There does seem to be similarity, but I think the difference is that absolute presuppositions are not taken to be self-evidently and timelessly true in the way a priori intuitions are. Instead absolute presuppositions (Collingwood) or regulative assumptions (Peirce) or, assuming that Wittgenstein is on the same track, hinge propositions, are taken to be those things we need to suppose in order to further our investigations, or carry out our everyday activities. So, for example, the idea that chemical elements could be transmuted into other chemical elements was an absolute presupposition, regulative assumption, or, perhaps it might be said, a hinge proposition, for the alchemists.



I still tend to think the difference between Wittgenstein and the other two, might be that the former would want to say, as suggests, that hinge propositions are true, but not justifiable.

I'm not convinced that it could be consistent with any coherent notion of truth to say that something could be true, yet not justifiable.

Notice I quoted twice where the word "hope" was used. That we "hope" there is such an ascertainable truth indicates that we are uncertain as to whether there is. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, the point is that, following this line of thought, we assume there is an ascertainable truth; we don't take an attitude of uncertainty, because that would be crippling to our investigations. The other point, contra to what Peirce says (perhaps carelessly) there, is that we don't actually need to assume that there is an ascertainable truth (not, at least in every case) at all, we merely need to assume whatever it is that is indispensable to inquiry and can safely leave aside the question of its truth, or we might go further and think that its truth is not ascertainable even in principle.

So, for example, in the case of assuming that every event has a cause, which underpins scientific hypothesis and investigation, we can fully acknowledge that the truth of this assumption could never be ascertained, and yet proceed on the assumption that every event has a cause merely for the sake of seeing what our investigations then lead us to discover.

Remember that, for Peirce, a truth is that which we would never find reason to doubt, no matter how much we investigated it. This is an "in principle" definition, and in practice we can never, at any time, know whether future investigations will find reason to doubt anything we might currently accept as true. This means that all things accepted as true are provisional, all knowledge is fallible.

Science may have held this absolute presupposition, but modern physics forced scientists to reevaluate it, at least for the very small. Not sure whether that supports what you're saying about presuppositions equating to an uncertainty, but developments have lead people to question their presuppositions. — Marchesk

Yeah, that's relevant. My point was that science really is not based on "absolute presuppositions", it's based on descriptions and definitions, and these provide self-evident truths. However, as time passes and knowledge evolves, the descriptions and definitions change as well, such that what was once a self-evident truth may no longer be a self-evident truth. The fact that what was once a self-evident truth, is no longer a self-evident truth, so that its truth or falsity can no longer be ascertained, doesn't qualify it for the what is called an "absolute presupposition". The absolute presupposition is supposed to be neither true nor false at the time it is supposed, yet the self-evident truth is supposed to be true.

In sum, to date, every thing you have written about absolute presuppositions has been plain wrong. — tim wood

I'm just going by what has been posted in this thread. The following:

As I understand it. according to Collingwood absolute presuppositions are the fundamental principles upon which the fields of human inquiry depend. They are understood to be different than propositions in that it is inappropriate to speak about them in terms of truth and falsity. — Janus

In sum, to date, every thing you have written about absolute presuppositions has been plain wrong. — tim wood

So it seems quite clear that an "absolute presupposition" is something which was supposed when there was a lack of evidence as to its truth or falsity, and is therefore nothing more than an uncertain thought.

If you'd like to explain to me what an absolute presupposition "really is", in a way which leaves it not reducible to an uncertain thought, then be my guess.

But as I've explained, I think this proposition of Collingwood's is off base, wrong. I think that science is based on descriptions, definitions, and self-evident truths, not absolute presuppositions. If I misunderstand what an "absolute presupposition" is then pleas explain exactly what it is.

No, the point is that we assume there is an ascertainable truth; we don't take an attitude of uncertainty, because that would be crippling to our investigations. — Janus

That's ridiculous. If we assume that there is ascertainable truth, yet this truth is not already ascertained, then there is uncertainty by the fact that it has not been ascertained. We investigate to find answers because we are uncertain. So it is absolutely necessary that we proceed with an attitude of uncertainty. If we proceeded with an attitude of certainty this would be a bias which would be utterly crippling to the scientific method which is designed with a procedure of objectivity, to avoid such bias.

So, for example, in the case of assuming that every event has a cause, which enables scientific investigation, we can fully acknowledge that the truth of this assumption could never be ascertained, and yet proceed on the assumption that every event has a cause merely for the sake of seeing what our investigations then lead us to discover. — Janus

Either way, if we assume that the truth could never be ascertained, or that the truth is ascertainable, each implies a lack of ascertainment, and that is an attitude of uncertainty. The fact that the truth or falsity of the assumption has not been ascertained indicates that there is uncertainty.

You're conflating two different things here. Of course we must be uncertain about what we will find when we investigate, but we cannot investigate without assuming that nature is invariant, if not deterministically, than at least statistically, and that things have been caused to be the way they are observed to be. We are not uncertain about invariance and causality, even though we know they cannot be proven; they are not what is in question at all in any scientific investigation, instead they are indispensable assumptions.

You seem to want to say they are "uncertain thoughts' just on the basis that they cannot be proven. I don't think that is a helpful way to think about it, but if you insist that that is how you want to think about, I am not going to argue further about that, because I think it is merely a trivial pedantic point which is not at all relevant to the salient point; which is that our scientific inquiries are based on indispensable absolute presuppositions which themselves cannot be demonstrated. If you acknowledge the salient point, or if you do not, yet fail to produce a decent argument why not, then I think we are done here.

However, as time passes and knowledge evolves, the descriptions and definitions change as well, such that what was once a self-evident truth may no longer be a self-evident truth. The fact that what was once a self-evident truth, is no longer a self-evident truth, so that its truth or falsity can no longer be ascertained, doesn't qualify it for the what is called an "absolute presupposition". The absolute presupposition is supposed to be neither true nor false at the time it is supposed, yet the self-evident truth is supposed to be true. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is contradictory nonsense. If something were once really a "self-evident truth" then it could never fail to be true forever. If it later comes to be false, then it was never a self-evident truth in the first place, but at best a provisional truth, that may have seemed to be self-evident to some minds. And that is really the difference between the kind of thinking which underlies the belief in a priori truths, and the kind of thinking that is involved in the notions of absolute presuppositions and regulative assumptions. The latter are not taken to be true and should not be thought about in terms of truth and falsity; the avoidance of thinking about them in terms of truth and falsity is the way to avoid the absurdity involved in the idea of self-evident truths that could later cease to be self-evident truths.

Of course we must be uncertain about what we will find when we investigate, but we cannot investigate without assuming that nature is invariant, if not deterministically, than at least statistically, and that things have been caused to be the way they are observed to be. — Janus

OK, so let's suppose that we assume that nature is invariant, for the purpose of investigation. Either we assume that such is true, In which case it's not an absolute presupposition as described, or we assume that we do not know whether this is true or not, in which case it is an uncertain thought, but also qualifies as an absolute presupposition. What am I missing?

We are not uncertain about invariance and causality, even though we know they cannot be proven; they are not what is in question at all in any scientific investigation, instead they are indispensable assumptions. — Janus

If you claim that we are not uncertain about invariance, then why can't we call it truth. If I am certain of something, I believe it to be true, so why not say that? It's nonsense to say that it's acceptable to claim that you are certain that nature is invariant, yet it's unacceptable to claim that it's true that nature is invariant. If I am certain of X, on what basis do you insist that I ought not say it is true that X.

Why not face the reality, that you are not really certain that nature is invariant, and this is why it cannot be proven? If you are not really certain that nature is invariant, and therefore uncertain, this justifies your claim that you ought not speak about the invariance of nature in terms of truth or falsity.

