In terms of schizophrenic voices - I just mean the voices seem more like a drama being played out through (or within) a person than a hallucination appearing (resounding?) to a stable subject. — csalisbury

I don't understand. What do you mean by this?

You originally seemed to suggest that an analysis of an organism does not lend itself to talk of states. — frank

Nope. My point was that talk of "states" usually already presupposes a particular metaphysical point of view - a mechanical or computational one.

And indeed, talk of states does become problematic when talking about organisms as if they were merely finite state automata.

So it would be helpful if the OP had tried to define how state is intended to be understood - in some hand waving way that defies definition in fact, or as something that can be given a usefully precise set of ontic commitments.

That was my point. Not something else.

Homeostasis is in fact all about states. The state of blood pressure, the state of glucose and O2 supply, etc. — frank

Un huh. Well I did biology and it was all about managing the instability of those things.

And how do organisms regulate their blood pressure or glucose levels? In some sense they sense their own state of being. They can make measurements that encode something of significance about how they "are right now" compared to how they imagine they "ought generally to be".

And the fact that there is this interpreting of measurements business going on is where things start to get interestingly complex. What happens if your body is misreading its glucose signals - something about its instrumentation is out of whack - and so homeostatically it is chasing a misguided target?

So yeah, in a very loose way you can talk about "states" of the body's vital signs as if they were something clearly physical - the kind of readings a doctor's instruments would provide. But that kind of Newtonian physicalist ontology doesn't really get you very far in understanding how the biology actually works.

And the same applies in spades when it comes to neuroscience and "states of mind".

It's hard to put into words exactly.

So:

I've spent time in psych wards, for major depression. In those wards, I spent a lot of time around people with schizophrenia. Big caveat here: My experience with schizophrenics is mostly with those who are in the depths of acute psychosis, not with those who are managing symptoms out in the real world.

That said: I noticed that most of the schizophrenics I talked to seem to be highly attuned to the power dynamics and emotional currents of their environment. In many ways they seemed *more* aware of what was going on than the others there. Talking to them, they'd almost always speak in allegories, or metaphors. People talk about schizophrenic 'word salad' but my impression was that there was always a strange logic to their free-association. And they'd shift 'voices' or 'registers' correspondingly. But they weren't just 'in another world' - they were interpreting the world we were in, through themselves.

It's hard to put this into words: We're very used to people talking about what they feel and who they are and what's going on - we're used to people talking about that stuff in terms of personal beliefs, feelings, etc all centered around an 'I'. But these conversations - it was more like witnessing - and being called upon to witness - a kind of jazz show/tone poem/mood play, that would shift depending on what was happening. Most of the schizophrenics I talked to had a stable cast of characters (or scenarios, or voices) that would act in different ways, depending.

But most of the schizophrenics were also aware of the position of power the psychiatric staff held - one patient, who preferred to bathe things in Norse Mythology - talked about the Priests of Asgard, for example. Psychiatrists ask you to give an account of what you're feeling. You, the I, giving an account to another, the doctor. Quite like priests. This is only one way of talking, and most - not all - of the schizophrenics I knew would adjust themselves, and speak in terms of hallucinations etc. But that isn't how they usually talked to the rest of us, when the psychiatrists weren't around.

I don't know if that helps at all.

Just out of curiosity. We're these schizophrenics against or grudging towards these high 'priests' as they call the psychiatrists there? Schizophrenia is essentially a issue of a 'failure to adapt' to one's settings or even one's diagnosis, and in many cases schizophrenics rebel against the settings, themselves, and the people who they resent being called as schizophrenics.

And how do organisms regulate their blood pressure or glucose levels? In some sense they sense their own state of being. They can make measurements that encode something of significance about how they "are right now" compared to how they imagine they "ought generally to be". — apokrisis

Blood pressure is complex plumbing. We generally start by looking at baroreceptors on the renal arteries and go from there. Its not magic.

The oddity of an organism vs a mechanism has to do with the kind of causation that's revealed in the overarching flowchart.

Most were paranoid about them. Some would deal with them through a particular kind of obsequiousness (this is describing stuff on the psychiatrist's terms) others with hostility, others with a kind of blank indifference.

'failure to adapt' seems too broad to me though. There's a lot of ways to fail at adapting that aren't schizophrenia.

