Look, I'm not typing the same stuff over and over to just have you ignore a bunch of stuff I say, which has happened in a few posts. So one thing at a time:

Right. The primitives do the work — darthbarracuda

The existents "do the work." I don't know if existents are "primitives" in your view. I don't call them that. Existents have properties, or rather, they ARE properties. It's what materials/structures/processes are like. Those properties, which are identical to the materials/structures/processes are not numerically identical in two different things.

Those properties, which are identical to the materials/structures/processes are not numerically identical in two different things. — Terrapin Station

And this, I contend, it impossible to maintain if you also maintain that they are similar in some respects, for numerical identity between properties is necessary for a similarity to be. I don't understand how you go about explaining why and how things are able to be identified as being a certain universal concept, such as red, square, 1.346 g, etc, without believing that the reason we have these concepts in the first place is that the objects they correspond to have a certain ontological structure. How do we identify some two things as being red if they aren't both red, i.e. being a certain way, a duplicative way?

And this, I contend, it impossible to maintain if you also maintain that they are similar in some respects, for numerical identity between properties is necessary for a similarity to be. — darthbarracuda

What do you take to be an argument for that? (And I mean an argument in the sense of premises leading to a conclusion, where the conclusion is logically valid and you believe the argument to be sound.)

Or, if not that, at least give a more fleshed-out, heuristic argument for it, or what you take to be empirical evidence for it or whatever you think is a good support of that claim.

Russell said it better than I could.

When we identify two things as being of a certain quality, they are of a certain quality, that is, a numerically-distinct and unitary quality. One quality. The basis of adjectives.

Without universals, we're left with two white objects with no way to explain why they are white, or how we come to know that they are both white. It contradicts even our own language: the two things are white. They are under the category of "white". Members of the category are such because they instantiate a universal. Without universals there's no reason to be in a category. There's no reason why x is a square and y is a circle, or why they appear to be different. Difference requires a difference in composition which can only be done by property differences. Without universals, there is no way to differentiate between a white object and a black object, a square object or a circle object.

Okay, but at least two times above I gave my account of what "identity" is in that sense. You didn't comment on that. That's what I meant about not typing too much. Part of a fuller response would be explaining again what I think is going on with "identity" in that sense, but I already explained it twice without any sort of direct response from you whatsoever about it. So why explain it again?

It kind of seems like you must not be understanding my arguments, so you're instead just repeating with slightly different wording the party line, broad supports for universals, figuring that surely they must address what I'm saying without having to understand my comments and directly respond to them (whether you agree or disagree, specifically why you disagree if you do, etc.).

It's hard to consider something that doesn't make sense, sorry. You said that existents are properties, i.e. a bundle theory of objects. But this does not address the theory of universals at all, for it's a substratum/composition question. You argued that things are similar because they have some sort of putative relationship to each other that makes them similar (as I understood extensionality), without explaining why these things have these relationships in the first place. It's completely arbitrary.

In the example you give, for example, % one has a circle to the left of a slanted line as does %, — Terrapin Station

SInce both %s have a circle to the left of a slanted line, they both have circles, they both have slanted lines, and they both have a relationship between the circle and slanted lines. You just described universals.

Without universals, we're left with two white objects with no way to explain why they are white, or how we come to know that they are both white. It contradicts even our own language: the two things are white. They are under the category of "white". Members of the category are such because they instantiate a universal. Without universals there's no reason to be in a category. There's no reason why x is a square and y is a circle, or why they appear to be different. Difference requires a difference in composition which can only be done by property differences. Without universals, there is no way to differentiate between a white object and a black object, a square object or a circle object. — darthbarracuda

This is another illustration of the paradoxes that arise within traditional reductionist notions of existence. We know that both universals and individuals must be "real", and yet there is no way to show that using a reductionist ontology. The two halves of the deal always seem to wind up dualistically divided.

And so we have nominalism wanting to say that universals are just ideas, and not real. Then we have the Platonic response to that of idealism, which says well OK, but that just means the real reality is the realm where the perfect ideas have their eternal existence.

A systems approach to ontology looks at it differently in talking instead about reality as a process. Now universals become constraints - emergent limitations that are real enough to go out and physically measure. Likewise, individuals become instead acts of individuation. They are what the prevailing constraints actually produce in terms of local events. And so, in being now merely events, individuals are rather less substantially "real" than the entities or objects imagined by conventional reductionism.

Thus the reductionist sense of paradox is eased from both sides. Universals become more obviously real - we can physically measure their presence in terms of historically developed constraints. While individuals now become matchingly less real - they exist only by virtue of some constraining context which forms them.