If something were once really a "self-evident truth" then it could never fail to be true forever. — Janus

A self-evident truth is dependent on the meaning of the terms, definitions. These things change over time. Therefore what was once a self evident truth is not always a self-evident truth. There is no contradiction, because contradiction requires that the same thing is and is not at the same time. The proposition is a self-evident truth at one time, and not a self-evident truth at another time. Where's the contradiction?

The latter are not taken to be true and should not be thought about in terms of truth and falsity; the avoidance of thinking about them in terms of truth and falsity is the way to avoid the absurdity involved in the idea of self-evident truths that could later cease to be self-evident truths. — Janus

The fact that what was once a self-evident truth later ceased to be a self-evident truth is not at all absurd, it's just a reflection of the temporal nature of reality. Things come into being and cease to be, that's what happens in the temporal world. Human knowledge is a part of this temporal reality.

The absurdity is your description of absolute presuppositions, as something you are certain of, but you cannot claim to be true. That this is absurd is self-evident.

What am I missing? — Metaphysician Undercover

The third alternative that you are missing is that we think it is inappropriate to speak about it being true or not, because it is undecidable.

If you claim that we are not uncertain about invariance, then why can't we call it truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can't call it truth because certainty or uncertainty about it is irrelevant to the fact that we merely assume it on account of its indispensability to our investigations.

A self-evident truth is dependent on the meaning of the terms, definitions. These things change over time. Therefore what was once a self evident truth is not always a self-evident truth. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems to be nothing more than sophistry. If we can still understand the definitions that were being used when what is now false was allegedly 'self-evidently true", then its truth, in the context of those definitions, should still be self-evident to us. Can you offer up an example for analysis?

The fact that what was once a self-evident truth later ceased to be a self-evident truth is not at all absurd, it's just a reflection of the temporal nature of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not the one proposing that there are self-evident truths at all, beyond the analytic, and even those may be questionable. However it does seem evident to me that nothing of a temporally contingent nature could ever be self-evident, but would have to be observed to be so or not.

The absurdity is your description of absolute presuppositions, as something you are certain of, but you cannot claim to be true. That this is absurd is self-evident. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's tiring to have to repeatedly correct someone who is repeatedly distorting the intended meanings of my words! I haven't said that we are certain of absolute presuppositions at all, or uncertain about them, but that we assume them for the sake of scientific investigation. (I've also failed to follow my own stipulation that I would not argue over this pedantic point any further).

I'll try one last time to help you to understand the point. Returning to the example of causation; it seems to us that the events we observe have causes, but we also know we cannot prove that all (or even any) events actually do have causes; so, why would we need to claim that it is true that all events must have causes, rather than merely assuming that they do in order to enable our investigations? You need to show what practical advantage it would lend to our investigative abilities to claim that it is true that all events must have causes, rather than merely proceeding on the provisional assumption that they do, if you want to convince me that your harping on this point is not merely pedantic carping.

.

The third alternative that you are missing is that we think it is inappropriate to speak about it being true or not, because it is undecidable. — Janus

If the truth or falsity of a matter is undecidable then thoughts about that matter are uncertain thoughts. That's not a third option, it's the second option.

This seems to be nothing more than sophistry. — Janus

Your argument is deception, describing an uncertain thought and claiming that it's some form of certainty.

Can you offer up an example for analysis? — Janus

Human beings once described the sun and planets as orbiting the earth. That the sun took 24 hours to orbit the earth was a self-evident truth. It's no longer true.

I haven't said that we are certain of absolute presuppositions at all, or uncertain about them, but that we assume them for the sake of scientific investigation. — Janus

You clearly described absolute presuppositions as things which we are uncertain of. Then when I called them "uncertain thoughts", which is how you described them, you objected, as if they were somehow certainties. Now you seem to claim that scientific investigation is based in thoughts which are neither certain nor uncertain.

The issue is that there are two aspects to our approach to scientific investigation, things which we are certain about, and things which we are uncertain about. Proper scientific investigation proceeds by maintaining a clear distinction between these two, to confuse these two is disastrous to science. The conflation of the things which we are certain of, with those that we are uncertain of, and the claim that absolute presuppositions are neither, is a simple violation of the fundamental laws of logic. Any description which violates the fundamental laws of logic is wrong. Therefore this description of the foundations of science, as "absolute presuppositions", is wrong.

I'll try one last time to help you to understand the point. Returning to the example of causation; it seems to us that the events we observe have causes, but we also know we cannot prove that all (or even any) events actually do have causes; so, why would we need to claim that it is true that all events must have causes, rather than merely assuming that they do in order to enable our investigations? — Janus

You are just describing the problem of induction. We see through observation that all events have causes, but the proof is in inductive reasoning, and the problem of induction allows you to deny that this proof proves. Therefore any principle known by induction cannot be known with certainty, and cannot be called "a truth". Because of this, you would claim that any premise based in induction is neither true nor false. But this would render all deductive logic which follows from these inductive premises as unsound. Therefore your approach renders everything which follows from scientific investigation as unsound.

You need to show what practical advantage it would lend to our investigative abilities to claim that it is true that all events must have causes, rather than merely proceeding on the provisional assumption that they do, if you want to convince me that your harping on this point is not merely pedantic carping. — Janus

The practical advantage is that by distinguishing true from false in inductive reasoning, we have the means whereby we can judge inductive reasoning and the premises upon which scientific knowledge is based, so that not all scientific knowledge is classed together as unsound. We turn to the accuracy of descriptions and definitions to judge the validity, and determine the truthfulness of scientific premises based in induction, instead of just claiming that such principles are neither true nor false because inductive reasoning cannot give us truth.

How low can you go?

Your techniques are those of a Trump. — tim wood

Coin that, you've just designed the worst possible insult.

Let me be succinct. To describe a proposition, assumption, or presupposition, as neither true nor false is to violate the law of excluded middle. Any description which violates the law of excluded middle is illogical. Therefore the description of "absolute presuppositions", which describes these as neither true nor false is illogical.

Your remarks on the topic in the face of repeated references and descriptions is not reasoned argument, rather it is a form of badger-like viciousness. — tim wood

If, to point out that one's position is illogical is to be vicious, then you are correct to accuse me of viciousness.

↪tim wood
How low can you go?
Your techniques are those of a Trump.
— tim wood
Coin that, you've just designed the worst possible insult.

Let me be succinct. To describe a proposition, assumption, or presupposition, as neither true nor false is to violate the law of excluded middle. Any description which violates the law of excluded middle is illogical. Therefore the description of "absolute presuppositions", which describes these as neither true nor false is illogical.

Your remarks on the topic in the face of repeated references and descriptions is not reasoned argument, rather it is a form of badger-like viciousness.
— tim wood

If, to point out that one's position is illogical is to be vicious, then you are correct to accuse me of viciousness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't troll me. Your reply shows just two things: you either never read or never understood anything I wrote about them, and you have never troubled, and apparently don't intend to trouble, to find out what what they are.

To be completely clear, I never said they were neither true not false. I did say that their truth or falsity was irrelevant. Here is what the author says for anyone else interested - I realize I am wasting my time so far as you're concerned, because you're entirely committed to your display of ignorance and apparently proud of it.

"Prop. 5. Absolute presuppositions are not propositions.

"This is because they are never answers to questions (def. 6); whereas a proposition (def.1) is that which is stated, and whatever is stated (prop. 1) is stated in answer to a question. The point I am trying to make clear goes beyond what I have just been saying, viz. that the logical efficacy of an absolute presupposition is independent of its being true: it is that the distinction between truth and falsehood does not apply to absolute presuppositions at all, that distinction being (see def. 1) peculiar to propositions.

