat room and the same people are here. It’s a shame. — Brett

No one is forcing you to be here. There are other "chat rooms", you know. The internet is a big place. If we do not meet your approval, then what's stopping you from discussing this with others?

"But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it."

Maybe absurd, or maybe crucial to any truly fundamental understanding of the basis of mathematics and its relation to both science and ethics. Given your professed ignorance of philosophy, at this point open minded curiosity might be a more adaptive approach than cynicism.

"But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it."

Maybe absurd, or maybe crucial to any truly fundamental understanding of the basis of mathematics and its relation to both science and ethics. Given your professed ignorance of philosophy, at this point open minded curiosity might be a more adaptive approach than cynicism. — Joshs

I did not profess an ignorance of philosophy (in general). I actually know quite a bit about the subject. Way more than the average person. I once had a friend who had just qualified from spending years studying philosophy at university who said that I knew more about it than him. I have never been to university, or college.

But sure, I have no qualms in being open about the areas in philosophy of which I am largely ignorant, and I can be open-minded and curious whilst having cynical suspicions which might or might not be confirmed.

And the quote is true. Not literally of course, but I'm sure you get that.

It may not even be cynical to point to the absurdity of some contemporary philosophy, especially since its being absurd doesn't mean that it's not true.

It may not even be cynical to point to the absurdity of some contemporary philosophy, especially since its being absurd doesn't mean that it's not true. — Joshs

Yes, it doesn't mean that in the looser sense. But it can often be an indication of a problem of some sort. It makes sense to be cautious.

Either that, or condense it into subjective relative truth. That way, truth meets its logical criterion of a sound conclusion but with different premises. I mean, in effect, we’re doing that very thing right here. We agree the leaders of the Crusades understood their sojourns to save Jerusalem were moral.....but we wouldn’t do it in a million years. We might notwithstanding all that, disagree on how the Crusaders came by their moral justifications from which their actions developed.

You know, truth, per se, really doesn’t have much to do with a philosophical moral system. I use logical truth to signify how it is possible to arrive at non-contradictory subject/predicate propositions, which are required for explaining why one morally acts the way he does under the auspices of a particular moral theory. Truth explains how the theory works, but doesn’t enter into the moral actions themselves.

What do you think morality actually is? What can you reduce it to? — Mww

Understand, so we have to make both truth and morality variable.

Let me test that perception against slavery.

For most, if not all, human history, many cultures have practiced slavery. These views, in my admittedly novice understanding would meet the criteria for a normative relative moral view that slavery was not immoral.

In the case of the United States, and I would think in most others, while the prevailing or controlling moral view viewed slavery as moral, others in the same culture held a different moral view that slavery was immoral.

So here are the available moral options as I see them for this actual situation.

1. Both truth and morality are culturally relative:

The slave holders have the majority cultural belief and therefore their moral view that slavery is not immoral is the correct moral view, and then the same people held the incorrect immoral view when the majority of the culture changed

The abolitionists while not the cultural majority at this time, had the incorrect moral view that slavery was immoral, until the cultural majority view changed, and then they had the correct moral view.

2. Some truths and moral judgments are not culturally relative they are to large measure objectively true regardless of situation or culture or individual views.

Slavery was always immoral, and the slave holders were always wrong and the abolitionists were always right.

3. The is no truth or moral statement that you can say about slavery

Slavery just is. It is neither true nor false that it is good or bad. There is no moral judgement anyone can make about slavery - it just is.

4. The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement.

All of us just make our own judgement - each as valid as the other.

5. Others I can't think of.

Of course my view is only 2 makes any practical sense to me, it is always true that slavery is wrong, and enslaving people is immoral.

How do the other options work with truth and morality ?

4. The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement.

All of us just make our own judgement - each as valid as the other. — Rank Amateur

"Valid" in what sense, and from whose perspective?

"Valid" in what sense, and from whose perspective? — ChrisH

Yeah, I've asked him that a few times, but we haven't managed to explore it at all yet.

each as true, real, meaningful, correct, right. I am not tied to the word, it is not specifically special. Just trying to convey the concept, the idea within the limits of language and my limited command of it.

I know definitions are often important, don’t think this is the case here. If you are going down that road lMO you are being semantic.

