I think Kant is right on the point that we can't know an object freed of all subjective interpretation. — Hanover

It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena.

I'm not sure Kant is wrong. For Kant to be wrong, I think the transcendental aesthetic must fall - without collapsing the transcendental aesthetic, I don't think it's possible to show that Kant is wrong. — Agustino

There's a lot of good insight in the transcendental aesthetic, but it's doubtful whether the metaphysical principles which it is based in are acceptable. If they are not, then the whole thing, as a metaphysics, a system called "the transcendental aesthetic" collapses, despite the fact that there are many insightful points.

Consider that physical existence, which we apprehend through the senses, by means of phenomena, is "in itself" noumena. The question is, can we treat ourselves, one's own physical existence, as a thing in itself, a noumenon, and access that noumenon directly through the intellect, without the medium of phenomena. I see no reason to believe that we cannot do this, and this would mean Kant is wrong.

For example, given the transcendental aesthetic this is wrong. Those "intelligible objects" are given at minimum mediately, through the pure intuition of time. Thus, they are not given as they are in-themselves, but as they are in time. — Agustino

Sure, but as I explained, it seems highly likely that the transcendental aesthetic is wrong instead. So our intuitions of time may be derived from our direct access to the noumena through the apprehension of our own being, rather than what you describe, as the intuition of time being a medium between oneself and the noumena.

Notice that Kant even describes the intuition of time as an "internal" intuition. As an internal intuition it is distinct from the phenomenal influence of sensation, and therefore must be a direct intuition of the noumena. In actuality this is simply inconsistency in Kant. He claims that we have no direct access to the noumena, but then he allows for this internal intuition, which could be nothing other than direct access to the noumena.

Thanks.

It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't follow your distinction. I'm saying that the thing in itself is unknowable because all we have are appearances that cannot be said to reflect the thing in itself. You're saying that we can't know the thing in itself because it's mediated by sense phenomena. In either event we seem to be saying there's something causative between the noumena and phenomenal, so I don't see where I've gone astray calling the phenomena interpretative.

There's a lot of good insight in the transcendental aesthetic, but it's doubtful whether the metaphysical principles which it is based in are acceptable. — Metaphysician Undercover

What are those metaphysical principles? The Transcendental Aesthetic is not super long (well, it is long, but not super long), so we can quote at length from it:

http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm#chap12

Consider that physical existence, which we apprehend through the senses, by means of phenomena, is "in itself" noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what this means from within Kant's system. "Physical existence" is not something different from the phenomena, so we can't apprehend it by means of phenomena - "physical existence" just is the phenomenon.

So it's like this. Sense impressions are given within the pure intuition (of space and time), and structured under the categories of the understanding (like causality). That's the objective world. So sense impressions are the matter, and space & time & the categories are the forms. Together these form the phenomenon. Kant's writing is quite clear:

In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But an thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us.

The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.

I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. — Kant

It's not a matter of subjective interpretation, it's the question of can we apprehend an object directly with the intellect, without the medium of sense phenomena. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it mean to apprehend directly with the intellect? Anything that the intellect apprehends has already passed through the "filter" of the pure intuition - it must pass through that filter in order to be individuated and be an object of awareness at all.

Notice that Kant even describes the intuition of time as an "internal" intuition. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's what that means:

Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena alone. On the other hand, because all representations, whether they have or have not external things for their objects, still in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state; and because this internal state is subject to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, to time—time is a condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever—the immediate condition of all internal, and thereby the mediate condition of all external phenomena. If I can say a priori, “All outward phenomena are in space, and determined a priori according to the relations of space,” I can also, from the principle of the internal sense, affirm universally, “All phenomena in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time.” — Kant

I suggest you re-read the Transcendental Aesthetic quickly (or at least the relevant parts) since otherwise it will be difficult for me to tell you at each and every point how Kant uses his technical terms, so that we can be talking about the same thing.

As an internal intuition it is distinct from the phenomenal influence of sensation, and therefore must be a direct intuition of the noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is "internal" in the sense that it applies to our subjective world as well - to what thoughts we have and, in short, to our intellect.

So our intuitions of time may be derived from our direct access to the noumena through the apprehension of our own being, rather than what you describe, as the intuition of time being a medium between oneself and the noumena. — Metaphysician Undercover

But our apprehension of our own being is given through the mind right? And the mind thinks successively, not all at once. Thus this aspect of ourselves presupposes time.