"Putting the same point differently: absolute presuppositions are never (see def. 1) propounded. I do not mean that they sometimes go unpropounded, like the so-called 'propositions' of the fashionable modern logic, which are called propositions even when nobody in fact propounds them, and would on that account be more accurately called 'proponibles'; I mean that they are never propounded at all. To be propounded is not their business; their business is to be presupposed. The scientist's business is not to propound them but only to presuppose them. The metaphysician's business, as we shall see, is not to propound them but to propound the proposition that this or that one of them is presupposed" (An Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 32-33, R. G. Collingwood).

This is actually a striking and exciting idea. Once understood, it immediately breaks one free from the chains of dogma.

Here's a challenge - let me be even more specific: I challenge you: Make clear that you have researched absolute presuppositions to the point where you can exhibit that understanding and make clear that you understand what they are. Then argue them, up or down, either way. Until you do, what you write is error and misleading: you dis-serve everyone who reads your posts. That is, put up or shut up.

OK, an absolute presupposition is different from a proposition in the sense that the distinction of truth or falsehood does not apply to them. Why would you not accept that what you have described is what I call an "uncertain thought"? Propositions which we are certain of, we describe in terms of truth and falsehood, this is a representation of our certainty. To say that something is true or false indicates one's certainty. If an absolute presupposition falls outside of these descriptive terms, then why is the absolute presupposition not an uncertainty? If we do not say that absolute presuppositions are true or false, this indicates that they are uncertainties.

Make clear that you have researched absolute presuppositions to the point where you can exhibit that understanding and make clear that you understand what they are. Then argue them, up or down, either way. Until you do, what you write is error and misleading: you dis-serve everyone who reads your posts. That is, put up or shut — tim wood

I've seen enough information about absolute presuppositions to know that the description of them places them into the category of uncertainties. if you truly believe that I am wrong about this, then please, by all means demonstrate that you have a better understanding of "absolute presuppositions" than I, and show how I am wrong. If not, then accept my description and we can proceed to discuss what, if any role, uncertain thoughts play in science and metaphysics. And quit the fuss, you're like a child wrongfully accusing me of bullying.

I've seen enough information about absolute presuppositions to know that the description of them places them into the category of uncertainties. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then I'm sorry to say you have not learned from it.

In German are the verbs können and fahren, to be able to and to travel respectively. In their conjugations are forms that to the English ear are both crude and rude. Imagine I went to Germany and was incensed by the crudeness of their speech and their personal rudeness in using such terms. If, on being apprised these were perfectly good German words that merely sound bad to English ears but have nothing to do with English, I continued to protest and pressed the issue long enough and far enough, good folks would tell me to be still, learn some German, and be quiet until I had.

We're in that position. You can if you want to transliterate fahrt and könnt into obscene English, but to what end, to serve what point? Similarly, you can if you want "transliterate" absolute presupposition into proposition. Then you can say whatever you want about the proposition. But to what end, to serve what point? And of course what you say about the proposition has nothing to do with the absolute presupposition.

Why not just try to understand them for what they are? If you want to call them "uncertain," I suppose ultimately you can. But since that designation is irrelevant, then why not call them also bing cherries or horse chestnuts?

I hear a loud BANG! I look outside to see what caused it. Perhaps I ask a neighbor. Perhaps I'm reduced to speculation. If we analyze this, which in this case would be tedious, we might work backwards through a lot of questions (and answers) to this: something caused the explosion - how do I know that something caused the explosion? And this would a question for which I have no answer. It might be a relative supposition on my part that a car backfired (i.e., did a car backfire cause the bang?), or a jet broke the sound barrier (did a jet fly by?), or any number of such questions. But I wouldn't ask if the explosion had a cause - that I would take for granted; that would be for me an absolute presupposition; that would be my ground, my logical starting point.

Is it "uncertain" that everything that happens has a cause? You answer. And whatever you answer, it is irrelevant to the fact that for me it is an absolute presupposition of my beliefs about the explosion.

In the same way all endeavor rests on absolute presuppositions. To be sure, ancient ones might sound ridiculous to you and me. But it would be a mistake to dismiss them, because they were the foundation for the machinery that got that work done. And we all everyone at every level have them now. But they're hard to ferret out. Some are obvious (hidden in plain sight, as it were): God, for Christians; Allah, for Muslims; none of the above, for atheists. Unlike most APs, these are often made explicit and questioned. But most APs lurk in the background.

Earlier I suggested that the belief that a sterile bandage could be got from the pharmacist when needed stood as an absolute presupposition. When you need one, do you question it?

Perhaps you don't think the notion that everything that happens has a cause is a supposition. Maybe it's just a fact. I asked you above either to prove it by recourse to a more fundamental presupposition, or to prove it without any presuppositions at all. That question still stands. I would argue that it's unprovable, but that it is an absolute presupposition in a lot of thinking.

I suppose the end is this. You can if you choose ignore what absolute presuppositions are, and in that ignorance continue to be ill-informed about them - and I shall have to learn to ignore it when you express that ignorance. Or you can do a better job of learning what they are. I imagine you can do it!

I thought this thread was in general philosophy; how did it get into the lounge - or is that where it always was?

Similarly, you can if you want "transliterate" absolute presupposition into proposition. Then you can say whatever you want about the proposition. — tim wood

Clearly I recognize the difference between an absolute presupposition and a proposition. We describe propositions in terms of certainty, truth and falsity. We do not describe absolute presuppositions in these terms, so I conclude we describe them in terms of uncertainty. So I have not been trying to translate one to the other, I've been trying to relate one to the other.

Why not just try to understand them for what they are? If you want to call them "uncertain," I suppose ultimately you can. But since that designation is irrelevant, then why not call them also bing cherries or horse chestnuts? — tim wood

You have claimed that absolute presuppositions are fundamental to science. Therefore whether they are certain or uncertain is extremely relevant. It's .nonsense to point out the foundational elements of epistemology and then claim that it's irrelevant whether they are certainties or uncertainties.

As fundamental to epistemology, clearly it is relevant whether we are certain about them or not. Furthermore, propositions form the body of epistemology, so we need to find a relationship between propositions and absolute presuppositions if they truly are fundamental to epistemology. Therefore my act of establishing a relationship between propositions and absolute presuppositions, by means of the terms stated above, certainty and uncertainty, is warranted, and relevant.

Why not just try to understand them for what they are? — tim wood

That's exactly what I am trying to do, understand them for what they are. They are said to be fundamental to science, yet truth and falsehood is irrelevant to them. From the former I conclude that they play a key role in epistemology, and from the latter I conclude that we have no certainty concerning them.

But I wouldn't ask if the explosion had a cause - that I would take for granted; that would be for me an absolute presupposition; that would be my ground, my logical starting point. — tim wood

I would call this an intuition. That's the word Aristotle, as well as others used to describe this type f knowledge, "intuition". Are you comfortable categorizing an absolute presupposition as an intuition? I would say that "intuition" has a broader meaning such that an absolute presupposition is a type of intuition, where there would be other types of intuitions as well. An absolute presupposition would be a pure intuition, while a relative presupposition would be less pure.

Is it "uncertain" that everything that happens has a cause? You answer. And whatever you answer, it is irrelevant to the fact that for me it is an absolute presupposition of my beliefs about the explosion. — tim wood

Whether or not the absolute presupposition is uncertain may be irrelevant to you, the one presupposing it, but to the metaphysician who is analyzing it in relation to epistemology, the degree of certainty of the absolute presupposition is extremely relevant.