#4.

The morality or immorality of any situation is a product of individual judgement, and all individual moral judgements are equally valid, iff confined to each of those same individual perspectives.

"Valid" in what sense, and from whose perspective? — ChrisH

Answering this for myself: valid in the sense of being valid, and from the "perspective" of what being valid is and entails, i.e., the rules and their consequences.

The only ways I know of to reconcile differences in thinking on matters in contention are either force or through reason. Force isn't really reconciliation. That leaves reason. Opposing parties, assuming they act in good will, seek principles they agree on and that might bear on the issues. Finding same, they investigate how in fact they do bear. Then they see what in the way of reason follows.

Reason thus used ought to yield a range of possibilities at least tentatively agreed to by the opposed parties, probably neither being completely satisfied, but both presumably acknowledging and placing appropriate value in the respective differences. Of course lots of folks do not act in such good will. And some positions are irreconcilable. Slavers in the antebellum South in the US generally denied the humanity of their slaves and refused to acknowledge they possessed human value as human beings, essentially for money, an atrocious and evil reason. And it was the plan of and intention of those to make slavery legal in all of the US forever. And so the Civil War.

Why evil and atrocious? Because Southern "reasoning" was essentially unreasonable, and not based in reason, but greed.

each as true, real, meaningful, correct, right. — Rank Amateur

But this is begging the question (it assumes as fact the very thing that's in dispute).

That "individual [moral] judgements" are the kinds of things that can be "true" or "correct" is what, I thought, was in question here.

and all individual moral judgments are equally valid, iff confined to each of those same individual perspectives. — Mww

I think you're saying that a unique X, X = (implicitly) an individual moral judgment on a (unique) individual perspective, is, if called an individual moral judgment, just is an individual moral judgment as just defined. That is, you seem to have bounded the thing to render it a tautology, for which in this discussion I cannot find any use.

Maybe I'm wrong - did you mean something else?

Answering this for myself: valid in the sense of being valid, and from the "perspective" of what being valid is and entails, i.e., the rules and their consequences. — tim wood

Sorry, but I'm struggling to make sense of this.

(it assumes as fact the very thing that's in dispute). — ChrisH

Care in referring to facts. What fact, what kind of fact, is it that you suppose assumed though in question?

If by fact you mean that so-an-so holds such a view (and they do) then no problem. If you're referring to something - anything - else, then problem.

If you mean that a true proposition is true, then it's just true. Its truth is not a fact. That a person agrees or does not not agree would be a fact about that person. And a statement of that fact would be true, or not, as it is true, or not.

I didn't offer any conclusion - i offered different moral view options for a specific situation. I can't beg the questions if there is no conclusion to beg.

what I am trying to say is -

if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, than the judgement of the slave owner and the abolitionist are in no way superior, better, more correct ( fill in a word you like) to each other - they are just individual moral judgments that are different.

Struggle away. Perhaps start by asking yourself if you really know what "valid" means. If validity itself is in question, then perhaps a retreat to an underlying sense or more fundamental validity or understanding. My point is that oppositions are in theory reconcilable by appeal to shared fundamental beliefs. They may have to be articulated and the text worked out. Reason both is the presumed framework and provides the tools. Doesn't always work, and thus to war. But I'm satisfied that probably all wars are the caused by bad actors on at least one side of the question.

if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, — Rank Amateur

A very big "if."

Preface any proposition with an if and then grant it and you can prove anything you like. But that is actually just validity. You still need truth.

if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, than the judgem noent of the slave owner and the abolitionist are in no way superior, better, more correct ( fill in a word you like) — Rank Amateur

If you mean there's no non-subjective standard by which to assess disparate moral judgements, then yes, you're right. But it does not follow from this that disparate moral judgements are all seen, in any sense, as 'equally valid' by any single individual.

Nice catch; it is indeed a tautology. And tautologies are the simplest versions of logical truth. If there is truth required in morality, a binding of it, so to speak, it should be as simple as possible in order to offset the ambiguity and indefiniteness of cultural anthropology or empirical psychology, which has no bearing on the origins of moral philosophy at all, but merely denotes practical examples of it.

The tautological reduction is useful to support the choice of #4, and that’s all it was supposed to do.