I don't follow your distinction. I'm saying that the thing in itself is unknowable because all we have are appearances that cannot be said to reflect the thing in itself. You're saying that we can't know the thing in itself because it's mediated by sense phenomena. In either event we seem to be saying there's something causative between the noumena and phenomenal, so I don't see where I've gone astray calling the phenomena interpretative. — Hanover

I don't think it right to think of noumena as the "thing in itself" because I don't think it right to reduce the ordinary objects of perception to their external causes. A tree isn't just a bundle of atoms (to assume for the sake of argument that atoms are noumena).

So I don't think Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena rules out knowing the "thing in itself".

Although I should note that I also wouldn't equate the object with the phenomena. The best analogy that I can think of is that of a story; the story isn't the ink on the page or the ideas in our heads (as there are lots of books and lots of readers but only one story). The analogy does suffer slightly in that stories are taken to be abstract whereas trees aren't, but I think there's an underlying principle in it.

So sense impressions are the matter, and space & time & the categories are the forms. — Agustino

So, there are formless sense impressions?

I don't follow your distinction. I'm saying that the thing in itself is unknowable because all we have are appearances that cannot be said to reflect the thing in itself. You're saying that we can't know the thing in itself because it's mediated by sense phenomena. In either event we seem to be saying there's something causative between the noumena and phenomenal, so I don't see where I've gone astray calling the phenomena interpretative. — Hanover

Are you not a "thing in itself"? Do you not know yourself directly, without the medium of sense phenomena?



The point is that in the traditional sense of "intuition" an intuition is the direct apprehension of an intelligible object with the mind. Even in common usage, we associate "intuition" with "instinct", and this would imply something known without learning it through sense information. Under Kant's definition of "intuition", intuition requires sensation:

But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. — Kant

So Kant denies the possibility of apprehending intelligible objects (noumena) direct with the mind. He redefines "intuition" such that an intuition is necessarily derived from sensation.

So it's like this. Sense impressions are given within the pure intuition (of space and time), and structured under the categories of the understanding (like causality).

...

What does it mean to apprehend directly with the intellect? Anything that the intellect apprehends has already passed through the "filter" of the pure intuition - it must pass through that filter in order to be individuated and be an object of awareness at all. — Agustino

What do you mean by "pure intuition"? This does not seem to be Kant's usage. For Kant, intuitions have distinct forms, like space and time are "forms" of intuition. The notion of "pure intuition" seems to be inconsistent with Kant's terminology and incomprehensible under Kant's metaphysics. What could a pure intuition be?

I suggest you re-read the Transcendental Aesthetic quickly (or at least the relevant parts) since otherwise it will be difficult for me to tell you at each and every point how Kant uses his technical terms, so that we can be talking about the same thing. — Agustino

Well, it's all a matter of interpretation anyway. I could reread Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, and give you my interpretation, but you wouldn't accept it anyway, because you're already committed to your interpretation. Look at this quote, Kant says: "Space, as the pure form of external intuition...". And somehow, you interpret Kant as talking about "pure intuition". So, is it the case, that if you don't like certain words in the text, you simply leave them out of your interpretation?

But our apprehension of our own being is given through the mind right? And the mind thinks successively, not all at once. Thus this aspect of ourselves presupposes time. — Agustino

Evidently, the issue is whether time is a pure intuition, or whether time is a form of intuition. If it is a "form" of intuition, as Kant says, then we class it with the other forms, and they're phenomenal, requiring sensation, as Kant defines "intuition" above.. But if it is a "pure" intuition, as you suggest, then perhaps it is a thing in itself (noumenon) grasped directly with the intellect.

So, there are formless sense impressions? — Janus

No. What is this below:

That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. — Kant

The point is that in the traditional sense of "intuition" an intuition is the direct apprehension of an intelligible object with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a problem with the traditional sense of "intuition". Philosophers have used it as a coverup, when they didn't know how to explain how something came about. Why is it that so and so is true? Oh, it's an intuition. If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner.

So Kant denies the possibility of apprehending intelligible objects (noumena) direct with the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are intelligible objects noumena? And what does it even mean "intelligible objects"? When you are critiquing a system of philosophy, you should first try to get into it, and critique it from inside. That is what Socrates was doing - he would get into what his interlocutors were saying, and show inconsistencies from the inside.

What do you mean by "pure intuition"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I quoted it already before. Did you read it?

And accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. — Kant

What could a pure intuition be? — Metaphysician Undercover

A pure intuition is what is left when you abstract sensation and the categories that are imposed by the understanding.

Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. — Kant

So you start out with an empirical (or impure intuition) you abstract sensation and the categories of the understanding from it (like causality), and then you're left with pure intuition, which are space and time.

So, is it the case, that if you don't like certain words in the text, you simply leave them out of your interpretation? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I read those words guiding myself by the larger context and the way Kant has defined them.

You need to make an effort and use terms as Kant means and uses them. You can't just start using terms your way if you want to discuss this.

There is a problem with the traditional sense of "intuition". Philosophers have used it as a coverup, when they didn't know how to explain how something came about. Why is it that so and so is true? Oh, it's an intuition. If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner. — Agustino

"Intuition", in the traditional sense, does not necessitate truth, that's fundamental, there is good intuition and bad intuition. The person with good intuition is the one we trust. Aristotle identified two distinct forms of intuition in his Nicomachean Ethics, practical intuition and theoretical intuition. The person with practical intuition is the one adept at applying multiple theories to a particular situation, to decide what to do. So for example, the farmer with good practical intuition decides the best time to plant the seed. The person with theoretical intuition knows how to create a theory which is applicable to many particular situations, a theory with universal applicability. So for example, Einstein had good theoretical intuition.

Why are intelligible objects noumena? And what does it even mean "intelligible objects"? — Agustino

Noumena are intelligible objects because this is what Kant designated, within his system. Read the "Critique of Pure Reason", First Division, Ch.3: The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena. Pay particular attention to the footnotes.

If you do not know what intelligible objects are, then refer back to Plato, and Neo-Platonists who distinguish intelligible objects from sensible objects.

A pure intuition is what is left when you abstract sensation and the categories that are imposed by the understanding. — Agustino

So we remove sensation, and all the categories of understanding, and we are left with "pure intuition". Is that what you claim? If so, I would say that leaves us with nothing. However, I will grant you that this "nothing" could be conceived of as the possibility of sensation and understanding, what Kant calls "sensibility". Therefore "pure intuition" would refer to the possibility of sensation and understanding, "sensibility". But that contradicts the other quote you put up:

But an intuition can take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. — Kant

Notice, that an intuition can only take place insofar as an object is given to us. And, sensibility, being the possibility for sensation, is required in order that an object be given to us. So according to this passage, intuition only takes place after objects are received by means of sensibility, and this directly contradicts the claim that "pure intuition" provides us with the possibility for sensation, "sensibility".

In other words, it is impossible to take away sensation from intuition to be left with pure intuition, because according to the passage quoted, sensation is necessary for, as an essential aspect of intuition. I suggest that either you have misquoted something, or Kant simply contradicts himself. Honestly, neither of these possibilities would surprise me.

You need to make an effort and use terms as Kant means and uses them. You can't just start using terms your way if you want to discuss this. — Agustino

I perceive a great big problem. If Kant uses terms like "intuition" in a blatantly contradictory way, as is in evidence above, then we could each make an effort to use the terms "as Kant means", yet each go off into contradictory "understandings". It wouldn't be the case that you misunderstand, nor would it be the case that I misunderstand, but it would be the case that Kant misunderstood.

The passage seems to be attempting to distinguish between the sensation and the form; which would be to say the sense impression is without form; formless.

If the human mind gives form then it follows that the matter which Kant wants to equate with sensation is prior to form, no?

If the human mind gives form then it follows that the matter which Kant wants to equate with sensation is prior to form, no? — Janus

Yes, the matter is "from the noumenon" so to speak.

So, there are formless sense impressions? — Janus

OK, but when you previously answered 'no' to this it seemed as though you wanted to deny that sensation, for Kant, is formless.

OK, but when you previously answered 'no' to this it seemed as though you wanted to deny that sensation, for Kant, is formless. — Janus

Hmm no, I believe I misunderstood what you meant at first. I thought you did not understand that there was a form which was given through the pure intuition of space & time and also through the understanding.

And this is puzzling because you should know from previous conversations that, from your own admission, I have studied Kant, and German Idealism in general (with the exception of Schopenhauer who I have little regard for) far more than you have.

