They can enjoy a particular kind of existence, as fictional characters. — Shevek

No. Unborn people are not fictional characters.

Or barring discussions on the existence of fictional entities, or modal realism — Shevek

Even if one were a modal realist, unborn people would not be actual, and only actual entities can be affected by actions in the actual world.

they can still be quantified as negative existentials that are nonetheless causally efficacious. — Shevek

A negative existential is a kind of statement, not a kind of person. If a negative existential is true of an unborn person, this just means, as I've said, they they don't exist. Sapientia has difficulty wrapping his head around this -- he claims to understand it, and then makes posts that are only intelligible if he does not.

I'm obviously jumping into this discussion very late, and perhaps someone brought this up before, but why should we look at suffering as something defective with the state of things? There are other ethical frames, such as Nietzsche's, that see suffering as a necessity for any meaningful form of human transcendence. Pleasure or pain might take particular values only in an instrumental sense. — Shevek

What is good or bad does not depend on an impotent 'ethical frame.' It doesn't matter what ethical frame you have, suffering is still bad, precisely because it doesn't care whether anyone 'looks at it' as bad. What you think, or how you look at it, doesn't matter -- suffering is bad on its own terms, and no alternative belief system tat claims it isn't can change this, as if mere belief or framing could stop reality.

Pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad, while everything else can only be extrinsically so.

No. Unborn people are not fictional characters. — The Great Whatever

Why not? What would qualify an unborn person being a fictional character? Does it have to be in a published novel or short story? What about unpublished narratives? Or narratives that exist in the space of conversation?

Even if one were a modal realist, unborn people would not be actual, and only actual entities can be affected by actions in the actual world. — The Great Whatever

Fair enough, and I'm not arguing that whatever kind of existence unborn/possible babies have is the kind that can be effected by actions in the actual world. I'm not sure I want (or need) to argue that, so maybe what I'm saying has little bearing on the discussion (i.e. moral duties to unborn children). But it does seem like a kind of existence that has effect.

A negative existential is a kind of statement, not a kind of person. If a negative existential is true of an unborn person, this just means, as I've said, they they don't exist. Sapientia has difficulty wrapping his head around this -- he claims to understand it, and then makes posts that are only intelligible if he does not. — The Great Whatever

That's why I said it can be quantified so. But I think first-order predicate logic viewed as operating so here kind of belies a less crudely materialistic view of existence. And then we get into broader questions of ontology, when we ask "what is there?" or what it means to exist. It's only further complicated when we ask "what does it mean for some being to exist such that moral duties could be applied to it?"

My comments were meant to draw attention to how, following this philosophical methodology, disagreements ultimately lead us to questions that go up the ladder of fundamental explanation, i.e. all the way to metaontology. They weren't necessarily meant to argue for a particular position, as much as they were meant to show why someone can have reasonable disagreements about what 'x doesn't exist' means, or entails in the context of the current discussion. Simply stating 'unborn babies don't exist' doesn't solve anything.

What is good or bad does not depend on an impotent 'ethical frame.' It doesn't matter what ethical frame you have, suffering is still bad, precisely because it doesn't care whether anyone 'looks at it' as bad. What you think, or how you look at it, doesn't matter -- suffering is bad on its own terms, and no alternative belief system tat claims it isn't can change this, as if mere belief or framing could stop reality.

Pleasure and pain are intrinsically good and bad, while everything else can only be extrinsically so. — The Great Whatever

You're essentially just saying your metaethical view is true by bare assertion. This is a form of argumentation that has little purchase in my mind.

Why not? What would qualify an unborn person being a fictional character? Does it have to be in a published novel or short story? What about unpublished narratives? Or narratives that exist in the space of conversation? — Shevek

I feel like this question isn't worth answering. I don't need a complete account of fiction to know unborn people aren't fictional characters. To insist otherwise IMO is not to understand what fiction is, not even in a technical sense, but just in a vulgar sense.

But it does seem like a kind of existence that has effect. — Shevek

I mean, I disagree, but then, I think modal realism is fundamentally confused and is not really an account of modality so much as a science fiction story.

And then we get into broader questions of ontology, when we ask "what is there?" or what it means to exist. — Shevek

These are not necessary to know unborn people don't exist. If your theory says otherwise, that is evidence agains your theory.

