I think the problem with the inability to endure pain or anxiety is largely due to "being too absorbed" whether it be in the moment, concerns about the future, or concerns for the self. Pain becomes unbearable because we are consumed by the moment. This attention to the present prevents us from appreciating memories of the past or to properly realize that the present is soon to pass and that there is much to the future to look forward to. I'm not sure about Epicurus' framing of the matter or that we should apply that to every moment of pain, but I can see how there is some truth to following this type of advice at times.

I think the limits with applying Epicureanism (& Stoicism) by itself is that it gives very valuable advice but it doesn't really guide us how to get to that state of mind. That's because human beings are masters of self-deception and thus we often fail to become the type of people we want to through rational deliberation, we fail to notice the hidden motives that underly the emotions and rationales that inhabit our contemplation (Kierkegaard) So the roots of our anxieties aren't always quite what they appear to be.

Like take the fear of death for an example (something I've struggled through for long time). I and many others stubbornly refused the Epicurean argument while in angst. I mean we find it largely convincing in ways (in fact, we want to believe it and live by it) but somehow it doesn't appease us and we fight back fiercely why the Epicurus' reasoning doesn't work. And strangely, many of us have these strange contradictory urges towards suicidal thoughts despite our supposed fear of death.

Now that I largely escaped death anxiety, I can really understand better what was driving those anxieties. Although I'm much less anxious of death now, the Epicurean argument wasn't really more compelling than it was before. Rather that now I'm in a different state of mind, I'm free from the fetters that prevented me from experiencing life properly. It was much less that I was afraid of death itself, but rather I was too absorbed in the far future. I wasn't satisfied with the present and had extreme anxieties about future concerns & failures, so I was really looking too far ahead (to divert myself of what bothered me) and only saw death rather than long uncertain years of life to look forward to. And if death is the only thing you see, you start becoming obsessed with it. It was really the fear of life that was the root of it all, but it's difficult to perceive that when the concept of death is the immediate occupant of your thoughts.

(I can't say this for all individuals who experience death anxiety because our experiences are different case by case, but from talking to another friend who suffered the same anxieties, I suspect that the roots are similar.)

But in my anxious state of mind, I couldn't really see that and apply Epicurus' principles properly. I can come up with other parallel examples. Like say, a friend who had a skin condition that caused his face to become crimson and no amount of rational argument could convince him that he isn't the ugliest person in the world (in comparison to people who had even much more severe problems with their appearance) He got out of it by applying make up and it struck him how strange he found his rationalization back then, that his condition wasn't even such a big deal never got to him until now.

Basically, human rationalizations are complex and fucks with your mind. I take Epicureanism seriously, but for setting goals to achieve rather than advice to simply follow by somehow forcefully convincing myself of it. Just being "convinced of the arguments" doesn't get me there. I think the less emotional barriers one has, the easier it is for people to simply follow the advice directly, but I suspect most people will fail to do that for the reasons mentioned. Clearer self awareness is needed, and that's usually achieved not by rational deliberation of the moment but placing yourself in a state of mind where these barriers weaken so life in context is easier to see.

I found Wolfman's words long time ago helpful:

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/comments.php?id=65083&findpost=1172736#post1172736

The insight being -- it's not that the trick of remembering good times is especially good. It's that the practice of philosophy is so good that all you need is a simple mental trick to endure any pain. — Moliere

Sounds like bullshit, with all due respect to Epicurus. But, some people are more disciplined in what they can endure. I'm skeptical that any kind of suffering can be endured in such a fashion.

Not sure about Epicurus' particular position or framing or Molier's interpretation, but is it possible that can be part of the mental trick Epicurus noted? People who are disciplined to endure pain experience the same type of pain as those who are undisciplined but that discipline may be due to them being able to take their moments of pain in perspective better. They have a mental trick. It's just that perhaps developing a mental trick is the "hard part" which I have noted in my response above.

I think and thought it did as well. But I don't think that it sounding like bullshit is enough to discount the notions at play -- Epicureanism was a widespread way of life back in the day. So clearly people saw something in it (though what that is may be and is disputed, I only mention this to say that it's not some flight of fancy dreamt by an individual person). Also, it can't be dismissed that Epicurus endured a painful death using this technique.

So my object is more to gain an understanding of the philosophy -- while my initial impulse of this particular part of Epicurean philosophy was to be dismissive, that's far from helpful in understanding it. Epicurus was no slouch. So, presuming that there is something worthwhile to be had to the fourth part of the tetrapharmakos, that it is not merely practical advice to assuage anxiety but also seems to have a direct relation to the actual endurance of pain, in what way can we make sense of this?

that's what I'm attempting to illuminate through my answer.

First I want to say it was wonderful to read your reply Saphsin.

Secondly, two things come to mind -- one is the role of rationality in ancient ethics, and two is the differences in rationality between antiquity and modern day.

It would seem that your finding is something of a challenge to the stoics and the more rationalist interpretations of the epicureans. While the arguments were persuasive to your reason, you claimed they were not enough to influence your character -- that this took something more than the argument. Something like an insight into yourself and why the argument was not moving you initially, based on your description. And so reason was not enough to modify character, therefore it must take more than reason to get one to a place where said beliefs become practical. The philosophers art is not enough.

But then I'm reminded that reason and emotion were not so cleanly separated in antiquity as they are often today. Might we consider the insights into your character which helped you reach a state of mind where the epicurean cure became effective as reason operating on the soul, if in fact reason is not separate from emotion? Perhaps the arguments differ from the power of reason, where the former gave you the goal (as you said), and the latter is what operated on your soul (used in the broad, non-spiritual sense) to help you realize that the cure could help you with your fear of death?

I don't know. A bit of free association going on there. I don't really have an argument against anything you've said, just a reaction.

This is a doctrine that the Epicureans' hedonistic competitors, the Cyrenaics, mocked, in my opinion rightly. The notion that remembering past pleasures is effective and quelling present pains is quite simply ludicrous.

Well, it's effective insofar as pleasure becomes present. The Epicureans are aiming to produce pleasure through the value and significance of the past. They have knowledge of the absence of pain or what it takes to "endure" painful activity, pleasure, and are trying to produce that state in ourselves by referencing our memory. Quelling present pains isn't the point. Replacing them with something else is the goal.

Epicureans' absurd call to feel pleasure in anything, even torture, is sort of an exaggeration to the imagined maximum benefit in the world. If we are stuck in this world with so much pointless and terrible pain, then the best we can do is to remove it as much as we can. If we are stuck being tortured, the only way to improve things replace the pain with pleasure, as much as it is possible. If one could enjoy torture, then their inevitable future would cease to be suffering. It's just not very effective. An idea to the benefit of the people imagining the world without suffering (not even from torture!!!) rather than to anyone being tortured.

Epicureanism, and also Stoicism, are philosophies that have a perfect figurehead as a goal to attain. To a certain extent this is also present in Buddhism, as well as in Christianity.