Here's another thing to consider. To you, being the one presupposing, and acting on this intuition, the presupposition has the effect of having a high degree of certainty. You act on it without doubting it, therefore it appears like you hold this belief with a high degree of certitude. That is your personal attitude, which is a subjective certainty. To the metaphysician, who seeks to observe these intuitive activities, that activity is activity which is unjustifiable and is therefore based in uncertainty. Until the intuitions, absolute presuppositions, can be brought out, stated in the form of propositions, and justified, these intuitions are uncertainties to the metaphysician.

In the same way all endeavor rests on absolute presuppositions. To be sure, ancient ones might sound ridiculous to you and me. But it would be a mistake to dismiss them, because they were the foundation for the machinery that got that work done. And we all everyone at every level have them now. But they're hard to ferret out. Some are obvious (hidden in plain sight, as it were): God, for Christians; Allah, for Muslims; none of the above, for atheists. Unlike most APs, these are often made explicit and questioned. But most APs lurk in the background. — tim wood

So once the absolute presuppositions are "ferreted out", they may be stated, and are put in the form of propositions. At this time they can be judged for truth or falsity. Prior to this, they are intuitions, tendencies in one's actions, a hunch that worked so you follow it. They really cannot be judged for truth or falsity, nor stated as propositions, because they are not understood, nor are the words available. When the action is repeated time and again, the reasons for the action start to come to light, the words to describe these reasons are produced, and the intuition is ferreted out, stated as a proposition so that it may be judged.

Perhaps you don't think the notion that everything that happens has a cause is a supposition. — tim wood

The notion that everything which happens has a cause is a very ancient intuition. It has already been ferreted out by Aristotle, and forms the basis of the cosmological argument. In its propositional forms, the most common being the principle of sufficient reason, it is judged by some as true and by others as false. This reflects its uncertainty.

I thought this thread was in general philosophy; how did it get into the lounge - or is that where it always was? — tim wood

Being in the lounge we're allowed to use bad language, insult each other, maybe even throw things at each other. It's all in good fun until someone gets hurt.

so I conclude we describe them in terms of uncertainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

The form of your argument here is that you say they're a or b or c. You have determined they're neither a nor b, therefore they must be c. Petitio Principii, false alternatives, don't waste my time.

And, the proposition that whatever happens has a cause is uncertain? You can call APs whatever you want, but there's a question as to the accuracy and efficacy of the name you use. If you describe the absolute presupposition (AP) as "uncertain," what does that mean? One thing it does not mean is that the people who held them as APs thought them uncertain - if they thought about them at all. Nor does it mean that the proposition that they actually held the particular AP in question as an AP, is uncertain. So what is uncertain?

The only thing that might be uncertain is the AP taken out of its context as an AP and regarded as a proposition. You and I likely agree that sacrificing virgins to the volcano god doesn't affect the cycle of volcanic activity. But what of it? Some people did. The value of APs isn't that the people who held them knew something that you don't (although they might), rather it is that they held them at all, and you and I learn something by knowing a) that they held them and b) that they're a thing to be held.

You have claimed that absolute presuppositions are fundamental to science. — Metaphysician Undercover

No one (that I know of) has claimed anything of the kind. If i were to claim anything, it would be that anyone engaged in any enterprise including science holds some ideas/notions/understandings as absolutely presupposed in his or her thinking.

Therefore whether they are certain or uncertain is extremely relevant. It's .nonsense to point out the foundational elements of epistemology and then claim that it's irrelevant whether they are certainties or uncertainties. — Metaphysician Undercover

You simply don't get it, do you. You really, really want that AP to be a proposition so that you can critique it in your own way in your own terms. First: your claim as to the relevance of "certainty" is itself irrelevant. The question is not whether some AP is true; the question is, did some group of people at some time hold it as an AP (and what can be learned from that). Some cannibals believe in the benefits of eating the enemy soldier they killed. Were you at a convention of anthropologists arguing that such a thing were nonsense and "uncertain," I don't think they would indulge you for any great length of time. Likely they would simply explain to you that you clearly had no idea what they were about, and to that degree, no clue as to what you were yourself doing.

So you can see that the question is not, Is there any benefit to be had from eating the freshly killed enemy? rather it is, is that an AP of their system of beliefs and practices? This latter question is one of substance, resolvable through research. If answerable at all, it becomes a matter of fact.

No one claims, unless you do, that APs are "foundational elements of epistomolgy." The criteria of such things - whatever they are - is misapplied to APs.

As fundamental to epistemology, clearly it is relevant whether we are certain about them or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

You see - likely you don't - that you have created your own world of understanding within which you're operating. The only trouble is that you're not understanding your object as it is for what it is, but instead as you take them to be to serve your own purpose. If this, if that, if those, then conclusion. The trouble is that your ifs are no good and the argument doesn't follow.

Why not just try to understand them for what they are?
— tim wood

That's exactly what I am trying to do, understand them for what they are. They are said to be fundamental to science, yet truth and falsehood is irrelevant to them. From the former I conclude that they play a key role in epistemology, and from the latter I conclude that we have no certainty concerning them.

You're exactly not. For some reason you insist they are something other than what they are, that you want them to be, so that you can create useless arguments and useless and false conclusions.

But I wouldn't ask if the explosion had a cause - that I would take for granted; that would be for me an absolute presupposition; that would be my ground, my logical starting point.
— tim wood

I would call this an intuition.

No. It seems to me that one aspect of understanding what an AP is, is that once understood, one is free forever from the notion that there is only one way of doing or thinking about anything. There is no "right" way. History shows that some ways are better than other ways - for our purposes. From "intuition" I infer a movement toward "certainty," even if understood as as only provisional certainy, certainty "on the way" so to speak. But this certainty of which you write - what, exactly, is that? Isn't the existence of that "certainty" a presupposition of your thinking?

who is analyzing it in relation to epistemology, the degree of certainty of the absolute presupposition is extremely relevant.

Sure, ok. and perhaps also in relation to the knitting of Guernsey sweaters?

Let's go this way: in as much as you now claim some knowledge of what an absolute presupposition is, in a well-crafted sentence or two, tell us. Never mind what you think of or about them, just what they are.

In another well-crafted few sentences, tell us exactly what an Aristotelian "intuition" is. Is, in Aristotle's terms not yours. And not what you think about them. Just what they are. In this I'm holding you to a reply of not more than a few sentences. Maybe that way we can keep this manageable.

I'm not convinced that it could be consistent with any coherent notion of truth to say that something could be true, yet not justifiable. — Janus

Why not? Truth and justification are quite distinct, after all; they are independent of each other.

The trouble with a presupposition's not being true is that it could not then be used to make any deductions - if it is not true, nothing true could follow from it.

What is your problem, MU? You don't read, you don't understand, you're non-responsive, you're not interested in anything except your own ideas, and your last resort is that of a scoundrel: mere invective. Am I an asshole? Of course I am! What does that have to do with anything? A 20th century philosopher, R.G. Collingwood, wrote a very interesting book which contains compelling ideas compellingly argued. I've tried to share them. And you, in a stunning display of arrogant ignorance, have made every effort to discredit them, absent, apparently, any effort even to understand them. And you are careful to ignore those parts of my posts that either are quotes, or make clear arguments, or answer specific questions I've asked. Clearly it's all about you; you're playing your private game, that has little or nothing to do with philosophic endeavor. So, it's all yours. Enjoy your "wisdom."

