Dualism is normally contrasted with monism rather than materialism. Materialism is only one form of monism. The other main monisms are idealism (one substance and it is primarily mental), and neutral monism (one substance which is in itself neither mental nor physical but gives rise to these two). There is also property dualism which could be construed as a substance monism, namely that there is one substance which has both mental and physical properties which are not reducible to one another. I guess I am a panpsychist property dualist monist. Spread that on your toast. :)

my belief is that mind is result of body and we are self-aware beings capable of reasoning
and yeah if god exists can somebody answer why he create the universe?

if god exists can somebody answer why he create the universe? — papamuratte

The notion of creation is anthropmorphic.

Theism isn't incompatible with inevitably spontaneous self-generating universes.

Michael Ossipoff

I would have preferred that the options stated "lean towards" but I voted that way anyway: I lean towards materialist/atheist. However, materialist theories of mind are not quite complete - there remains the hard problem of consciousness (although I have a vague idea about how this might be solved).

The mind body problem is inherent within the problem of measurement itself as it leads to an inherent opposition of elements.

Where the mind and body may be respectively viewed as having inherent thetical, or positive, and antithetical, negative, properties relative to eachother this dualism observes a necessary monism and triadic from which they extend.

This monadism stems from the fact the mind and body, while observed as separate, are inherently connected because of this separation. This may seem paradoxical at first, but considering the opposition of mind and body are dependent upon a movement between and through the other and inherent connection is formed. The mind, as existing, is defined through the absence of mind by the body. The body as existing is defined by the absence of body by the mind.

This interplay between the two necessitates a form of synthesis where the inherent tension between the two becomes a medial element that defines them. To argue a mind body dualism leads to a synthesis of spirit as a medial point from which both extend. The same occurs with mind/spirit resulting in body and spirit/body resulting in mind.

A third degree of the human constitution is always necessitated as a center of balance, where the spirit is this case acts as the synthetic element.

In a separate respect the interplay between the mind body dualism always results in a progressive definition of the two. The mind is x and is not y, relative to the measuring point of the body, and the definition continues. This applies dually with the body.


In these respects the mind body dualism causes an continual expansion of definition between the two while necessitating a dual point of origin from which they exist (spirit).

So the spirit exists dually as what the mind and body are not, while existing as both. As both it maintains a connection but as a negative of both it maintains its own positive degree of definition.

For example the body may be composed of organs, which the mind may be one, but the body is not the foundation of abstract thought which the mind is. However the mind as an extension of the body neccitates the body as responsible for abstract thought. So what we understand of the body as absent of thought necessitates the mind as the connector of this thought. The mind acts as a connector to the body and abstract thought.

Under these terms the mind as positive in thought, while the body is absent of thought except through the mind, observes the body as negative of thought except through the mind where the mind as positive in one thing observes the body as negative, hence observing the mind as a negative dimension.

This negative dimension observes the mind as a connector where the body is directed towards abstract thought and abstract thought is directed towards the body, with both existing through each other as each other and are inherently connected. This connection observes the mind as strictly a negative limit where is strictly exists as a connection between the two and not a thing in itself.

In a separate respect the mind may be composed of thought, with the body in itself being a thought of the mind, but the mind is not the foundation of empirical senses organs which the body is. However the body as an extension of the mind necessitates the mind as responsible for empirical organs. So what we understand of the mind as absent of empirical sense organs necessitates the body as a connector of these empirical organs and the mind. The body acts as a connector to the mind and the empirical sense organs.

So the body is positive in empirical sense organs, while the mind is absent of empirical sense organs except through the body. This observes the body as a negative limit which connects the mind and empirical senses organs. As a connector of the mind and empirical sense organs the body is not a thing in and of itself but rather and interplay of the mind and sense organs existing through each other as eachother.



This inherent connectimg of the three necessitates them acting as various grades of the other and a problem of definition ensues, while the continual interplay causes a self defining unity where one always acts as a mediator between the interplaying opposition of the other two.

Under these terms we can observe that body/mind/spirit exist through growth of one through the other.

So where

A. the mind as positive in abstract thought results in the body as negative in abstract thought through the mind, the body is positive in abstract thought through the mind.

B. And the body as positive in empirical sense organs results in the mind as negative in empirical sense organs, the mind is positive as a sense organ through the body.

C. The body is both abstract thought and mind, and the mind is both empirical sense organ and abstract thought. However the mind and body are nothing but connectors in themselves between facets of the other, hence as connectors are separate as absent of quality in themselves.



