• Streetlight
    9.1k
    I was struck recently while reading a paper by Daniel Dor and Eva Jablonka [PDF - READ THIS IT'S AWESOME] about the origins of language, and the similarities that paper had with the thought of Wittgenstein. The line from Wittgenstein in particular that I have in mind is this one: "Essence is expressed in grammar" (PI, §371). This is, in many ways, a very strange line, given that grammar is usually taken to be just a matter of organisational scaffolding, a mere formality foisted upon the 'good stuff' of semantics and meaning. Strange also for its invocation of 'essence', a loaded philosophical term usually avoided by Wittgenstein, who tended to view such words with great suspicion. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein's own interest in linking grammar to essence was due to his overwhelming interest in kinds - as he put it a few lines down: "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is" (§372).

    In a very concrete sense, the whole of the Philosophical Investigations can be read as a meditation on the importance of kinds of words, and the need to take kinds seriously. As early on as §6 of the PI does Witty already state the importance of kinds in his critique of Augustine: "Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word."

    So what does this have to do with the origin of language? Well, for Dor and Jablonka, grammar in language also reflects the types of concepts into which we classify words. For example, we speak about things differently from the way in which we speak about events, or else we speak about events being factual or their being imagined, or whether things are countable (like bottles and people) or not countable (like beer and fog). In all these cases, the kinds of things we speak about delimit the kinds of things we can say about them: I cannot ask 'how many fog are there?' (or better: 'how are many fog'?) without committing a grammatical error (or what what otherwise be understood to be a category mistake....).

    Now, the crucial thing for Dor and Jablonka is this: while it is possible in principle to parse out grammatical categories in any way we like, for the most part, language only ever reflects a small subset of all the possible grammatical categories that we could use. For example, while differences between events and things are generally marked by grammar in most - if not all - languages, the difference between friend and foe is not. Nor are there grammatical differences between say 'interesting events' and 'boring events': we can speak about these latter things in the same way, without committing a grammatical or categorical error.

    Implications

    What is important about this, in turn, is that it means that language is not a general purpose communication tool. Language is better at communicating some kinds of things better than others. This makes intuitive sense, even though it is often not acknowledged - it is much easier for me to show you in a diagram how to tie a knot, than to describe it step-by-step in language. Not all languages are of course structued in the same way grammatically: while "there is a core set of categories that are identifiable in all languages... the way that they are indicated grammatically varies from language to language. In addition, different languages may structurally distinguish some categories that are not distinguished in others".

    One further implication of this is that it allows language to be understood as a product of evolution: the fact that language is better at communicating some things than others would generally indicate that those things would have been selected for because of the advantage they provide in whatever social-environmental setting that any one particular language took hold. In particular, language is really, really good at describing specific things that have taken place: "It is a communication system structurally designed to communicate messages which are grounded in a specific and constrained categorical scheme. This categorical scheme is centered around a specific set of events and situations (not all types of events and situations), their participants, their time and place, their properties, and some of the properties of their participants" - and this because language has gone though what the authors call "epistemic selection" - selection in which "a specific subset of all possible categorical distinctions was isolated, highlighted and marked by grammars for the purposes of linguistic communication."

    Back to Wittgenstein

    This, in turn, helps us shed light on another one of Witty's otherwise enigmatic declarations: that "if a lion could speak, we could not understand him" (§223). In light of the above, the idea would be that a lion's epistemic concerns would be different from that of a humans. The kind of grammatical categories 'natural' to a lion would be - or would probably be (this is Wittgenstein's not-unfair-wager) - quite different from a humans. In fact, it's possible to argue that one wouldn't even have to be a lion for this 'non-understanding' to take place: speakers of languages from different roots (say, Chinese and Greek - my background!), would recognise too the different grammatical/categorical parsings that each respective language has, and the effort it takes to sometimes communicate certain things, because of that difference in grammar and classification.

