I don't think there are any strict, established or proscriptive distinctions between the two, although there are I think differences of emphasis: historically, gnosis referred to esoteric knowledge, knowledge 'hidden' from plain view, usually divine or relvelatory knowledge (knowledge of God, or else of the divine nature of things), so in this sense gnoseology can be understood to be a more constricted or narrower form of knowledge, a knowledge not of 'things in general', but of very specific things.

On the other hand, one can also understand gnoseology in a broader sense than epistemology, insofar as gnosology might include ways of knowing that not sanctioned by 'official' or theoretical understandings of knowledge: knowledge gained though meditation, practical knowlege, reflexive knowledge, local knowledges, etc. Walter Mignolo for instance, positions gnoseology as a 'third way' apart from the Greek distinction between doxa (opinion and 'mere' belief) and episteme (justified belief), with gnoseology incorporating both along with all kind of other manners of knowledge production (see here or here [PDFs])

What do you think, personally?

I don't have any stake in the distinction.

So you don't care?

About terminology? Not particularly.

No, not about terminology.

I don't think there are any strict, established or proscriptive distinctions between the two — StreetlightX

If so, we can use both of them instead of each other. But why we use one in sometimes and other in another time?

historically, gnosis referred to esoteric knowledge, knowledge 'hidden' from plain view, usually divine or relvelatory knowledge (knowledge of God, or else of the divine nature of things), so in this sense gnoseology can be understood to be a more constricted or narrower form of knowledge, a knowledge not of 'things in general', but of very specific things. — StreetlightX

As historically and etymologically, that's right. However, can we see using of it in this manner in recent terminology? I think, no.

But why we use one in sometimes and other in another time? — Pacem

Eh, just convention and linguistic fashion. Gnoseology in particular is a pretty archaic term that most people wouldn't use just on account of it being so unfamiliar.

Here we have an indistinct subject; i can not find a clear paraphrase on difference between these two concepts (To be honest, i didn't be satisfied existing expositions). Furthermore, as far as can be seen, there are no academic work on it, or i didn't see at least. How can we define the border between one another? What is your consideration? — Pacem

I had never heard or seen the word "gnoseology" before your post where "epistemology" is referenced all the time in a philosophical context. That says something.

I had never heard or seen the word "gnoseology" before your post — T Clark

Yeah, i hadn't heard too, but some time ago, i saw this concept while i was reading for my phd research in the book titled "Word as Bread-Language and Theology in Nicholas of Cusa". Author has used this concept in a subheading of his work's without examined or accounted for a bit. As far as i can understand from my reading, the concept in question contains some connotations are related to a kind of revelational knowledge which can be obtained through a way of "thinking" transcends discursive reasoning; and Cusa has described it "visio intellectualis".

But be careful, Cusa don't put forward a mystical or irrational context, he has an understanding of stratified reason, but quite different from Aristotelian sense; there is no cosmological reference. That is to say, there is a kind of a problem of knowledge in great measure in terms of it's way of obtaining and man's cognitive faculties. So, some academicians prefer this concept instead of epistemology.

So, some academicians prefer this concept instead of epistemology. — Pacem

I can understand the distinction. I'm trying to think if previously I would have applied the word "epistemology" to more intuitive or spiritual knowledge. I probably would have.

But be careful, Cusa don't put forward a mystical or irrational context, he has an understanding of stratified reason, but quite different from Aristotelian sense; there is no cosmological reference. — Pacem

Darn it, going back on my word about not posting today so as to make this one exception (imperfect me :cool: ):

Going by connotations, I’ve always understood gnosis to be something whose experiential evidence cannot be ubiquitously shared in principle, kind of (examples below). Knowledge, on the other hand, holds justified beliefs of givens whose justifications are readily accessible to all, as well as the either empirical or conceptual nature of that which is believed.

So, as what I take to be an unorthodox example of gnosis, when a person senses in the atmosphere that it will rain (by what can best be described as the smell of the air; not due to knee joints or some such), believes it will thereby rain, and can justify this belief based on past experiences of this same sensation being followed by rain, this justified belief, if true, will then be more toward gnosis than toward knowledge.

But to my knowledge, more commonly gnosis is exactly about what is today often termed mystical experiences—the ancient Gnostics as an example. Yet this doesn’t make the gnosis irrational to the gnostic (lower case “g”) ... if it were, would they still believe it? Don't know. But a good example is the attested to gnosis of the Buddha while he sat under a tree otherwise starving to death. The knowns he gained are something that cannot be ubiquitously shared by pointing fingers to things or by use of concepts pre-established within language. Nevertheless, here granting that the Buddha actually obtained gnosis, he then was quite able to justify his gnosis to others within his culture, albeit in what at times were somewhat esoteric ways (as a well-known example: neither is there a self nor not a self). And Buddhism, for good reason, touts itself as being a reason-based faith … the four Noble Truths and the like.

But of course anyone can bullshit (wittingly or unwittingly) about having gnosis just as readily as one can bullshit about having knowledge. And with gnosis it’s that much harder to establish non-(self/)deception because it’s that much harder to validate. Far easier to believe knowledge of what the satellites picked up on in terms of potential weather than to believe some other’s gnosis/knowledge gained from it smelling like rain today to them, for example.

I’ve always understood gnosis to be something whose experiential evidence — javra

Actually, Cusa's knowledge (or gnosis) is based on an experiental ground too. He describe it as a "divine gift" of profound experience during his journey back from Constantinople in the winter of 1437. Maybe we can compare it with the "activity of theoria" in original sense contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics (recourse Hadot's works).

albeit in what at times were somewhat esoteric ways (as a well-known example: neither is there a self nor not a self). — javra

Cusa uses mathematics as a demostrational device to throw light on the matter. More exoteric way compared to the other.

Actually, Cusa's knowledge (or gnosis) is basen on an experiental ground too. He describe it as a "divine gift" of profound experience during his journey back from Constantinople in the winter of 1437. Maybe we can compare it with the "activity of theoria" in original sense contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics (recourse Hadot's works). — Pacem

I'm not familiar with Cusa, but I find myself interested. Thanks for bringing it up.