So if we are talking about a white thing - a thing that partakes in the property of "whiteness" - a systems view is that the real question here is "Is the thing white enough?". Whiteness is not some perfect absolute but instead an act of individuation where possibility has been constrained to a degree where any vagueness, any further variation, doesn't, on the whole, matter.

And this individuation is physically measurable in terms of a dichotomy. To be white can be reciprocally defined as to be not not-white, or not-black. So we can claim whiteness by measuring the lack of its "other" - a state of constraint sufficient to exclude any meaningful degree of blackness.

So conventional ontology is usefully simple - it treats the world as a collection of existents, a state of affairs, a collection of formed objects that thus only partake in predicate type logic arrangements.

But a holistic ontology talks instead about such existence as a state of self-regulating persistence. The whole is forming its parts - the very parts needed to compose that formative whole. Logically, it is a closed reciprocal deal where universals cause individuation and individuation contributes to there being the steady flow of particular events that results in the emergence of the regularities we call universals.

It is a feedback, cybernetic, or dynamical way of looking at things - normal in science, but apparently still alien in philosophy.

I don't really see how your process system view solves the riddle. Numbers seem to be digital: you have only a discrete amount of objects in a given set. Sure you can break the objects up, start talking in terms of fractions, change your positional number system, etc. But at the end of the day there's still only a certain amount of objects in a certain domain.

So if we are talking about a white thing - a thing that partakes in the property of "whiteness" - a systems view is that the real question here is "Is the thing white enough?". — apokrisis

This only means that there has to be a sufficient amount of qualities to be called "white" - Wittgenstein's family resemblance all over again. Things overlap. A is similar to B, but not similar to C. B is similar to both A and C. They aren't identical but neither are they totally different. They share qualities, i.e. universals

So conventional ontology is usefully simple - it treats the world as a collection of existents, a state of affairs, a collection of formed objects that thus only partake in predicate type logic arrangements.

But a holistic ontology talks instead about such existence as a state of self-regulating persistence. The whole is forming its parts - the very parts needed to compose that formative whole. Logically, it is a closed reciprocal deal where universals cause individuation and individuation contributes to there being the steady flow of particular events that results in the emergence of the regularities we call universals. — apokrisis

You deny conventional ontology yet retain predication by talking about a state of self-regulating persistence, wholes and parts\, etc. You're still referring to these as something that fills the subject in a predicative statement. These subjects have properties in themselves because they are of a certain state: a state is vague when it has no "crisp" as you like to say properties - yet vagueness would be a property itself. Any sort of adjective is going to either refer to a specific property or a collection of properties abstracted into a unified concept.

Numbers seem to be digital: you have only a discrete amount of objects in a given set — darthbarracuda

Huh? Isn't the number line continuous ... as an infinity of infinitesimals?

If you are talking about set theory, then you are talking about a conception of things that builds in the very atomism I have disputed. So to wheel it out is not proof of anything except, yes, that is what a reductionist model of reality looks like. And we all know that mathematically that way of thinking winds up in paradox.

They aren't identical but neither are they totally different. They share qualities, i.e. universals — darthbarracuda

Or what they share is a state of individuation sufficient to achieve the general purpose of some actual boundary condition. They are X enough (in being sufficiently, self-groundingly, not not-X).

You deny conventional ontology yet retain predication by talking about a state of self-regulating persistence, wholes and parts. — darthbarracuda

As usual, I use language I hope might be familiar to you. But the relation of wholes and parts is then different - reciprocal - as I go on to explain. And then as I also say, we can still use a logic of predication as our rough and ready way of thinking about things.

We exist in a highly individuated state of being as a result of our rather particular thermal scale. We sit on a planet that orbits a star in the middle of a void which is nothing but a radiation bath 2.7 degrees above absolute zero. So a classical, reductionist, object-orientated approach to reality modelling can take a lot for granted.

However we also know that it is only a very particular and unrepresentative view of the cosmic reality.

These subjects have properties in themselves because they are of a certain state: a state is vague when it has no "crisp" as you like to say properties - yet vagueness would be a property itself. Any sort of adjective is going to either refer to a specific property or a collection of properties abstracted into a unified concept. — darthbarracuda

You just keep pointing out properties of our habits of language, not things we have to believe of reality itself.

Sure, we can give names to even the unspeakable. We can talk about "everything", "nothing", "vagueness", "God", "matter", or anything we like.