Simply stating 'unborn babies don't exist' doesn't solve anything. — Shevek

It states a truth and removes confusions from the conversation that Sapientia, and other commentators, are prone to.

You're essentially just saying your metaethical view is true by bare assertion. This is a form of argumentation that has little purchase in my mind. — Shevek

It isn't 'my metaethical view.' Again, what metaethical view you have doesn't really matter. Pain's still going to be bad on its own terms without any care for your philosophy.

I feel like this question isn't worth answering. I don't need a complete account of fiction to know unborn people aren't fictional characters. To insist otherwise IMO is not to understand what fiction is, not even in a technical sense, but just in a vulgar sense. — The Great Whatever

I'm not insisting otherwise, but just seeing why, in principle, unborn babies couldn't enjoy the kind of existence that some attribute to fictional characters. I'm asking for more nuance and sophistication in our ontology, which I see as opposite of asserting vulgar views.

I mean, I disagree, but then, I think modal realism is fundamentally confused and is not really an account of modality so much as a science fiction story. — The Great Whatever

The view I'm exploring is different from modal realism.

These are not necessary to know unborn people don't exist. If your theory says otherwise, that is evidence agains your theory. — The Great Whatever

They're at least necessary to be clear on our terms and what we mean by being and existence. At the most, they constitute real substantive disagreements on what it is to exist. For example, you could be an eternalist who would say that unborn (presently nonexistent) babies exist. And you can't really appeal to intuition either, because a lot of people have the intuition that they're responsible in some way to their future children and family.

You can't just keep reasserting a premise that's under question. You have to make some argument.

It isn't 'my metaethical view.' Again, what metaethical view you have doesn't really matter. Pain's still going to be bad on its own terms without any care for your philosophy. — The Great Whatever

And yet there are all sorts of people out there that think pain is good, because it teaches them a lesson, helps them grow, or they're just good old-fashioned masochists. If you think they're mistaken somehow, you have to explain why.

I'm obviously jumping into this discussion very late, and perhaps someone brought this up before, but why should we look at suffering as something defective with the state of things? There are other ethical frames, such as Nietzsche's, that see suffering as a necessity for any meaningful form of human transcendence. Pleasure or pain might take particular values only in an instrumental sense. — Shevek

I always thought Nietzsche's idea that meaning needs pain is telling that one must choose between good old-fashioned "happiness" or "pleasure" or meaning through trial and tribulation on the other hand, or some bizarre mix of the two. I suspect the idea that suffering needs to be there to have a more rich life is often post hoc ways of coping with the painful event. Often, if given the choice, the less painful scenario would have been the preferred scenario- despite post hoc assertions that the pain was really necessary for meaning to flourish.

However, even if I was to grant you that meaning needs pain, then if one believes pain is intrinsically bad, than a world where pain is necessary for meaning, might not be an ideal one, and thus not worth starting for another person in the first place. To have a new human in order for them to be a "great" person by suffering trials of painful events, sounds unnecessary. Why does someone need to experience meaning in the first place, if pain is involved in the process? Having people exist to experience meaning, in spite of suffering seems an odd position. Meaning does not need to be experienced by anyone. In other words, this experience of meaning is not something that needs to be carried on by the next generation. Meaning is not a host that needs a home in the next person born. It may be something that is experienced once born, but how it is a compelling reason to have someone new, despite pain, does not seem to be explained.

You can say pain leads to meaning- then one can just say if meaning needs pain, then meaning is not all its cracked up to be. There could be many non-painful events that lead to meaningful experiences. Also, a lot of what might be "meaningful" that derives from pain or discomfort, is actually just maintenance. One must simply go through anxious, physically/emotional discomfort just to maintain their social position and out of not knowing how else to spend their time.

You can say that there are some pains that are suffering, and that do not even lead to meaning- this means that suffering can exist separate from the pains that lead to meaning. This happens in varying degrees and amounts with no way of knowing how much will happen for each individual.

The key word I used was "effectively", i.e. given the inevitable effect, or "by-product", of such a contention, you may as well further contend that that there is also a duty to not cause positive experiences. You want to eradicate suffering, despite the great cost of doing so.

Life is mostly misery, there is little joy, for some people none. To focus on joy is cherry picking. — The Great Whatever

It isn't in my case, because I acknowledge the suffering in the world, but I point out the joy to counterbalance the scales that you've tipped too far on one side.