And this is puzzling beacuse you should know from previous conversations that, from your own admission, I have studied Kant, and German Idealism in general (with the exception of Schopenhauer who I have little regard for) far more than you have. — Janus

Hm? I never claimed not to have studied Kant/Schopenhauer (especially in-so-far as metaphysics is concerned). It's Hegel and the other German Idealists that you have certainly studied more than me.

If I remember correctly, Descartes for example used "intuition" and "clear and distinct ideas" in this manner. — Agustino

Kant denied that there is intellectual intuition in the very sense that Spinoza (probably following Descartes) claimed is the highest form of intellectual knowledge. "Intuition' for Kant denotes something like 'sense perception'.

I never claimed not to have studied Kant/Schopenhauer (especially in-so-far as metaphysics is concerned). It's Hegel and the other German Idealists that you have certainly studied more than me. — Agustino

OK, I don't want to get into arguing over who has studied what more; perhaps I was mistaken in my impression that you were familiar with Kant mainly through the lens of Schopenhauer (if that can be counted as being familiar with Kant). In any case I thought you were aware that I have studied Kant's critical philosophy sporadically yet consistently for more than twenty years, a fact which would make it surprising if I were not aware of something so fundamental to Kant's thought.

OK, I don't want to get into arguing over who has studied what more; perhaps I was mistaken in my impression that you were familiar with Kant mainly through the lens of Schopenhauer (if that can be counted as being familiar with Kant). In any case I thought you were aware that I have studied Kant's critical philosophy sporadically yet consistently for more than twenty years, a fact which would make it surprising if I were not aware of something so fundamental to Kant's thought. — Janus

Sorry, I didn't mean to put that in an insulting way (as in, saying that you don't know Kant), I simply didn't understand what you meant by your question. Maybe not being a native speaker doesn't help here.

And I don't prejudge people by how much they studied a certain thinker, it is possible to be mistaken about details even if you have spent a long time studying a certain thinker, especially one who makes as many distinctions as Kant.

With regards to Schopenhauer, yes, I think Schopenhauer is more complete and coherent than Kant in his metaphysics. But that doesn't mean I study Kant through the lens of Schopenhauer. Also, not quite sure why you say that someone who studies Schopenhauer won't be familiar with Kant - that is somewhat strange.

Kant denied that there is intellectual intuition in the very sense that Spinoza (probably following Descartes) claimed is the highest form of intellectual knowledge. "Intuition' for Kant denotes something like 'sense perception'. — Janus

Yes.

Sorry, I didn't mean to put that in an insulting way (as in, saying that you don't know Kant), I simply didn't understand what you meant by your question. Maybe not being a native speaker doesn't help here.

And I don't prejudge people by how much they studied a certain thinker, it is possible to be mistaken about details even if you have spent a long time studying a certain thinker, especially one who makes as many distinctions as Kant. — Agustino

Hey, no sweat, man. :smile:

I agree that it is possible to be mistaken about details even after long study. Look at the disagreements among Kant scholars for example. Although there appear to be some significant inconsistencies in Kant, and these are the points where scholars haggle over what he meant.

I do think that there are basic details over which anyone who is familiar with Kant to a passable degree should not be mistaken, though.

Also, not quite sure why you say that someone who studies Schopenhauer won't be familiar with Kant - that is somewhat strange. — Agustino

I would say that someone who has not studied Kant at all, but only studied Schopenhauer will not be familiar with Kant; at least when it comes to the finer points. For example in declaring that Kant was wrong in talking about things in themselves because there can be no noumenal differentiation Schopenhauer shows that he did not understand the purely formal nature of the concept of noumena.

It is Schopenhauer who inappropriately makes a substantive claim about noumena when he asserts that it cannot be differentiated or causal, and that we should therefore speak about the thing in itself rather than thing in themselves. Kant's claim is that we cannot speak about 'it' in terms of either being differentiated or undifferentiated, causal or acausal. The relationship between the phenomenal thing and the noumenal 'thing' is a purely formal one for Kant, the ding an sich stands as a mere placeholder, an unknowable 'X', that is the idea of the 'other' corresponding to the known, phenomenal object.

With regards to Schopenhauer, yes, I think Schopenhauer is more complete and coherent than Kant in his metaphysics. — Agustino

Actually, that raises an interesting point, because there is a sense in which I don't think Kant can be said to have a metaphysics, but that his philosophy (of the CPR and the Prolegomena, at least) really consists in an epistemology. It is (what I believe to be mistaken) substantivist 'Two Worlds' readings of Kant that lead to the thought that he was doing metaphysics.