In my view this statement is pretty much the point of the thread, the math thing was just illustrating this point. — fdrake

Really? Then I must apologise for hijacking such an entirely mundane discussion with a side-track into the authority by which we judge philosophical propositions. That we can abstract enough to discuss the presumptions essential to our discourse (or not depending on your view of hinge propositions), seems, as my comment implies, self-evidently true. I'm not sure what else a thread entirely about it might be trying to say.

The statement I was arguing against was this one in the OP;

What I want to add to this is that philosophical concepts are just like this. The concepts we employ are a function of what we aim to capture with them; to employ one concept rather than another is to bring out one aspect of the world rather than another. Moreover, the deployment of our concepts is not governed by truth, but by their range of illumination. This is not on account of their being arbitrary ('subjective'), but absolutely necessary.

The paper makes the point that maths is governed by choices and proofs sometimes simply 'fall out' of making those choices, other times, as with SLX's example above, the proofs are simply chosen or ignored out of preference for what they can do.

But the argument that philosophy is "...just like this", has been advanced without further explanation as to why.

The first part, that philosophy too makes choices about frames which in turn dictate solutions, is pretty uncontroversial. The second part, that is does so out of some quest for utility, their "their fruitfulness for ... whatever it is we want to do" remains an entirely unsupported assertion. What exactly is it that philosophy "does" in this argument, that frames could be chosen on the basis of their ability to further? In what way can any philosophy be rejected as 'bad' philosophy, under this understanding? Presumably, because it isn't fruitful at producing whatever it is it's supposed to produce. And yet we have no evidence to show that this is happening at all. Hence my comment that "the levels of disagreement about what constitutes a 'solution' in maths (as a whole) are dwarfed by the wholesale and almost exhaustive disagreement on the same question in philosophy."

This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's investigation. A point not lost on the authors of the paper themselves who note the importance of Wittgenstein's solutions to the rule-following paradox.

It's rarely the actual preliminary points made in any of these threads that I object to. Largely they are trivially true. It's the game they're used to play, it's the "therefore...." that comes at the end of it all that bothers me.

"What can a machine do? (Not this or that machine, by the way, but machines in the abstract) Tell me! Oh you can't tell me what a machine can do? Well, obviously machines cannot be evaluated as to their usefulness because you can't answer my question!".

Language on holiday. Exemplary of the kind of pseudo-question that philosophy rightly rejects.

"What can a machine do? (Not this or that machine, by the way, but machines in the abstract) Tell me! Oh you can't tell me what a machine can do? Well, obviously machines cannot be evaluated as to their usefulness because you can't answer my question!". — StreetlightX

But it's easy to answer your question, I don't understand the difficulty. A machine does a job of work. If you're trying make a connection with utility, then you need a person. Utility requires a person to be useful to, nothing can be useful objectively. A machine is useful if it does work that the user of the machine wants it to do. There's no requirement that I judge its utility in order to define it as a machine, but there is in order that I judge it as a 'good' or 'bad' machine.

I don't see what point you're trying to make here.

It's a machine if it does some job of work, it's a useful one if it does that job to the satisfaction of the person using it.

It's philosophy if it makes some argument about 'the way things are' that cannot be checked against objective empirical sense data (or whatever definition you prefer). It's a useful one if the person holding it finds it satisfying.

The problem comes when someone who does not find an argument satisfying tries to claim that it is therefore universally 'bad' by some hashed-together criteria because they can't handle the relativism of philosophical propositions.

This is the whole point of Wittgenstein's investigation. A point not lost on the authors of the paper themselves who note the importance of Wittgenstein's solutions to the rule-following paradox. — Pseudonym

Wittgenstein did not provide an adequate description of what it means to follow a rule. He stated that if one could be observed to be acting in a particularly described way, then that person could be said to be following a rule. But this requires that the person do the same type of thing, more than once, producing an inductive conclusion by the observer, in order that the person is following a rule. Therefore "following a rule" is a property of the inductive conclusion of the observer, rather than a property of the person following the rule.

In reality, to follow a rule is to hold a principle within one's own mind, and adhere to it. This allows that one is following a rule in the very first instance of acting according to the rule. Furthermore, it allows for the very important, and relevant type of following a rule, which is to restrain oneself from a certain activity, like we do with a resolution to quit a bad habit. This is clear evidence that Wittgenstein's description of rule following is way off the mark. If one is successful in quitting a bad habit, there is no second time, and according to Wittgenstein this person could not be following a rule..

So Wittgenstein doesn't really solve any "rule-following paradox". All he does is define "rule-following" in a way which could make the problem appear to go away. But his definition doesn't match what rule-following really is, so what he has done is produced a fantasy solution which is really quite useless because what it resolves, if anything, is an issue with what Wittgenstein refers to with "rule-following". and this is nothing real.

It's philosophy if it makes some argument about 'the way things are' that cannot be checked against objective empirical sense data (or whatever definition you prefer). It's a useful one if the person holding it finds it satisfying. — Pseudonym

"It's philosophy if I'm philosophically incompetent".

Interesting example of what I'm talking about.

Wittgenstein did not provide an adequate description of what it means to follow a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

But he obviously did. I don't think there can be any doubt that Wittgenstein was a very clever man. He obviously found it adequate, as do a number of equally clever Wittgenstein scholars who still hold to his solution to a greater or lesser extent. (one could include John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Saul Kripke, potentially Crispin Wright). So unless you are privy to some unique insight these other scholars lack, one of two things must be the case - either one group is wrong but it will be impossible to tell which (all the relevant data having already been presented), or you are simply using words differently to describe the same thing. On no account does the mere presentation of a counter-argument demonstrate anything at all about the 'adequacy' of Wittgenstein's solution other than an expression of your own personal satisfaction with it.

Its possible to arrive at dozens of counter-arguments to your position, not that doing so makes your position wrong either. We could say that the first instance is not a true expression of 'rule-following' (having just invented the term, we're free to define it as we see fit), we could justify such a distinction by saying that the first instance represented an investigation, whereas only subsequent ones can be said to follow a truly 'private' rule. We could claim that one could not be said to follow a private rule until they had personal experience which removes it from the public sphere. And on and on. At no point in time is anyone 'proving' to anything. Nothing is what is happening "in reality" because we do not have unfiltered access to 'reality'.

If, for some reason, you feel some need to be abundantly clear about your world-view with regards to the solutions to the rule-following paradox, then I'm sure that rendering them available for criticism is a good way to refine them to your satisfaction, but personally it's a point I'm happy to accept a number of possible interpretations of.

In reality, to follow a rule is to hold a principle within one's own mind, and adhere to it.

