This position is not only absurd, it also suffers from crippling epistemic issues. For example, from the position of being an onboard self model, how is it that you can know a single thing about the external world beyond the model/representation? How do you know there is physical neuronal brain cells causing your experience, when the part of reality those cells inhabit transcends your epistemic access?
And more conceptually, what does it even mean to speak of non-experiential brain cells? The only cells I know are the images/depictions used and described in the biological sciences - we talk about them Write about them, draw them, observe them in a microscope, posit they're existence, use them within our scientific theories and explanations - they're experiential, part of the lived world. So if we aren't talking about those cells, then what are we talking about? — dukkha
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