Ex-aptation and the Jury-Rigged Universe

Streetlight

'Exaptation' is probably one of my favourite words in the biologist's dictionary, but outside of the discipline, it's not very well known - which is upsetting because it's a particularly useful word that would be well suited to a philosopher's lexicon. So what is exaptation? To begin with, it's meant to be distinguished from an 'adpatation': where an ad-apatation is a feature or trait selected for by natural selection because of it's usefulness at fulfilling a particular function (survival, in the broadest context), an ex-aptation is a feature or trait which, while 'originally' used for some function or another, has been co-opted or re-purposed to do something other than it was originally evolved for.

The usual example are feathers. As the evolutionary story has it, feathers were originally evolved for the sake of insulation and warmth, before later being exapted for the sake of flight, which they happened to be particularly well suited to. The 'opposite' of ex-aptations, by the way, are 'vestigial features', like your appendix. The appendix is a 'vestige' or a 'remnant' of a part that at one point probably played a role in digestion, though no longer. Things are slightly complex here because the appendix also has 'exaptive' features: although it no longer does digestive things, it now plays a role in helping to maintain our gut biomes - the environment for our gut bacteria.

So, what kind of philosophical significance can be drawn out of these terms? Well for one thing, the idea of an exaptation was originally introduced to highlight the role of contingency in evolution. As Gould and Vbra (the evolutionary theorists who coined the term [PDF]) put it, "all exaptations originate randomly with respect to their effects" (emphasis in the original). The concept of exaptation then, helped to bring into evolutionary consciousness the idea that evolution largely works by jury-rigging alot of its results: it makes use of features or traits that were 'lying around', as it were, in order to plug them into different contexts and modify their 'original' uses. In a sense, all creatures are products of just this kind of evolutionary tinkering, building upon past-results to achieve new ends.

(Which is not always a good thing: it's often said human brains, because they were so clumsily put together - a result of a 'kludge', a haphazardly thrown together, inelegant assemblage developed across the span of literally centuries - just isn't great at strict reasoning, often relying on faulty heuristics to arrive at cognitive results).

It's telling too that biological structures can exhibit both exaptive and vestigial aspects at the same time, as through any 'pieces' of biology are just so many cogs and levers waiting to be plugged into different contexts in order to do different things. What matters is that function is not a principle but a result. Anyway, the larger point - and to pick up on the 'machine' metaphor - is that is useful to extrapolate the idea of exaptation to a cosmic principle: to see organisation - social, ecological, biological, astronomical, even - as a matter of just this kind of haphazad, contingent coming together of things, in which results build off the back of other results, retro-actively modifying their function, and intro-ducing new things into the universe as a result.

tim wood

Neat stuff! We're not often cross-fertilized with ideas from other disciplines! But I'm having a little difficulty with it that maybe - probably - you can steer me through.

Often, descriptions and definitions of things have nothing whatever to do with the things themselves and what they actually do or are for. The description or definition in such a case is an appending of a meta-consideration that at the level of the thing's being or functioning simply isn't there. I think right here you likely understand perfectly what I'm trying to say; but that in itself doesn't relieve me from continuing to try to be as clear and as explicit as possible.

It works to define or describe a car as a vehicle for carrying people around. But is that what a car is, or does? Most of a car does nothing at all. The main part that works, the engine, converts fuel to energy that is used to turn gears and wheels. The car itself knows nothing of considerations of transport or travel. Nor is this a mere cognitive failure on the part of the car. The appendix was an aid to digestion. But what does an appendix know about digestion or about giving aid or being an aid? Now, apparently, it helps regulate the environment of our intestines. But this in turn gives no clue as to how or why or what the appendix is doing in terms of itself.

Some questions: is the terminology a meta-consideration, an idea that surfs the waves in the sea of thinking, subject to its currents and turbulence but mostly apart from the thing named? That is, is exaptation, like most terms of art, simply a tool that in the way of many tools is often conceptually confused with and for the thing referred to?

I'm going to guess it's a tool for thinking, useful in classification.

I suspect a brief answer is all this calls for or is worth.