This seems to miss the point of Wittgenstein's challenge regarding rule following (at least under Kripke's interpretation of it) - it merely pushes the sceptical challenge back to asking what tells you which principle it is that you hold in your own mind.

But he obviously did. I don't think there can be any doubt that Wittgenstein was a very clever man. He obviously found it adequate, as do a number of equally clever Wittgenstein scholars who still hold to his solution to a greater or lesser extent. (one could include John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Saul Kripke, potentially Crispin Wright). — Pseudonym

Sure, Wittgenstein found his description of "rule-following" adequate for his purposes, and perhaps these other philosophers found it adequate for their purposes as well. However, as I explained, it doesn't apply to a vast quantity of instances of rule following, therefore we would be foolish to accept it. Would you accept a description of "plant" which was inapplicable to a large number of things which we call by that word? I would reject the definition as unacceptable, wouldn't you?

In any situation where an observer was incapable of identifying the rule which an individual was following, as a specific rule, the individual could not be following a rule. That means that a large number of cases where a person is actually following a rule, we have to say that the person is not following a rule. Furthermore, if a person makes a rule, and follows this rule with one's actions, but the actions are inconsistent with, or contrary to a rule identified by an observer, the observer would have to say that the person is not following a rule, because the person is breaking a rule. However, that person is clearly following a rule, it's just that the observer has wrongly identified the applicable rule, saying that the person is breaking a rule, rather than that the person is actually following a different, unidentified rule.

So unless you are privy to some unique insight these other scholars lack, one of two things must be the case - either one group is wrong but it will be impossible to tell which (all the relevant data having already been presented), or you are simply using words differently to describe the same thing. — Pseudonym

It's very easy to see who is right and who is wrong. My description applies to all cases of "following a rule" whereas Wittgenstein's only applies to some specific cases. According to Wittgenstein's description, a person is only following a rule if the person acts in the right way. This excludes the possibility that a person who is acting in the wrong way is actually following a rule. So all the instances when a person is acting in the wrong way, yet is still following a rule, are excluded as instances of rule following. It is obvious therefore, that Wittgenstein's rule, concerning rule following, is wrong, because it disallows the possibility that when someone is wrong, they are still following a rule. It only allows us to say that a person is following a rule if the person is judged to act in the right way, despite the evidence that people who act in the wrong way are still following rules.

On no account does the mere presentation of a counter-argument demonstrate anything at all about the 'adequacy' of Wittgenstein's solution other than an expression of your own personal satisfaction with it. — Pseudonym

Right, I was very dissatisfied with Wittgenstein's proposed solution. And if you follow what I say, then unless you have a rebuttal for me, you ought to be dissatisfied with it as well, regardless of whether any other philosophers are satisfied with it.

Its possible to arrive at dozens of counter-arguments to your position, not that doing so makes your position wrong either. We could say that the first instance is not a true expression of 'rule-following' (having just invented the term, we're free to define it as we see fit), we could justify such a distinction by saying that the first instance represented an investigation, whereas only subsequent ones can be said to follow a truly 'private' rule. We could claim that one could not be said to follow a private rule until they had personal experience which removes it from the public sphere. And on and on. At no point in time is anyone 'proving' to anything. Nothing is what is happening "in reality" because we do not have unfiltered access to 'reality'. — Pseudonym

Sure, you can define "rule-following" however you please, and offer this to me. It doesn't serve as a rebuttal though, because my argument is against the use of such a definition. What is the point in defining "rule-following" such that it excludes a vast number of instances which we refer to as following a rule? If it's just for the purpose of solving some paradox, then the paradox is not really solved, because all these paradoxical instances of rule-following are still going on, despite the fact that your definition of "rule-following" denies that we can call these instances of rule-following.

This seems to miss the point of Wittgenstein's challenge regarding rule following (at least under Kripke's interpretation of it) - it merely pushes the sceptical challenge back to asking what tells you which principle it is that you hold in your own mind. — jkg20

I really don't see your point. Care to explain?

A is not equal to A, then we would know A could not exist. People overlook the fact that a mathematical object can only exist if its existence is consistent with logic. It works both ways.
9d — LD Saunders

This is presumptuous. There are developments in quantum mechanics - extending to its ontology and thus the formal logic used - where quantum objects lack identity. They are not self-identical, sometimes terms "non-individual objects". Also, there are non-classical logics (and thus corresponding non-classical mathematics) where contradictions can be proved without trivialism, thus allowing one to prove the existence of inconsistent mathematical objects (e.g. the Russell Set).

However, as I explained, it doesn't apply to a vast quantity of instances of rule following, therefore we would be foolish to accept it. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you didn't "explain" it, you asserted it using your private definitions;

"In reality, to follow a rule is to hold a principle within one's own mind, and adhere to it." - Which 'reality' are you referring to here, and what god-like insight has allowed you to simply 'know' what it is to follow a rule in it? Philosophers can't even agree what a mind is, let alone what's in it. Peter Hacker, for example, doesn't even think there is such a thing as a mind.

"This allows that one is following a rule in the very first instance of acting according to the rule." - Why would we want, or need, to allow this?

"...it allows for the very important, and relevant type of following a rule, which is to restrain oneself from a certain activity, like we do with a resolution to quit a bad habit." - Again, why would we want, or need, to allow this?

"... If one is successful in quitting a bad habit, there is no second time," - Tell that to an alcoholic, most consider their entire lives to be a continual struggle to not drink alcohol.

"That means that a large number of cases where a person is actually following a rule, we have to say that the person is not following a rule." - How do you know they are "actually" following a rule? The whole point of the paradox is that we have no way of defining what it is to "actually" follow a rule.

Would you accept a description of "plant" which was inapplicable to a large number of things which we call by that word? I would reject the definition as unacceptable, wouldn't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, of course I would have to. If the rest of the speaking world were referring to some object as a 'plant' which I personally considered not to be one, or vice versa, I would have to follow suit in order to communicate. The is no thing that 'plant' means outside of its use. You're arguing that your personal uses of the the term 'rule' need to be included in the global definition of what it is to follow a rule. That's the whole of what Wittgenstein had to say about Private Language.

According to Wittgenstein's description, a person is only following a rule if the person acts in the right way. This excludes the possibility that a person who is acting in the wrong way is actually following a rule. So all the instances when a person is acting in the wrong way, yet is still following a rule, are excluded as instances of rule following. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is simply wrong, in that this is not what Wittgenstein said. His claim was that we would have no way of knowing whether a person was following a rule correctly causing their actions or following a different rule but making a mistake.