Basically, a follower of Epicureanism or some other kind of philo-religious doctrine imagine a kind of "superhero" that would be able to deal with what they normally cannot do. For example, the evangelical Christians will say "What Would Jesus Do (WWJD?)?" and appeal to the demigod Jesus as the penultimate figure. The Buddhist sees the Buddha as the goal to attain (as well as nirvana), the ideal person. Epicureanism and Stoicism create an image of a person who is able to deal with pain and whatnot by sheer will alone - what a strong person they must be! Essentially, these kinds of beliefs revolve around a quest for the ideal hero.

I'm always a bit skeptical of philosophies or religions or self-help books that attempt to solve a problem in life without recognizing that life is problematic just because of this problem. Certain early Christian sects recognized the problem of life and essentially shunned existence, eventually going out of existence entirely since nobody had children and it was apparently too nihilistic for everyone else. Buddhists come right out in the open and say that life is suffering, and then offer ways to deal with this suffering (it wasn't until it became more of a religion that Buddhism started to see these techniques as part of some kind of cosmic law).

But you don't really see this in the Greek philosophies. Some of the techniques used can work to an extent no doubt, or at least help reassure the individual, but they still don't quite go far enough to recognize that an unproblematic life is not one that you have to use techniques to deal with.

The Epicurean dilemma is that one the one hand it, against Stoicism, places emphasis on man's continuity with animals, and recognizes our ends as of the same genus, if not the same species: our end is concrete, pragmatic, and has to do with our bodily makeup, the achievement of static pleasure, rather than some abstract value of virtue like with the Cynics or Stoics preach. On the other hand, the Epicureans were convinced that it was possible to overcome all life's ills through philosophy, seduced by Socrates' intellectualism, which led them into abstractions that their purported end couldn't stomach. Pain can't be abstracted away from, yet in order to maintain that the sage could be perfectly happy at all times, the Epicurean must admit that the sage can avoid pain at all times. But he can't, and so this is absurd.

This dilemma is unique to the Epicureans, and their rivals don't have to deal with it because they bite one of two bullets: either, like the Cynics and Stoics, they admit that man's end is more abstract than we might think, and so remove ethics from the concreteness of pleasure and pain, or like the Cyrenaics, they admit that philosophy is of very limited power, and while it can help you, there is no state of sagehood that will relieve you of all life's ills, or guarantee you won't be harmed. How is a man happy on the rack, if he feels pain, and lack of pain is the end? Does he literally remove the pain through some mental trick, as Moliere seems to suggest? But this is just fantasy -- bodily pain is inflicted by our animal nature that philosophizing has no power to stop. Is it that even in pain (as Epicurus 'screams' on the rack), we can still be happy? Then the core of Epicureanism is compromised, and it isn't really a hedonism, but some sort of virtue ethics that gives lack of pain some secondary role, certainly not the end.

I'm not sure if it ever reaches the level of a dilemma. To me it seems like the Epicureans are engaged in some wistful imagination. In their "wisdom" they've noted how the world could be great even if it was still filled with the coercive actions and situations we find everyday. It strikes me as an game of pretend which quells fear of pain or failure, sort or like how people sometimes refer to God's plan or goodness to reduce fear of tragedy or pain.

I don't think they care whether or not they remove pain form their lives entirely. It's all about an idea which sometimes comforts in less immediate situations, but really does nothing (by their own admission) in situations like being tortured. Their target would seem to be more general, a question of how someone thinks about an approaches the world in daily life, more so than handing out magical torture immunity. I think the Epicureans have other more pessimistic philosophies in their eye, rather than immediate relief from any pain. I'd say it is just a fantasy and that's all the Epicureans ever wanted it to be.

A core is hard to compromise when it wasn't there in the first place. The Epicureans are certainly guilty of presenting a imagined miraculous future as if it is real, but then what does logical coherency mean in the face of life? If the Epicurean outlook makes them feel better, mainly in general terms, what use is the more accurate descriptions of human experiences like the Cyrenaics? The distance of philosophy sort of gives the Epicurean outlook a space to work.

I think that's the easy way out, though. :)


I'd also say that though I find the extreme cases (which were relevant to the day, but I'm not so sure we care about invulnerability) hard to buy that there may still be something to the philosophy -- something reasonable and worthwhile -- when an Epicurean isn't trying to defend against counter-examples. If the Epicurean way of life could relieve pain, in the no-bullshit way of actually doing so (as opposed to having a practical benefit by simply believing that pain is easy to endure), then I'd still say that there's merit to the claim.

And it strikes me that there are people who are better at coping with pain in their life, even if they are not going to stand up to torture. I could see how a disposition would lend itself to being able to endure pain, too. So, it seems to me, there's plausible reason for accepting that there might be some way to make one better able at coping with pain (though whether Epicurean philosophy actually accomplishes this is another question -- just saying I wouldn't write it off as absurd in lesser, more common, cases)

I understand your reaction quite well because I've had similar lines of thoughts myself. I still don't really understand how the fear of death (and in general, the relation between anxiety & rationale) works.

The relation between how reason, emotion, and agency is a very tricky one to me. So my rant that I'm soon going to write below has limited perspectives and easily seen gaps. =\

Note that I actually don't think that the power of arguments is so ineffective in all cases regarding anxiety. It can prevent people from drifting into a train of irrational thoughts that can become the fuel for anxiety to take place. (I mean the reason why people are afraid of death in the first place was because they were able to reason out the fact about their mortality and what it means to them)

Also, I'm not quite sure that I was "convinced by its reason yet it didn't move my character" more like there were different sides of me that were convinced and another side that was unconvinced. It's sort of like that experience you have with Procrastination. Part of you know it's irrational and another voice in your mind becomes louder and convinces you into it.

I think that certain deep anxious states (like common anxieties about their appearance and death) tends to not just be about the object of anxiety, but something rooted elsewhere. So the Epicurean Arguments that are laid out don't really serve as a good framework to the people who are grappling with those problems. It's the self's relation to the objects of their thoughts & emotions that's often more important. I think this relation between to the self and the object tends to mean something unique to the experience for each person (a narrative) which is why I think you can often learn more insight from people who can empathize with your experiences (or can analyze them to a high degree) than from general practitioners who just happens to know a lot about how the mind works.

Kierkegaard's Psychology was pretty insightful for me in understanding the problem from this perspective (His "Subjectivity is Truth" is more about this, one's personal narrative, than a framework of metaphysics or fideism, which I find most people mistake to be the emphasis. A bit like Nietzsche's philosophy of truth.)