Streetlight

Now, apparently, it helps regulate the environment of our intestines. But this in turn gives no clue as to how or why or what the appendix is doing in terms of itself. — tim wood

I guess one of the things I would like to put into question is the very idea that there is any sort of 'in terms of itself' that belongs to anything. If I were to formalize it, I'd want to say something like: everything belongs in the 'exaptive mode' from the very beginning. So one of the things I'd like to avoid is this distinction between 'mere description' and 'the things themselves': what I'm getting at is that the things themselves function differentially from the very beginning; the fact that the appendix had it's genesis in the digestive tract says nothing about 'the thing the appendix really is': the point is that there is no 'really is': the 'terms' of a thing are found in it's exaptive environment, from the very start.

Everything that is, is just a cog, ready for appropriation and co-option (ex-propriation?). I mean, one thing I didn't mention is that the idea of exaptation has somewhat fallen out of vogue in biological discourse itself, not because there's something 'wrong' with it per se, but because the lesson it was invented to impart has been so thoroughly absorbed that every adaptation is now seen as more or less a kind of exaptation to begin with: the distinction has fallen apart somewhat because it's now recognized that most, if not all evolutionary adaptations began - if you push far back enough - as structures that had either no use or different uses entirely. In a sense, the difference between exaption and adaptation is the kind of emphasis you want to place on whatever it is you're looking at.

There's a nice Quanta article that deals with some of the ambiguities of the term, ambiguities which for some discredit the term, but which for me enrich it: "The metabolism study suggests that a healthy portion of novel traits get their start as exaptations. In fact, the ratio skews heavily that way ... “If what we find holds in general, it will become very difficult to distinguish traits that are adaptations from the traits that are not adaptations,” Wagner said".

tim wood

So one of the things I'd like to avoid is this distinction between 'mere description' and 'the things themselves': what I'm getting at is that the things themselves function differentially from the very beginning; the fact that the appendix had it's genesis in the digestive tract says nothing about 'the thing the appendix really is': the point is that there is no 'really is': the 'terms' of a thing are found in it's exaptive environment, from the very start. — StreetlightX

This seems to approach an argument that says that what a thing is (if you even grant the possibility of there being a thing) is simply its description. Among the many problems with this is that descriptions can change. I agree with you that in terms of descriptions, your point holds, near as I can tell. But as description you've departed from the thing - perhaps for the best under some specific applications.

If I may return to the example a a car, I may hold this car as the best car made. You might regard it as a piece of junk. Qua description, both are correct, although clearly they rely on different criteria. That is, the description is qualified and constrained by the criteria that gives it its substance. The main point here is that it is the criteria that govern, not the car. Whatever the car is, it does not change in any way because the description changed.

It would seem, then, that we're not on common ground, here, but are instead on differing ground with different purposes. It seems to follow that we find here two kinds of descriptions: 1) with respect to some set of criteria (it's great v. it's junk, and 2) with respect to what it is. By "what it is," I'm thinking of those parts of any descriptions that might reasonably be common to all.

And it seems that the distinction is no small one, limited to arcane biology.

To return to exaptation: that seems a useful "tool" for making a smart discrimination not hitherto made. But at closer look, it concerns the history not of a thing (e.g., an appendix) but of the concept of a thing taken with respect to differing criteria. In any case, no actual appendix is - or could be - under consideration.

One is forced to conclude and acknowledge that when a biologist (for example) talks of exaptation - or if anyone uses any terms of art - they're using a both a code and a shorthand that is neither as simple nor as easy to understand as might seem on its surface, and that is easy to misunderstand.

Streetlight

This seems to approach an argument that says that what a thing is (if you even grant the possibility of there being a thing) is simply its description. — tim wood

But this is just what I've denied. At no point in the OP did I invoke a distinction between 'descriptions' and 'the thing itself'. This kind of Kantian approach is just what I would like to totally escape from. That something is an exaptation belongs to 'the thing itself', and not merely our 'descriptions' of it. I would in fact drop the vocabulary of 'descriptions' entirely, which I think is here misleading and unnecessary.

tim wood

At no point in the OP did I invoke a distinction between 'descriptions' and 'the thing itself'. — StreetlightX

So one of the things I'd like to avoid is this distinction between 'mere description' and 'the things themselves' — StreetlightX

That's right, you didn't. I did, because I found it implicit in your posts and asked about it.

