Qualia are symbolic systems. — hypericin

Qualia are contingent forms of awareness. They are not symbols because they have no intrinsic or conventional meaning. The smell of vanilla is the quale of smelling vanilla, not some separate thing indicated by the quale.

Qualia are language, they have the same logical structure as language. — hypericin

Qualia are not language because language is a shared system of conventional signs while (1) qualia are not symbols, (2) qualia are not conventional and (3) we have no idea if they are shared or not. There is no way to compare the form of my experience in smelling vanilla to the form of your experience in smelling it.

Finally, the logical structure ideas, the contingent forms of some of which are qualia, is not the same as the logical structure of language. For language to signify, first, I must grasp the form of the medium of expression (I must hear you aright, make out your writing, etc.) and second, I must form an idea of what that physical form means. Only then can it indicate some target. So we have a ternary relation (physical sign - thinker - signified). That means that language employs instrumental signs.

For ideas to signify, I do not first have to recognize that I'm dealing with an idea. There is no question of making our its physical form. Rather, ideas signify directly. So, we have a binary relation (thinker - signified). That means that ideas (and qualia are the contingent form of some ideas) are formal, not instrumental signs.

The smell of vanilla is the quale of smelling vanilla, not some separate thing indicated by the quale. — Dfpolis

You misunderstand me. The smell of vanilla is the qualia, which is a symbol. It signifies the airborne vanilla molecules giving rise to the odor. We have no access to the reality, only to the symbols representing it: qualia.

(1) qualia are not symbols, (2) qualia are not conventional and (3) we have no idea if they are shared or not — "Dfpolis

(1) They certainly are. The vanillin molecule has nothing to do with the vanilla smell. The smell is purely symbolic, it points to the molecule.
(2,3): This is an internal language, the body speaking to itself. But the body itself is a multiplicity, and if there is sharing and convention, they exist at that level.

It signifies the airborne vanilla molecules giving rise to the odor. — hypericin

Smelling vanilla is an existential state. It might indicate the presence of vanilla extract, vanilla beans, good vanilla ice cream, etc. Since it can indicate many things, intrinsically, it indicates no one thing, including the presence of vanilla molecules. For thousands of years, people smelled vanilla and never thought of vanilla molecules. So, intrinsically, the quale of vanilla does not signify the presence of vanilla molecules. (It does not necessarily make us think of them.)

Of course, once we understand that odors are mediated by specific molecules, smelling vanilla is strong evidence for the presence of vanilla molecules. But, even then, it's not an infallible sign of vanilla molecules, because we could have a very vivid olfactory imagination or even be hallucinating.

Evidence is not necessarily, not essentially, a sign. it is something that can be used as a sign, but has an intrinsic reality of its own. Smoke is just combustion products in the air -- whether or not someone uses it as a sign of fire. In the same way, the quale of vanilla, which is identical with smelling vanilla, is simply an existential state, whether or not I use it as a sign that I'm near a vanilla orchid.

On the other hand, an idea is intrinsically a sign and signifies whatever it's about necessarily. My idea <apples> necessarily signifies apples. It's impossible for it to signify anything we don't think is an apple.

We have no access to the reality, only to the symbols representing it: qualia. — hypericin

Yes, that's the kind of pap modern philosophers take on faith. Of course, it is absolutely false. I don't know whose version of this nonsense you believe, so I won't refute them on by one, but simply show you why we do have access to reality.

Anything that can act in any way exists, it real. So, existence is the unspectified ability act. Of course, everything can act in specific ways, and if we knew all the ways it could act, we'd know all the ways it can present itself. So, the essence of a thing is the specification of its ability to act -- what it can and cannot do.

When we sense something, it is acting on us in some way. Perhaps it's emitting vanilla molecules that trigger an olfactory response, scattering light into our eyes or pushing back when we touch it. Whatever it's doing, it modifies our neural state, and that modification of our neural state is our sensory representation of the object. There is an identity and joint ownership here. The object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. So, there's no epistic gap here between us and the sensed object. Rather, our representation of the object is the object's existential penetration of us.