The question occurs as to what this negative dimension of connection between body and mind are, as a positive. This connective median would be spirit where the spirit is absent of both body and mind as it is a connector between the two while simultaneously being both.

Considering the mind manifests abstract throught and is the connector of the body and thought, the spirit is mind.

Considering the body manifests empirical senses and is the connector of the mind and empirical sense, the spirit is body.

So where the mind as negative connects body and abstract thought, and the body as negative connects the empirical sense organs and mind, the spirit is both body and mind through empirical sense and abstract thought as the connective median through both.

However considering the body manifests through empirical sense, and the mind manifests through abstract thought, the spirit manifests as neither.

So where empiral sense and abstract thought are separate, except through the manifestation of the spirit, this connection can be observed as intuition where intuition is the connection of empirical sense and abstract thought. In these respects intuition is a connector through the spirit where the spirit through intuition is a connector of the two.

So

A. the mind and body existing as spirit necessitates the spirit as being a positive existence of both.

B. the mind as existing through abstract thought and the body as existing through empirical sense necessitates the spirit as existing through intuition as a connection between abstract thought and empirical sense, hence negative.

C. The spirit as body and mind observes the spirit as positive in regards to being both, but negative in the respect it acts as a connector through intuition between abstract thought and empirical sense.

So while abstract thought may be connected to the body through the mind,

and the empirical senses are connected to the mind through the body,

the abstract thought and empirical senses are connected to body and mind through the spirit as intuition where intuition exists as the connector of the abstract thought and empirical senses. the body and mind are respectively absent of on there own terms.

Hence the spirit as both body and mind, is the absence of body and mind through intuition which connects abstract thought and empirical sense.

We therefore observe the body and mind as intuitively connected through the spirit as body and mind (heart, emotion)

while the body and thought as empirically connected through the mind as body (brain)

and the mind and empirical senses as abstractly connected through the body as mind (form).


These definitions continue to expand in a circular progression that is simultaneously self referential.

Trump is reptilian, in any case.

There is no mind-body problem. The body (including the CNS) produces "the mind". "The mind" is the noise the brain makes. No brain: silence.

There is no mind-body problem. The body (including the CNS) produces "the mind". "The mind" is the noise the brain makes. No brain: silence. — Bitter Crank

Here is a pristine mind untouched by philosophy. Bitter Crank has spent years frequenting this forum and the previous one and yet retains his philosophical virginity.

If there is no mind body problem, and they are effectively unified, the problem occurs as a result of any act of division where unity is distorted through measurement.

The problem occurs in the respect this distortion of the self (considering the mind body problem is an extension of the self) occurs through the self where the self instills a degree of separation or polarity within its nature by forming opposition.

This opposition of the self through the self as the self gives premise to an absence of structure as fundamentally being void. In simpler terms the question of the self, through the mind body dualism, is an expression of void as constituting the self.

Under these terms it is simultaneously problematic to expect a solution to the mind body problem considering this nature of "void" within the self that gives rise to the problem.

At most the mind/body dualism can be encapsulated through circular reasoning to maintain the problem considering the opposition of the mind and body are premised in void. A progressive linear approach to the problem will give an increase in definitive parts which form the mind and body, but this in itself leads to contradiction as the increase in definition leads to an increase in philosophical problems.

Effectively the mind body dualism necessitates a fracturing of the human condition, under standard logic geared towards the prevention of fallacies where the self that composes the problem is the very same self effectively being atomized so to speak.

The question of mind body dualism, under the terms of a dualistic approach, necessitates a form of atomism where the base limits of the self are reduced in many respects to continually dissolvable atoms of various definitions and sorts.

In a separate respect it reduces the mind and body effectively to point space considering the point is the only atomic definition that if continually divided maintains its same nature. Under this premise, we are left with basic geometric limits that composes the human condition of mind and body, with these foundations being the foundation of measurement, further implying that in this dualism the mind wins as all is mind and we cycle back to a form of unity under point space.

From a separate respect if the dualism is to continue with the prior premise of continual atomization where the mind and body are continually broken down to through further abstract and empirical definitions of what constitutes what, this progressive nature necessitates an element of time within the responses as all current answered become means to further answers and a continual probabilism occurs.

