• Gary M Washburn
    Putting down Sartre is as popular a sport as always, it seemve you read his two works on 'imagination'? You see, he caught-up Husserl (and he was more a student of Husserl than Heidegger) in the 'intentional act'. In his later work, albeit strewn throughout with the angst of his times, he graphically draws our attention to the infernal isolation of the methods and practices of his time, and ours. You cannot 'deconstruct' a mistake. All we can do is exacerbate it. Viva la 'differance'? How do we break the isolation? At least Existentialism brings our attention to the issue. Sartre offers no solution, he is committed to the stand that it would be dishonest to do so, and we should admire him for that honesty, which we cannot say for Heidegger. But there is a solution. A solution so real that we stumble through it even in the most intensive commitment to deny it. That is, there are changes in the certitude of our presumptions even as we pursue an effort to secure them. Those changes are called emotions. They do not secure anything as true or real, but they do evoke the terms necessary to pretend we can be sure about what we deem true and real. It is as much a mistake to embrace the flow of that evocative change as it is to pretend it is impertinent. But these two mistakes divide and yet encompass philosophy today. The truer and realer dynamic is that, by expressing who each of us is, and by posing real variations to the meaning of the terms we otherwise think we share, the personal character of each one of us becomes the origin of the terms the other employs to deny the reality and pertinence of the changes that come to those terms, through each of us. The isolation is the myth, that we need each other, and need each other free from each other, is what is real. It is the defeat switch to the isolation both science and myth would hang around our necks.
  • Gary M Washburn
    Well, perhaps I seem impertinent. When others bring up authors I become impatient. Why do so many philosophy discussions hinge on the character of authors of texts? In physics, there is lots of interest in who Newton was, but we do not go on endlessly about the guy's psychic makeup in an effort to understand his three laws of motion. Why then do we do so in philosophy? There is a reason. Human character is the central theme and meaning and mystery of philosophy, and yet it is fundamental to the conduct of philosophy, especially in a scholastic or academic setting, to repudiate this. But despite this, careerists harp on personalities as if crucial to ideas. I read the same books others read, and maybe then some, but I see little point in lengthy discussions on the ideas of third parties. I prefer what might be called 'table stakes'. Fine, refer to texts and authors if you will, and certainly give credit where it is due, but discussions should be limited to the actual views of the actual interlocutors. Little is to be gained by bashing heads over what is going on in a third party's mind, though this is precisely what those who have or aspire to a career in the field not only deem a worthwhile activity, but the only activity permissible. I had one instructor who made an assertion to his class that he believed an original idea impossible. “The scariest thing in the world,” he said, “is a blank page!” This attitude derives from the very real circumstance that reason cannot proceed without its antecedent terms. It is from this that Heidegger derives the, false, assertion that “Dasein is always already in a world.” And, presumably because this is internally inexplicable, “Dasein is always in a mood.” I wonder if the term 'Dasein' might not have an alternative origin, not “Da-sein”, but “Das-ein”, that one there. It certainly biases us to regarding person as a quantifier. But time is a value or worth, not a quantity. And its most explicit term is the characterology of a necessary yet untenable presumption and prior, a priori, commitment to understanding time as a quantity. Quantum theory is a reduction. It is the derivative, the summation of mathematically defined and ordered probabilities reduced to presumably uniform quantities. What gets forgotten is that the result of this calculus enforces being unrecognized the real energy of the indefinable differences this process obscures. The enigma arises because one set of valid reductive terms results in a detectable event that represents one reality, while another set of equally valid reductive terms results in a contradictory event. Something is clearly going on that exceeds our confidence in the calculation. But what does this might be our misperception of the need for antecedent terms, or for how real and prior to our finding it we assume the world to be. That is, we take the received terms, rational logical or mathematical antecedence, or world, to be inductive. As if the product of the reduction were a justification or discovery of the inductive term antecedent to it. But the evidence, in quantum, cosmology, even logic sociology and political entities or polities, is that the product of the reduction is proof of the untenable character of the induction, and that, therefore, the intimate result of the reduction, the final reductive term, is the inductive term. That is, the changing character of our presuming induction is antecedent to rational reduction. In the world that difference reveals itself as an enigmatic universe, at the extreme scale, however obvious and profane and face-value may seem the macro. But its most explicit term, and language of presumed induction and rigor of reduction, is the characterology of that presumption. That is, it is the character of changing commitment to that presumption each of us is, and the drama of evincing that difference each of us is, through each other, to that presumption that discourse generates. It really is the most personal and intimate interactions amongst us that generates that language of our perceptions of even the most “objective” and “rigorous” calculative terms. The least term of matter is an unquantifiable probability, or mathematical impossibility. But even this has a real outcome, for chaos is only chaos if nothing in it pertains to the quantifier. However, if there are communities in this chaos that oppose each other in any term of that quantification, such that the untenable presumption of a priori induction becomes recognizable, then something real occurs, something as real as the wholesale re-characterization of antecedence. Hawkings thought we could obviate this by pretending that community, his 'string theory', is quantifiable. But the material effect of that infinitesimal chaos is not yet reductive enough for the full explication of the real. A further reductive term is required. That further reductive term, so far as we yet can know, is the human person, and the discourse of persons intimating the characterology, through each other, of the language of our changing confidence in the precedence of the quantifier. Heidegger is committed to Being as the inductive term a priori to reduction, and is therefore, either in his early or late works, not giving us any perspective of a real world.

