↪creativesoul Both belief and doubt are conceptual, actions are inadequate to express these.
An observer might infer them from the actions of one whose language is not developed, such as a child having an idea that a treat under a cup, but the belief that the treat is under the cup is not a belief in the child. — charleton
If the language-less child believes that there is a treat under the cup, then it's belief cannot consist of the terms used to report upon it. What else could it consist in/of — creativesoul
Both belief and doubt are conceptual, actions are inadequate to express these. An observer might infer them from the actions of one whose language is not developed, such as a child having an idea that a treat under a cup, but the belief that the treat is under the cup is not a belief in the child. — charleton
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