• Banno
    3.3k
    3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. 
    The written signs 'stand in' for the items in the picture of the world. Hence:
    3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’ we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’ 

    What is happening is that the picture is presented as signs, using symbols:

    3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. 

    What I find difficult here is that the picture theory continued into PI, yet I would have it replaced by use. I wonder what @Sam26 has to say about this.
  • Sam26
    983
    What I find difficult here is that the picture theory continued into PI, yet I would have it replaced by use. I wonder what Sam26 has to say about this.Banno

    Where do you see that Wittgenstein continued with the picture theory in the PI? If anything he rejects it, although when considering use, and the multiplicity of uses, some statements are pictures in a manner of speaking. It's just that the picture theory doesn't explain all statements. Just as some definitions of the word game don't explain all uses of the word game. Use is primary in the PI, but even use has it's limits.
  • Banno
    3.3k
    Where do you see that Wittgenstein continued with the picture theory in the PI?Sam26

    Not just I, but Anthony Kenny, too. In PI Wittgenstein shows how an incorrect picture of the world can be foisted on the unwary philosopher by a twist of grammar. What has carried through is that the picture can be wrong.

    The picture, if it is a fact, depicts the form of the world; but it cannot depict this form, it can only display it (2.172 and hereabouts).

    The proposition, as it where, depicts (or brings forth?) this logical form.

    So we have a picture of the world, and with this at hand we interpret our signs, rendering them as symbols, and setting forth the logical form of the world in propositions...

    Yet when I re-read that, I find it unsettling.
  • Sam26
    983
    You quoted the Tractatus. Where does the PI put forth that view?
  • Banno
    3.3k
    In PI Wittgenstein shows how an incorrect picture of the world can be foisted on the unwary philosopher by a twist of grammar.Banno

    ⎰520; but there are numerous examples. The picture theory is not absent from PI.
  • Sam26
    983
    Sorry, but I don't see Wittgenstein putting forth a picture theory in the PI. That said, of course there are places where he talks about how statements put forth a picture, but that's a far cry from saying that Wittgenstein has continued the picture theory in the PI. If anything he criticizes it.
  • Banno
    3.3k
    Do his criticisms amount to rejection? I'm not sure they do.

    But we ought take care as to what we think the picture theory is. The elements of the picture correspond to the elements in the world; and the structure of the picture is shared with the world. One way of thinking of this is that the picture is a model of the world; that seems to be the way Witti thought of pictures in the Tractatus. I suspect this view is what is rejected in PI, where a picture is more just one way of seeing how things are amongst many other pictures, the choice depending on what one wishes to do. The picture does not model how things are so much as set out what we can do.
  • Sam26
    983
    I agree he rejected the picture theory as presented in the Tractatus. However, as I've mentioned, that doesn't mean that propositions can't or don't represent a kind of picture in some uses. A statement can be used as a picture, that's one of the uses of statements. There are an array of uses, of which picturing is only one among many uses. Whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein was more dogmatic about how statements pictured things in the world.

    Yes, picturing is something we do with statements. So I agree with your point. I'm not sure where you think Wittgenstein went wrong in the PI. Picturing is clearly a use in the PI.
  • Banno
    3.3k
    I'm not sure where you think Wittgenstein went wrong in the PI.Sam26

    It's just that I would go further that I think he does, and reject the notion of a picture as a model that is distinct from reality. Doing so might lead away from thinking of language games as incommensurate with each other.

    But this is all beyond the exegesis of this thread; let it rest.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    2k
    It's just that I would go further that I think he does, and reject the notion of a picture as a model that is distinct from reality.Banno

    A picture is a fact, and thus part of reality, part of the world.
  • Posty McPostface
    4.7k
    Sorry guys, I've been pretty apathetic recently, and hope I can come around to this thread again fairly shortly.

    That's all on my part. Anyone interested in assuming command of this thread is always welcome too.
  • Srap Tasmaner
    2k

    Post something when you feel like it. I'll keep the thread bookmarked.
  • Posty McPostface
    4.7k
    Post something when you feel like it. I'll keep the thread bookmarked.Srap Tasmaner

    Will do. I found this book in my local CC library. It's pretty awesome; but, I've been brain farting too much to entertain it. I'll probably buy it this coming month and use it as a side companion.
  • Posty McPostface
    4.7k
    Does anyone want to go over the Paris courtroom model to elucidate where Wittgenstein derived his conception of the picture theory?
  • Posty McPostface
    4.7k
    Anyone still interested in this reading group?

    I can cover what has already been covered in some small snippets if necessary.

    Edit: I'm thinking about skipping the entire picture theory part, due to its obscure content. Any ideas if this is a good idea?
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