(delete comment please)

I'd also say that though I find the extreme cases (which were relevant to the day, but I'm not so sure we care about invulnerability) hard to buy that there may still be something to the philosophy -- something reasonable and worthwhile -- when an Epicurean isn't trying to defend against counter-examples. If the Epicurean way of life could relieve pain, in the no-bullshit way of actually doing so (as opposed to having a practical benefit by simply believing that pain is easy to endure), then I'd still say that there's merit to the claim. — Moliere

I doubt that Epicureanism fares much better for ordinary life -- even if it's not as bad as torture, it's questionable whether it's bearable, or whether Epicureanism has anything to say about making it bearable. What Epicurean wisdom amounts to, most generously interpreted, is a set of maxims for avoiding typical sources of pain in life.

In other words, if the 'counterexample' is all of life, it becomes hard to see your philosophy as anything other than an abstraction, aimed at a kind of intellectualistic perfection of the body.

And it strikes me that there are people who are better at coping with pain in their life, even if they are not going to stand up to torture. I could see how a disposition would lend itself to being able to endure pain, too. So, it seems to me, there's plausible reason for accepting that there might be some way to make one better able at coping with pain (though whether Epicurean philosophy actually accomplishes this is another question -- just saying I wouldn't write it off as absurd in lesser, more common, cases) — Moliere

I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. The Epicurean life is perhaps so simple and safe that it minimizes risks of certain pains, but even then it reifies certain things that are clearly instrumental, like eschewing luxury.

I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. — The Great Whatever

Ever yell "FUCK!" when you stubbed your toe? Made the pain a lot less sharp.

Coping involves resuming your general activities as if nothing has changed (i.e. not succumbing), and also includes directing your attention to finding an elimination of the pain.

Coping doesn't remove the problematic thing, but makes it easier to bear. I don't think it makes sense to say that pain can become easier to bear -- for a situation to become easier to bear is just for the pain to be eliminated.

People are psychologically flexible. They can bend and twist in various ways to cope with pain. Like a rubber band, it's flexible but it takes a single cut in the band to make it all come unraveling. With the mind, this cut usually has to be specific and deep.

I don't think coping means being easier to bear. To bear is synonymous to cope. Both involve not succumbing.

What about that monk in Vietnam who did the thing of lighting himself on fire and staying stock-still til he died? Something was going on there, it's hard to say what, but something was going on.

It might be that ascetic practices yield extraordinary abilities. If so, that'd be great -- unfortunately as a Westerner I'm just not familiar with those traditions and have no way to evaluate their effectiveness. Epicureanism was certainly NOT such a practice, however, since all records we have of it mostly record banal platitudes meant to be able to be followed by anyone, and that if followed clearly do not yield those kinds of abilities.

Lots of the religious and philosophical stuff I've grown up in has been vaguely anti-ascetic, but it's difficult for me to know whether that position is justified. It could be that a lack of exposure to asceticism makes it difficult to appreciate the extent to which suffering can be warded off. But even in those traditions, asceticism is a higher calling NOT intended for ordinary lay practice, which Epicureanism claims to be.

Yeah, I agree with all of what you said. I think the monk's remaining still is proof itself of the effectiveness of whatever he was doing, but I don't think I have a ghost of a chance of ever learning whatever that is.

I'm a bit cynical about philosophies of How to Live, not because I think that's less important that abstract theoretical stuff, I'm just skeptical that philosophy of any kind can teach you much about how to live your life.

What Epicurean wisdom amounts to, most generously interpreted, is a set of maxims for avoiding typical sources of pain in life — The Great Whatever

I'd disagree with this assertion because there's more to Epicurean philosophy than maxims. That maxims are for initiates more than anything -- but for those that wished to dig deeper there were texts upon texts to do so. It just wasn't necessary to do so in order to live a happy life. (hence, the maxims for those who wanted to live as an Epicurean, but maybe did not want to be a philosopher).

The great difficulty here is just how little that's left to infer from over the ages. But there's enough evidence to indicate that there's more to the philosophy than maxims.

And the entire philosophy is not just about avoiding pain -- it's about living a happy life, and the answer to the happy life is pursuing pleasure in the correct way.

The focus on pain, here, is just because I find this to be the problematic (from my perspective) part of the philosophy, not because this is all of what Epicureanism entails. Especially since, though it is hedonic, the Epicurean does not avoid pain, but deals with it (since pain is an inevitable part of life) -- and deals with it by directing our focus to what it is we do have control over, rather than what we do not.

I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. — The Great Whatever

But what if you felt pain to a lesser degree because of your general state of mind? I think that makes a great deal of sense. I can remember what pain was to me as a child, for instance. It hurt a great deal more than it does now.

The Epicurean life is perhaps so simple and safe that it minimizes risks of certain pains, but even then it reifies certain things that are clearly instrumental, like eschewing luxury.

I would say this isn't quite accurate, either, or is at least ambiguous depending on what you mean by "luxury".

A particular luxury isn't a bad thing, per se -- it's just that the pursuit of luxury can seduce one into forgetting what makes human beings happy. Luxury would safely fit into the category natural but unnecessary desires, like sex, because it's a creature comfort, but it's not necessary for the fulfillment of a happy life.

Though if you mean the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle then, yes, that would seem to fit into the unnatural and unnecessary desires, and therefore would be forbidden according to the ethic. Not sure which you're saying, though.

What do you mean by reification? What idea are Epicureans treating like a thing? I would claim the opposite -- that as far as philosophy goes, Epicureanism tends towards eliminating reifications than making them. For example, the pursuit of luxury -- where men would pursue luxury as if it were something that can be held onto, Epicureans would say that an item of luxury is of course pleasurable, but that you are hurting yourself because of some idea you have about the luxurious lifestyle when you could just fulfill your desires which are natural to you and, thereby, be happy.

. Epicureanism and Stoicism create an image of a person who is able to deal with pain and whatnot by sheer will alone - what a strong person they must be! Essentially, these kinds of beliefs revolve around a quest for the ideal hero. — darthbarracuda

In the case of Epicureanism, at least, they did more than create an image -- Epicurus was the person you were meant to aspire to become like.

But it was not by sheer will alone. In accord with the philosophy it seems to me that what was meant to change one's character was the power of reason -- but in practice I think the Epicurean community plays a larger role in being able to accomplish (or progress, at least) along the Epicurean path. At least, this would go in line with my reasoning I've put forward in this thread. But it fits very well with what goods Epicurus emphasized -- self-reflection, autarky, and friendship with fellow Epicureans.

I just wanted to note I liked reading your explanation about having different parts of you being persuaded and other parts not. It hit some correct notes to me.

I think that certain deep anxious states (like common anxieties about their appearance and death) tends to not just be about the object of anxiety, but something rooted elsewhere. So the Epicurean Arguments that are laid out don't really serve as a good framework to the people who are grappling with those problems. It's the self's relation to the objects of their thoughts & emotions that's often more important. — Saphsin

I agree entirely here. I think this is the function of the Epicurean community, and the maxims. In some sense one is meant to take certain tenets on faith not because there are not arguments, but because once we are already ensnared by an irrational anxiety then we require an irrational means to undo that anxiety. It's not the object -- it's that we are pursing something that is no object in the first place, yet we treat it as such (wealth and death come to mind as the obvious examples here, but anthropomorphized Gods and other superstitions fit too).