What is the point in defining "rule-following" such that it excludes a vast number of instances which we refer to as following a rule? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not about following a rule it's about the inability to know which rule a person is following.

But this is not the right place to get into a deep discussion about Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox. It is relevant to this thread, as the authors of the paper in the OP point out, in that one cannot say anything concrete about solutions arising from framework choices because one cannot say anything concrete about what rules the respective thinkers are actually following to derive their conclusions.

what god-like insight has allowed you to simply 'know' what it is to follow a rule in it? — Pseudonym

I follow rules all the time, don't you? I hold a principle within my mind and adhere to it. There is no "god-like insight" involved in me knowing this, just a little bit of self-reflection. It's really quite straight forward, you ought to try it sometime. However, you for some reason seem to think that following a rule is some sort of complex, and difficult thing to understand, requiring a god-like insight. Why make it so difficult when it's not?

Yes, of course I would have to. If the rest of the speaking world were referring to some object as a 'plant' which I personally considered not to be one, or vice versa, I would have to follow suit in order to communicate. The is no thing that 'plant' means outside of its use. You're arguing that your personal uses of the the term 'rule' need to be included in the global definition of what it is to follow a rule. That's the whole of what Wittgenstein had to say about Private Language. — Pseudonym

Right, so my argument is that Wittgenstein didn't account for a vast amount of usage of "rule-following" when he defined it. So he acted in a hypocritical way, arguing that usage must be accounted for in producing a definition, but then not doing that when he produced a definition for rule-following.

This is simply wrong, in that this is not what Wittgenstein said. His claim was that we would have no way of knowing whether a person was following a rule correctly causing their actions or following a different rule but making a mistake. — Pseudonym

This is a misunderstanding of what I said. I was not talking about a situation of when a person appears to be following a rule, but is really not following that rule, I was talking about a situation when a person appears not to be following a rule, but really is. These are the situations which serve as evidence that Wittgenstein's description of rule-following is unacceptable. These are the situations in which rules come into existence. A person thinks up a rule and starts following it. In these situations there is also "no way of knowing" that the person is following a rule, but it must be concluded according to the definition, that the person is not following a rule. This is an unjustified conclusion.

This unjustified conclusion has extensive epistemic consequences. It leaves us with no principles whereby we might judge rules themselves, as right or wrong. A person is judged to be acting rightly or wrongly, according to whether one is acting by the rule, but a rule is not the type of thing which can be judged as right or wrong. This, what you call "no way of knowing" the actual rule which is being followed by the individual, makes it impossible to judge the rule itself. All we can do is judge the individual's actions in relation to known rules. If the person does act according to known rules the person cannot be acting rightly.

Of course there is a simple solution to this problem which Wittgenstein creates, and that is to recognize that judgement, as well as rules, occur within peoples' minds. This allows that an individual, with one's own mind may judge a rule as right or wrong, as well as judging another person's actions as right or wrong. But Wittgenstein's principles leave us without the capacity to judge a rule as right or wrong.

That's the point of this thread, without that capacity, the capacity to judge a rule, rules must be completely arbitrary. However, we actually often judge rules. The op adds "aim", purpose, such that rules are judged and shaped toward specific goals. Now we have to account for the existence of such goals, and this brings us right back into the minds of individuals. So we are no further ahead. Instead of having principles for judging a rule as right or wrong, which is what Wittgenstein avoided the need for, we now need principles for judging a goal as good or bad. Wittgenstein provides us with nothing but a deferral of the problem, veiling the deferral as a proposed solution.

It's not about following a rule it's about the inability to know which rule a person is following. — Pseudonym

I agree, but this "inability to know" is exactly where Wittgenstein makes his mistake, what I called the unjustified conclusion. By Wittgenstein's principles, if there is an inability to know whether or not the person is following a rule, we must proceed as if the person is not following a rule. That is simply how Wittgenstein defines "rule-following", and we must adhere to the definition in our procedure. But this is to proceed on an unjustified premise, and that's why the definition is unacceptable.

But this is not the right place to get into a deep discussion about Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox. It is relevant to this thread, as the authors of the paper in the OP point out, in that one cannot say anything concrete about solutions arising from framework choices because one cannot say anything concrete about what rules the respective thinkers are actually following to derive their conclusions. — Pseudonym

I don't think you are adhering to Wittgenstein's principles here. By his principles, if we cannot say anything concrete about the rule which a thinker is following, we must conclude that the thinker is not following a rule. This is the critical point which renders Wittgenstein's principles ineffectual for dealing with instances of creative thought. Such choices are left by Wittgenstein as arbitrary, unruly. The op turns to "aim", purpose, to deal with these choices. This puts us back into the minds of the thinkers, which is what Wittgenstein was trying to avoid.

I follow rules all the time, don't you? I hold a principle within my mind and adhere to it. There is no "god-like insight" involved in me knowing this, just a little bit of self-reflection. — Metaphysician Undercover

So what conclusion do you think someone with false memory syndrome would come to about what rule motivates their actions? What about phantom limb syndrome, Capgras delusions, synathesia, or simple dementia. How are you so sure your brain serves you up an accurate report of what is it to follow a rule, not just for you, but apparently for all humanity?

Are you implying that Wittgenstein and all the well-respected experienced thinkers who follow his line of argument have all failed to do even a "little bit" of self-reflection? I mean, I don't even completely go along with Wittgenstein (or Kripkenstein) on this issue, im just trying to point out how unlikely it is that such intelligent people are categorically 'wrong' about an issue in respect of which they are in possession of all the relevant facts.

Right, so my argument is that Wittgenstein didn't account for a vast amount of usage of "rule-following" when he defined it. — Metaphysician Undercover

How many people have you spoken to about what it feels like is going on when they use the term "rule-following"? I mean, out of the 7 billion people currently speaking to each other about their experiences, how many of them have you interviewed to arrive at this "vast number" who are using the term and meaning by it exactly what you describe.

This is a misunderstanding of what I said. I was not talking about a situation of when a person appears to be following a rule, but is really not following that rule, I was talking about a situation when a person appears not to be following a rule, but really is. — Metaphysician Undercover

It needn't make any difference to the argument. What, to you, is "not following" a rule might well be to Wittgenstein "following a rule which mandates the opposite of the rule you claim the person is" not following". It all just comes down to how you use your terms.

A person thinks up a rule and starts following it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do they?

but it must be concluded according to the definition, that the person is not following a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, as I said, it's not about concluding that they're not following a rule, it's that we must conclude that we cannot know what that rule is.

