• tim wood
    2k
    if some thing is true a priori, is it also necessary?Banno
    You are first asking if something is true. But true in this sense amounts to asking nothing more than if the thing is what it says it is, and I think this may be granted; i.e., that the judgment is a priori. Given that it is a priori, the question then becomes can the judgment be a priori and yet what it avers violate the law of non-contradiction?

    I have scanned the pdf and nowhere therein seen a definition of a priori. Kant seems to assume that we know what a priori is. But there are substantial clues, and that a priori = universally and necessarily so seems solidly justified. So the predication is such that it must be so, universally and necessarily. I do not in this case have a problem with detachment, so it seems correct to say that if it is universally and necessarily so, then it follows that it is necessarily so. Now here we hit a snag. To say that something, as a consequence of something else, is necessarily so, is just to say that given the antecedent, the consequent necessarily follows - just logic 101. But does it imply existential necessity? I kinda think it does not. Logical, but not existential necessity. Which I suppose is to say that if the terms and conditions are instantiated, then it would be existentially necessary. Yes? No?
  • csalisbury
    1.6k
    Yeah but one water's not actually water and my kid, who I happened to name Richard Nixon, isn't actually Richard Nixon, that other guy.

    My sense is that Kripke isn't talking about a priori a posteriori synthetic analytic etc in the same as Kant. So the introduction of him here is a kind of confusion of genres.

    One person (kant) is talking about the structure of cognition and reality. Another (kripke) is talking about how to use names and identity as best we can in order to meaningfully communicate. Both seem like good conversations, but different ones.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.6k
    Yeah but one water's not actually water and my kid, who I happened to name Richard Nixon, isn't actually Richard Nixon.csalisbury

    The water is actually water (that would be an analytic truth :smile: ). Your Richard Nixon named kid is actually Richard Nixon. In all possible worlds, the "water" (of the village) is rigidly fixed to whatever substance they named. The water that is H20 is also rigidly fixed to H20. They are different referents, but they are rigid designators none the less. In all possible worlds, there is some essential thing that water has that if you took it away it would not be water. It is just that there are two waters, just as there are two Richard Nixons. There are several interpretations of Kripke- once is causal essentialism I believe. That would mean, at some point there was a dubbing of Richard Nixon (the president guy) and Richard Nixon (some other Richard Nixon), and that name is fixed to that referent by this original baptism. I believe Banno has a broader interpretation whereby it is simply the fact that we use the name Richard Nixon in some historical fashion that it gets fixed on to a thing.

    My sense is that Kripke isn't talking about a priori a posteriori synthetic analytic etc in the same as Kant. So the introduction of him here is a kind of confusion of genres.csalisbury

    I think that Kripke himself brought up the idea of being connected with Kant in his book. He was the one who said that Kant didn't think of a possibility for necessary a posteriori truths. This I suspect is why Banno is bringing it up perhaps.
  • csalisbury
    1.6k
    [Thought my earlier post was lost so rewrote it, worse. disregard]
  • tim wood
    2k
    And what do you make of the case, in the Kripke text I quoted above, in which we ponder what it might have been like of gold were not yellow?Banno

    In brief, that Kripke is writiing about issues of perception, while Kant is writing about matters of logic.

    If gold were not a yellow metal, because it's really blue, then we're idiots for supposing it yellow, or alternatively that is isn't gold. An acquaintance of mine would say, "if frogs had wings they wouldn't bump their asses on the ground." That is, how is Kripke relevent, not just here, but anywhere?
  • schopenhauer1
    2.6k
    But one 'water' is water and the rest isn't. The same way I can name my kid 'Richard Nixon' but he still isn't actually Richard Nixon.csalisbury

    This is precisely what he Kripke was against- a "descriptivist theory of names". Saying "Richard Nixon is the guy who was president" is not true in all possible worlds, and thus not the basis for the actual person Richard Nixon. Rather, the proper name is rigidly fixed at some point when he was named Richard Nixon and used continuously by other people after that.

    My impression is that Kant is talking about the structure of cognition and the form of reality. And that Kripke is talking about rules about identity - about the relations of things and names - that one must follow to do science and to have meaningful discussion.

    It seems to me that to combine the two, without a big big qualifying and explanatory preface, is to mix genres and to generate confusion.
    csalisbury

    I agree that Kripke definitely seems to veer clear of metaphysics but as far as truth claims, it does intersect. However, I do think there could be different terminologies going on that may make it incommensurable, despite his claim that it does have to do with Kant. It would be obviously in some kind of "What would Kant say if he was around.." kind of way as obviously Kant can't speak for himself, so it is interpretations of Kant as applied to more contemporary philosophy.
  • csalisbury
    1.6k
    The water is actually water (that would be an analytic truth :smile: ). Your Richard Nixon named kid is actually Richard Nixon. In all possible worlds, the "water" (of the village) is rigidly fixed to whatever substance they named. The water that is H20 is also rigidly fixed to H20. They are different referents, but they are rigid designators none the less. In all possible worlds, there is some essential thing that water has that if you took it away it would not be water. It is just that there are two waters, just as there are two Richard Nixons. There are several interpretations of Kripke- once is causal essentialism I believe. That would mean, at some point there was a dubbing of Richard Nixon (the president guy) and Richard Nixon (some other Richard Nixon), and that name is fixed to that referent by this original baptism. I believe Banno has a broader interpretation whereby it is simply the fact that we use the name Richard Nixon in some historical fashion that it gets fixed on to a thing.schopenhauer1