Yes; but, I guess schizophrenia is the logical conclusion of the highest form of a failure to adapt. It's just a placeholder name I referenced.

Blood pressure is complex plumbing. — frank

Why do I bother.

True, just a minor quibble. I thought you might be characterizing schizophrenia as in in essence a failure to adapt, whereas I would characterizethe failure to adapt as a consequence of schizophrenia.

Most were paranoid about them. Some would deal with them through a particular kind of obsequiousness (this is describing stuff on the psychiatrist's terms) others with hostility, others with a kind of blank indifference. — csalisbury

This is interesting. Because I've realized that schizophrenia has to be addressed at an early age to deter a person from becoming convinced about the internal chatter/reality/distorted dreamworld they generate.

We're most of these people of an early onset in their diagnosis and if not we're the older types more prone to not wanting to adhere to the protocol of treating their diagnosis and thus were more hostile towards the people trying to help them?

That I don't know. The people I talked to weren't in a state to give an objective account of their history. I can say that there was a very wide spectrum, age-wise.

But again, I should probably re-iterate that you only wind up in a psych ward if your symptoms have become overwhelming. So there could be a kind of selection bias, here. It may be that I didn't meet many people who were open to standard ways of treating their condition, because the people who were able to integrate that kind of treatment didn't need to go to psych ward. Hard to know.

That I don't know. — csalisbury

OK, thanks.

I think to designate something a state is to attempt to quantify or describe it.

This is hard and there are mountains of books trying to describe things including on psychology and psychodynamics.

Accessing other peoples mental states is a puzzle. We cannot see other peoples minds in the same way as we experience our own. It seems an impenetrable barrier. This becomes quite solipsistic where one has to rely on ones own mind to make analogies about other people and it is also where process all other information.

Maybe we well be able to connect peoples brains so that they can tap into other peoples experiences in some way.

I think the best we can is to try and report our mental contents as accurately as possible. Another question though is to what is mind independent and what things are like stripped of the input of mental processes.

I would think that a mental state would not be a propositional attitude, but a propositional attitude is a mental state. But not all mental states are about propositions, or are even necessarily about anything, so mental states are wider than propositional attitudes. — Moliere

OK, so mental states have a subset of propositional attitudes.

And some mental states have no content - I suppose that's like "I'm happy".

That's another decent point. Cheers.

Talk about states implies that a thing changes over time, although there is no reason a thing couldn't be in the same state for its entire existence. It's just that it could be in a different state and still be the same thing. (Nixon could have lost or have been in a state of defeat). — frank

I'm not too happy about including time here. But the point that being in a given state implies the possibility of bing in some other state is a good one.

So mental states have a modal element.

All states of mind are 'determined' by the emotions at the time. This holds good from the rudimentary state of fear to the complex state of righteous indignation. — creativesoul

Mental states are just feelings?

Sure, they are all the time. They were in those links you linked, for example, weren't they? — csalisbury

Was it? "John is mad" - the mental state is a predicate rather than an individual here...

Are you asking whether 'mental states' correspond to some actual thing, a mental-state, in the person to whom they're ascribed? My guess is no, not really, tho, if youre familiar with the terms and the settings in which they crop up, you stand a good chance at making valid inferences about someone given the knowledge they've been ascribed mental state x. — csalisbury

This. Yes. The mental state is exhibited, apparent in the doings of the individual.

All states of mind are 'determined' by the emotions at the time. This holds good from the rudimentary state of fear to the complex state of righteous indignation.
— creativesoul

Mental states are just feelings? — Banno

I wouldn't equate the two. Emotion is an integral part. Personally, I do not find these mental states very understandable at all aside from experiencing some emotion or other for a time. During the time, it's a state. I suppose.

I'm unsure about that much actually. I mean, I personally wouldn't object to a mental state of hunger, for example. Hunger isn't normally categorized as an emotion.

And some mental states have no content - I suppose that's like "I'm happy". — Banno

Yeah, moods were what I mostly had in mind when saying that the mental state isn't about anything in particular -- since moods are global upon experience.