When we turn our attention to this sensory representation and become aware of it, we know the object -- not exhaustively but to the degree that we are interacting with it. It is informing us. Recall that Claude Shannon defined information as the reduction of possibility. Of all the ways and unknown object could act on us, it is acting on us in the specific way we are experiencing. Since this is necessarily one of the ways in which it can act, it is informing us about its essence -- about the specification of its possible acts.

So, when we are aware of our sensory encounter with an object, we learn of both its existence (it can act because it is acting on us) and it essence (its specification of possible acts must include the ways it is acting on us.) Again, there is no epistic gap.

So, forget all the nonsense you've heard about epistic gaps, They simply don't exist.

The vanillin molecule has nothing to do with the vanilla smell. The smell is purely symbolic, it points to the molecule. — hypericin

I explained why this is not so. It can be evidence, but it is not intrinsically a sign.

This is an internal language, the body speaking to itself. But the body itself is a multiplicity, and if there is sharing and convention, they exist at that level. — hypericin

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. If there were a language of thought, then it would have to elicit its interpreting thoughts and this would lead to an infinite regress.

The notion of "the body speaking to itself" is a metaphor, not an accurate description. Yes, information is transmitted from point to point neurally and chemically. That information is not a language in the sense of a system of signs that elicit meaning. Rather, neural pulses and hormones effectuate responses without need of mental interpretation. Meaning only enters when we reflect on the process. It is not intrinsic.

The body is not a multiplicity, It is an organic unity with each part depending upon the others. Thinking of parts that we can separate mentally as separate unities is committing Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Regions that are joined physically and dynamically are only potentially separate, not actual units.

I am in general agreement with this explanation, except for the following two points:

1)

The object's modification of our sensory state is identically our sensory representation of the object. So, there's no epistic gap here between us and the sensed object. Rather, our representation of the object is the object's existential penetration of us. — Dfpolis

If the word phrase "sensory representation" and word "representation" were replaced with "awareness" (perception and cognisance caused by sensation), I could agree with your formulation. Otherwise, I consider the use of the word "representation" in this context to be unnecessarily metaphorical.

2)

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. — Dfpolis

I agree with the first sentence, but disagree with the second. While my own thought is largely verbal, Einstein's thought experiments were, by his own admission, nonverbal.

Also, Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens).

If true, nonverbal thought and communication proceeded verbal thought and communication in evolutionary terms.

If the word phrase "sensory representation" and word "representation" were replaced with "awareness" (perception and cognisance caused by sensation), I could agree with your formulation. Otherwise, I consider the use of the word "representation" in this context to be unnecessarily metaphorical. — Galuchat

I suspect this is simply a matter of defining "representation" differently, and not a difference about fact.

One can have a representation without being aware of the representation. There are many, many unread texts and unviewed pictures. In the same way we can have sensory representations without being intellectually aware of them. In another thread, I gave many examples of complex "automatic" or sensory behavior -- playing musical instruments, bicycle riding, and driving being a few. So, as I use the term, there are sensory representations and intellectual representations. In my view, only the latter require awareness.

There is no "language of thought." Rather thought is what is elicited by language. — Dfpolis

I agree with the first sentence, but disagree with the second. While my own thought is largely verbal, Einstein's thought experiments were, by his own admission, nonverbal. — Galuchat

I was insufficiently precise. I should have said "thought is elicited by language." I did not intend to say that thought is only elicited by by language. I agree that much thought is nonverbal as shown by the experience of knowing what we mean, but not being able to find the right words to express it.

Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens). — Galuchat

I have no idea what data one could bring to bear to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. So, in my view it is an unscientific speculation.

Semioticians Lotman and Sebeok think that language developed as a mental modelling system (an adaptation) in Homo habilis, and that speech is an exaptation derived from language (which emerged in Homo sapiens). — Galuchat

I have no idea what data one could bring to bear to confirm or falsify this hypothesis. So, in my view it is an unscientific speculation. — Dfpolis

From Anthropology:

Homo habilis (-2,000,000 years):
Brain Capacity = 600-800 cc
Unable to encode speech.