But Wittgenstein's principles leave us without the capacity to judge a rule as right or wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Instead of having principles for judging a rule as right or wrong, which is what Wittgenstein avoided the need for, we now need principles for judging a goal as good or bad. — Metaphysician Undercover

Must we really engineer our epistemology just in order to preserve our ability to judge things as right and wrong. Are you really so beholden to your Minoan complex that you disregard every proposition that doesn't allow you to judge things 'right' or 'wrong'?

By his principles, if we cannot say anything concrete about the rule which a thinker is following, we must conclude that the thinker is not following a rule. This is the critical point which renders Wittgenstein's principles ineffectual for dealing with instances of creative thought. Such choices are left by Wittgenstein as arbitrary, unruly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how you've arrived at this conclusion. We need not conclude that the thinker is not following a rile. The Skeptical solution is that we can't know what the rule he's following is, so we can't draw any conclusions about things like consensus, or public meaning. It doesn't imply anything about what we "must" conclude. Also, you've suddenly introduced the idea that instances of creative thought are something we must "deal with". Deal with in what sense?

The op turns to "aim", purpose, to deal with these choices. This puts us back into the minds of the thinkers, which is what Wittgenstein was trying to avoid. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. Despite the evident pleasure people seem to get out of it, the idea that some particular notion could be objectively "not useful", "not necessary" or any other term dug out of the thesaurus to avoid saying "wrong" just does not seem to me to be justifiable.

So what conclusion do you think someone with false memory syndrome would come to about what rule motivates their actions? What about phantom limb syndrome, Capgras delusions, synathesia, or simple dementia. How are you so sure your brain serves you up an accurate report of what is it to follow a rule, not just for you, but apparently for all humanity? — Pseudonym

I don't see how this is relevant.

I mean, I don't even completely go along with Wittgenstein (or Kripkenstein) on this issue, im just trying to point out how unlikely it is that such intelligent people are categorically 'wrong' about an issue in respect of which they are in possession of all the relevant facts. — Pseudonym

Oh, so you don't "completely go along with" it. Then why not give it up as unacceptable? Why gloss over the unacceptability? Who cares if other intelligible thinkers accept it. If you can't go along with it, then take the aspects which appeal to you and leave the rest as unacceptable.

How many people have you spoken to about what it feels like is going on when they use the term "rule-following"? I mean, out of the 7 billion people currently speaking to each other about their experiences, how many of them have you interviewed to arrive at this "vast number" who are using the term and meaning by it exactly what you describe. — Pseudonym

What I describe is instances of "rule-following" which are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's definition. These are situations such as when someone resolves to do something, like a New Year's resolution. It appears to me like there is a vast number of people who talk about New Year's resolutions, don't you agree? Or are you going to obstinately insist that following a New Year's resolution is not an instance of rule-following.

No, as I said, it's not about concluding that they're not following a rule, it's that we must conclude that we cannot know what that rule is. — Pseudonym

This is a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein. It is very clear that if we cannot know the rule which one is following, we cannot say that the person is following a rule. If the rule cannot be identified then the person must be said to be not following a rule. This is the crux of the private language argument. An unidentifiable rule is not a rule at all. If it were a rule then there could be private rules and private language. So if we conclude that we cannot know what the rule being followed is, then it follows that there is no rule being followed. An unidentifiable rule is not a rule. A private rule would be a rule which cannot be identified and therefore it is not a rule at all. So there is no such thing as a private rule.

We need not conclude that the thinker is not following a rile. — Pseudonym

Reconsider your misunderstanding of Wittgenstein which I described above. A private rule is not a rule. If the thinker is following an unidentifiable rule, the thinker is not following a rule. This is fundamental. Have you read the Philosophical Investigations, and how Wittgenstein describes what it means to follow a rule? Or, are you going by some secondary source, a watered down version with an author trying to cover up the unacceptability of Wittgenstein's proposal? Why would someone try to make an unacceptable principle appear acceptable?

Really if all you've got to say is that your interpretation of Wittgenstein is right and mine is wrong without any attempt to substantiate that claim then there's little point in continuing this discussion. It consistently astounds me how many posters on this forum seem to have not the faintest clue as to how diverse, contradictory and most times mutually exclusive, propositions and interpretations are in academic philosophy, particularity about Wittgenstein. I suppose it takes a certain hubris to think that one can contribute meaningfully to a discussion and so that may filter out those who see the diversity of opinion as a probably the only true fact out there, but still, the level continues to surprise me.

Quine and Kripke have different interpretations of Wittgenstein's intent in removing facts about meaning. Scott Soames at Princeton disagrees with both. Cripin Wright sees a fairly full removal of judgement about rules, John Mcdowell disagrees, seeing no problem with consensus judging. If you can think of a possible way to interpret Wittgenstein, chances are someone's written it. I have not, however, yet read any interpretation of Wittgenstein that suggests that he is making the claim that we must conclude the thinker is not following a rule at all.

John McDowell has the most sympathetic interpretation to your preference that we maintain some ability to judge right and wrong, yet he specifies "Wittgenstein's target is not the very idea that a present state of understanding embodies commitments with respect to the future[rule-following itself], but rather a certain seductive misconception of that idea."

Even the more Skeptical interpretations of Crispin Wright only go as far as to say "Wittgenstein seems almost to want to deny all substance to the 'pattern' idea" (not even my emphasis, he put that in).

Or, from Investigations itself (219) "“All the steps are really already taken” means: I no longer have any choice. The rule, once stamped with a particular meaning, traces the lines along which it is to be followed through the whole of space. – But if something of this sort really were the case, how would it help? No; my description only made sense if it was to be understood symbolically. – I should have said: This is how it strikes me. When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly."

If there is an interpretation where Wittgenstein insists we must presume the thinker is not following a rule at all, however, it would not surprise me in the least. Why don't you actually quote the passage you think is making that claim (or the secondary interpretation) and we can look at it.

Or you could just join in the general condescending approach to philosophy here that every position you don't personally agree with must be the result of a deep ignorance of the subject on the part of your opponent. I'd just rather not continue under this second approach.

Presuming the former approach, pending your posting the actual quotes you're using for your interpretation, I will quote a few sources for mine;

Consider first this passage in the PI in which Wittgenstein reassures his interlocutor:
"But I don't mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense present." - But of course it is, 'in some sense'! Really the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression "in a queer way". The rest is all right ...."