I think this relation between to the self and the object tends to mean something unique to the experience for each person (a narrative) which is why I think you can often learn more insight from people who can empathize with your experiences (or can analyze them to a high degree) than from general practitioners who just happens to know a lot about how the mind works.

If that were so I think that this would be a blow against the Epicurean cure, too. The cure is meant to apply to all humans, I think. It's not meant to apply to people in particular circumstances with particular experiences, but something that is commonly felt by mankind.

(not saying you're wrong, by any means. Just responding more than anything)

The great difficulty here is just how little that's left to infer from over the ages. But there's enough evidence to indicate that there's more to the philosophy than maxims. — Moliere

Epicureanism's main thrust and appeal was that it was not esoteric, that anyone could practice it and reap its benefits. So aside from the weakness of claiming there were (probably?) deeper doctrines that we don't and can't know about right now, it seems that even if this is true it's not going to save the common case, which is what is so important to the Epicurean to begin with.

And the entire philosophy is not just about avoiding pain -- it's about living a happy life, and the answer to the happy life is pursuing pleasure in the correct way. — Moliere

That correct way being the achievement specifically of static pleasure, which is the freedom from pain.

Especially since, though it is hedonic, the Epicurean does not avoid pain, but deals with it (since pain is an inevitable part of life) — Moliere

But this is precisely what's under question. How does the Epicurean deal with pain? Clearly it can't be by impotent mental tricks, which you seem to agree. But then, we seem to have no evidence that they do, except precisely by avoiding it, which is what the Epicurean recommendations amount to.

What do you mean by reification? What idea are Epicureans treating like a thing? — Moliere

There is no such thing as an unnatural or unnecessary desire. Epicureans treat temporary, contingent, custom-bound properties of things (like the desire for a luxurious lifestyle) as if they were inherently bad in virtue of conflicting with a static human nature. This is reification because it takes what is situational and treats it as essential. There is nothing good or bad about wanting a luxurious lifestyle in of itself.

For example, the pursuit of luxury -- where men would pursue luxury as if it were something that can be held onto, Epicureans would say that an item of luxury is of course pleasurable, but that you are hurting yourself because of some idea you have about the luxurious lifestyle when you could just fulfill your desires which are natural to you and, thereby, be happy. — Moliere

But there may be circumstances in which the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle is beneficial. Doctrines about what is natural or unnatural -- which a naturalistic eudaimonism like Epicureanism must commit itself to -- must perform these reifications, or else collapse into a different kind of hedonism (I would say a genuine hedonism) that treats pleasure as good on its own terms rather than because it checks off certain requirements having to do with final ends and human nature.

Epicureanism's main thrust and appeal was that it was not esoteric, that anyone could practice it and reap its benefits. — The Great Whatever

This is something appealing about Epicureanism to myself (and is probably what anyone from today would find appealing next to some of the more aristocratic sentiments expressed in the day), but I don't think it was the main thrust.

Happiness is.

So aside from the weakness of claiming there were (probably?) deeper doctrines that we don't and can't know about right now,

As for "probably" -- if we accept Diogenes Laertius as a source when describing rather than quoting (as I do in the beginning of the post -- where the quote about being happy on the rack comes from, though it is problematic), then he describes several texts Epicurus wrote, including one called On Nature comprising of 37 books.


Insofar that by "deeper doctrines" all we mean is "more than maxims", we already have access to them too. Even letters do more than speak about maxims -- they contain arguments. But we don't have to rely upon the letters alone -- there's Diogenes Laertius' chapter on Epicurus, Cicero's De Finibus (polemical), Plutarch's Against Colotes (polemical) Lucretius' poem On the Nature of Things, and the remains of an inscription done by Diogenes of Oenoanda just as a few examples. I know there are more texts than this, too, but these I'm at least familiar with.

it seems that even if this is true it's not going to save the common case, which is what is so important to the Epicurean to begin with.

Again, I would say that this is only appealing to us because of the cultures we live in. But I wouldn't say that this is the focus of Epicureanism, as much as it is a result of its methods. If there be a universal cure, then it would apply across the board, not just to the sage.

That correct way being the achievement specifically of static pleasure, which is the freedom from pain. — The Great Whatever

Sort of. First, the division between static and dynamic pleasure is not necessarily an Epicurean one. This way of understanding Epicureanism is at least contended in the literature, and I haven't been able to find the division in the Epicurean texts. If you know where to look I'd be much obliged to you for pointing this out.

As of right now, at least, I'd say the better way to understand the proper way is to understand Epicurus' theory of pleasure. Happiness is achieved by pleasure. Pleasure is the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires, as opposed to the other two kinds of desire which are "natural and unnecessary" and "unnatural and unnecessary". (logically speaking there could be a fourth, but in terms of the philosophy there are no unnatural and necessary desires).

Under this rubric I'd categorize the avoidance of bodily pain as natural but unnecessary, if we accept the DL quote at least. And there is at least reason to believe that the philosophy applies, even in extreme cases, because Epicurus died a horrible death and, again if we accept the texts as evidence in the first place, faced said death with the appropriate Epicurean attitude (though, granted, said death was specifically not one of torture on the rack, or in the brazen bull). While it makes sense to avoid pain, what we have control over is a calm state of mind, which helps us deal with bodily pain.

But, aside from extreme cases, yes -- mental tranquility and freedom from bodily pain are very important to living an Epicurean life. But this is not the correct way -- this is the goal. The correct way is better understood, so I would claim at this point at least, through Epicurus' theory of pleasure. (which is what leads to things like the necessity of self-reflection, so that one can appropriately identify their desires and categorize them, then act on the appropriate ones).

But this is precisely what's under question. How does the Epicurean deal with pain? — The Great Whatever

Exactly :). That's my question. One thing that may differ in our approach here, though, is that I'm assuming from the start that there's an answer to the question -- not that Epicurus fails here, but rather, that I'm failing in understanding.

I'd note that it's more of a practical hermeneutic rule on my part rather than a belief I necessarily hold, except insofar that it is necessary to believe in order to test a belief.

Clearly it can't be by impotent mental tricks, which you seem to agree. But then, we seem to have no evidence that they do, except precisely by avoiding it, which is what the Epicurean recommendations amount to.

It is the tricky part, I agree. If we accept the evidence of Epicurus' death, however, then we have evidence of possibility, at least, of enduring extreme pain. The popularity of the philosophy just shows that Epicurus' philosophy was not only something that applied to him, though it's possible that the philosophy applies differently in the two cases (the lay Epicurean vs. the Sage being quite different in their life patterns, at least, even if they draw from the same texts and doctrine).

The "how" is exactly what my question is.