    One last consideration: to the degree that human languages mostly share the same 'core' set of grammatical categorisations (with a few significant variations here and there) can be to a large extent put down to our shared physiognomy: the fact that we are (mostly) upright, forward-facing, symmetrical and motile beings. Moreover, we occupy a certain and shared scale of space and time (not shared by a mountain, say, who, if could speak, we would definitely not understand), with similar sets of 'epistemic concerns'. This is a nice way to link our embodiment with language in a way that is I think often overlooked, and which was intuited by Wittgenstein in his remark on the lion.
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    @Banno- here it is, I finally got around to it.
    @Saphsin- This is why I can't stand Chomsky (read the paper!)
  • Baden
    15.6k
    Yes, I'm for Halliday not Chomsky. The grammar is built up from how we relate to the world. Chomsky and his bloody trees. Bleurgh.

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  • sime
    1k
    "Esssence is expressed by grammar."
    "Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is"

    I think Wittgenstein's central point here was deflationary in the sense of identifying essence with grammatical expression. which is to not take kinds seriously in any transcendental sense that is independent of our way of speaking.

    In contrast, suppose somebody said:

    Essence is represented by grammar

    This leads to Hume's problem of induction but in the context of the classification of objects.
    For to state that grammar is a representation of essences raises the sceptical question "what is it about the previously witness examples of each essence that necessitates how this object is to be classified?"

    This question, along with other Humean problems of induction can be thrown out by replying that essences and the notion of necessity are normative notions pertaining to what we say and do rather than referring to independently intuited features that the individual sees.

    Which I suppose is complementary to the empirical idea of epistemic selection.
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    Huh. Never come across Halliday before, but his stuff looks really cool. I can't speak for him of course, but I suspect that what might distinguish Dor and Jablonka's work is that they insist upon language being a matter of genetic assimilation as much as much as social incubation, which I think is really cool. But that would be an extension and not a disagreement.
  • unenlightened
    8.7k
    It's a great paper, and a really plausible account of the evolution of language. I particularly liked the ideas that certain functions, the expression of emotion, the performance of acts such as knot tying are already well catered for by facial expression and gesture, and visual/performative means respectively, and so did not develop a role in the grammatical structure of the language. Also the way they answer and acknowledge Chomsky while they demolish him.
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    This question, along with other Humean problems of induction can be thrown out by replying that essences and the notion of necessity are normative notions pertaining to what we say and do rather than referring to independently intuited features that the individual sees.

    Which I suppose is complementary to the empirical idea of epistemic selection.
    sime

    Exactly. The idea is that such kinds are naturally emergent, at is were, and not a function of any kind of pre-established harmony, if I can use that Humeian term. The question of necessity and contingency is an interesting one as well, insofar as I think there definately is a kind of principle of sufficient reason at work here: that some grammatical categories are selected over others is not simply arbitrary, but in some sense necessary: it is not an accident that so many of our grammatical categories just so happen to converge across so many different languages. In fact it might be entirely appropriate to invoke convergence in its properly evolutionary-theoretic meaning, as when different species independently evolve similar morphological features (like eyes or fins) despite great distances in space and time.

    On the other hand, one can speak of these necessities themselves as contingent: the grmmatical categories we largely use could have been otherwise, had evolution taken different turns than it did, had the contingencies of social selection played out differently as a function of history and events, etc. The whole question of modality is given a very interesting twist insofar as neither contingency nor necessity alone account for the dynamics of grammatical evolution, but a curious blend of the two.
  • Streetlight
    9.1k
    Yep, fuck Chomsky. He's so quick on his feet to call out so-called charlatanism when his own contribution to lingustics has been to essentially mystify the field for decades.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    12.3k
    We can look at grammar as the means by which we make what we say comprehensible to others. We often overlook the fact that the way things appear to me may very well be an inversion of the way that they appear to you. For example, if we are facing one another, to my right is to your left, what is behind me is in front of you, etc.. Grammar provides us with the "objective" perspective.