Homo erectus (-1,500,000 years):
Brain Capacity = 800-1200 cc
Linguistic competence exhibited by tool design and fire use.

Archais Homo sapiens (-300,000 years):
Brain Capacity = 1400 cc
Ability to encode and decode speech.

Modern Homo sapiens (-40,000 years)
Brain Capacity = 1500 cc

Linguistic competence exhibited by tool design and fire use. — Galuchat

I don't see that this implies "linguistic competence."

Obviously there is some historical point at which language use began. I don't think that that point can be determined from the level of tool construction and usage. I might be willing to see etching, drawing and painting as signs of representational thought that could be related to language.

After considering these responses I would like to weaken my claim.

Qualia are abstract symbols. They represent the endpoint of a transformation of sensory data into a purely abstract plane. But it is too much to say they are a language. After all, we don't interpret these symbols, we operate in our day to day lives in this world of symbols, as if the symbols were reality itself. It took centuries of difficult work to discover what these symbols refer to.

It seems likely that qualia exist to enable us to process information efficiently, at the symbolic level.

Qualia are symbolic systems.

Qualia are language, they have the same logical structure as language.

Qualia are to reality as language is to semantic content.

The sematic value blue is is not the utterance blo͞o. Rather, the utterance blo͞o signifies the semantic value.

By the same relation, 470nm light is not the qualia blue. Rather, blue the qualia is a sign that signifies 470nm light. — hypericin

This is something I have argued for many times on this forum.

After considering these responses I would like to weaken my claim. — hypericin

That isn't necessary. Observe:

Smelling vanilla is an existential state. It might indicate the presence of vanilla extract, vanilla beans, good vanilla ice cream, etc. — Dfpolis

In other words, it indicates the presence of vanilla in some form. You would need context, like what your visual system provides, to be more specific as to what the smell actually is. This is no different from language use. You derive the meaning of some sounds or scribbles from the context.

Dogs might be able to make the distinction between vanilla beans and vanilla extract with their noses, but our human noses are so sophisticated. We can make those distinctions with our eyes.

Since it can indicate many things, intrinsically, it indicates no one thing, including the presence of vanilla molecules. For thousands of years, people smelled vanilla and never thought of vanilla molecules. So, intrinsically, the quale of vanilla does not signify the presence of vanilla molecules. (It does not necessarily make us think of them.) — Dfpolis

Words can indicate anything as well. We simply agree on what symbols to use to refer to other things.

We interpret words as much as we interpret qualia. As a matter of fact, you could say that language is a kind of qualia. The title should actually be: "Language is qualia." You cannot learn a language unless you experience the sounds and visual scribbles of some language and are taught what they refer to.

We can misinterpret words just like we misinterpret our other qualia. It is experience that allows us to fine-tune our interpretations over time to eventually symbolize the world accurately. It is no surprise that our first interpretations of the world were preliminary and inaccurate, just as our preliminary understanding of a language we don't know that we are reading or listening to is.

Qualia are symbolic systems.

Qualia are language, they have the same logical structure as language.

Qualia are to reality as language is to semantic content.

The sematic value blue is is not the utterance blo͞o. Rather, the utterance blo͞o signifies the semantic value.

By the same relation, 470nm light is not the qualia blue. Rather, blue the qualia is a sign that signifies 470nm light. — hypericin

I like to think of the Qualia as Data for the Conscious Mind Processor.

Do you mean one type of data? Obviously the conscious mind handles all sorts of things other than qualia.

I generally agree with Dfpolis, but I suggest that one COULD devise a language with qualia. This would entail mapping various qualia onto other concepts - just as words map to concepts.

E.g. the scent of roses = love; the scent of feces = hate. Greenness = action, redness = cessation.

This is what we do when we "speak to ourselves". Typically we just borrow the existing language and speak to ourselves literally, but we can employ other perceptual systems: visual, spatial, musical, emotional.

Qualia themselves are symbolic, not linguistic, but we cobble together a kind of language out of qualia we use to communicate with ourselves.

Makes a lot of sense.