My guess, right now, is that the Epicurean way of life transforms character to be the sort of person that is better able to deal with pain than before they were an Epicurean. Otherwise impotent mental tricks, such as remembering happy times with friends, would have no effect.

I'll remention here because I'd like to see what you think of the argument: Children feel pain to a greater degree than adults do from the same sources of pain. You burn your hand on a stove you don't go crying about it. You may not be a happy Epicurean, but there's a difference in the feeling of pain between these two events. I'd say that this is due to development in dealing with pain. If that were the case, then it seems plausible, at least, that we could further develop ourselves so that pain is less of a nuisance (easy to endure), no?

There is no such thing as an unnatural or unnecessary desire. Epicureans treat temporary, contingent, custom-bound properties of things (like the desire for a luxurious lifestyle) as if they were inherently bad in virtue of conflicting with a static human nature. This is reification because it takes what is situational and treats it as essential. There is nothing good or bad about wanting a luxurious lifestyle in of itself. — The Great Whatever

I'd half-way agree with you, here. Epicureans believe in a static human nature. I'm with you on that. But the Epicurean doesn't treat a desire as intrinsically bad. There are no intrinsic bads -- there are only things bad insofar that they violate what is good, i.e., what leads to a happy life -- pleasure.

If you can have a luxurious lifestyle without anxiety then there's nothing wrong with it. The error is in thinking that a luxurious lifestyle will relieve you from pain, when it won't -- especially when people who are rich often worry about maintaining their riches, and thereby make themselves unhappy. But if you were an Epicurean who happened to inherit a trust-fund, for whatever reason, and it was just added to your life through no struggle of your own, then there'd be nothing wrong in keeping it if it didn't lead you to become anxious in trying to maintain it.

I don't necessarily agree with the Epicurean categories, but I find them more useful than the usual division of pleasure today -- which is largely subjective, empirical (in the sense that one must try it themselves) and phenomenological. While even human nature, so I would agree (just to switch to my beliefs, vs. Epicurean beliefs), is not static, I think there are too many commonalities between humans to treat the notion as fallacious.

So I suppose that while I agree with you that "human nature" is a reification, I'd just note that it's a practical one which yields practical knowledge (which is contingent, as you note), if not universal knowledge. (which would be a strike against the Epicurean claim to a universal cure -- but the notion of a universal cure is not what I would defend. I fully confess that I doubt this. My aim is to understand what is valuable, though, rather than discount Epicureanism on some of its more exaggerated claims which were more a product of the state of ethics at the time, so I would argue).

But there may be circumstances in which the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle is beneficial. Doctrines about what is natural or unnatural -- which a naturalistic eudaimonism like Epicureanism must commit itself to -- must perform these reifications, or else collapse into a different kind of hedonism (I would say a genuine hedonism) that treats pleasure as good on its own terms rather than because it checks off certain requirements having to do with final ends and human nature. — The Great Whatever

I would note here that it seems to me your notion of genuine hedonism here seems to be committed to a theory of pleasure which states that pleasure is subjective, empirical (as in, one has to try things out, not in any scientific sense), and phenomenological as I mentioned earlier.

Would you say that's true or false? I'm just guessing because that strikes me as a good approximation of how people talk about pleasure.

Which would highlight where you differ from the Epicureans. But if that be the case then I would at least float the idea (to see how you would respond) that your disagreement is not with how Epicureans deal with pain (as a related aside, though not necessarily direct to Epicureanism: is pain not inevitable, after all? Won't every life feel pain?), but with their treatment of pleasure.

And if that is the case, wouldn't the charge of reification just depend upon which theory of pleasure we think is true? (not rhetorical -- I want to hear what you have to say to the question)

As for "probably" -- if we accept Diogenes Laertius as a source when describing rather than quoting (as I do in the beginning of the post -- where the quote about being happy on the rack comes from, though it is problematic), then he describes several texts Epicurus wrote, including one called On Nature comprising of 37 books. — Moliere

But why would a work on nature be relevant?

Sort of. First, the division between static and dynamic pleasure is not necessarily an Epicurean one. This way of understanding Epicureanism is at least contended in the literature, and I haven't been able to find the division in the Epicurean texts. If you know where to look I'd be much obliged to you for pointing this out. — Moliere

Yeah, a pretty clear statement of the division is in Lives & Opinions 10.136:

He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both [...] So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

Under this rubric I'd categorize the avoidance of bodily pain as natural but unnecessary — Moliere

From the Letter to Menoeceus:

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled.

My emphasis. I don't see any way to read this other than being free of bodily pain as being necessary for happiness.

I'll remention here because I'd like to see what you think of the argument: Children feel pain to a greater degree than adults do from the same sources of pain. You burn your hand on a stove you don't go crying about it. You may not be a happy Epicurean, but there's a difference in the feeling of pain between these two events. I'd say that this is due to development in dealing with pain. If that were the case, then it seems plausible, at least, that we could further develop ourselves so that pain is less of a nuisance (easy to endure), no? — Moliere

What I'm saying is, I don't see how this differs from simply conditioning oneself to feel less pain. Both emotionally and physically, some repeated exposure can actually subdue the pain itself. Short of that, I don't understand what better coping with the pain amounts to, unless you're talking about something extrinsic, like making better life decisions in the face of pain.

So I suppose that while I agree with you that "human nature" is a reification, I'd just note that it's a practical one which yields practical knowledge (which is contingent, as you note), if not universal knowledge. (which would be a strike against the Epicurean claim to a universal cure -- but the notion of a universal cure is not what I would defend. I fully confess that I doubt this. My aim is to understand what is valuable, though, rather than discount Epicureanism on some of its more exaggerated claims which were more a product of the state of ethics at the time, so I would argue). — Moliere

If humans differ significantly enough as to what they find pleasant, then the use of a static human nature is going to be detrimental to your ethics. It seems to me they do.

I would note here that it seems to me your notion of genuine hedonism here seems to be committed to a theory of pleasure which states that pleasure is subjective, empirical (as in, one has to try things out, not in any scientific sense), and phenomenological as I mentioned earlier.

Would you say that's true or false? I'm just guessing because that strikes me as a good approximation of how people talk about pleasure. — Moliere

If you are asking whether pleasure is a feeling, then yes -- and I'd say also that I don't know of any way to understand pleasure except as feeling, to the extent that this seems not to be a theoretical commitment but rather a facet of competence with the lay concept. Epicurus at least seems to agree -- again from the letter:

...we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing

If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean).

Which would highlight where you differ from the Epicureans. But if that be the case then I would at least float the idea (to see how you would respond) that your disagreement is not with how Epicureans deal with pain (as a related aside, though not necessarily direct to Epicureanism: is pain not inevitable, after all? Won't every life feel pain?), but with their treatment of pleasure. — Moliere

I basically have a Cyrenaic sort of hedonism, which differs from Epicureans on several points regarding pleasure:

-All pleasure is kinetic. There is no static pleasure, the latter just being indifference or the absence of pleasure and pain. Indifferent states in a sense do not exist, because they are lack of motion, rather than a kind of motion, and the achievement of a truly static sate is thus simply death.