Why not? Truth and justification are quite distinct, after all; they are independent of each other. — Banno

I don't see that; it seems to me that if truth and falsity are properties of propositions. then the truth of a proposition is justified by its accordance with actuality. this is the logic in "Snow is white is true" iff snow is white. Perhaps I am using "justification" in a way somewhat different than you might be accustomed to; for me it is synonymous with 'verification".

So, I think the verification of a statement just is its truth and the falsification of a statement is its falsity; truth and falsity are not some substantive metaphysical essence that stands beyond the processes of verification and falsification.Truth is simply the property, accordance with actuality, we mean to ascribe to statements that we believe do accord with actuality.

The same logic is inherent in Aristotle's "To say that that which is, is not, and that which is not, is, is a falsehood; therefore, to say that which is, is, and that which is not, is not, is true".

This does not mean that we can perceive some purported accordance-as-metaphysical-essence or relation; it just expresses the straightforward logic of our thinking about truth and actuality. Obviously, we don't perceive the exhaustive or absolute nature of actuality, but the point is that what we think is the truth is that which we have no reason to doubt after exhausting our possibility of investigation. It seems reasonable to say that there are actualities which are beyond our grasp, but not that are truths beyond our grasp, since truths only seem to exist in relation to minds, whereas actualities could conceivably exist independent of minds. It seems pointless to try to dig any deeper than that.

The trouble with a presupposition's not being true is that it could not then be used to make any deductions - if it is not true, nothing true could follow from it. — Banno

It is not that deductions are made from absolute propositions, but rather abductive and inductive inferences are grounded upon them. So, to return to the absolute presupposition that every event has a cause, the whole of science has been made possible by this "regulative assumption". The truth or falsity of scientific theories cannot be deductively proven; this is uncontroversial in philosophy of science; so deduction is not really the salient issue.

No, that's not the form of my argument at all. There is no third option. My argument is that there are two options, A and B, where B is opposed to A. Thoughts may be described in terms of certainty or uncertainty. Thoughts which are certain, such as those expressed by propositions, are described by the terms of certainty, which are "true" and "false". Absolute presuppositions are not described in terms of certainty, therefore they are uncertain thoughts. — Metaphysician Undercover

If all you are doing is using "uncertain" as a synonym for "undecidable" then I would agree with you. But if you want to say that absolute presuppositions are uncertain in the sense that they might turn out to be true or false, then I would disagree, because 'undecidable' means that they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false. We are certain of their undecidablility, because they are things which cannot be either empirically or logically confirmed.

But if you want to say that absolute presuppositions are uncertain in the sense that they might turn out to be true or false, then I would disagree, because 'undecidable' means that they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false — Janus

We need to ask then, in what sense are they "undecidable". If it's as per the quote you gave me from Peirce, "we hope that there is some ascertainable truth", then the belief that "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false", would constitute contradictory beliefs. In the one case we would recognize that they could never turn out to be true or false, and in the other case we would hold out hope that there was ascertainable truth. These two are inconsistent, incompatible.

We are certain of their undecidablility, because they are things which cannot be either empirically or logically confirmed. — Janus

I really don't think that this is the case with absolute presuppositions. I think the hope is there, that they will be decisively proven at some future time. That's my opinion. However, having the nature of uncertainty, one person's attitude toward an absolute presupposition might be different from another's. So some people who hold a particular absolute presupposition, might have hope that it could be decided in the future, while others might believe it is impossible for it to be decided ever. That's the nature of subjectivity.

This is why it is important to determine the precise characteristics of what it means to be an absolute presupposition. We need to find the precise thing which is referred to and analyze it. Only then can we make an informed judgement as to whether or not there is hope of ever proving one true or false. I believe that we ought not do as tim woods does, and continually make blind assertions concerning the nature of absolute presuppositions, denying the descriptions provided by others, we need to really look at what they are and agree on descriptive terms.

As I explained already, if the idea that all things have a cause, is an absolute presupposition, the nature of this particular presupposition has already been explained by Aristotle in his Physics. And it now exists in a propositional form, as the principle of sufficient reason. Therefore it would be incorrect to say that an absolute presupposition could never be rendered in a propositional form. Perhaps it loses it's status as an absolute presupposition if rendered in propositional form, but that would be a different matter.

We could look at some other absolute presuppositions as examples. There must be some such presuppositions in relation to space and time, what Kant calls pure intuitions.

If it's as per the quote you gave me from Peirce, "we hope that there is some ascertainable truth", then the belief that "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false", would constitute contradictory beliefs. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think Peirce, as a good scientist, allows for the possibility, and even hope, that what is understood to be possible in principle in the future may not be the same as it is understood now. So I see no contradiction there.

I really don't think that this is the case with absolute presuppositions. I think the hope is there, that they will be decisively proven at some future time. That's my opinion. However, having the nature of uncertainty, one person's attitude toward an absolute presupposition might be different from another's. So some people who hold a particular absolute presupposition, might have hope that it could be decided in the future, while others might believe it is impossible for it to be decided ever. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, what you point to there is a difference of dispositions in relation to beliefs, and yes, of course, there will be such differences between individuals, and this might be a difference between Peirce and Collingwood. As it stands now, though, we can only see two ways in which propositions can be confirmed, the one certain and the other forever uncertain, in the final analysis. So deductively logical confirmation is certain, because it is dealing with tautologies, with the fact that true premises must, deductively speaking, yield true conclusions. Inductively logical confirmation is uncertain, or only relatively certain, insofar as it is a matter of empirical observation and is always contingent upon empirically observable events and matters of fact.

So, the idea that every event has a cause is neither logically nor empirically confirmable, and hence is undecidable in principle. However, we are committed to the idea, because it is indispensable to, because absolutely presupposed by, all our investigations of anything. Although we might say that it seems logically impossible to us that something could come from nothing, or come about without cause, nonetheless that may just reflect the way we are constitutionally determined to interpret events; so that without the assumption of causation there could be no interpretation of the general nature of events possible for us.

So, we can say that the idea is epistemologically necessary, but not that it is ontologically necessary, unless we wish to conflate knowing with being. And indeed, QM gives us some reason to think that causation has no absolute provenance. Whatever way you look at it; from the current situation of human knowledge, the question would seem to be undecidable, so we can be certain of its undecidablitiy now, and more certain of its future decidability (since there is not even a hint of a foreseeable means to decide it) than that the question will be answerable in the future. The other point is that an answer to the negative would seem to be fatal for all future inquiry.

I really don't think that this is the case with absolute presuppositions. I think the hope is there, that they will be decisively proven at some future time. That's my opinion. However, having the nature of uncertainty, one person's attitude toward an absolute presupposition might be different from another's. — Metaphysician Undercover

My last word on the topic of absolute presuppositions. "Absolute presupposition" and for that matter "relative presupposition," as used by R.G. Collingwood in An Essay on Metaphysics, are terms of art with precise and determined meanings. There is no need to wonder about them, and there are no grounds for "opinions" about what they are. What they are is simply a matter of fact, that anyone can learn by perusing the first few chapters of his book. Any discussion that veers from those understandings, without first having clearly understood them, is just nonsense. And they're not difficult to understand.

I go out to the parking lot to get my car to go to work. I (relatively) presuppose the car is there. The relative presupposition is the answer to the question, where is the car? And indeed it may not be there. It may have been stolen, or maybe I parked it somewhere else and forgot where I parked it. The significance of the relative presupposition, then, has nothing to do with its being true (the car is in the lot where I think it is) or false (the car is not in fact there); rather it has to do with its efficacy in facilitating my thinking. Now, in the terminology of the thing, the relative presupposition is also a proposition. As a proposition it may well be true or false, but as a relative presupposition its function is to be presupposed.