Your first sentence is debatable. It isn't an established fact. I don't agree with it. But even if true, what really matters is the overall effect that such experiences have on the worth of life. It isn't up to you or any other individual to decide the worth of the lives of everyone that lives, or has lived, or will probably live. You're free to do so, but you lack the authority for your decision to be representative of those intended. And no evidence that has been brought forward about not taking what people say for granted is great enough to rule out the virtual certainty that some of those people are speaking the truth.

Even if suffering is disproportionate to joy in terms of quantity, it doesn't follow that it has such a detrimental effect on the overall value of life that it renders it not worth living (or at least would do so for any possible future generations if they were actualised).

Pleasure also plays its part in propagating misery, of course, and is in the end a servant to it. — The Great Whatever

Again, you say such things because of your one-sided way of looking at them. The other way to look at it would be to view pleasure as a reward, and the experience which motivates us to seek it out - which isn't necessarily misery, and in fact is not misery in typical cases, but something far less extreme - as an incentive.

You're guilty of bias and of hyperbole.

Also, there is no baby to be thrown out.

Unborn people do not exist.

Unborn people do not exist.

Unborn people do not exist. — The Great Whatever

Ha! You still can't get your head around that point, I see.

I'm not insisting otherwise, but just seeing why, in principle, unborn babies couldn't enjoy the kind of existence that some attribute to fictional characters. I'm asking for more nuance and sophistication in our ontology, which I see as opposite of asserting vulgar views. — Shevek

Because unborn people aren't fictional characters? I don't understand the relevance of this question. As an example, Frodo Baggins is a fictional character. If you want more nuance, you should do it with a hypothesis that is at least plausible -- though I suspect the call for 'nuance' is here as in so many cases just a red herring that will license the denial of obvious truths (like that unborn people don't exist).

They're at least necessary to be clear on our terms and what we mean by being and existence. — Shevek

'Being' and 'existence' are ordinary words of English. They don't need to be defined, and I'm not using them technically. If you understand the language, you need no definition (and in fact I could not provide one, since their meaning is not up to me, as if I made them up), and if you don't understand the language, then we can't have this conversation anyway.

The plea for definition is only relevant when one is inventing technical terms for some technical purpose. But that is not what is going on here.

For example, you could be an eternalist who would say that unborn (presently nonexistent) babies exist. — Shevek

I could, but then I would be saying something patently false, and in general I try to say true things, not false things. 'Presently nonexistent babies exist' is a contradiction -- duh.

You can't just keep reasserting a premise that's under question. You have to make some argument. — Shevek

You cannot decide to make whatever premise you want 'under question' by assaulting it with a slew of specious views and then insist that the discourse move where you want it to, though. I have every bit as much right to think that your purported objections to an obvious fact are red herrings and not worthy of consideration, as you do to insist that we ought to entertain that nonexistent people exist. That may end up with us parting ways without a productive discussion -- but then, insofar as you were serious in your claims (which perhaps you aren't -- this, like so much of philosophical discussion, already has the air of an idle game and round of 'position-citing'to me), you will still walk away considering something obviously false to be a possibility, which is your loss & not mine.

And yet there are all sorts of people out there that think pain is good, because it teaches them a lesson, helps them grow, or they're just good old-fashioned masochists. If you think they're mistaken somehow, you have to explain why. — Shevek

What they think doesn't matter -- they're wrong.

They are mistaken because the phenomenon itself, i.e. pain, is bad on its own terms, and this is indifferent to whether they say it is good or bad. We are interested in the thing itself, not people's opinions about it, so citing their opinions as if it had some sort of bearing is absurd.

It isn't up to you or any other individual to decide the worth of the lives of everyone that lives, or has lived, or will probably live. — Sapientia

Okay, so why then is natalism, which makes precisely such a decision, justified?

Notice the absurdity of your position: to not have a child because you fear the child's life might not be worth living is to decide for a nonexistent person unjustly; yet to actually have a child and so decide for a real person this same thing, but in the opposite (your favored) direction is fine because...?

I mean, what the hell are you even talking about? Insofar as your argument works, it shoots you in the foot, and insofar as it doesn't, you should stop bothering with it.