-There are no categories of natural, unnatural, necessary, or unnecessary, goods, desires, pursuits, etc. Things are good and bad not by nature but by contingent bodily makeup and convention. Nothing is inherently good or bad, except for pleasure and pain, which are not really 'things' in the sense that anything can be either pleasant or painful potentially. Furthermore, we do not have enough knowledge about human commonality to make universal recommendations.

-Pleasure is good insofar as it is pleasant, not insofar as it services a notion of happiness or eudaimonia. Happiness, if there is such a thing, is worthwhile for pleasure's sake, not vice-versa.

-There is no inherent tie between virtue and pleasure.

If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean). — The Great Whatever

The rest I still must think about, but I wanted to respond to this -- here I am attempting to stay away from what I believe is ethical, but am rather attempting to make sense of Epicurean philosophy. While, granted, I have sympathies to epicurean ethics, I don't think (or, perhaps, no longer think?) it even possible to be an Epicurean today. At least minimally speaking I don't think it possible to be an Epicurean in the same vein as Epicurus and the communities that sprang forth from there were. It would have to be called Neo-Epicureanism or something to distinguish it, since there is no continuity between the communities of the past and people today who claim to be Epicurean.

Just to lay that out there. The beliefs I'm espousing are not so much about the topic of ethics as much as they are about how Epicureanism works (even though I am not and, according to what I believe, cannot be an Epicurean).

But why would a work on nature be relevant? — The Great Whatever

Because it's nature which gives sense to the ethic -- in the world, as portrayed by Epicurus, the Epicurean doctrine is what makes sense. Further, it is human nature, in particular the nature of our soul, which gives the ethic its force.

Lastly, it seems to go against the claim that epicurean philosophy is just a collection of maxims. Without having the actual texts it's not clear-cut -- but since Epicurus uses arguments in all of his letters, including the letters on nature, it would seem to me that we can't call Epicurean philosophy a collection of maxims only.

Yeah, a pretty clear statement of the division is in Lives & Opinions 10.136: — The Great Whatever

Thanks! I don't pretend to know and have read everything, even of what I'm familiar with. I've tended to jump back and forth between the primary texts and secondary texts to help me understand them. As I noted, my quest to understand Epicureanism is an ongoing project.

However, I don't think that this division here goes against what I'm saying about Epicurus' theory of pleasure being central to the philosophy. I'd rather say that this is one way of summing up the philosophy, but that the majority of the philosophical work is being done by the theory of pleasure -- that this is the "main thrust", so to speak -- where the division between natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires is how a proper Epicurean is meant to sort their desires and then act to fulfill the first category in order to obtain the goal of peace of mind and freedom of bodily pain (which you may say I'm contradicting myself here -- I admit there's a tension, but I'm trying to figure out how to resolve that tension more than anything -- but perhaps freedom of bodily pain does not mean we do not feel bodily pain, but rather, a lesser degree of pain? At the least this would make sense if pain is inevitable, which would at least cohere well

From the Letter to Menoeceus:

We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled.

My emphasis. I don't see any way to read this other than being free of bodily pain as being necessary for happiness. — The Great Whatever

So I tracked down my copy of the letter. I think it a lesson on the importance of interpretation. I'll type out what my copy states:

One must reckon that of desires some are natural, some groundless; and of the natural desires some are necessary and some merely natural; and of the necessary, some are necessary for happiness and some for freeing the body from troubles and some for life itself. The unwavering contemplation of these enables one to refer every choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom of the soul from disturbance, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For we do everything for the sake of being neither in pain nor in terror. As soon as we achieve this state every storm in the soul is dispelled, since the animal is not in a position to go after some need nor to seek something else to complete the good of the body and the soul. For we are in need of pleasure only when we are in pain because of the absence of pleasure, and when we are not in pain, then we no longer need pleasure

I honestly couldn't argue which is the better interpretation. I don't have that kind of basis. I imagine that it would rely upon which way we're trying to make the philosophy cohere together based on several texts, to be honest. It wouldn't surprise me if you could kind of go one way or the other, at least without some pretty deep study. But this should highlight where some of our difference in opinion comes from on this particular point.

The other solution that comes to mind, for me, is to strike out the example that Diogenes Laertius uses of on the rack, since it is not in quotes, and simply give up the ground on invulnerability in all circumstances. But that wouldn't work to make sense of pain in the context of the ethics of the day, at least as I've come to understand them through the secondary literature.

What I'm saying is, I don't see how this differs from simply conditioning oneself to feel less pain. — The Great Whatever

Does it have to differ? What if "conditioning oneself to feel less pain" is, more or less, what makes pain easy to endure?

If you are asking whether pleasure is a feeling, then yes -- and I'd say also that I don't know of any way to understand pleasure except as feeling, to the extent that this seems not to be a theoretical commitment but rather a facet of competence with the lay concept. Epicurus at least seems to agree -- again from the letter:

...we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing

If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean). — The Great Whatever

I am not asking whether pleasure is a feeling or not. I grant that pleasure is a feeling.

I'm asking whether the theory of pleasure I put forward captures that feeling, for you.

As I understand it, when people talk of pleasure they mean that it is. . .

Subjective -- The person who feels pleasure is the one who can say whether or not this or that is pleasurable. The speaker has priority over anyone else on whether or not such-and-such is pleasurable.
Empirical -- One cannot know what is pleasurable without having tried this, that, or the other thing/activity/state/etc. You must try it out to know if something is or is not pleasurable.\
Phenomenological -- related to the first, but I like to state this explicity; pleasure is had only from a first-person perspective. I differentiate this from the first category only by saying that the first governs the rules by which we may speak of pleasure, while this latter point gives the ontological foundation for said rules.


If this is the case then it would be a reason why you wouldn't agree with Epicurus, who maintains that not only that pleasure is the rule, but that pleasure works in a particular way. He claims to know what is pleasurable for you, for me, and for every human.

Now, having said this, there's something else that should be noted -- Epicurus' philosophy does not really focus much on particular actions or things. It's not that this, that, and the other are forbidden. And I don't think that a proper Epicurean would be against this, that, or the other on the basis that everyone will react to it in the same manner. So I don't think a charge of hubris would apply so easily, at least, as the strong statement above seems to indicate. There's plenty of leeway for "trying things out" and seeing what works for you in a particular circumstance. What is "fixed", so to speak, is fixed by human nature, and that leads to how we can free ourselves from anxiety, and thereby live a joyous life.

So perhaps you would also differ with respect to human nature being so fixed -- or, even, it seems to me, you claim that it is in a state of flux. I wouldn't agree with the latter, even if I also don't agree with the former notion that human nature is immutable (though never explicitly stated, it would seem to me that this is a reasonable inference from the basis that the Epicurean philosophy is meant to be a universal cure).