    Gary's 1st law: The least term of time is all the differing it is.
  • fdrake

    Please break up your post into paragraphs.
  • Gary M Washburn
    I don't think in bullets points. Mind is holism.
  • fdrake

    Mind needs to put more effort into post formatting or mind will soon receive mod attention.
  • Gary M Washburn
    The problem with the Turing Test is that it is rigged in favor of the computer. The problem with Heidegger is that he uses “being” as a cryptic operative quantifier. That is, as the 'unity of the one'. That may be what believers need to think their god is, but it not what person is. Person is the qualifier, the contrary term that defeats the count, both the count of divine oneness and the enumerator the machine 'mind' is. Neither is really what person is. Your ad hominem remark seems to say “get with the program”. If it is impossible to find a person in a computer, it is by no means necessary that we find the person in each other. Something programmatic tends to get in the way. But what sweeps these obstacles away is the contrariety we find in each other to them, even as we find contrariety to each other in that same action. That is why we have to be human to be rational. There is no mechanical mind. There is no divine design. Mind is personal. And finding the contrary term in ourselves through each other is how we find how true this is.
  • waarala
    Heidegger presents here in a nutshell his philosophy (or meditation) (of the correlation of (temporal) Being and Truth (as the "lighting-up of the concealment")):

    "Setzen wir statt "Zeit": Lichtung des Sichverbergens von Anwesen, dann bestimmt sich Sein aus dem Entwurfbereich von Zeit. Dies ergibt sich jedoch nur insofern, als die Lichtung des Sichverbergens ein ihm entsprechendes Denken in seinen brauch nimmt.

    Anwesen (Sein) gehört in die Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit). Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein)."

    Richardson's translation:

    "If instead of "Time" we substitute: the lighting-up of the self-concealing [that is proper to] the process of coming-to-presence, then Being is determined by the scope of Time. This comes about, however, only insofar as the lighting-process of self-concealment assumes unto its want a thought that corresponds to it.

    [The process of] presenc-ing (Being) is inherent in the lighting-up of self-concealment (Time). [The] lighting-up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the process of presenc-ing (Being)."

    William J. Richardson: Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought. Citation is from Heidegger's preface to this book (1962).

  • Gary M Washburn
    Is philosophy a seance? Or, “awaiting upon the lord”? Where does rigorous or critical thinking come into it? Of course, get that little issue out of the way and you can do 'philosophy' by fiat. Which is precisely my buggaboo with all of it, Continental as much as Anglo-American, analytic as much as the inductive aspirations of lexical tradition. Is what 'shows itself by hiding' really there, or there and gone? And, either way, is it somehow unilateral? That is, in whose terms does it come and go, come or go, or come by going? If in our terms, how can it avoid “in-authenticity”? If in its own, what hope have we of anything but a pretended perception of it? Isn't there something fraudulent, here, in Heidegger?
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