That's another decent point. Cheers. — Banno

Always a pleasure. :)

This. Yes. The mental state is exhibited, apparent in the doings of the individual. — Banno

I would only add that the beliefs, emotions (ineffable other being-a-person things) etc of the person to whom the mental state are ascribed are totally real, just slip through the mesh of 'mental states' and any other linguistic net one might try to cast.

In other words, I'd agree that 'mental states' have a socio- behavioral meaning, but also say the fact that one can correctly use 'mental state x' indicates that there's an iceberg-beneath-the-tip level of stuff allowing this.

I'm not sure if we're on the same page in this regard?

Yeah, someone who thinks mental states are purely manifested in behavior doesn't understand what a mental state is in the ordinary use. This isn't an elucidatory but a revisionist account. I feel the tension here between wanting to be the 'common sense' one on the block, and holding a highly uncommonsense position (behaviorism, which no one believes, and which probably makes mince meant of our notions of mental life). I suspect it's because certain philosophers historically have also dealt with these contradictory impulses and OP has read them.

Apologies for trying to read so much into OP's scattered comments so far. I try to jump ahead because there are tells and these beliefs tend to cluster together, and I've heard & gotten tired of them all, so I try to predict where people are going so we can get a move on to more interesting stuff.

Mental states on exhibition are only and always only talked about in ways familiar to the observing speaker.

Who's to say that they've gotten things right? Mental states aren't all entirely creations of our language and understanding. Some consist of things that we discover.

So, focusing upon our conception use neglects to focus upon the target of our meaning. Our conceptions can be wrong about some things. Namely any and all things that are not existentially dependent upon our language use.

:worry:

It's the ambiguity, or perhaps the obscurity, of "mental state" that I want to examine.

I don't think it's a lack of focus - one can't focus on a fog; it might be that an analysis of mental states will not reveal more detail. If it were helpful we could talk of being happy, or sad, or hungry, or indifferent, as emotions. But there appears to be a difference between an emotion and a mental state. Is being convinced, say by a mathematical discourse, an emotion or a state of mind?

Yeah, moods were what I mostly had in mind when saying that the mental state isn't about anything in particular -- since moods are global upon experience. — Moliere

This, as I understand, is an internal position; mental states are independent of what is going on around us. Not sure if this is like being a priori or like being phenomenal. Either way, we have to avoid it being seen as inexpressible, and hence beyond discussion.

Can one know the mental state of another?

I'm not sure if we're on the same page in this regard? — csalisbury

Nor am I.

I would point out that if someone's mental state is ineffable, then it is pointless to discuss it.

But then we do discuss mental states - with a degree of ambiguity or uncertainty.

Hence, mental states cannot be ineffable.

How does that sit with you?

Do I reply to this?

Wittgenstein showed that meaning lies in shared use. There is a long history of mistaking this for behaviourism.

Behaviourism does not necessarily deny that there are hidden things going on; it suggests that the way to learn about them is to look at the behaviour in which they result. Wittgenstein, in one way, goes further in supposing that meaning is found only in our shared use of words and symbols.

That is, whatever goes on beneath the surface, it is not language or meaning.

But that's not to deny that there is stuff going on beneath the surface.

We talk about the ineffable in poetry, philosophy, art, mystery. And yet it remains ineffable.

It's the ambiguity, or perhaps the obscurity, of "mental state" that I want to examine.

I don't think it's a lack of focus - one can't focus on a fog; it might be that an analysis of mental states will not reveal more detail. If it were helpful we could talk of being happy, or sad, or hungry, or indifferent, as emotions. But there appears to be a difference between an emotion and a mental state. Is being convinced, say by a mathematical discourse, an emotion or a state of mind? — Banno

As hinted at in the earlier post of mine, I would tend to agree with all this...

There indeed can be a difference between experiencing some emotion or an other and a state of mind. However, it seems that there are states of mind that are virtually indistinguishable from emotional states. Being excited is both. Being hungry, not so much. So, I would think that all emotion would qualify as a state of mind, but I would not say that all states of mind are emotional ones.

Being convinced would qualify as a state of mind. The contemplating would be a state of mind in itself. Being convinced would be a resultant state of mind. Or at least, that seems simple and straight forward enough for my liking.

So, yes. I would think that being convinced by a mathematical discourse would qualify as being a state of mind. That of being certain or convinced.

What about being in pain? It seems wrong to say it is just a state of mind.