Wittgenstein is not saying that a person does not follow a rule (this seems obvious to me from the passage at 219 where he clearly describes his feeling about the process), but that there are no facts about that rule which can be used to determine if it is being 'correctly' followed. As John McDowell puts it in 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule', "these natural ideas lack the substance we are inclined to credit them with", or Crispin Wright saying a similar thing "there is in our understanding of a concept no rigid, advance determination of what is to count as its correct application" in his paper 'Rule Following without Reasons' (if you haven't read it by the way, it is an excellent summary of an interpretation I have a lot of sympathy with, but I'm not sure if it's available on the internet)

It is his understanding of what Wittgenstein undermines which was the reason I mentioned the whole rule-following thing in the first place (which I think may now be off topic?) He says that the rule-following problem undermines the notion that "Discoveries in mathematics are regarded as the unpacking of (in the best case) deep but (always) predeterminate implications of the architecture of our understanding of basic mathematical concepts, as codified in intuitively apprehended axioms.", @StreetlightX's position (that this recognition does not remove our ability to judge) simply tries to shift the rule-following to another dimension - how things should fall out of frames, how frames are or are not useful etc. That is the the only sense in which this interpretation of Wittgenstein on rule-following is relevant to this thread. Crispin Wright again clarifies perhaps better than I could "no response, however aberrant, in and of itself defeats the claim that a subject correctly understands and intends to follow a particular rule – you can always make compensatory adjustments by ascribing a misapprehension of the initial conditions for the application of a rule, as expressed in the minor premise in the modus ponens model" (which he explains earlier likening rule-following to a simple chess game).

If you want to discuss rule-following in general then perhaps a fresh thread might be appropriate? If you still see a relevance to the interpretation of the paper in the OP, then I'm not quite following and perhaps you could make that link clearer. Alternatively, If you'd like to just like to continue the presumption that every opposing position must stem from naive ignorance, then you would, it seems, at least have some company.

I have not, however, yet read any interpretation of Wittgenstein that suggests that he is making the claim that we must conclude the thinker is not following a rule at all. — Pseudonym

My claim is not that we must conclude that any given thinker is not following a rule. It is that if a rule cannot be identified from the person's actions, then we must conclude that the person, despite believing oneself to be following a rule, is not following a rule. I really can't understand why you argue against this, as it is the key premise to the so-called private language argument. Are you arguing that those Wittgensteinians who produce a private language argument from his principles have misinterpreted him? Here's a simplistic version of the private language argument. If you think that you can create a rendition without the third premise, the one that you claim Wittgenstein didn't state, then show me.
P1. Language requires following rules
P2. A private language would consist of following private (unidentified) rules.
P3. Following private (unidentified) rules do not qualify as "following rules".
C. Therefore a private language is not possible.

If there is an interpretation where Wittgenstein insists we must presume the thinker is not following a rule at all, however, it would not surprise me in the least. Why don't you actually quote the passage you think is making that claim (or the secondary interpretation) and we can look at it. — Pseudonym

All right, here you go

201. This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to
accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out
to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it.
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after
another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we
thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which
is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it"
in actual cases.
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the
rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation"
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another.
202. And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one
is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it. — Philosophical Investigations

Notice 202. It explicitly states "And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule." This is what makes it impossible to obey a rule privately. Holding a principle within my mind, and adhering to it is to "think I am obeying a rule". But this is explicitly "not to obey a rule". That is what Wittgenstein excludes from "obeying a rule". As a result, "obeying a rule" is restricted to a practise which is observed to be in accordance with a rule. If the observer cannot identify the rule, because it is only the actor who holds the rule within one's mind, this is "to think one is obeying a rule", which is "not to obey a rule".

Firstly, these passages are Wittgenstein laying out the paradox and its implications, not providing the solution to it. Only Saul Kripke has really considered the phrase at 202 to be the conclusion of the argument. Most scholars (Hacker, Wright, McGinn, McDowell, for example) do not consider the argument concluded until passage 243 where he begins his attack on Private Language, with “The words of this language are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another cannot understand the language.”

Which is why your conclusions about how we must respond to the rule-following paradox are not necessitated by it. As I said, There are numerous interpretations, there's no 'right' or 'wrong', there's no 'unacceptable' it just depends what conclusion you want to come to and then re-arrange the meanings of the terms to suit. The whole philosophical argument resulting from the rule-following paradox is about how we conceive of 'a rule', not about how we 'must' respond to others in respect of whether they are following one or not, that is part of the paradox, not one of the the solutions to it. If the private rule-following behaviour is or is not really 'rule-following', then does that mean anything? It's certainly some form of behaviour. It's undeniably a different form of behaviour to following public rules, so what difference does it make if we call it 'rule-following' or not?

In Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein says "How was it possible for the rule to have been given an interpretation during instruction, an interpretation which reaches as far as any arbitrary step?” (RFM VI-38), which I think explains his position more clearly than it is expressed in PI. Basically, he's saying that if a rule must be interpreted 'correctly' to be followed 'correctly', then where is the 'correct' interpretation? It can't be in the rule itself (that would be self-referential), so it is nowhere.

Either there is no 'correct' interpretation because we have no reason to believe rules are other than as they appear to us - the quietism of McDowell, or it is not the case that rules must be 'interpreted correctly' in order to be followed correctly, or there is a 'correct', but we cannot know it (the Skeptical solution)

So, you'd said...

I was talking about a situation when a person appears not to be following a rule, but really is. These are the situations which serve as evidence that Wittgenstein's description of rule-following is unacceptable... A person thinks up a rule and starts following it. In these situations there is also "no way of knowing" that the person is following a rule, but it must be concluded according to the definition, that the person is not following a rule. This is an unjustified conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

But this is not what 'must' be concluded at all. This is part of the paradox. It's conclusions are the rejection of private language and either quietism, skepticism or (if you must!) the anti psychologism of McGinn.

I'm not sure if I'm explaining it any more clearly, but I will try to use the example you gave of a person quitting smoking. You'd said that such a person must be following a rule - the rule "I will not have a cigarette", but that it is perverse to say he's not following a rule simply because we cannot say if he is following it correctly by his action of not having a cigarette. So this is the paradox. But Wittgenstein says that we cannot simply say he is following a rule (one in his own mind) because even he does not know all the interpretations of that rule until they arise, he has not, for example specified whether, should some company invent a new type of smoking device, that constitutes 'a cigarette' or not. He has not defined 'cigarette' against all possible future issues, nor could he ever define 'cigarette' without using other words which he would then have to define...and so on. So either we must remain quiet on whether the man is following a rule (or breaking it), or we must conclude that he might be but it's impossible to know. Or, to use Crispin Wright's words instead;

"If a (suitably precise and general) rule is—by the very definition of 'rule', as it were—intrinsically
such as to carry predeterminate verdicts for an open-ended range of occasions, and if grasping a
rule is—by definition—an ability to keep track of those verdicts, step by step, then the prime
question becomes: what makes it possible for there to be such things as rules, so conceived, at
all? I can create a geometrical figure by drawing it. But how do I create something which carries
pre-determinate instructions for an open range of situations which I do not think about in creating
it? What gives it this content, when anything I say or do in explaining it will be open to an
indefinite variety of conflicting interpretations?"