    I get this, I swear! My example - the village- was designed (tho maybe poorly) to accommodate these very ideas. So I know my kid Richard Nixon (love you rick :heart: ) is really Richard Nixon, but he's not that Richard Nixon. The water, not in the original pond - the water that is just like water except for not being H20 - may very well be 'water' if the people call it that. But it's not the same 'water' as the water in the villagers pool. It has the same name, but its different. Same name, different identity.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.6k
    I get this, I swear! My example - the village- was designed (tho maybe poorly) to accommodate these very ideas. So I know my kid Richard Nixon is really Richard Nixon, but he's not that Richard Nixon. The water, not in the original pond - the water that is just like water except for not being H20 - may very well be 'water' if the people call it that. But it's not the same 'water' as the water in the villagers pool. It has the same name, but its different. Same name, different identity.csalisbury

    Same name, different identity, but the name is fixed to the identity in all possible worlds. Perhaps we cannot get the essential property of the other liquid, so there is nothing to fix, but we can maybe put in X essential property for now. When it is found that specific essential property will be rigidly designated as that liquid (also called "water"). The fact that two different referents can have the same name doesn't matter to this model. It is only the fact that there is some essentialness that stays the same in all possible worlds after the referent is dubbed that particular name.
  • csalisbury
    1.6k
    The fact that two different referents can have the same name doesn't matter to this model. It is only the fact that there is some essentialness that stays the same in all possible worlds after the referent is dubbed that particular name.schopenhauer1

    That's what I'm saying!
  • schopenhauer1
    2.6k
    That's what I'm saying!csalisbury

    Yes, and so is Kripke :smile: .
  • csalisbury
    1.6k
    I know!

    I'm trying to say that bringing that analysis to bear on Kant is confused, and confusing.
  • schopenhauer1
    2.6k

    I'm going to let @Banno answer that since he brought it up in this thread and had the disagreement with @tim wood. I just saw that there might need to be clarification before they went any further with how they are defining terms. I guess the way Banno answers this will bear directly on your question.
  • Banno
    4.8k
    To say that something, as a consequence of something else, is necessarily so, is just to say that given the antecedent, the consequent necessarily follows - just logic 101. But does it imply existential necessity? I kinda think it does not. Logical, but not existential necessity. Which I suppose is to say that if the terms and conditions are instantiated, then it would be existentially necessary. Yes? No?tim wood

    Here's something new - two sorts of necessity: logical and existential.

    But if being necessary is being true in all possible worlds, then they are much the same. So I guess I kinda think it does...

    And that's what is interesting about looking at Kant through Kripke eyes. Kripke's view of necessity appear to be at odds with Kant's.
  • Banno
    4.8k
    Are you suggesting that Kant and Kripke are incommensurable?

    That's a long stretch.
  • Snakes Alive
    348
    Kant does not posit the existence of a noumenal world. Read "The Ground of the Distinction of All Objects into Phenomena and Noumena." The noumenon is a limitative notion.
  • csalisbury
    1.6k


    I don't think so? I think it's more like they're carrying on two different seminars in two different parts of the house. I don't think they blend well in one room. Which isn't to say they can't be brought under one umbrella.
  • csalisbury
    1.6k
    The noumenon is a limitative notion.Snakes Alive
    In terms of responding to the OP, this is the right answer.
  • Mww
    497
    As to how you might want to label the processes of the discovery that water is h2o, that's a different topic.tim wood

    Ever get some bug in yer ear, keeps you up at night......rather than argue from point A, let’s rather see how it may be that point B has legitimacy.......

    H2O is water is a proposition. As such, if you know what water is, then, per Kant, the law of non-contradiction appliestim wood

    The thesis:
    Put these two together, I submit that you are correct. The proposition “water is H2O” is an analytic a priori statement, insofar as it adheres to the conditions of universality and necessity, which Kant teaches such statements require.

    The proof:
    From the Prolegomena, “.....I require no experience *beyond* my conception....”, which presupposes an experience, and it is *from* this experience that “gold” becomes an empirical intuition to start with, to which understanding assigns the conceptions of yellow and metal to it necessarily. Thus, henceforth, “Gold is a yellow metal” is analytic, insofar as the conception of gold must have the conceptions of yellow and metal conjoined with it.