Why "relative"? "By a relative presupposition I mean one which stands relatively to one question as its presupposition, and relatively to another as its answer." (29)

My car is in the lot presupposes I have a car and the car is somewhere; i.e., do I have a car? And it answers the question, where is it? Clearly in this example, the questions aren't usually verbalized, but they're logically implied. If I did not own a car, if I did not think it was in the lot, then I wouldn't go out to the lot to drive it away, and so forth.

What then is an absolute presupposition? "An absolute presupposition is one which stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer." (31).

The alchemist, trying to turn tin into gold, or whatever, makes any number of relative presuppositions. But what does he absolutely presuppose? That there exists a method, which he intends to find, of accomplishing his goal of turning tin into gold.

The cannibal eats the enemy he just killed because he absolutely presupposes he's better off for doing it, and worse off for not.

The witch doctor sacrifices virgins to the volcano god because he absolutely supposes that his efforts will mean fewer volcanic eruptions.

Any natural scientist absolutely presupposes one god - monotheism. That is, the world is absolutely presupposed to operate under one set of rules and not many sets of irreconcilable rules, and that the one set is valid both here and there. (And because the presupposed god is perfect, the nature of his creation is absolutely presupposed to be comprehensible within the bounds of scientific thinking). That is, "[N]atural scientists standing in the Greek tradition absolutely presuppose in all their inquiries
1. That there is a world of nature....
2. That this world of nature is a world of events....
3. That throughout this world there is one set of laws according to which all movements or events, in spite of all differences, agree in happening; and that consequently there is one science of this world.
4....." (222-223).

None of these, alchemist, cannibal, witch doctor, or modern natural scientist asks if his absolute presupposition is true. He simply absolutely presupposes it. That does not mean it is true. But it also means that as an absolute presupposition, the question as to its truth is irrelevant. One determines if in fact such an absolute presupposition is being made, and that's that, period.

If you identify an ancient absolute presupposition for the purpose of mocking it and laughing at it and the people who held it, you can do so if that's what you think is valuable. But are you prepared to mock and laugh at modern natural science? Or everyone, for that matter. The point is that thinking involves relative presuppositions (I have a car, where is it? It is in the parking lot), and absolute presuppositions (cars exist; I don't question that.) And in as much as everyone thinks, everyone has - makes - both relative and absolute presuppositions. Collingwood's argument is that metaphysics is an historical science, and the metaphysician's business is to figure out what absolute presuppositions have in fact been made by various groups of people at various times - including the present and near past.

Any discussion of these terms of art absent understanding - which understanding can be perfected by very simple research - or their value or significance is just ignorance talking nonsense. And this material is too simple for that to be excusable.

I'm a big fan of Collingwood, and I've enjoyed reading your erudite exposition of his concepts, even in such a challenging environment as 'the lounge' (which I hardly ever venture into for this reason), but I'm not sure where you're going with this last post, particularly "... If you identify an ancient absolute presupposition for the purpose of mocking it and laughing at it and the people who held it, you can do so if that's what you think is valuable. But are you prepared to mock and laugh at modern natural science? Or everyone, for that matter. ". Surely one of the things it is reasonable to take away from Collingwood is that some presumptions which seem to be absolute presuppositions turn out, on analysis, to be either relative presuppositions, or not to be presuppositions at all, but propositions. That is, surely the point of analysing them?

It is in this sense that one can mock (or critique, depending on one's disposition) those presumptions which appear to be ancient absolute presuppositions, by revealing them to be, in fact, relative presuppositions, or indeed propositions posited as an answer to a specific question (and if shown to be a ridiculous answer, then one deserving of all the mockery it gets).

You seem to be implying (and I'm open to the possibility I've simply misinterpreted you) that if a presumption appears prima facae to be an absolute presupposition (such as that of your virgin-sacrificing volcano worshippers), then it must be fairly treated as such without question, and I'm fairly certain that is not what Collingwood is saying.

Furthermore, I realise you must be tired of the harassment you've had for trying to explain these ideas, but I think you have gone too far in dismissing possible criticisms of Collingwood's terms, even within his own framework. A philosopher will rarely define a term as being simply 'all that with property x'. It is more usually (and certainly so in Collingwood's case) that terms are defined as 'all that with properties x, y and z'. It therefore leaves open the possibility that one does not need to take his definition of terms as fact prior to critique. If one could, for example, demonstrate that there are no x's that are also y's then his definition is incoherent. I'm not saying that Collingwood's is, but that your refusal to acknowledge that the definitions themselves can be analysed for their rigour goes too far.

I hope you don't take these as excessively negative. It's just that defending the concept of absolute presuppositions is something I think is quite important and I wanted to plug any gaps I thought might be there.

i

I think Peirce, as a good scientist, allows for the possibility, and even hope, that what is understood to be possible in principle in the future may not be the same as it is understood now. So I see no contradiction there. — Janus

What do you mean no contradiction? You said "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false". Clearly that contradicts "we hope that there is some ascertainable truth", "possible in principle in the future". One expresses hope, the other no hope.

As it stands now, though, we can only see two ways in which propositions can be confirmed, the one certain and the other forever uncertain, in the final analysis. — Janus

Propositions are confirmed as either true or false. They cannot be confirmed as "forever uncertain". That's nonsense which you are making up.

So deductively logical confirmation is certain, because it is dealing with tautologies, with the fact that true premises must, deductively speaking, yield true conclusions. Inductively logical confirmation is uncertain, or only relatively certain, insofar as it is a matter of empirical observation and is always contingent upon empirically observable events and matters of fact. — Janus

Deductive logic alone cannot produce certainty because it cannot confirm the truth or falsity of its premises, and it requires premises. Truth or falsity of the premise is most often confirmed with inductive reasoning. If you deny that inductive reasoning can produce certainty, you deny the possibility of certainty altogether. That is what you have done here, denied the possibility of certainty.

So, the idea that every event has a cause is neither logically nor empirically confirmable, and hence is undecidable in principle. — Janus

You've just denied the possibility that we could be certain about anything. Everything, even the idea that every event has a cause, is undecidable in principle, when your principles are such as you have described, because you deny the possibility of certainty.

So, we can say that the idea is epistemologically necessary... — Janus

You haven't shown that it is epistemologically necessary though. You have just asserted that it is indispensable to all our investigations. That particular "absolute presupposition", if it is true that such are required for investigation, is responsible for some particular investigations, but from another "absolute presupposition", other investigations follow. So that particular "absolute presupposition" is not necessary.

Surely one of the things it is reasonable to take away from Collingwood is that some presumptions which seem to be absolute presuppositions turn out, on analysis, to be either relative presuppositions, or not to be presuppositions at all, but propositions. That is, surely the point of analysing them? — Pseudonym

I accept your correction and criticism (I actually appreciate it!) I think you're right maybe except for a small point. The metaphysical analysis that's supposed to identify APs is according to the author an historical science. I understand that to mean that he, the historical scientist, aka metaphysical analyst or just analyst, after suitable research, publishes a statement to the effect that this bunch of folks held such-an-such as an AP during that period of history. As such, it is a fact supported by research - or overturned by subsequent research as you suggest is possible. If true and accurate, then that bunch of folks actually did hold such an AP and presuppose it in their endeavors.

Likely most APs, once identified, and especially if ancient, likely don't cut it in modern science, or politics, or religion, or whatever. But this doesn't touch them as APs. Rather it evaluates them as current propositions.

APs held by you and me and everyone else are hard (I find it hard) to make explicit. The best I can do to detect them is ask "why" until I hit a dead end - not necessarily a stone wall, but rather a place where progress ends. Above is the example of a fellow who needs a sterile bandage. For him it is an AP that he can buy one at the local pharmacy. Ask him why he thinks that and you likely won't get very far.

