• Srap Tasmaner
    1.9k

    Banno says logical space is populated by propositions. I thought it was populated by possible facts. Propositions have a structure that mirrors the structure of facts, so maybe this makes little difference, in one sense. BUT-- IF a propositional sign, which is a fact that has the form, the structure of another fact, can consist of any sorts of things, not just entities we're accustomed to thinking of as symbols, THEN might we not say the fact itself is in effect a propositional sign, a perceptible expression of a proposition?

    That seems slightly crazy, but it dissolves the difference between me and Banno (and it's terribly important we do that). It does mean thinking of propositions as something a bit different from, you know, sentences we assert.

    Not clear to me yet. Rest of the book will make it all plain as day, I'm sure.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    1.9k

    Good discussion. (I skimmed a little.)

    Here's a point against my suggestion: you would have to say that the projection of the fact onto itself is trivial.
  • Posty McPostface
    3.9k
    This is from the Morris companion:

    The proposition is what we have when we have a string of signs with the range of possible grammatical combinations fixed. It is, therefore, only the constituents of a proposition — rather than a mere propositional sign — which can be correlated with items in reality. In effect, a proposition is a certain kind of sign with the syntax fixed. Contrary to some modern uses, syntax brings in more than what we are given with the mere signs: we can have two examples of the same sign, which have different syntax; syntax provides us with the range of combinations.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    1.9k

    Yeah but that misses the whole issue by talking about signs.
  • Posty McPostface
    3.9k
    Yeah, I leave it to Banno to clarify the issue.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    1.9k

    Well the way I've done this we do get a solid distinction we can work with, between trivial and non-trivial mappings or projections.

    It is curious to think of a possible fact actually obtaining as a possibility being expressed. The projection we need, the form of representation, would be a mapping onto substance.

    Not sure if the projection is going in the direction W wants though...
  • Srap Tasmaner
    1.9k

    Oh, and "expressed" can be glossed as "becoming perceptible by the senses," like a propositional sign. That's cool.
  • Banno
    2.9k
    Yeah, I leave it to Banno to clarify the issue.Posty McPostface
    :wink:

    I would have thought that things like "Pp" and "PPp" were our symbols. Allow them to picture the world, then they have what we would now call an interpretation, in terms of what WItti called substance, and they become propositions. The ones that are true are facts.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    1.9k
    I would have thought that things like "Pp" and "PPp" were our symbolsBanno

    So how do you read 3.1431?
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