Firstly, these passages are Wittgenstein laying out the paradox and its implications, not providing the solution to it. Only Saul Kripke has really considered the phrase at 202 to be the conclusion of the argument. Most scholars (Hacker, Wright, McGinn, McDowell, for example) do not consider the argument concluded until passage 243 where he begins his attack on Private Language, with “The words of this language are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another cannot understand the language.” — Pseudonym

That, at 202 is the premise, the definition of "obeying a rule" which allows for the private language argument. As you can see, it's very clearly stated:

"And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately':"

I really don't care what "most scholars believe", I know how to read. I am doubtful about some scholar's ability to do that. As I said, if you think that you can formulate a private language argument without that premise, then demonstrate it. Otherwise you're just blowing smoke.

Which is why your conclusions about how we must respond to the rule-following paradox are not necessitated by it. — Pseudonym

What are you talking about? Either you continue to deny that Wittgenstein stated this principle or you accept that he did, and accept what the proposition means, as well as the logical implications. You cannot accept the proposition, and the private language argument which follows from it, yet reject what the proposition means.

I reject the proposition because I do not accept the meaning of it as representing what I consider to be rule-following. You seem to agree with me, but instead of rejecting Wittgenstein's principles, you insist that Wittgenstein didn't mean what is explicitly stated. Then what do you think Wittgenstein means with the conclusion, that there cannot be a private language?

Which is why your conclusions about how we must respond to the rule-following paradox are not necessitated by it. As I said, There are numerous interpretations, there's no 'right' or 'wrong', there's no 'unacceptable' it just depends what conclusion you want to come to and then re-arrange the meanings of the terms to suit. The whole philosophical argument resulting from the rule-following paradox is about how we conceive of 'a rule', not about how we 'must' respond to others in respect of whether they are following one or not, that is part of the paradox, not one of the the solutions to it. If the private rule-following behaviour is or is not really 'rule-following', then does that mean anything? It's certainly some form of behaviour. It's undeniably a different form of behaviour to following public rules, so what difference does it make if we call it 'rule-following' or not? — Pseudonym

Right, it is Wittgenstein's definition of "rule". To think that I am following a rule is not to follow a rule. As I said, this definition excludes all the times that I hold a principle in my mind, privately, and follow that principle, as a rule. This is very explicitly "not to obey a rule". Either we can accept this definition, or we can reject it as unacceptable. But for you to try and say that Wittgenstein didn't mean this, what is stated so explicitly, is complete nonsense.

I'm not sure if I'm explaining it any more clearly, but I will try to use the example you gave of a person quitting smoking. You'd said that such a person must be following a rule - the rule "I will not have a cigarette", but that it is perverse to say he's not following a rule simply because we cannot say if he is following it correctly by his action of not having a cigarette. So this is the paradox. But Wittgenstein says that we cannot simply say he is following a rule (one in his own mind) because even he does not know all the interpretations of that rule until they arise, he has not, for example specified whether, should some company invent a new type of smoking device, that constitutes 'a cigarette' or not. He has not defined 'cigarette' against all possible future issues, nor could he ever define 'cigarette' without using other words which he would then have to define...and so on. So either we must remain quiet on whether the man is following a rule (or breaking it), or we must conclude that he might be but it's impossible to know. Or, to use Crispin Wright's words instead; — Pseudonym

Nonsense, it is explicitly stated, he is not following a rule. This is the way that the paradox is avoided, and private language is denied. We do not have to say whether the person is following the rule correctly or not, because the person is simply, and very explicitly, not following a rule. And, the consequences of this, are the absurdities I referred to earlier, concerning the relationship between rules, and right and wrong.

It's not difficult. It's only difficult if you desire to hide this premise, because it's unacceptable to you, yet you also want to maintain the conclusion of the argument. That's deception though.

As I said, if you think that you can formulate a private language argument without that premise, then demonstrate it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well that's relatively simple since the private language argument only really starts at 243, the section on rule-following being only one of the numerous preliminaries to it in PI.
The argument traditionally is expounded using definitions of signs.

1. A definition of a sign cannot be formulated privately because to define a sign is not simply to associate it with a sensation at the time, but to correctly associate with that sensation at all times. As Wittgenstein says "“I impress [the connection] on myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection right in the future’. For I do not define anything, even to myself let alone anyone else, by merely attending to something and making a mark, unless this episode has the appropriate consequences."

2. That such an association would have no meaning (make no sense) as a definition because it could not be doubted (being a private sensation).

Neither explanation has anything much to do with the rule-following paradox. Not that your definition of the 'impossiblity' of following a private rule is a necessary interpretation there either. The exposition of the rule following argument is simply that since you can think you're following a rule when you're not, thinking you're following a rule cannot be the same as actually following a rule. Yet privately (in the sense Wittgenstein uses the term), thinking you're following a rule is all you have, so it's impossible to claim you're following a rule privately.

I get the sense from the tone of your responses, however, that you're not particularly interested in the complexities of interpretation, but rather "he said X, by which he meant Y, and anyone who disagrees must be an idiot."

I really have no more stomach for these types exchanges.

I don't see any argument there. Since we can and do communicate without definitions, your talk of definitions is irrelevant. Definitions are not a required part of language. That sort of private language argument fails for that reason.

The exposition of the rule following argument is simply that since you can think you're following a rule when you're not, thinking you're following a rule cannot be the same as actually following a rule. Yet privately (in the sense Wittgenstein uses the term), thinking you're following a rule is all you have, so it's impossible to claim you're following a rule privately. — Pseudonym

Right this is the point I dispute as unacceptable. I think that following a rule is nothing other than thinking that you are following a rule. It is to hold a principle in one's mind and adhere to it. That's what "following a rule" is. And, I do not see how it is possible that while one is holding the principle in mind, and adhering to it, (thinking you're following a rule), that person is actually not, as Wittgenstein suggests here. Yes, mistakes are possible but this occurs when we do not hold the principle, or do not adhere to it. At this time, it is impossible to be thinking that you are following the rule, because thinking that you are following a rule is to hold the principle and adhere to it.