Under these terms this probabilistic nature to the mind body dualism, as evidenced by its continual dependence on time to redefine the answer, elevates the dualism to literally being a qualitative fraction where the abstract thought of the mind divides the potential unity of the empirical senses into relative parts and vice versa. This continual alternation of one as the premise which divides the other (considering the mind is some times determines to give definition to the body while the materialistic nature of the body gives rise to the mind) leaves an inherent cycling to the answer leading to the munchaussen dilemma considering the answers is literally one based in relativism.

Under these terms it can be argued that relativism is an extension of the very same "self" which addresses the problem of the "self". In these respects it may be argued that relativism, as a constant through this problem, is an inherent psychological law not limited to the realm of physics stemming from a problem of void within the psyche as void is where the "problem of problems" seems to arise as it gives foundation to opposition as absent of structure.

The mind/body dualism can be necessitated as an element of void within the psyche as an inherent element of continuous inversion. In these respects the self maintains an inversive element conducive to a problem of irrationality where a stable state of being effectively is divided and multiplied into further parts.

The mind body problem is strictly premised in the presocratic atomist schools where any perceivable unity would neccessitate a question of unity of the self and the environment around the self leading to a viewpoint similar to Parmenides.

The problem is structured according to how chooses to quantify the human condition, where this nature of quantity being inherent with the self and lending further questions to the nature of quantification and free will.

The mind-body "problem" is supposed to be Descartes' baby. Questions (as in, I don't know): 1) Was he first? 2) Did he invent it - i.e. is it at bottom a consequence of his mathematicism - or did he discover it?

That is actually a good question as to whether he discovered or invented it.

I would argue both at the same time in different respects.

He discovered it in the respect he observed the philosophical implications of dividing phenomenon into duals. In these respects there are certain qualitative problems with mathematics as the act of division results in a distortion of the previously unified phenomenon.

In a seperate respect he invented it by applying a dualism to a specific phenomena (the self). However considering this phenomena of the self, which applies to him as well, observes his argument as a creation of the self.

And the above is really just a cheap explanation.

The question really breaks down to the nature of creation/discovery and can be a whole thread in itself.

well Theism is compatible with self generating universe,
in Hinduism there is such belief and things like parallel universes also comes up
[the nature of god ]is what i want to know

well Theism is compatible with self generating universe,
in Hinduism there is such belief and things like parallel universes also comes up
[the nature of god ]is what i want to know — papamuratte

Benevolence.

That's all that can be known or said about God.

God is Benevolence.

If the Atheists don't like that, then it can be said as: Reality is Benevolence itself.

Of course that is what is meant by God.

Michael Ossipoff

Answer to the question in the original post: Idealist and Theist.

The "Mind-Body Problem", aka the "Hard-Problem of Consciousness" is an artifact of Western academic philosophers' insistence on believing in Materialism.

(Not that it's a necessary consequence of Materialism.)

Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. But Western academic philosophers, and those who adopt their views, are a conservative lot.

Michael Ossipoff

Are you a Vedantist?

It seems to me that my metaphysics is consistent with what the 3 main branches of Vedanta (describable) metaphysics have in common.

Vedantists often say things that go farther than what I'd say, because I like to only say uncontroversial easily-supported obvious things.

But I feel that there's something to what Vedanta says, though it goes beyond the metaphysics of describable things.

For example:

At the end of lives, as the body is shutting down and the person is fading out, of course eventually there's no more such thing as individuality or identity. Then, there's no meaningful distinction between different individuals.

And that end-of-lives state-of-affairs, arriving as the final state-of-affairs of a sequence of lives, and being timeless, is arguably the natural, normal and usual state-of-affairs, from which our sequence of lives is a temporary anomaly, a blip in timelessness.

Nisargadatta said that what's temporary isn't real, and that's consistent with something that I've been emphasizing, in metaphysical debates--that I don't claim that anything in the describable realm is real or existent.

Additionally, surely you've sometimes gotten the impression that there isn't really a significant difference between people. For example, maybe you notice a beautiful house on a good-size well-planted lawn piece of land, and maybe your first impression is that it's good that there's that beautiful place...without regard to who it is who gets to live there.

Sometimes such impressions are right, in a way more fundamental than the world of describable matters and practical affairs. After all, words don't describe Reality, or even reality.

Michael Ossipoff

I don't think there's a mind-body problem and why should I? Why should the mind (or any other abstract aspect) or the body be anything other than what it is? We don't know everything about what it means to be human, not even the full monty about our physical bodies, so why assign conclusions based on ignorance. In the first place, why conclude anything?