-Pleasure is good insofar as it is pleasant, not insofar as it services a notion of happiness or eudaimonia. Happiness, if there is such a thing, is worthwhile for pleasure's sake, not vice-versa. — The Great Whatever

On the rest of what you say I'll grant, though your fourth statement strikes me as odd. Here, however, I would note that you are in agreement with Epicurean philosophy. It's perhaps one of the strongest reasons I disagree with Epicureanism, in the end. But the Epicurean puts forth pleasure as the goal.

Because it's nature which gives sense to the ethic -- in the world, as portrayed by Epicurus, the Epicurean doctrine is what makes sense. Further, it is human nature, in particular the nature of our soul, which gives the ethic its force. — Moliere

I have doubts both that physics is foundationally relevant to ethics (perhaps it is instrumentally) and that the Epicureans did any useful physics. What we know of their theories makes them seem speculative and unhelpful.

Lastly, it seems to go against the claim that epicurean philosophy is just a collection of maxims. Without having the actual texts it's not clear-cut -- but since Epicurus uses arguments in all of his letters, including the letters on nature, it would seem to me that we can't call Epicurean philosophy a collection of maxims only. — Moliere

But is there any real sense in which Epicurean views on nature tie organically to their ethical project? It seems in the modern imagination the latter has retained some interest while the former hasn't in the slightest. Is everyone involved in modern Epicureanism just deluding themselves? And if not, doesn't that show the physical project to be of little importance?

However, I don't think that this division here goes against what I'm saying about Epicurus' theory of pleasure being central to the philosophy. I'd rather say that this is one way of summing up the philosophy, but that the majority of the philosophical work is being done by the theory of pleasure -- that this is the "main thrust", so to speak -- where the division between natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires is how a proper Epicurean is meant to sort their desires and then act to fulfill the first category in order to obtain the goal of peace of mind and freedom of bodily pain (which you may say I'm contradicting myself here -- I admit there's a tension, but I'm trying to figure out how to resolve that tension more than anything -- but perhaps freedom of bodily pain does not mean we do not feel bodily pain, but rather, a lesser degree of pain? At the least this would make sense if pain is inevitable, which would at least cohere well — Moliere

I never said his theory of pleasure wasn't essential to the project, only that the Epicureans understand pleasure in a certain way, creating divisions between the static and the kinetic, and valuing the latter only insofar as it is on road to the former. Epicurean pleasure is negative and still, a pleasure of freedom from ill. The question as the letter points out is 'necessary for what?' If it's necessary for eudaimonia, the final end, and freedom from bodily pain is among what's necessary for this, there's just no getting around that you need to be free from bodily pain to be happy. And I think this is pretty obviously right. The problem is that once you admit this plausible principle, you're stuck as an Epicurean, because you have to say that the sage somehow must be able to avoid bodily pain with impunity, which he can't. The Epicurean wants, on the one hand, to have complete control and freedom over his life, and on the other, to base his ethics around what by its nature can't be controlled. I don't think there's a way of resolving this dilemma.

The other solution that comes to mind, for me, is to strike out the example that Diogenes Laertius uses of on the rack, since it is not in quotes, and simply give up the ground on invulnerability in all circumstances. But that wouldn't work to make sense of pain in the context of the ethics of the day, at least as I've come to understand them through the secondary literature. — Moliere

It's more than that -- it makes one tenet of the tetrapharmikos obviously false, which is what we started out with. I think an Epicurean philosophy that abandoned the abstract ideal of an invincible sage is perfectly coherent, but it goes against the spirit of the philosophy, and eudaimonistic philosophy generally.

Does it have to differ? What if "conditioning oneself to feel less pain" is, more or less, what makes pain easy to endure? — Moliere

There's a difference in what usually when we say we can cope with X, or get better at dealing with X, we don't mean we remove it, but make its presence more tolerable. If we could remove it, we exactly wouldn't have to cope with, or get better at dealing with, it. With pain this distinction seems not to hold. I can't make sense of undergoing pain and easing it -- to ease pain is simply for pain to go away.

Subjective -- The person who feels pleasure is the one who can say whether or not this or that is pleasurable. The speaker has priority over anyone else on whether or not such-and-such is pleasurable.
Empirical -- One cannot know what is pleasurable without having tried this, that, or the other thing/activity/state/etc. You must try it out to know if something is or is not pleasurable.\
Phenomenological -- related to the first, but I like to state this explicity; pleasure is had only from a first-person perspective. I differentiate this from the first category only by saying that the first governs the rules by which we may speak of pleasure, while this latter point gives the ontological foundation for said rules. — Moliere

Some of this would have to be tempered -- it seems unreasonable to say that you can never 'say' that someone else is in pain, or that you 'can't know' if something will be painful without undergoing it. We often can make educated estimations that people are in pain (but this is sometimes very hard to do), and educated guesses about what will be painful, although this is also hard. I have never hit my dick with a hammer, but I can say with confidence it would be painful and so won't do it.

But yes, pleasure is always from a first-person perspective, and nothing is essentially guaranteed to be pleasant or painful, and there is no ultimate measure of what is or is not either of these other than the feeling itself.

Now, having said this, there's something else that should be noted -- Epicurus' philosophy does not really focus much on particular actions or things. It's not that this, that, and the other are forbidden. And I don't think that a proper Epicurean would be against this, that, or the other on the basis that everyone will react to it in the same manner. So I don't think a charge of hubris would apply so easily, at least, as the strong statement above seems to indicate. There's plenty of leeway for "trying things out" and seeing what works for you in a particular circumstance. What is "fixed", so to speak, is fixed by human nature, and that leads to how we can free ourselves from anxiety, and thereby live a joyous life. — Moliere

Epicurus seems to speak explicitly against luxury and sensuous gratification, in a sort of moralizing tone, and defensively as if he knows, claiming to be a hedonist, that people will accuse him of approving of or recommending these things. Certainly Epicureanism makes explicit universal recommendations for how one ought to live.

On the rest of what you say I'll grant, though your fourth statement strikes me as odd. Here, however, I would note that you are in agreement with Epicurean philosophy. It's perhaps one of the strongest reasons I disagree with Epicureanism, in the end. But the Epicurean puts forth pleasure as the goal. — Moliere

There's a subtle difference here, though, in that Epicureans take themselves to be doing ethics in the sense of finding the final natural end of a thing -- it just happens to be for humans, and that end for humans just happens to be a certain kind of pleasure. Thus the point of Epicurean philosophy is to begin by asking 'what is eudaimonia?' and to give an answer to this question: 'static pleasure.' But the Cyrenaic hedonists don't ask this quesiton, because they deny that the end is eudaimonia. And so an Epicurean can sensibly ask, 'why is pleasure good?' and respond, 'because it is a human's natural end,' and so an Epicurean chooses particular pleasures for the sake of a state not reducible to any of these, for the sake of happiness. The Cyrenaic, by contrast, will choose happiness for the sake of the particular pleasures, which need no justification outside of themselves, including not in human nature.

