• Aleksander Kvam
    212
    Now think about what infinity means. understanding what infinity is simple, but trying to understand what infinity implies is a little harder to do"

    yeah, so you wrote this in the first post, and you may have gone through this but, can infinity be proven in any way? are there "anything" that CAN be infinite?
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    And you overlook the fact that this "proper method of metaphysics" leads in multiple directions.Relativist

    There's nothing wrong with fruitfulness. Variety in conclusions don't necessarily mean inconsistency. If two arguments lead to contradictory conclusions, at least one is unsound.

    metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them.Relativist

    Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them.

    if you would educate yourself in coherent physicalist metaphysicsRelativist

    Coherence is no guaranty of truth. J. K. Rowling tells very coherent tales.

    Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience. See my videos "#35 Induction and Abstraction" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VvqcL9LILiA) and "#36 Abstraction & Metaphysics" (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s9ohvFQn1J0).

    Following a path we find fruitful does not mean other paths are "blind alleys," We all have to judge how to spend our limited time. If you present some pivotal insight(s) I'm missing by not studying Armstrong, I will be glad to discuss them.

    Again, keep in mind that there are multiple metaphysical theories.Relativist

    There are also thousands of well-written, coherent works of fiction.

    If your arguments persuasive power depends on one such theory, and fails with another, how can it be said to truly have persuasive power?Relativist

    First, the FTA is not "my argument." I use abstraction and deduction in metaphysical reasoning, not probable arguments. That does not prevent me from analyzing the FTA and the counter arguments -- judging their strengths and weaknesses.

    Second, not all theories are equally credible. I won't pretend they are.

    BTW - a metaphysical theory can be falsified by finding incoherence.Relativist

    I agree. Still, being coherent does not imply being true. The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.

    physicalism has a problem with consciousness. If not for that problem, I'd lean more strongly toward physicalism rather than being on the fence.Relativist

    It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.

    It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory.Relativist

    No, it is not.

    I am agnostic to naturalism/deism specifically because there are coherent metaphysical theories for each.Relativist

    You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.
  • Relativist
    2.1k
    metaphysical theories are contingent upon the the imperfect mental processes that develop them. — Relativist
    Following the method I suggested will avoid this. If you have a specific example of contradictory arguments, I would be happy to comment on them.
    Dfpolis
    A method to avoid imperfect metaphysical theories would be a monumental achievement - it would finally, after all these centuries, remove all controversy from metaphysical inquiry. I'm a wee bit skeptical.

    Regarding examples: Metaphysical theories of natural law are a good example of disagreement. Here's a handy outline depicting the variety of metaphysical theories about natural law.

    Since metaphysics is concerned with the nature of being, it must be based on our experience of being -- not on a priori assumptions, however "coherent" they may be. That's why I require metaphysical principles be abstracted (not induced) from experience.
    I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions.

    Coherence is no guaranty of truth.
    Of course not, but the point is that incoherence is a guaranty of falsehood.

    The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.
    Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment.
    It's always good to give reality a bit of weight in your reasoning.
    It is contingent on a particular metaphysical theory. — Relativist

    No, it is not.
    I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs.


    You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.
    Instead?! Surely you misspoke. Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested. Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. This can help us decide what metaphysical beliefs are worthy of belief, and on which we should withhold judgment. Your assertions have not given me any reason to change my view that judgment should be withheld, and the fact that you're unaware of alternative metaphysical theories makes me think that you may have settled on something a bit hastily.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    I watched the second video, and noticed you asserting definitions of "existence" (power to act) and "essence" (specification of possible acts). These can be defined differently but equally plausibly, and this will lead one in different directions.Relativist

    You can define terms in any number of ways. Definitions are not claims about reality. They're ways of clarifying our meaning. If you use a different, incompatible, definition, it does not make either of us wrong. It just means that we're discussing different things.

    The coherence of truth derives from the self-consistency of reality.

    Yes, but the truths of reality are not apparent, and much of reality may be hidden to us. Consequently we need to apply good epistemology to identify what should be believed, and when we should withhold judgment.
    Relativist

    We agree.

    I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs.Relativist

    No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness.

    You make a good case for looking beyond coherence -- considering adequacy to reality instead.

    Instead?! Surely you misspoke.
    Relativist

    Conclusions adequate to reality will automatically be self-consistent. So, self-consistency is not a separate consideration.

    Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims.Relativist

    Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens,
  • Relativist
    2.1k
    Note that this establishes a potential basis for abductively (as IBE) judging metaphysical claims. — Relativist

    Falsification is not abduction. It is the basis for a sound deduction by the modus tolens,
    Dfpolis
    I agree falsification is not abduction, and I never suggested it was. I said, "Clearly the theory must be coherent, and as I've also said repeatedly - it must also be able to account for all aspects of reality against which it can be tested.

    How well each theory accounts for reality can often be judged, even if the judgment is subjective. That judgment is an IBE. The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle).

    I'm sorry, but that's absurd - you have some beliefs about metaphysics, and you draw inferences from those beliefs. — Relativist

    No, I have some awareness of how the world interacts with me and I draw conclusions based on that awareness.
    Dfpolis
    What you are "aware of" is belief. The conceptual framework in which you interpret this awareness is belief, and your conclusion is belief. Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief.

    I gave you a link to an outline listing a variety of metaphysical accounts of natural law, this was to demonstrate to you that there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accounts - which demonstrates that metaphysical analysis can get it wrong, in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysician. It may seem like an exact science to you, but it isn't.
  • Dfpolis
    1.3k
    That judgment is an IBERelativist

    I have looked up "IBE" and still have no idea what you are referring to.

    The same process is involved with historiography (which is also unfalsifiable, in principle).Relativist

    Which shows that there are rational approaches to reality other than the hypothetico-deductive method.

    What you are "aware of" is belief.Relativist

    I can't imagine why you feel competent to comment on what I am aware of.

    If I am aware of reality, most people in our culture would call that "knowing" reality.

    If I choose to treat a proposition as true, most people in our culture would call that "a belief" -- especially if I did not have sufficient grounds to know it is true.

    Even if your belief has sufficient warrant for knowledge, it is still belief.Relativist

    Knowledge is not a species of belief. I can know things are true, but chose not to believe the, especially if believing them would cause me pain. Again, Decartes tells us he was in his chamber when he was doing his philosophical reflection, but chose to doubt it -- thus knowing, but not believing. That would be impossible were knowledge a species of belief, as many contemporary philosophers teach.

    Although the terms have many analogous uses, primarily, knowing is an act of intellect, and believing is an act of will. That is why Descartes' methodological doubt does not have anyting to say about knowing properly so-called.

    there are indeed contradictory metaphysical accountsRelativist

    I never doubted that. The question is, are there contradictory accounts based on sound methodology?

    in spite of the fact they are constructed just as you describe - based on "awareness of how the world interacts" with the metaphysicianRelativist

    I am still waiting to see the sound arguments leading to contradictions.
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