    It is clear, now, that the proposition “water is H2O” is analytic in the same regard as “Gold is a yellow metal”, and your “...label the process of discovery...” comes into play. It is merely a matter of what the experience is: for gold it is much simpler, yellow and metal, both of which are already empirical intuitions themselves, re: we already know what they are. H2O, on the other hand, has no intuition of its own, other than as a conjunctive term. The issue then becomes, the requirement for another kind of experience in order to distill “hydrogen” and “oxygen”, which are intuitions themselves, but do not belong together universally or necessarily, or in any particular combination thereof, out of the conception of “water”. At some arbitrary point, experience will inform the understanding that “water”, in its original conception, will have these two additional conceptions conjoined with it, re: my mention of Vion, 1869. Again, henceforth, “water is H2O” will be an analytic statement.

    Now, “water is H2O” being established as an analytic statement, does nothing whatsoever to disestablish the synthetic empirical statement that water is a translucent, non-compressible fluid. It subsequently appears that water, if it remains a translucent non-compressible fluid but is not H2O, then the predicate H2O does not belong to water necessarily, whereas the former two conditions absolutely must so belong. If a thing is compressible it is not water, but if a thing is D2O, the conditions of non-compressibility and translucence are still met and the substance is still “water”.

    Piece ‘a’ cake, I tell ya!!! Unless I’m wrong; then cake becomes egg.
  • Mww
    497
    It's his ideas as laid out by him we should attend totim wood

    Absolutely. Kinda difficult sometimes, but still fun. One guy bases his argument on something from Chapter 2, say, and his dialectic adversary bases his counter argument on that same something from Chapter 8.....and they end up in a veritable intellectual fistfight, because the Good Doctor treats the same thing in different ways.

    Ever notice that pre-Kantian philosophers of some note classify folks like us as “of the vulgar understanding”, but Kant was gracious enough to call us “of the common understanding”? Gotta appreciate that, I must say.
  • Moliere
    1.6k
    I wouldn't say that water being H2O is a priori -- that at least seems a posteriori to me. The oddity here, taking Kripke as correct and comparing to Kant, is that there is such a thing as a posteriori necessary truths. I don't know if it fucks up Kant, but I think it's an interesting query to compare the two.

    Guess I'll have to stop being lazy and actually read Naming and Necessity with y'all before I say more.
  • tim wood
    2k
    This is the Kant extract Snakes Alive referenced above. It's always good to read Kant himself, because he thought it through. Most of the rest us - or perhaps I should limit that to just I - are always on the way in his thought, and rarely ever there, as my re-reading of Kant shows me.

    "On the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into
    Phenomena and Noumena
    Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of
    the categories, are called phenomena. But if I postulate things which are
    mere objects of understanding, and which, nevertheless, can be given as
    such to an intuition, although not to one that is sensible … such things
    would be entitled noumena. …
    If the senses represent to us something merely as it appears, this
    something must also in itself be a thing, and an object of a non-sensible
    intuition, that is, of the understanding. In other words, a [kind of] knowledge
    must be possible, in which there is no sensibility, and which alone has
    reality that is absolutely objective. Through it objects will be represented as
    they are, whereas in the empirical employment of our understanding things
    will be known only as they appear. …
    All our representations are, it is true, referred by the under standing to some
    object; and since appearances are nothing but representations, the
    understanding refers them to a something, as the object of sensible
    intuition. But this something, thus conceived, is only the transcendental
    object; and by that is meant a something = X, of which we know, and with
    the present constitution of our understanding can know, nothing whatsoever
    … and the same conclusion also, of course, follows from the concept of an
    appearance in general; namely, that something which is not in itself
    appearance must correspond to it. For appearance can be nothing by itself,
    outside our mode of representation. Unless, therefore, we are to move
    constantly in a circle, the word appearance must be recognized as already
    indicating a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is,
    indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the constitution of our
    sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be
    something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility. There thus
    results the concept of a noumenon. It is not of anything, but signifies only
    the thought of something in general, in which I abstract from everything that
    belongs to the form of sensible intuition."

    From

    https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil1020/Kant.pdf
  • Hanover
    4.3k
    It seems to me that Kant presupposes that there exists a world which, by virtue of its being independent of our experience, is unknowable, yet nevertheless is the cause of our experience.DiegoT

    Point me to where Kant says this. I think you're making Kant an indirect realist here, suggesting that we experience phenomena that in some how relate to an unknown reality (noumena) but we simply don't know to what extent. I don't think Kant offers any attribute to noumena, including it being causative of phenomenon.
  • S
    8.6k
    When we place ourselves under a showerhead and turn the tap, it is not water we feel, but the sensation constructed by our mind to label this update on environmental interaction of our skin. We can not feel the actual element.DiegoT

    No, we do feel the water. We also hear noises and see images. You make it sound as though you do not know what it means to feel water. When we say that we feel water, that's referring to the information which we receive from the process which began with the stimulus: water. That's part of the environmental interaction. The water is the stimulus which activates the sensory receptors. The information stems from - and can be traced back to - the water. Yours is only a partial description of the process and it has limited explanatory power. Things just wouldn't make sense if we took that approach.
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