When we refer to mind or body, we mean a field of activity, influence, interactive associations, etc, all of which play a significant part of every human being. So where's the problem? Is it because we don't see it? Do we see everything? Is it because it's not material in character? Not everything we acknowledge is material, consider gravity.

The idea that the abstract and physical are antagonists is a product of esoteric spiritual teachings which filtered through religious teachings and now almost everybody wants to see them that way. What most people miss is that, originally, the teachings were symbolic. What they meant was that if focus is limited to any of the two paradigms, then the other gets undervalued. We should not forget that life unfolds through both. There's no external without internal and vice versa. Abstract just implies internal.

Are the mind and body are separate substances or elements of the same substance (dualism or materialism)? — Yajur

There are things that exist. Some of them exhibit mental (non-physical?) qualities, and some exhibit physical qualities. Some exhibit both. I would not distinguish between them because they exhibit one or other of these properties. Existence is existence. Attributes are just that, not more.

Just my two pennyworth. :smile:

if god exists can somebody answer why he create the universe? — papamuratte

She didn't. Someone else (or no-one at all) did that. :chin:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLbSlC0Pucw

I found this quite illuminating, check it out.

The mind-body problem is specific to dualism. Physicalist theory of mind has its own problem the "hard problem" of consciousness,

I guess I am a panpsychist property dualist monist. — bert1

Nice! I had to look this up.
1.Panpsychist claims there is mental element present in everything.
2.Property Dualism says while there is only one kind of substance (physical kind), it has two properties (physical properties and mental properties)
3. Monoism is the view that all is one and there are no fundamental divisions.

This is contradictory, 1 makes the claim that everything has mental element while 2 says everything is fundamentally physical.

Further I think property dualism and monoism cannot be congruent either; property dualism takes qualia to be a unique feature of reality.

Can you please elaborate on this belief? Also, am I right in assuming you are a theist given this belief?

Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. — Michael Ossipoff

By Quantum Mechanics I assume you mean Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle aka the observer effect.

I want to clarify how the observer affect or anything in Quantum Mechanics isn't in contradiction with materialism. For instance take any object you wish to observe from your eyes. For this to happen there needs to be some information that has to come from that object tow you i.e. you will need some light to reflect of the object and reach your eyes.
Now if say we reduce this object to the size of the atom and again you wish to observe this object. Given the size of the object, the photons will now come in, hit the atoms and pop it to another location. Therefore, the very act of trying to measure the position will prevent you from measuring it's position.

It is nothing to do with consciousness, mind or any of that. The fact is, the smaller the object is the more susceptible it will be to the energy of the light changing it's position in space

Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. — Michael Ossipoff


By Quantum Mechanics I assume you mean Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle aka the observer effect.
— Yajur

I don't claim to be qualified in or have the answers about quantum-mechanics, but, from what I've heard, the uncertainty-principle is a consequence of QM. But I claim no authority on QM.

I want to clarify how the observer affect or anything in Quantum Mechanics isn't in contradiction with materialism.

I don't claim any authority or qualification about QM. I was just quoting something that has been said by some physicists who specialize in QM.

Michael Ossipoff

I'd be curious re the source of the data re whether most physicists are materialists . . . And curious, for that matter, how they'd attempt to even describe what a nonphysical existent is supposed to be, how we're supposed to know about it, etc.

This is contradictory, 1 makes the claim that everything has mental element while 2 says everything is fundamentally physical. — Yajur

If you're an identity theorist as I am, those two are not contradictory. Not that I share the view. I think that only some physical "stuff" is mental stuff, I'm not a property dualist, etc.

I'd be curious re the source of the data re whether most physicists are materialists — Terrapin Station

I'm not aware of a census or survey that tells what percentage of physicists are Materialists. Perhaps you're confusing me with someone else, if you think that I made that claim.

What I said was that some physicists who specialize in quantum-mechanics, and who are recognized authorities on the subject, have said that QM lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world.

. . . And curious, for that matter, how they'd attempt to even describe what a nonphysical existent is supposed to be

Are you referring to religion? It's common knowledge that, not only are not all physicists Materialists, but also that some are religious. As for what they'd attempt to describe, you'd have to ask them, wouldn't you.

But I certainly didn't say that physicists describe God, if that's what you're asking. Some things, a subset of Reality, are describable. Metaphysics is about those things. Reality isn't describable. You say it might be describable? But, even if it merely might not be describable, then it certainly isn't reliably describable.

(...as I define metaphysics. Some use "metaphysics" with a much broader and unrealistically-ambitious meaning, expecting metaphysical discussion and debate to cover all of Reality.)