But if we pay close enough attention, we will see the same organic logic at play behind the names we feel most metaphysically confident about. Something like vagueness can be considered a measurably real property of the whole of existence - a viable predicate or act of individuation - because it is understood as being counterfactual to some "other", namely the crisp or definite.

So vagueness is not-not vagueness. Or in other words, it is at the other end of the spectrum, as distant as it is physically possible to get, from the crisp.

Your confusion may stem from the fact that we are also - through language - quite free to predicate the contingent or accidental. A heap might "actually" have 101 grains of wheat and not 102. But who cares about that level of individuation? (And in the systems view, you have to have an answer to that - you have to show there is some reason to care.)

Huh? Isn't the number line continuous ... as an infinity of infinitesimals? — apokrisis

In bowl 1 you have 3 oranges. In bowl 2 you have 4 oranges. It is an objective fact that there are 2 bowls and 7 oranges, and an objective fact that the two bowl's contents are different in virtue of the discrete amount of oranges in them.

Properties don't just disappear just because they come from a more general source. The number 3 is still the number 3.

Or what they share is a state of individuation sufficient to achieve the general purpose of some actual boundary condition. They are X enough (in being sufficiently, self-groundingly, not not-X). — apokrisis

Wittgenstein all over again, man. You're talking about classes of things. But classes are identified by their essential properties. The properties that you must have to be an x, or, in the case of Wittgenstein, the properties you must have to be similar to a sufficiently large amount of objects that are already seen as a set.

We exist in a highly individuated state of being as a result of our rather particular thermal scale. We sit on a planet that orbits a star in the middle of a void which is nothing but a radiation bath 2.7 degrees above absolute zero. So a classical, reductionist, object-orientated approach to reality modelling can take a lot for granted. — apokrisis

But you're assuming that properties are like those you see on your office desk. When really there shouldn't be any kind of limit like that. 2.7 degrees above absolute zero is a property. We can identify it. Being a billion miles away is a property. We can predicate it. Being general is a property. We can understand what it means to be general.

Furthermore objects need not be limited to the boring office desk pens, papers, coffee mugs and staplers.

So vagueness is not-not vagueness. Or in other words, it is at the other end of the spectrum, as distant as it is physically possible to get, from the crisp. — apokrisis

At what point do properties no longer classify as properties? Properties (universals) are just the way things are. If something is general, say, the universe, the the universe is general. It is in a state. The state of affairs is always crisp. The objects and their parasitic properties within need not be.

But who cares about that level of individuation? (And in the systems view, you have to have an answer to that - you have to show there is some reason to care.) — apokrisis

Our disinterest in something doesn't make it not-true. You're more focused on pragmatics, I'm more focused on what's actually true in the correspondence sense. Not-caring about something doesn't make it go away.

In bowl 1 you have 3 oranges. In bowl 2 you have 4 oranges. It is an objective fact that there are 2 bowls and 7 oranges, and an objective fact that the two bowl's contents are different in virtue of the discrete amount of oranges in them.

Properties don't just disappear just because they come from a more general source. The number 3 is still the number 3. — darthbarracuda

This concreteness of thought is now beyond a joke. You know all this about the oranges because you have ... counted them again right now?

You're talking about classes of things. But classes are identified by their essential properties. — darthbarracuda

Or classes of things are produced by acts of constraint. That's why a better term for them is family resemblances. They only have to be judged alike enough to the degree there is person (or a system) that cares.

Look! One of your oranges is a tangelo! Crikey, what now? Does the number three no longer exist?

Furthermore objects need not be limited to the boring office desk pens, papers, coffee mugs and staplers. — darthbarracuda

Yep, talk is cheap. We can say what we like.

But for "object" to be a meaningful term in a metaphysical discussion, it needs the reciprocal context of that which is its "other".

So in talking about objects, what are you thinking are their exact opposite? And having spoken that name, do you now still feel you have mentioned everything that is the case ontologically?

Our disinterest in something doesn't make it not-true. You're more focused on pragmatics, I'm more focused on what's actually true in the correspondence sense. Not-caring about something doesn't make it go away. — darthbarracuda

You are stuck in your realism which is a dualist subjectivism - naive realism in other words. There just isn't a problem for you in dividing mind and world, observer and observables, in brute and unaccounted-for fashion.

The habit is so engrained that you can't even realise it is your way of thought.

Pragmatism (of the Peircean kind) is all about bridging that gap by granting the ability to care to the whole of nature - even if we then wind up with "the Universe" which in fact seems to care about very little beyond arriving at its Heat Death. Bastard!