The push to regard APs as ordinary propositions is strong and naturally so. One form of innoculation against the pressure is to remember that the AP is always (formally) a statement about what some person or group of people in fact did.

There is a strong analogue between grasping what APs are and belief in religion. Skeptics (to throw a large and varied group into one bag) always ask if God exists. The believer, after long and mature thought that lies yet in the skeptic's future, answers that the existence of God is not a question for him; he believes in God; God is an absolute presupposition of his belief. The skeptic connects belief with necessary existence, both a failure of understanding and metaphysical error, along the lines of supposing that because your mother should love you, that she actually does.

Collingwood's rule that covers this is simply that APs are not propositions ("because they're never an answer to a question"). The proposition that an AP was or is held (by someone at some time) is simply a statement of a fact presumably based on research.

And after a while it all seems wonderfully simple and freeing. No more struggling to reconcile irreconcilable ideas: it instead becomes a matter of studying how they thought, and perhaps subsequenty bringing that into juxtaposition with what we think. It enables one to think not that they're "clearly" wrong, but rather that they simply understood the world differently and as best they could by their lights.

As a corollary, it fits with the notion that languages, many of which have disappeared and many more of which are on the cusp, can be and in many cases are (were) repositories of knowledge that modern western man does not have.

What do you mean no contradiction? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no contradiction involved in saying that what seems impossible in principle now may not seem so in the future; in other words there may appear a foreseeable way to answer questions about which there is presently no foreseeable way to answer them.

Propositions are confirmed as either true or false. They cannot be confirmed as "forever uncertain". That's nonsense which you are making up. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again you're distorting what I've said. I am saying that, according to contemporary philosophy of science it is not controversial that scientific knowledge is fallible; it is not certain.

Deductive logic alone cannot produce certainty because it cannot confirm the truth or falsity of its premises, and it requires premises. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you're agreeing with me. The deductive certainty as I already explained is that the conclusion must follow from the premises if the argument is valid. Whether or not the premises are true is the uncertain, empirical part.

because you deny the possibility of certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I do, because that is the way it is with our knowledge. The only deductive certainty is validity and tautology, neither of which count as substantive truth. The only certainty with regard to substantive truth is empirical "certainty", which is fallible. The closest we can get to certainty is where we have no reason to doubt.

That particular "absolute presupposition", if it is true that such are required for investigation, is responsible for some particular investigations, but from another "absolute presupposition", other investigations follow. So that particular "absolute presupposition" is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

If by "that particular absolute presupposition" you mean the idea that every event is caused, made possible by certain other conditions, then what kind of investigations are you alluding to that could dispense with that idea? Please provide an example.

Why do you say that an absolute presupposition "never answers a question" then give examples, each of which is an answer to a question. You make such a fuss about how little I know about absolute presuppositions, and how I misunderstand the whole concept, yet you give examples which clearly contradict the description you give. I really think that you know less about this then I do, and I quite obviously know very little. But I think that it's worse when you know little, to think that you know a lot.

The alchemist, trying to turn tin into gold, or whatever, makes any number of relative presuppositions. But what does he absolutely presuppose? That there exists a method, which he intends to find, of accomplishing his goal of turning tin into gold. — tim wood

This cannot be an absolute presupposition because it answers the question of is there a method to turn tine to gold, with Yes, there is such a method.

The cannibal eats the enemy he just killed because he absolutely presupposes he's better off for doing it, and worse off for not. — tim wood

This cannot be an absolute presupposition because they do not answer questions, and this answers the question of am I better off eating the enemy.

The witch doctor sacrifices virgins to the volcano god because he absolutely supposes that his efforts will mean fewer volcanic eruptions. — tim wood

Once again, an answer to a question. Why do you think that these examples are of absolute presuppositions rather than relative presuppositions? They all appear as relative presuppositions to me.

The significance of the relative presupposition, then, has nothing to do with its being true (the car is in the lot where I think it is) or false (the car is not in fact there); rather it has to do with its efficacy in facilitating my thinking. — tim wood

It's very clearly not true that the significance of the relative presupposition has nothing to do with its truth or falsity. It may be true that it facilitates thinking, but the truth or falsity of the presupposition leads one toward either appropriate, or mistaken thinking respectively. Thinking itself is insignificant, it may be completely random, but whether the thinking is correct thinking, or incorrect thinking is what is significant, and this is determined by the truth or falsity of the relative presupposition.

Are you ever going to get to the question of the nature of the absolute presupposition? That's what you're talking about isn't it?

Any natural scientist absolutely presupposes one god - monotheism. That is, the world is absolutely presupposed to operate under one set of rules and not many sets of irreconcilable rules, and that the one set is valid both here and there. (And because the presupposed god is perfect, the nature of his creation is absolutely presupposed to be comprehensible within the bounds of scientific thinking). That is, "[N]atural scientists standing in the Greek tradition absolutely presuppose in all their inquiries
1. That there is a world of nature....
2. That this world of nature is a world of events....
3. That throughout this world there is one set of laws according to which all movements or events, in spite of all differences, agree in happening; and that consequently there is one science of this world.
4....." (222-223). — tim wood

All these are answers to questions, and absolute presuppositions are never answers to questions. Furthermore, the truth or falsity of these presuppositions would guide the scientist either correctly or incorrectly. So let's get beyond these relative presuppositions, and find the true nature of an absolute presupposition, one whose truth or falsity is irrelevant to the thinking of the person presupposing.

Didn't Socrates or Plato say that philosophy is derived from wonder? Would you agree that "wonder' is completely general, and never the answer to any specific question, but related to many questions? And would you also agree that wonder presupposes no specific truths or falsities? The point I think you are missing is that the absolute presupposition cannot presuppose any truth or falsity, or else it is not absolute, as described. Truth or falsity must be irrelevant. The truth or falsity of the presupposition cannot lead the person's thinking correctly or incorrectly, so the thinking must be free from any presupposition of truth or falsity. The thinking may go any which way, because there is no presupposed truth or falsity.

So you cannot give examples of "absolute presuppositions" as this or that person believes that such and such is true, because this makes truth or falsity relevant in directing the thinking correctly or incorrectly. You need examples where nothing is presupposed as true or false, where there is a complete lack of bias or prejudice, and this is why "wonder" is a better example. The problem though, is that as we approach the true "absolute presupposition", it ought to become increasingly clear to you, that this requires that nothing is presupposed. The real "absolute presupposition" is the presupposition of nothing. Any inquiry, to be objective, true, unbiased, and honest, must approach the matter without presupposition. The "absolute presupposition" is the complete lack of presupposition.

Surely one of the things it is reasonable to take away from Collingwood is that some presumptions which seem to be absolute presuppositions turn out, on analysis, to be either relative presuppositions, or not to be presuppositions at all, but propositions. That is, surely the point of analysing them? — Pseudonym

Yes, this is where I'm trying to get. How are we going to distinguish an absolute presupposition from a relative presupposition? According to tim woods' description, there is a substantial difference between these two, so there must be some defining principles which we could identify within presuppositions to distinguish them, if the various presuppositions are described properly.

There is no contradiction involved in saying that what seems impossible in principle now my not seem so in the future; in other words there may appear a foreseeable way to answer questions about which there is presently no foreseeable way to answer. — Janus

I know, but you said "they cannot, even in principle turn out to be true or false", to me that implies in the future. So if you remove that implication, then there is no contradiction. However, then the absolute presupposition may take the form of a proposition which may or may not be proven to be true or false, in the future. And that's what we're trying to avoid.

