What's the formal fallacy? — creativesoul
No one anywhere in philosophy proper has drawn and maintained the distinction between thinking about thought and belief and thought and belief. — creativesoul
4. 'Objects' of physiological sensory perception are external to thought/belief. — creativesoul
Do you have an argument to support p4? — Michael
I thought there was such an argument, but (having just tried to describe it), I find I was mistaken. :yikes: The solipsist argument cannot be refuted or disproven. :wink: As long as this is the case, I don't think there can be an argument to support point #4. :chin:
If we want point #4, I think we must declare it as an axiom (assumption; guess). — Pattern-chaser
One mind is not different things. — creativesoul
Why could the thoughts in one mind not be different things? — Janus
What difference would that make? The thoughts in one mind are not one mind. The claim you're asking about says "One mind is not different things." It does not say the thoughts in one mind are not.
What's the relevance of the question? — creativesoul
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. One mind is not different things. — creativesoul
This is not to say that I am convinced by solipsism, rather just solipsism cannot be rationally disproved (or proved for that matter). — Janus
If ones thoughts about "one's own thought and belief' ( or anything else for that matter) consist in drawing correlations between different things (i.e. between one's different thoughts and perceptions, assuming for the sake of the solipsist argument that one's perceptions consist in nothing beyond one's feelings, thoughts, and beliefs) then your argument against solipsism fails. — Janus
1.)All thought and belief is meaningful.
2.)All meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
3.)All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two. — creativesoul
If we know that solipsism requires metacognition, and metacognition requires cognition, and cognition requires an external world, then we know and have rationally proven that solipsism is false. — creativesoul
This is neglecting the natural evolution of thought and belief, particularly regarding the complexity increase. — creativesoul
I don't know what you are driving at here. 'The natural evolution of thought and belief" and "complexity increase" (if they are assumed to be real independently of your mind) already presupposes an external world; that is it rests on an assumption that it purports to prove. — Janus
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Language requires shared meaning. Shared meaning requires another mind. — creativesoul
Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice. The questions you ask, if they are sincerely asked, can only be answered by me, since it is of me that you ask...
Read more. Yack less. — creativesoul
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Language requires shared meaning. Shared meaning requires another mind.
— creativesoul
Again this assumes that the others you share meaning with are not products of your own mind, or for a more universal solipsism, products of the one mind. — Janus
You can't prove that solipsism is false, so as usual you resort to casting aspersions on the one who has shown you to be mistaken.
Of course I agree that solipsism is ridiculous and that no one in their right mind would sincerely believe it to be true, but I also think that no one in their right mind would believe they could prove it to be false. — Janus
Are you claiming that shared meaning doesn't require a plurality of minds? — creativesoul
Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice. — creativesoul
Shared meaning requires at least the illusion of a plurality of minds. I'm not claiming that the apparent plurality of minds is an illusion; I tend to think the plurality is real, but i acknowledge it cannot be proven. In fact nothing that is not deductively true can be proven; all inductive and abductive belief is fallible. That doesn't mean I think we have any good reason to doubt that there is a plurality of minds, but that might also depend on the metaphysical context in which we are considering the question. Context is everything.
Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice.
— creativesoul
I followed the argument perfectly well and showed it to be flawed because it assumes what it purports to prove. You have provided no counter-argument just the usual insulting insinuations. I actually don't know why I continue to bother responding to you. — Janus
Cause it can be fun and informative. Don't act like I'm the only one of us that's a dick sometimes... — creativesoul
It’s not clear to me what you mean by meaning being existentially contingent upon something else. Are you saying that we can only conceive of a thing if that thing actually exists? — Michael
We think there is shared meaning. If there is no real plurality of minds then there is no real shared meaning. — Janus
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