Look! One of your oranges is a tangelo! Crikey, what now? Does the number three no longer exist? — apokrisis

:-}

But for "object" to be a meaningful term in a metaphysical discussion, it needs the reciprocal context of that which is its "other". — apokrisis

Not necessarily. Being-identical-to, existence, etc are no reciprocating properties. You can't have the property of non-existence...otherwise you'd exist. You can't be not-identical to yourself...otherwise you wouldn't even be.

You are stuck in your realism which is a dualist subjectivism - naive realism in other words. There just isn't a problem for you in dividing mind and world, observer and observables, in brute and unaccounted-for fashion. — apokrisis

How? You always tell other people they're dualists and that there's a problem with this but then never explain why it's problematic, only affirm that your position is right. Something something semiotics.

Pragmatism (of the Peircean kind) is all about bridging that gap by granting the ability to care to the whole of nature - even if we then wind up with "the Universe" which in fact seems to care about very little beyond arriving at its Heat Death. Bastard! — apokrisis

I might accuse you for being dualistic by separating the rest of the world from the agents that are part of the world. "The Universe doesn't care"...it does care in certain contexts when we're talking about sentients that are manifested by the Universe. Unless you want to claim that the manifest image is actually the scientific image.

Not necessarily. Being-identical-to, existence, etc are no reciprocating properties. You can't have the property of non-existence...otherwise you'd exist. You can't be not-identical to yourself...otherwise you wouldn't even be. — darthbarracuda

You kind of wandered away from the point.

What is the formal antithesis of "object"? What is its opposite in the mutually exclusive/jointly exhaustive fashion the LEM demands?

You always tell other people they're dualists and that there's a problem with this but then never explain why it's problematic, — darthbarracuda

If you are happy to defend dualism as ontology, be my guest. If you don't believe it problematic to have two entirely separate kinds of reality, with no way to account for their connection, then probably pretty much nothing is ever going to trouble you when it comes to metaphysics.

I might accuse you for being dualistic by separating the rest of the world from the agents that are part of the world. "The Universe doesn't care"...it does care in certain contexts when we're talking about sentients that are manifested by the Universe. Unless you want to claim that the manifest image is actually the scientific image. — darthbarracuda

Couldn't really follow that.

Complexity science and morality, especially if I get to mix the two....

For the last several years I've been trying to piece together a full blown "morality" by describing morality first as an emergent strategy or code of conduct (usually) designed for the mutual benefit of human beings, with an emphasis on how environment and circumstances affect changing pragmatic moral prescriptions. Right now my main objective is to try and better understand the scope and shape that moral landscapes take (think "your next best move in chess") given variations in environment and circumstance. A notable insight I've gleaned so far is that cooperative morality (perhaps the only relevant kind) can be evaporated via circumstance, especially when mutual survival or ability to thrive between human beings is inherently at odds. Resource scarcity, for instance, can reduce or eliminate the possibility of a mutually beneficial strategy between humans being held. If the odds of surviving or avoiding some harm are far better, or only possible, through acting in one's own interest even while it is against the interests of some or all others, then in this sense no mutually beneficial strategy can be held.

The prison environment in America (and many other countries) is a fascinating example of how environment can shape morality and what humans consider to be necessary, justified, or even praiseworthy behavior. As a new inmate enters some jail and prison environments, they are already over-crowded and overwhelmed by an internally violent pecking order like social structure. In some of these environments, you will be expected to fight your new cellmates, one by one, in order to establish your place in the pecking order and (hopefully) demonstrate that you are not an easy target. If you opt out, you will be viewed as a target for other people to use to demonstrate their own position and reputation. People will extort your commissary through violence and even your family by extension (for example, "have your family smuggle in narcotics or suffer daily attacks"). When an otherwise "moral" person is placed into this environment, short of being able to change the entire system, they can be forced to themselves become violent and aggressive, for their own protection. As gangs form, similar events play out on larger scales, where initially a gang may form for mutual protection, but like any individual in that environment must maintain it's reputation as powerful or else it will become an open target to the rest of the prison population.

Some would say that "morality" does not exist in such a place, that it cannot exist. And I would agree with them in the sense that the contemporary western morality we may share cannot exist there, but I think rather a different kind of morality exists due to the circumstances and environment that strain the feasibility of our higher moral virtues and standards in favor of virtues and standards we might consider barbaric. Rather than holding to one's own per-conceived moral notions about violence and transgression, this environment will force you to adapt to it's own. Trying to coherently conceptualize the differences in these inherent emergent norms as a mechanism of practice and production seems to provide me with unending complexity, which is a wonderful recipe for putting one's self to sleep!