If you're talking about concepts about things, then you're not talking about the thing the concepts are about. Nor is this in any sense Kantian - perhaps "things themselves" misled you - but you might have been drawn to Husserl instead, he of "to the thing themselves."

Everything that is, is just a cog, ready for appropriation and co-option — StreetlightX

This catches it, pretty much. The fundamental piece is the thing. You can, to the best of your ability, describe the thing. And you can elevate out that level to meta-levels of description useful to facilitate understanding about the thing. I happen to think the differences between the levels are irreconcilable and the different levels themselves incompatible.

Streetlight

↪tim wood

Eh, I kinda understand what you're driving at but I think the attempt to draw a distinction between 'concepts' and 'things themselves' within language is a doomed endeavour that can lead nowhere. But that is not a discussion that is very relavent here.

For instance, I don't think the distinction you're drawing between what you call 'criteria for description' and 'what a thing is' is well-founded. Part of what the concept of exaptation is meant to show is that a developmental environment - the environment in which any one trait undergoes evolution - determines, at the very level of 'the thing itself', what that thing is. There is no 'appendix-in-itself' apart from it's existence right now as a structure that helps regulate the gut biome: that is what the appendix is. But this 'is' is a 'provisional is', one subject to change and further evolution according to different possible evolutionary pathways. And of course one of the lessons of evolution is that all 'is' are 'provisional is'.

The so-called 'actual appendix' you're looking for - as if an 'actual appendix' existed apart from it's being in the here and now in a human species - is a just a figment of your imagination, or rather and more generously, an expectation derived from an outdated metaphysics that looks at actual appendixes and their functions and incredulously asks: 'yes but where is the real appendix?'. Or, to put it otherwise: the world itself functions as a 'meta-level' which conditions the object(-level) 'itself'. Language is not at all special in this regard, it just functions as another 'meta' framing device, one among myriad of them that already exist in the absence of any language whatsoever. What you call 'description' needs to be transposed right into the 'world' itself: the world functions as its own context, shaping the very being of the traits subject to evolution.

What you're looking for doesn't exist. Or rather, it's staring at you in the face, only to have you ask where in the world it could possibly be. Platonic illusion.

tim wood

There is no 'appendix-in-itself' apart from it's existence right now as a structure that helps regulate the gut biome: that is what the appendix is. — StreetlightX

Same page. And as you say, there is no other appendix. Exaptation,then, not being about the appendix that is, is not about the appendix that is. Rather it is about something that is not an appendix - the history of their evolution or something like. This is the only distinction I'm making, and nothing Kantian or philosophical to it.

The distinction might be characterized by suggesting it's the difference between substance and accidents. For example, you may be tall, as an accident, but you are not tall in the sense of substance. As a substance, you cannot be predicate. "Streetlight is tall," makes sense (whether true or not). "Tall is Streetlight," does not.

If, however, we push into it, it becomes an interesting question as to what exaptation is about. I think it's about ideas - and a particular kind of idea to be sure - and just here it gets foggy. But no one needs to go here. The hazard, and it exists with most thinking, comes into being when the idea is reified.

This all may seem a distinction without a useful point, and so far as "exaptation" goes, it probably is. The word and concept are new to me, and I'm glad to have them. The hazard has a general form. Maybe reification is the right word for it. It comes about when the idea is taken as real.

mcdoodle

↪StreetlightX

There's an odd bunch of academics who've formed the Serendipity Society and they're particularly interested in exaptation. You might like this quote from their website (https://theserendipitysociety.wordpress.com):

...many fundamental breakthroughs in science and technology followed what Wiener called the inverse question. These are cases in which the solution precedes the identification of the question. As Meyer writes: “Many of the essential medical discoveries in history came about not because someone came up with a hypothesis, tested it, and discovered that it was correct, but more typically because someone stumbled upon an answer, after some creative thought, figured out what problem had been inadvertently solved” (2007: p.300). Often, problems solved through the inverse question approach revealed new areas of the adjacent possible, which were not even supposed to exist. An essential, but under-appreciated, mechanism of the inverse question is exaptation, which is the co-option of artifacts (or biological traits) for functions different from the ones they were designed (or selected) for. The microwave oven, the bow and arrow, the first antibiotic, antiseptic, and antidepressant are all cases of exaptation. — Serendipity Society