I have doubts both that physics is foundationally relevant to ethics (perhaps it is instrumentally) and that the Epicureans did any useful physics. What we know of their theories makes them seem speculative and unhelpful. — The Great Whatever

I don't think it makes sense to look at ancient theories in light of foundationalism. The search for foundations, I don't believe, is what drives very much ancient philosophy but modern philosophy.

As for whether they did or did not do useful physics -- I mean, I wouldn't know whether or not that's the case. I do know that their atomic theories cohere well with modern atomic theories, though. But this was not by the same methods as modern atomic theories.

But is there any real sense in which Epicurean views on nature tie organically to their ethical project? — The Great Whatever

Definitely! Lucretius' poem does a superb job of demonstrating this.

It seems in the modern imagination the latter has retained some interest while the former hasn't in the slightest. Is everyone involved in modern Epicureanism just deluding themselves? And if not, doesn't that show the physical project to be of little importance?

I don't think I can say much about people involved in modern Epicureanism because I'm not involved in any sort of organized effort. But I can say that the physics ties into the ethics because it gives a pseudo-justification to the ethics. I say "pseudo-" because I think the ethical project takes prominence, though there are those who disagree with that.

Regardless of what we might give priority to in our reading, though, the physics and the ethics both support one another quite well. The ethics makes sense in a world where we have very little control over said world (it is a random collection of atoms extending infinitely upward and downward), where there is no afterlife (because the soul is a collection of very fine atoms), and where the Gods do not interfere with our lives (various superstitious explanations about nature are false). The physics makes sense in a world where we live as another one of the world's creatures with its own particular habits and needs.

I never said his theory of pleasure wasn't essential to the project, only that the Epicureans understand pleasure in a certain way, creating divisions between the static and the kinetic, and valuing the latter only insofar as it is on road to the former. Epicurean pleasure is negative and still, a pleasure of freedom from ill. The question as the letter points out is 'necessary for what?' If it's necessary for eudaimonia, the final end, and freedom from bodily pain is among what's necessary for this, there's just no getting around that you need to be free from bodily pain to be happy. And I think this is pretty obviously right. The problem is that once you admit this plausible principle, you're stuck as an Epicurean, because you have to say that the sage somehow must be able to avoid bodily pain with impunity, which he can't. The Epicurean wants, on the one hand, to have complete control and freedom over his life, and on the other, to base his ethics around what by its nature can't be controlled. I don't think there's a way of resolving this dilemma. — The Great Whatever

Just as a note I can go with your states all the way up to "a pleasure of freedom from ill". Sounds good to me.

I suppose, for me, I just see it as a tension in the philosophy -- I don't see it as sinking the project. It could be a strike against its internal consistency. But if there is a way for people to deal with pain, and Epicureanism helps one deal with pain, then I'd say that the Epicurean philosophy is still accomplishing what it set out to do within the bounds of human nature (i.e., it is internally consistent), even if there are cases where the notion of a sage simply will not apply (i.e. it does not accomplish what was set as a standard or interesting thought experiment by the interests of ethical conversation in his time and place).

Because it's the case that Epicureanism sets out to cure what ails people due to and through human nature. Autarky comes later as a result of being free of anxiety. Having a tranquil mind is the primary goal.

It's more than that -- it makes one tenet of the tetrapharmikos obviously false, which is what we started out with. I think an Epicurean philosophy that abandoned the abstract ideal of an invincible sage is perfectly coherent, but it goes against the spirit of the philosophy, and eudaimonistic philosophy generally. — The Great Whatever

I think you're overstating the case here. If a philosophy helps people within those human limits -- including the sage (which, in this case, is not just abstract, because there's Epicurus) -- then it accomplishes all that a philosophy can do. If torture is beyond that limit then what does that matter? Pain, more or less, is still easy to endure.

I mean, if you wanted, we could draw a convenient distinction just to make it true in all relevant circumstances :D. But that would be silly. And perhaps the project for invulnerability really is just silly, when the results that came from that question could still have worthwhile thoughts?

I would say "yes".

Also I would note here that we're sort of dealing with an empirical question. It could be elucidated if not resolved through experiment. Since that's the case we're also just dealing with "sounds plausible" -- it may sound implausible in certain circumstances, but that doesn't mean that it's false, only that it sounds implausible. I note this because, in interpretation, I don't think that it makes much sense to follow what sounds plausible to us. The whole point of understanding a work is to find what made sense to the person writing it, to the extent that this is possible. So while it may sound implausible, our goal as interpreters (so I would say) is to figure out how to make it plausible.

There's a difference in what usually when we say we can cope with X, or get better at dealing with X, we don't mean we remove it, but make its presence more tolerable. If we could remove it, we exactly wouldn't have to cope with, or get better at dealing with, it. With pain this distinction seems not to hold. I can't make sense of undergoing pain and easing it -- to ease pain is simply for pain to go away. — The Great Whatever

Not sure how to make it clearer to you than the example of a child burning themself vs. an adult burning themself. We could also look at physical sports and activity -- where someone who is new is not used to physical pain as much, but as you have to deal with it you learn how to cope better with physical pain.

Heck, emotional pain is similar, insofar that we deal with emotional pain in the correct way.


If we learn how to cope, then the pain is reduced. If not, then the next time we are hurt it hurts just as much as the first time. This seems to me to be a fairly common experience. (And I would note I don't think the mechanism is exposure -- mere exposure is not enough. There's more to it than that).

But yes, pleasure is always from a first-person perspective, and nothing is essentially guaranteed to be pleasant or painful, and there is no ultimate measure of what is or is not either of these other than the feeling itself. — The Great Whatever

Then I'd float the idea again -- it's your notion of pleasure which you differ with Epicurus on. And depending on which notion of pleasure we believe to be true then that is what would implicate who is reifying what, no?

Epicurus seems to speak explicitly against luxury and sensuous gratification, in a sort of moralizing tone, and defensively as if he knows, claiming to be a hedonist, that people will accuse him of approving of or recommending these things. Certainly Epicureanism makes explicit universal recommendations for how one ought to live. — The Great Whatever

I don't deny any of this.

What Epicurus says about sex and money is based on how these things affect people. But, again, there's nothing wrong with satisfying natural and unneccessary desires insofar that we retain ataraxia. That's the entire point of the tripartite categorization of pleasure -- to differentiate between what must be satisfied to be happy from the desires which do not need to be fulfilled, and to further differentiate between those what can cause anxiety from what will cause anxiety.

It seems to me that anyone who claims hedonism, at least in the philosophical sense (we can be practical hedonists without this, of course), owes their readers a theory of pleasure.