As I said before, Wittgenstein switches what it actually means to follow a rule, hold the principle in mind, adhere to it, and act accordingly, with what it means to be judged as following a rule, to act as if one is obeying a particular rule. He has no description of what it means to follow a rule, only a description of what it means to be judged as acting as if one is following a rule. So he dismisses a true description of rule-following, to replace it with a description of acting as if one is following a rules. He does not describe the object, (rule-following) but a representation of the object (act like one is following a rule).

I think that following a rule is nothing other than thinking that you are following a rule. It is to hold a principle in one's mind and adhere to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you talking about consciously thinking about the rule?

When you first learned how to play chess, you had to do that for a while, but no one who's played for a while ever thinks about the rules while they play, do they?

Yes, mistakes are possible but this occurs when we do not hold the principle, or do not adhere to it. At this time, it is impossible to be thinking that you are following the rule, because thinking that you are following a rule is to hold the principle and adhere to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the point. We do not have two minds. We cannot simultaneously hold a view on what a rule is and faithfully, with good intent, make a mistake in applying it. If the rule is indeed private (which means not just known only to us, but knowable only to us), then every action we take is a faithful attempt to interpret that rule for the circumstances we're faced with and a rule is nothing other than it's interpretation in certain circumstances. How can you think you are following a rule (which is known only to you) and yet not be (make a mistake)? Where, and in what form, is the rule kept in your mind which is something other than the responses to circumstances you're faced with?

Consider Srap's chess example above, but imagine a private version. A game which you invented the rules for and only you know them. In this game some piece (which only you know), moves in some way (which only you know), but playing it in your mind you make a mistake you move it in a way that is 'wrong'. How do you know you've made a mistake? How do you know that the piece wasn't actually supposed to move that way and you've misremembered the way you originally intended for it? How do you know that whatever sensory or internal input is telling you that the piece is in the 'wrong' place is the same or different to the one you had when you invented what the 'right' place for it should be? Since you cannot define a rule in your mind other than by the actions that should be taken in response to certain circumstances, you are beholden to the inconsistency of your understanding of 'action' and your meaningful interpretation of 'circumstances' neither of which you can have any faith in. And this is just one simple moving rule in a made up game. How much more unreliable will it be when we come to rules about the meanings of words or ethics?

When you first learned how to play chess, you had to do that for a while, but no one who's played for a while ever thinks about the rules while they play, do they? — Srap Tasmaner

That's how mistake is possible.

We cannot simultaneously hold a view on what a rule is and faithfully, with good intent, make a mistake in applying it. — Pseudonym

One problem of mistake is as Srap indicates. The rule is relegated to memory, and we act most times by habit without consulting the rule. Actions of habit must be distinguished from actions of following a rule.

How can you think you are following a rule (which is known only to you) and yet not be (make a mistake)? Where, and in what form, is the rule kept in your mind which is something other than the responses to circumstances you're faced with? — Pseudonym

As I described, it is impossible to follow a rule, and simultaneously make a mistake. That's contradiction. If one holds a principle and adheres to it, one is not making a mistake. if one makes a mistake, one is not holding a principle and adhering to it. However, we find ourselves in vastly varying situations, in which we need to interpret the situation, as well as interpret the rule in a way which is applicable to the situation. Mistake is often attributable to misinterpretation. As you can see at 201, Wittgenstein attempts to remove the importance of interpretation. Since interpretation is a major source of mistake, this procedure is unacceptable.

Consider Srap's chess example above, but imagine a private version. A game which you invented the rules for and only you know them. In this game some piece (which only you know), moves in some way (which only you know), but playing it in your mind you make a mistake you move it in a way that is 'wrong'. How do you know you've made a mistake? — Pseudonym

In that instance, it's easy to know you made a mistake. You go back and revisit the move while holding the rule in your mind, and see that you made the move absent mindedly.

How do you know that the piece wasn't actually supposed to move that way and you've misremembered the way you originally intended for it? How do you know that whatever sensory or internal input is telling you that the piece is in the 'wrong' place is the same or different to the one you had when you invented what the 'right' place for it should be? — Pseudonym

These would be cases of misinterpretation. And, as you describe, in these cases you do not know whether or not a mistake was made. That's life. We cannot liberate ourselves from the restrictions imposed by the facts of life, by changing the definition of rule-following, as Wittgenstein tries to do..

Since you cannot define a rule in your mind other than by the actions that should be taken in response to certain circumstances, you are beholden to the inconsistency of your understanding of 'action' and your meaningful interpretation of 'circumstances' neither of which you can have any faith in. And this is just one simple moving rule in a made up game. How much more unreliable will it be when we come to rules about the meanings of words or ethics? — Pseudonym

Uncertainty is an essential aspect of living as a human being. So be it.

The rule is relegated to memory, and we act most times by habit without consulting the rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Acting out of habit without consulting the rule would not be a case of the kind of mistake Wittgenstein is talking about. He's talking about a case where one has very consciously tried to apply the rule but nonetheless made an error. It is the impossibility of this kind of mistake which leads to the paradox. It is obviously possible to have what we think is a rule in mind and then not follow it (either deliberately, or absent-mindedly), what is not possible is to think that you are following your private rule when in fact you are not. This, Wittgenstein concludes, must mean that there is no 'fact' of the rule other than your thinking of the following of it at any one time.

Since interpretation is a major source of mistake, this procedure is unacceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover

But what would constitute a mistake. If your rule was, I must not smoke cigarettes, and a new cigarette-like device entered the market, how would you know whether smoking it was breaking your rule or not? You need to interpret the new cigarette-like item, but how could you possibly make a mistake in that interpretation? Remember, Wittgenstein is talking only about private rules, one's which cannot be verified by checking against public definitions.

In that instance, it's easy to know you made a mistake. You go back and revisit the move while holding the rule in your mind, and see that you made the move absent mindedly. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, we're talk about a mistake made in good faith, not absent-mindedly. One made despite your best intention to follow the rule.

These would be cases of misinterpretation. And, as you describe, in these cases you do not know whether or not a mistake was made. That's life. We cannot liberate ourselves from the restrictions imposed by the facts of life, by changing the definition of rule-following, as Wittgenstein tries to do.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously this is going nowhere. In my mind (and that of most interpretations of Wittgenstein) it is exactly because of the restrictions imposed by the facts of life that Wittgenstein reaches the conclusions he does.

He's talking about a case where one has very consciously tried to apply the rule but nonetheless made an error — Pseudonym

This would be an error of misinterpretation then. Either the situation is not interpreted properly, or the rule is not interpreted properly. So the rule is not applied correctly.