    The knot example is very interesting, because it can be very difficult for some people to learn a knot by watching another demonstrate it. You need to have the capacity in your mind to recognize that your perspective is an inversion of what the person demonstrating the knot is doing, and switch your perspective intuitively, to follow the demonstration. This is a matter of putting yourself in the position of the person demonstrating. That's what grammar is, an attempt to put us all in the same position, so that we can easily understand each other. It is the backbone of communication.
  • Saphsin
    383
    I've been interested in Jackendoff's work, the analysis in here is something to look into.
  • Galuchat
    808
    The Dor & Jablonka paper concludes:
    "We started out by characterizing language as a transparent mapping-system, dedicated to the expression of a constrained subset of meanings by means of sound concatenation."

    This agrees with my own conception of human language as a code which provides correspondence between a set of mental conditions and/or functions and a set of words (i.e., vocabulary) having paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations (i.e., grammar), hence; semantic content.

    And I think it's accurate to say that the communication of signs between environment, social group, and individual entails the development of meaning and culture.

    But I think it is incorrect to describe language as a communication system, because communication is the process of transmitting, conveying, receiving, decoding, authoring, and encoding information (language being encoded information).
  • unenlightened
    8.7k
    The idea is that such kinds are naturally emergent, at is were, and not a function of any kind of pre-established harmony, if I can use that Humeian term.StreetlightX

    Interesting that Hume comes up, as I see him as somewhat of a champion of sentiment, which the article identifies as one of the dimensions that does not find its way into the universal grammar. So our talk tends to neglect it the more our talk becomes formal. No emoticons in logic, please! I wonder if there could be a philosophy conducted through dance or painting or music, and what neglected topics might come to the fore? There seems to be some hint of it in conceptual art, but generally, I get the feeling that as it becomes more reflexive, so it becomes more dependent on the verbal analysis of the critics. But it's not my field; anyone care to educate me?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    "Essence is expressed in grammar" (PI, §371)StreetlightX

    Some ramblings, just to get my thinking going.

    First, it is important to note that PI is set out as a conversation between Wittgenstein and himself, and that hence some paragraphs have the characteristic of challenging Wittgenstein to re-think what is being said. See how, for example, §367 leads into a discussion of how an image can be quite right, despite being exactly wrong - the furniture in §368 being the wrong colour.

    But I don't think that this is the case with §371. I think instead that this fits with my ongoing criticism of @Metaphysician Undercover; that what was once thought of in terms of essence is better thought of in terms of use - grammar being the rules of use.
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    12.3k
    But I don't think that this is the case with §371. I think instead that this fits with my ongoing criticism of Metaphysician Undercover; that what was once thought of in terms of essence is better thought of in terms of use - grammar being the rules of use.Banno

    I've never disagreed with you, on this point. Saying what the essence of a thing is, is just a matter of following a specific type of rule. Where I disagree with you, and Wittgenstein as well, is in what constitutes "following a rule". I believe that when a person follows a rule, one hold a principle within the mind, and adheres to that principle. Wittgenstein describes "following a rule" as being judged to act correctly, in relation to a rule. When an individual is judged as consistently doing the right thing (or saying the right thing), then that person is following a rule.

    The difference being in the relationship between "rule" and "correct". In my understanding, a person may have a private rule, and follow that rule, and the rule might be correct or incorrect in relation to the judgement of others. In Wittgenstein's description, correct and incorrect follow from whether or not the person is following a rule, so it is impossible that a person could follow a rule, and be incorrect. My understanding makes following a rule neither correct nor incorrect, allowing that the rule itself may be judged as correct or incorrect.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    "if a lion could speak, we could not understand him"StreetlightX

    I'm at odds with Wittgenstein here.

    Consider, also on p.223,
    If I see someone writhing in pain with evident causeI do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me

    If I see a lion writhing in pain with evident cause, do I think: all the same, the lion's feelings are hidden from me?