But if you think that physicists will describe God for you, then go for it, and ask them.

..., how we're supposed to know about it, etc.

Metaphysics, as I define the term, is about the knowable and describable subset of Reality. Did I say that you were supposed to know about a nonphysical existent.

But, by the way, as I said before, the word "which" and the square-root of two are nonphysical.

As for "existent", the use of the silly and meaningless words "existent" and "real" is responsible for millennia of philosophical befudlement and confusion.

Michael Ossipoff

Yajur quoted you saying this: "Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. — Michael Ossipoff"

That's what I was referring to re the first part.

Re the other part, if they're not materialists, they must think that some things that exist are nonphysical. So I was wondering what the heck those things would be, just how they'd figure that nonphsyical things even make sense, etc.

Yajur quoted you saying this: "Due to conclusions from Quantum-Mechanics, many or most physicists don't believe in Materialism anymore. — Michael Ossipoff"

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That's what I was referring to re the first part.

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Yes, it seems fair to say that someone who says that the notion of an objectively-existent physical world has been laid to rest, doesn’t believe in Materialism.
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I admit that I don’t know how many physicists don’t believe in Materialism. I’ve read of, &/or from, two who said that QM contradicts, or lays-to-rest, the notion of an objectively-existent physical world. Of course two isn’t most. But I didn’t claim “most”. I said, “…many or most…”. A few who say it in popular writing suggest that there may well be a fair number like them, but who don’t write popular books and articles.
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But we needn’t quibble about how many “many” is, or about whether it’s really “many” or just “some”.
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Re the other part, if they're not materialists, they must think that some things that exist are nonphysical.

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I’m not a Materialist, but I don’t make any claim about anything describable (and describability is part of my definition of “thing”) existing.

Existence other than that of describable things? Not only do I not use "exist" or "existent", but, if I did use them, I'd only apply them to describable things.
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“Exist” and “real” are your nonsense-words, not mine.
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But, again, if you want to attribute beliefs to physicists, then you’d need to ask them.
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So I was wondering what the heck those things [“some things that exist [and] are nonphysical”] would be

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Don’t ask me—I don’t claim that anything describable (which includes any thing) exists.
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But people speak of and refer to nonphysical things all the time, such as numbers, logical facts, abstract words, etc. I re-emphasize that I don’t claim existence for anything physical.
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In fact, I don’t use “exist” or “existent”. So you’d need to ask someone else about what they claim exists.
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…, just how they'd figure that nonphsyical things even make sense, etc.

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Then maybe you should ask them.
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“Things”, as I use that term, are what can (at least in principle) be defined, referred to and described.
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The word “maybe” is a thing. Is it physical?
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Of course if you define “things” as “What are physical”, then it would be nonsense to speak of a nonphysical thing.
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(I define and describe “maybe” as an adverb indicating uncertainty regarding the veracity of the statement made by the verb that it modifies.)
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Of course, among all the abstract logical implications, there are many hypothetical things that they’re about-- things that no one claims are other than hypotheticalhose. Those hypothetical things include hypothetical propositions—propositions that aren’t claimed true--and the hypothetical things that those hypothetical propositions are about.
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And of course it goes without saying that abstract-implications, and all abstract-facts, are things too, as I define “things”.
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The metaphysics that I propose is about complex systems of inter-referring abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
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Especially in metaphysics, it’s essential to answer about when requested, and to be consistent about, what we mean by the words that we use.
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Michael Ossipoff

Not necessarily. I’m not a Materialist, but I don’t make any claim about anything describable (and describability is part of my definition of “thing”) existing. — Michael Ossipoff

You believe things exist that you can't describe?

You believe things exist that you can't describe? — Terrapin Station

You believe that words describe everything?

Write down a complete description of the smell of mint, or of what it's like to step on a tack.

Additionally, the notion of words describing everything is shown to be silly, by the fact that no finite dictionary can non-circularly define any of its words.

Anyway, as I said, even if you claim that Reality might be desribable, then the fact that you admit that it might not means that it isn't reliably describable, and any attempt at such description is speculative at best.

MIchael Ossipoff

You believe that words describe everything? — Michael Ossipoff

Potentially yes. And I don't know how I'd believe that there are things that I can't describe. I don't know how to make any sense of that. What would I believe, after all?.Some vague I don't-know-what?

I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions." I don't know what that would be referring to. What makes a description "complete" versus "incomplete"?

So how about the question I asked. Do you believe things exist that you can't describe?