In in article titled “Why Not God the Mother”, Andrew Dell’Olio defends a view that challenges any kind exclusivity Christians use when referring to or conceptualizing God. An important disclaimer regarding this argument is that Dell’Ollio is not attempting to address all theists, simply Christian theists. Additionally, he does not seek to claim Christians ought to refer to God exclusively as “Mother”, for doing so would be objectionable for the same reasons he opposes the current, Western practice of predominantly referring to God with exclusively masculine terms. On the contrary, Dell’Ollio defends the view that Christans have good reasons to not have exclusive references or conceptions of God. This includes being able to consider conceptions of God as both “Father” and “Mother” as legitimate.

Dell’Ollio considers four possible objections Christians could give to the practice of referring to God as “Mother”:

A. Referring to God as Mother is not Biblical.
B. Jesus only referred to God as “Father”.
C. Calling God “Mother” could lead to a pantheism worry – identifying God with the world.
D. Calling God “Mother” uses theology to serve political purposes.

This post is not going to summarize how Dell’Ollio defends his view against these objections. I would encourage those who may be inclined to utilize any of the aforementioned objections to first consider the following argument, then perhaps, if interested, even read how Dell’Ollio handles such objections himself. His defenses to these objections are built upon his argument against exclusivity when it comes to referencing or conceptualizing God, and it is there I would like to focus.

To frame his objection against exclusivity, Dell’Ollio refers to Thomas Aquinas. In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas claims that if humans were able to comprehend the divine essence of God, they would be able to reference His essence with a singular, comprehensive name. However, Aquinas and Dell’Ollio both agree that humans are incapable of fully comprehending the essence of God, and are thus resolved to referring to God analogously (Father, Mother, Shepherd, etc.). Therefore, they claim, at best, the names humans use to refer to God are accurate analogies that capture a characteristic of His divine essence.

The beginning of the argument can be outlined as follows:

1. If humans are limited to referring to and conceptualizing God analogously, then at best, humans refer to or conceptualize God with accurate analogies.
2. Humans are limited to referring to and conceptualizing God analogously.
3. Therefore, at best, humans refer to or conceptualize God with accurate analogies (1,2 MP).

The argument continues by claiming that regardless of how accurate these analogies are, they will always be limited in two ways. First, accurate analogies will never be able to capture God’s divine essence in its entirety. Second, it appears most Christians will grant that since they are limited beings that are prone to sin, any interpretation or conceptualization of God, whether developed through Scripture or by analyzing natural phenomena in the world, will be vulnerable to degrees of subjectivity, finitude, and fallibility.

This portion of the argument can be understood as making the following assumption:

4. Regardless of how accurate these analogies may be, they will always be limited.
4a. They will be limited to only capturing specific characteristics of God, but not His essence in its entirety.
4b. They will be limited due to being formed by humans that are imperfect, prone to sin, and vulnerable to degrees of subjectivity, finitude, and fallibility.

From this point, Dell’Ollio gets to the meat of his objection against exclusivity. He makes two claims
promoting why Christians have good reasons to use an array of analogies from which they can accurately reference or conceptualize God. The first reason is that if Christians become wedded to one conception, say God the Father, they are at best only accurately referencing one characteristic of God’s divine essence, and limiting themselves from further coloring their concept of God with other accurate analogies.

His second and more dramatic claim is that Christians who hold to one exclusive concept or reference for God make themselves vulnerable to idolatry. For, it is plausible that Christian who are exclusivists when it comes to referencing God are only worshipping their own human conception of God – one they are comfortable with – instead of actually worshipping God. Thus, when conceptualizing or referencing God, they are equating the divine essence of God to a singular, limited, human conception, and claiming this to be the only accurate analogy by which He can be referenced. If it is also true that there is an array of accurate analogies from which God can be referenced, then, as Dell’Ollio claims, it would be in Christians’ best interests to abandon analogy exclusivity when it comes to referencing or conceptualizing God.

The end of the argument can be outlined as follows:

5. If even accurate analogies are going to be limited when referencing or conceptualizing God, then Christians have good reasons to abandon analogy exclusivity.
5a. Analogy exclusivity can limit Christians’ from further coloring their concept of God by failing to consider other accurate analogies by which God can be conceptualized or referenced.
5b. Christians adopting analogy exclusivity become vulnerable to idolatry by equating the divine essence of God to a singular, limited human conception, and claiming this to be the only accurate analogy by which He can be referenced.
6. Therefore, Christians have good reasons to abandon analogy exclusivity (4,5 MP).

I personally find Dell’Ollio’s argument against analogy exclusivity to be rather compelling. It is from this perspective that he goes on to claim the term “Mother” can also be understood as an accurate analogy by which to reference or conceptualize God, hence his promoting of encouraging Christians to be open to referring to God as both “Father” and “Mother” along with any other analogies that may be accurate. However, his defense of why “Mother” can accurately refer to God, along with an array of other analogies, is built on the previous argument in favor of analogy exclusivity. Thus, while I find the previously outlined objections (A,B,C,D) interesting, I would prefer objections to focus on Dell’Ollio’s argument against analogy exclusivity as opposed to whether or not the term “Mother” can function as an accurate analogy by which one can refer to God. I look forward to the responses to come.