    No.
  • Shawn
    12.6k


    Yeah but what about p-zombies and Searls Chinese room argument?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    After Davidson, if we are able to recognise that the lion is indeed speaking, then by that very fact we must be able to recognise some of what it is saying.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    Don't doubt where doubt is unfounded.
  • Shawn
    12.6k


    Yeah, but what about qualia?

    I'm just saying that the notion of a private language or private pain is still being brought up to this day with the mentioning of qualia or the Chinese room.
  • Akanthinos
    1k
    If I see a lion writhing in pain with evident cause, do I think: all the same, the lion's feelings are hidden from me?

    No.
    Banno

    I've never understood how Wittgenstein regarded the animal as such a radical Other.

    I'd even go further and say, even before we are able to recognise that the lion is indeed speaking, we'll understand that some of what he is doing is saying stuff. Even if we can't know what it is.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    I don't see how the notion of qualia can be made coherent. either qualia are private, and hence irrelevant, or they are public, and hence already part of the discussion.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    I'd even go further and say, even before we are able to recognise that the lion is indeed speaking, we'll understand that some of what he is doing is saying stuff. Even if we can't know what it is.Akanthinos

    How could you recognise that the lion is saying something without recognising what it is saying?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    My understanding makes following a rule neither correct nor incorrect, allowing that the rule itself may be judged as correct or incorrect.Metaphysician Undercover

    You want to judge rules as correct or incorrect without reference to rules?
  • Akanthinos
    1k


    Pretty much the same way I'll recognize that someone who is speaking a foreign language I've never heard and which might sound (to me) like a bunch of honomatopea, is still likely speaking.
  • Shawn
    12.6k


    Then how do you go about that if lions could speak we would not understand them?

    I don't entirely understand that statement or sentence when confronted with the private language argument? Is it to say that language can be private if the non-cognitive or pre-linguistic and other characteristics of its participants are that radically different?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    ...and how, exactly, is that? Work through it.

    honomatopeaAkanthinos
    ?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    You want an assurance that the lion is not a zombie?
  • Banno
    23.1k
    This is a nice way to link our embodiment with language in a way that is I think often overlooked, and which was intuited by Wittgenstein in his remark on the lion.StreetlightX

    To be sure, I can agree with this.

    I would add that as well as being embodied, we are embedded in a shared world. SO we share long grass and antelopes and water holes with the lion.

    I do not think that Wittgenstein should be understood as saying that our world and the lion's world do not meet.
  • Akanthinos
    1k
    In any case, the whole "If lion could speak..." spiel goes so much against my personal experiences of trans-species communication that I'm fairly sure I'm so biased against it, I couldn't possibly acquiesce to it.

    ...and how, exactly, is that? Work through it.Banno

    Performative analysis? Unless producing honomatopea has significantly more value in the Other's world than mine, then I can assume that his production is actually aimed at a similar goal than mine. Contextual cues lead you to assume meaning behind potentially meaningless actions, because they are correlated to our domain of action, which is always meaningful to us.

    I was struck a long time ago by the image : An animal behaviorist was speaking of a relationship established by a black panther and a labrador, brought in to help the panther with her depression. The behaviourist kept insisting how the language games played by both were not, at all, the same as either those that would occur between panthers or labs, and not even really a mixture of both. The strength discrepency between the two was so large that they both had to develop a new set of communicative behaviours in order to interact.
  • Banno
    23.1k
    honomatopeaAkanthinos

    ??
  • Banno
    23.1k
    I was struck a long time ago by the image : An animal behaviorist was speaking of a relationship established by a black panther and a labrador, brought in to help the panther with her depression. The behaviourist kept insisting how the language games played by both were not, at all, the same as either those that would occur between panthers or labs, and not even really a mixture of both. The strength discrepency between the two was so large that they both had to develop a new set of communicative behaviours in order to interact.Akanthinos

    And recognisably, they interacted.

    What did these "language games" look like? I wonder if the behaviourist is using the term in the way Wittgenstein did.
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