Streetlight

Same page. And as you say, there is no other appendix. Exaptation, then, not being about the appendix that is, is not about the appendix that is. Rather it is about something that is not an appendix - the history of their evolution or something like. This is the only distinction I'm making, and nothing Kantian or philosophical to it. — tim wood

Hmm, okay, but I think I'd still put it differently. I'd say exaptation speaks to modality of the relations that compose the appendix - or anything else, for that matter. This is what I focused on in the OP: exaptation highlights the contingency of function of traits, with these contingencies of relation - evolutionary and historical - necessarily making of the appendix 'what it is'.

So I disagree that it is 'about something that is not an appendix': it most definitely is. The mistake seems to be in trying to separate the historical evolution of the appendix from the 'appendix itself' or some such: but an appendix is historical and evolutionary through and through and it is a mistake to try and isolate some 'appendix-substance' apart from that evolutionary history (the 'substance-accident' distinction being one of the greatest mistakes ever made in Western philosophy).

↪mcdoodle

Cool resource. 'Serendipity' rings a bit too whimsical for my tastes - I would like to affirm the necessity of contingency as much as the contingency of necessity - but the focus on novelty, creativity and chance seems right up my alley. Might write up a thread on the 'adjacent possible' next, actually.

unenlightened

Isn't this what we used to call 'bricolage'?

Streetlight

↪unenlightened

Related, for sure, but I there's a deeper semantic inflection here regarding the interplay between environment and 'thing' (a deeper focus on relations), as well a emphasis on 'nature' that is missing in the more 'culturally' inflected 'bricolage'. Nature's bricolage, if you will - although taken to it's limit, the idea of exaptation probably also helps to break down the artificial barrier between nature and culture.

unenlightened

the artificial barrier — StreetlightX

Yes. Just as the engineer is 'in the end' still a bricoleur, so adaptation is, if we remove all traces of teleology, always exaptation - a novel use for the chemistry of carbon.

Streetlight

Yes. Just as the engineer is 'in the end' still a bricoleur, so adaptation is, if we remove all traces of teleology, always exaptation - a novel use for the chemistry of carbon. — unenlightened

Yeah. One of the interesting things about history of the idea of exaptation is that it found a home in the study of technology (exapted to the study of technology?), even as its use in biology has declined: the fact that inventions are built off the back of other inventions is something that is far easier to discern in the development of technology than it is biology sometimes. Pascal Chabot gives the example of the locomotive, which was the result of the coming together of the steam-engine and the wagon, which in turn brought about new problems to be addressed, which needed new innovations in turn:

"Eventually, the idea arose to combine these elements. The steamengine was mounted on a wagon. A crankshaft transmission system converted the alternation of the engine’s pistons into a continuous turning of the wagon’s wheels. Primitive locomotives combined different existing technologies, but this combination was as yet ‘intellectual’, closer to the freedom of theory than to material practicalities. None of the components were originally conceived to function together. The structure of each element betrays its original intended purpose. The steam-engine adapted to power the wagon was originally designed to be fixed in place. In this position, its weight was unimportant. ... However, for the construction of the locomotive, the problem of weight and size had to be addressed: it was impossible to build a retaining wall on a wagon.

[To address this,] Marc Seguin invented the fire-tube boiler. Submerged in this boiler’s water tank were tubes which collected the hot gas released from the fire-box. By placing the heat source inside the boiler, Seguin reversed the older design, increasing the surface area for heat transfer while reducing the amount of water required to generate steam. A fire-brick frame was no longer needed to prevent heat loss. The weight of the engine was reduced. But Seguin’s invention had additional benefits. The tubular boiler also allowed for a reduction in the size of the fire-box, since the heat it produced was conserved inside the tubes. ... This type of boiler would be used in the first series of locomotives constructed by George and Robert Stephenson, beginning in 1823." (Chabot, The Philosophy of Simondon)

This is exaptation in action (Chabot, following the philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon, calls it 'concretization').

Ex-aptation and the Jury-Rigged Universe

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