• mrnormal5150
    23
    Pragmatic justification: Some linguistic or discursive form or an assumption is pragmatically justified in so far as there is adequate reason to go on engaging in a practice that exhibits that form or that makes that assumption.

    I read somewhere that moral realism is not a required assumption in moral practice. Because of this, it is not pragmatically justified. Because there is a possibility of carrying on with a useful moral practice without making the assumption of moral realism, moral realism is thus not pragmatically justified.

    My QUESTION: Why can't moral realism be pragmatically justified? It seems this all assumes moral realism can only be pragmatically justified if it is a necessary or indispensable assumption in moral practice. I'm not quite understanding why it can't be the case that moral realism IS pragmatically justified even if it is possible for moral practice to not require it as an assumption.
  • John Doe
    242
    I'm fairly confused by your phrasing of the question and the explanation that you give leading up to it but assuming I've understood you correctly then the choice you have to engage either in Practice 1 or in Practice 2 plumps and so you are justified in picking either practice on that ground.
  • mrnormal5150
    23
    yeah thank you for that. I admit my phrasing is quite confusing, and I think it is a product of me being confused. I'm trying to understand something specific but even the author isn't very clear. But your answer was helpful.
    I think what I'm trying to ask is if there is an indispensability criterion built into pragmatic justification? In other words, is some theory need to be the only game in town in order for it to be pragmatically justified? The author I'm reading seems to be saying "yes"...but my intuitions just don't agree with that. I think (though I don't have a good argument for why) it possible that two competing theories can be both pragmatically justified.
  • John Doe
    242
    The author I'm reading seems to be saying "yes"...but my intuitions just don't agree with that. I think (though I don't have a good argument for why) it possible that two competing theories can be both pragmatically justified.mrnormal5150

    This is my intuition as well though I'm definitely not an expert. I know that you said you are unclear on how to argue for your intuition but for what it's worth I do think that there's enough room here that even if you were studying this in a class and the authority figure, like a Professor or TA, held the opposite view it would still be a good idea to write a paper exploring or arguing for your intuitions.
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