However, then the absolute presupposition may take the form of a proposition which may or may not be proven to be true or false, in the future. And that's what we're trying to avoid. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, but as has been pointed out absolute presuppositions are historical. Something can be an absolute presupposition for us at our present stage of knowledge, and not be such for future inquirers. I have already given the example of the alchemists' absolute presupposition that elemental metals can be transmuted into other elemental metals. That is no longer a presupposition for science; but this fact does not prove that metals cannot be transmuted.

On reflection, it seems that example is perhaps not so great, though, maybe it does not even qualify as an absolute presupposition, but rather as an hypothesis, because although it can never be proven that metals cannot be transmuted into other metals, it would be demonstrated that they could be, if a method were found and it were done reliably and repeatably. Of course all hypotheses necessarily involve absolute presuppositions; so the hypothesis that metals can be reliably transmuted were the method found, would involve the assumption that there is some lawful process via which transmutation could occur. And this, similarly to the case with the assumption of the universality of causation, could not, I believe, at least as far as we can currently foresee, ever be definitively shown to be true.

So, I think the idea that all events are caused, and related principles, are far more certain candidates for being considered to be absolute presuppositions or regulative assumptions. And returning to that example, you have not provided any instances of investigations (hypotheses) which do not presuppose such principles.

On a theological note, the related ideas of God, an infinite being, infinite intelligence, universal designer or first cause,are certainly absolute presuppositions. There is no foreseeable way to prove the existence or non-existence, of God, an infinite being and so on. Apart from arguments for such a being, or beings, which appeal to inferences to the best explanation, and are not very convincing to the modern scientifically informed mind, the best we can do is to argue that the assumption that God exists is valuable or useful for some practical purposes.

Another absolute presupposition is that humans can acquire certain knowledge of a 'higher" kind. As I have argued extensively with @Wayfarer, it seems certain that this could never be definitively shown to be so. An individual may be convinced that they have attained higher certain knowledge by the nature of their own experience (which is the only way one ever could be "legitimately" convinced of such a thing) and yet this could never be a good reason for anyone else to believe it, and it is always possible that the individual convinced by their own experience is deluded.

However, then the absolute presupposition may take the form of a proposition which may or may not be proven to be true or false, in the future. And that's what we're trying to avoid. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that's not what I (at least) am trying to avoid at all. And I don't think Collingwood would argue that we could establish what must be absolute presuppositions for all time, but merely what are or have been the absolute presuppositions in various contexts at various historical moments. We can establish what are absolute presuppositions for us, what cannot presently "take the form of a proposition", as I have already argued.

The metaphysical analysis that's supposed to identify APs is according to the author an historical science. I understand that to mean that he, the historical scientist, aka metaphysical analyst or just analyst, after suitable research, publishes a statement to the effect that this bunch of folks held such-an-such as an AP during that period of history. As such, it is a fact supported by research - or overturned by subsequent research as you suggest is possible. If true and accurate, then that bunch of folks actually did hold such an AP and presuppose it in their endeavors.

Likely most APs, once identified, and especially if ancient, likely don't cut it in modern science, or politics, or religion, or whatever. But this doesn't touch them as APs. Rather it evaluates them as current propositions. — tim wood

Absolutely, I hadn't intended to give the impression that this would necessarily be a metaphysical analysis. In fact, I'm fairly convinced it would not be. Maybe a psychological at the most analytical end, but, as you say, mostly simply historical, or anthropological. My concern really is that whilst I agree entirely with Collingwood's concept and his method, I find myself disagreeing with many of the classifications I've read used as examples of APs from a psychological point of view. By this I mean that when someone says that such-and-such a society simply held belief X as an absolute presupposition, I don't doubt the existence of such a concept, nor the fact that, once found it is simply an historical fact and should be treated as such, but I do find myself often asking - did they though? Or were they really trying to answer a question? It may be my rather broad streak of cynicism, but I just get the gut feeling (not entirely unsupported by social psychology) that a lot of the practices and beliefs held by prior cultures which to us seem strange were quite consciously invented to create and maintain power structures, and belief in them merely professed out of fear of ostracisation rather than genuinely held.

So I take a more social psychology approach to the analysis of APs which finds far fewer of them in the sense they were (I think) intended. I find that in many cases people merely act as if they held an AP but in fact quite often question it internally, or ask the question to which it is an answer (and so render it no longer an AP), it's just that externally doing so is something of a taboo for their social group so you don't often see the behaviour which the historical analyst would otherwise use to discard it as an AP.

The push to regard APs as ordinary propositions is strong and naturally so. One form of innoculation against the pressure is to remember that the AP is always (formally) a statement about what some person or group of people in fact did. — tim wood

So basically, this is the point I'm tempted to want to modify, by introducing some small element of psychology. I think the value of APs is in understanding human behaviour, but in order to do that, it does have to allow at least small element of psychological analysis of all behaviour, both private and social. Take revolution as an example, in any revolution where an AP is overturned (for example the AP that 'the king has been appointed by God to rule the country'), there must have been a period prior to the revolution where the society was still acting as if it held that particular AP but in private it was no longer an AP, it was a proposition made by one class which was being rejected by another. The rejecting class, at least, held it to be a proposition, but at some point in the revolutionary process, they must have done so without any external sign that this was the case. This doesn't just count for political revolutions, but all revolutions and paradigm shifts.

So the key question that needs to be answered for an investigation of APs is - how long does this period last? Do people act as if beliefs were APs, when in fact they're treating them as propositions, for only a short period before the revolution, or does it go on for years, decades even?

I think this has important implications in modern society for things like religion, but also, at the other end of the scale, things like advanced science where the question would be - do people actually understand the position well enough to hold it as an AP or are they actually holding some other AP but acting as if they hold the AP in question because they've been told by those more intelligent than they are to act that way? For example, can you hold an AP that space and time are all one unified dimension if you don't actually understand what that means?

Of course, one can over-think this and risk losing some of the wonderful simplicity that Collingwood introduced, and I hope I'm not guilty of that, or perhaps only a little.

Surely one of the things it is reasonable to take away from Collingwood is that some presumptions which seem to be absolute presuppositions turn out, on analysis, to be either relative presuppositions, or not to be presuppositions at all, but propositions. That is, surely the point of analysing them? — Pseudonym


Yes, this is where I'm trying to get. How are we going to distinguish an absolute presupposition from a relative presupposition? According to tim woods' description, there is a substantial difference between these two, so there must be some defining principles which we could identify within presuppositions to distinguish them, if the various presuppositions are described properly. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, according to Collingwood, the principles are relatively simple. They are the same as those of any assessment of behaviour in an historical enquiry - the answer to the question "why did they do/think that?". As soon as that question no longer seems to have an answer you have an absolute presupposition. I think the mistake you're making is in not treating the classification as a theory. Like any other theory, it's a best guess until something better comes along or some evidence disproves it. Collingwood's conclusion (at least in my interpretation) is not to treat the classification of a belief as an AP as if it were a final indisputable fact, it's to treat is sufficiently like a fact that one does not get hung up on keep asking the question "why?" when it's just not yielding an answer.

In my interpretation, one asks of a belief "why would they believe that?". Sometimes one will find a set of empirical evidence and a rational argument but these will always be accompanied by another belief (the belief that this evidence coupled with this argument leads to this conclusion). So we ask the same question of that belief. At some point in time we do not find empirical evidence and rational argument forming part of the justification. At that point we propose the theory that this is an absolute proposition, and move on with investigating other things until such time as new evidence arises, or a better theory comes along. It's pragmatism as much as metaphysics really.