It is the impossibility of this kind of mistake which leads to the paradox. It is obviously possible to have what we think is a rule in mind and then not follow it (either deliberately, or absent-mindedly), what is not possible is to think that you are following your private rule when in fact you are not. This, Wittgenstein concludes, must mean that there is no 'fact' of the rule other than your thinking of the following of it at any one time. — Pseudonym

So it is very possible and common to think that you are following your private rule, when you are not, because you have misinterpreted the situation, misjudged, and therefore wrongly applied your rule. There is no paradox, the supposed paradox is artificial, made up by Wittgenstein to support his intent to avoid the matter of interpretation. All such mistakes, those which are not due to memory, absent mindedness, habit, can be understood as matters of interpretation. I would divide the source of error into two distinct sorts, errors of not having the rule properly in mind when acting, and errors of interpretation. All possible errors fall into these two categories and there is no paradox to be resolved.

But what would constitute a mistake. If your rule was, I must not smoke cigarettes, and a new cigarette-like device entered the market, how would you know whether smoking it was breaking your rule or not? You need to interpret the new cigarette-like item, but how could you possibly make a mistake in that interpretation? — Pseudonym

I don't see the problem. You must interpret the thing, and interpret your rule. You judge the relationship between them and decide in one way. Then, you later decide that you were wrong, mistaken in your interpretation. That's the nature of recognizing your mistakes. At a later time, something comes to your mind which makes you realize that your judgement was wrong, so you admit that you were wrong, mistaken. Each and every mistake only becomes evident after the fact, and your example is no different. There is no reason to insist that it is impossible to make a mistake in following your own private rule. That's nonsense. Why would a private rule be any different from a public rule in this respect? Is it that in a public case we might have a judge or jury decide whether a mistake was made, rather than the person who acted decide whether a mistake was made? There is no reason why the person who acted cannot decide that a mistake was made, if evidence to that effect is revealed.

You keep saying that it's possible to know whether you have misinterpreted your private rule, or mis-remembered it or maybe correctly interpreted but it in a novel circumstance... But you haven't explained how. How can we distinguish those three things, how could we ever know which it was? How could you later decide you were wrong about your interpretation, what measure of 'right' interpretation do you have by which to make such a judgement?

But you haven't explained how. — Pseudonym

I told you, evidence comes up at a later time which makes you see that you made a mistake. If anyone else can judge you at a later time, by reviewing the evidence, as having been wrong, why can't you judge yourself as having been wrong, by reviewing the evidence? What's the difference? It's nonsense to think that one cannot judge oneself as having been wrong. We are taught to recognize our mistakes as mistakes, and accept responsibility for them.

How could you later decide you were wrong about your interpretation, what measure of 'right' interpretation do you have by which to make such a judgement? — Pseudonym

How can anyone judge someone as having made a wrong interpretation? What measure of "right interpretation" does anyone have? It is the same issue whether the rule is public or private.

You are the one who has been arguing that there is no necessarily "right" interpretation of Wittgenstein. On what principle do you insist that the idea of private rules ought to be rejected because there could be no "right" interpretation? The 'right" interpretation is nothing other than an ideal.

why can't you judge yourself as having been wrong — Metaphysician Undercover

Because you cannot simultaneously hold a rule and faithfully try to interpret it yet make a mistake. We do not have two minds, one with the 'real' rule in it and another trying to understand the what the first one meant by it.

How can anyone judge someone as having made a wrong interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

By consensus.

What measure of "right interpretation" does anyone have? — Metaphysician Undercover

Consensus.

It is the same issue whether the rule is public or private. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, because it is impossible to have consensus privately, there's only one of you.

On what principle do you insist that the idea of private rules ought to be rejected because there could be no "right" interpretation? The 'right" interpretation is nothing other than an ideal. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the principle that a following a rule, and thinking you're following a rule must be two different things, but cannot be privately because we do not have two minds (one with 'the rule' in it and another attempting to interpret it). The 'correct' interpretation of the rule is held publicly, by consensus.

A schizophrenic could hold a rule privately though...???

Because you cannot simultaneously hold a rule and faithfully try to interpret it yet make a mistake. We do not have two minds, one with the 'real' rule in it and another trying to understand the what the first one meant by it. — Pseudonym

Quite obviously this is wrong, because it happens all the time that we make such mistakes. It's a matter of misinterpretation. It's not a case of having "two minds", it's a matter of changing one's mind. You make a judgement, apply the rule, then later you realize the judgement was wrong. Have you never changed your mind before?

You just keep making nonsense assertions without thinking about what you are saying.

By consensus. — Pseudonym

OK, that is your claim, consensus makes "right". I disagree. I see evidence that in many cases when there is consensus, mistake is still made. Therefore it is impossible that consensus makes "right".

The 'correct' interpretation of the rule is held publicly, by consensus. — Pseudonym

And this is just more nonsense. Interpretation is what individual minds do. How could "the public" hold an interpretation? If people discuss interpretations of a rule, they use language, and that language must be interpreted by each of them. So each person has one's own interpretation of the "public" interpretation. They could discuss their interpretations of the interpretation, and find consensus, but again, each would have an interpretation of the interpretation of the interpretation. Infinite regress is implied.

This is why Wittgenstein seeks to remove the necessity of interpretation at 201, to avoid this problem. Wittgenstein's claim is not that the correct interpretation of the rule is held publicly. That doesn't make sense. The claim is that the rule itself is what is held publicly. In this scenario, there is supposedly no need for interpretation, either the person follows the rule or not. The problem is that a judgement is implied here, as to whether or not the rule is followed, and there is no "public mind" to make that judgement. We really cannot refer to "consensus" because then we fall into the problem of interpretation.

You make a judgement, apply the rule, then later you realize the judgement was wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

But how do you realise it was 'wrong'. Different, yes, but 'wrong'?

I see evidence that in many cases when there is consensus, mistake is still made. Therefore it is impossible that consensus makes "right". — Metaphysician Undercover

Great, let's have a look at one of those examples for a public rule then, that might get us somewhere. If you provide an example of a public rule where the 'correct' interpretation or use of it can be derived by some means other than
consensus, we could resolve the problem.

The rest of your argument is based entirely on an error of mine. I meant to say the correct interpretation of the rule is 'judged' publicly, not is 'held' publicly. I can only blame trying to write too fast, I'm sorry to have made you painstakingly explain the infinite regress argument for no reason.

We cannot simultaneously hold a view on what a rule is and faithfully, with good intent, make a mistake in applying it. — Pseudonym

As I described, it is impossible to follow a rule, and simultaneously make a mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you both right in each instance? Just so it doesn't appear as if I'm trolling or insinuating anything, I am inclined to agree with Pseudonym. For, if one were to follow a rule, then the criteria for following it is dictated by something beyond the rule itself.