A negative existential is a kind of statement, not a kind of person. If a negative existential is true of an unborn person, this just means, as I've said, they don't exist. Sapientia has difficulty wrapping his head around this -- he claims to understand it, and then makes posts that are only intelligible if he does not. — The Great Whatever

Please don't make false claims about me or my posts. I'm willing to bet that others can understand my point, and thereby understand that it's not unintelligible, but rather that it has been uncharitably misinterpretated by the likes of you and Thorongil.

It's only bullshit on stilts if its meaning matches a foolish misinterpretation. For the last time, I'll explain the nuance, so please pay close attention:

To state that you're robbing a possible future generation, in the way that I have done so, is to express in a figurative manner something which can be expressed in the conditional mood, which avoids the contradiction which would be implied by a literal version of the aforementioned statement.

Hence, I am not guilty of implying that nonexistent people are being robbed, which is obviously a contradiction, because nonexistent people cannot be robbed. Rather, I am expressing a point that I've already made, namely that if we purposefully brought about the early extinction of humanity after the current generation had died, then we would, as a consequence, be removing the possibility of future generations. I am further saying that this would, as a consequence, also remove the possibility of said future generations experiencing a worthwhile life or even anything worthwhile at all, which, in my judgement, would be unfortunate.

Note my use of "if... then..." and "would" which are key indications of a statement in the conditional mood. I'm certainly not implying that future generations are missing out, or that they do object.

I'm not speaking on their behalf; I'm pointing out that we can obtain some knowledge about what their life would probably be like if they were to exist, and that we can use that knowledge to make a judgement. The funny thing is, you're doing exactly the same thing. The only difference is that we reach different conclusions. — Sapientia

If future generations are not missing out, then no one is missing out, and therefore there cannot possibly be anything to object to.

You cannot simply claim over and over that you understand that unborn people don't exist, and then go on to make claims that can only be sensibly interpreted if you do believe this. My guess is that you want to make such claims, but have been beaten back by obvious and appropriate objections, and are now scrambling for a way to say the same thing without claiming that you're saying it.

If not, please inform me in what way not robbing anyone of anything can possibly be 'unfortunate.'

Okay, so why then is natalism, which makes precisely such a decision, justified?

Notice the absurdity of your position: to not have a child because you fear the child's life might not be worth living is to decide for a nonexistent person unjustly; yet to actually have a child and so decide for a real person this same thing, but in the opposite (your favored) direction is fine because...?

I mean, what the hell are you even talking about? Insofar as your argument works, it shoots you in the foot, and insofar as it doesn't, you should stop bothering with it. — The Great Whatever

I don't think that you understand my position, despite my having explained it more than a few times. I wouldn't call myself a natalist. I'm a relativist regarding the issue of whether or not birth is justified: sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't, depending on context.

The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. Given that there's no other realistic alternative for the living, since we cannot consult non-existent people or babies, that's the best option.

The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

It is not possible to give someone the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to be born.

Given that there's no other realistic alternative for the living, since we cannot consult non-existent people or babies, that's the best option. — Sapientia

The other option is not to procreate, which is also the best option.

You cannot simply claim over and over that you understand that unborn people don't exist, and then go on to make claims that can only be sensibly interpreted if you do believe this. My guess is that you want to make such claims, but have been beaten back by obvious and appropriate objections, and are now scrambling for a way to say the same thing without claiming that you're saying it.

If not, please inform me in what way not robbing anyone of anything can possibly be 'unfortunate.' — The Great Whatever

Don't be so ridiculous. Of course that isn't the only sensible interpretation. That's not a sensible interpretation at all, in that it results in absurdity.

It's unfortunate that no one else would get the opportunity to live a worthwhile life. It wouldn't literally be robbing anyone of anything, but my figurative point still stands. To say that it's unfortunate is not to suggest that there are disappointed non-existent people or anything like that. That would be an idiotic interpretation.

It is not possible to give someone the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to be born. — The Great Whatever

Obviously. I said as much myself in the next part of what you quoted.

The other option is not to procreate, which is also the best option. — The Great Whatever

And that is where we disagree. This is where the disagreement is substantial, and can't be resolved merely by correcting a trivial misunderstanding, unlike the other issue, although apparently I haven't been able to get through to you on that one, and it has grown tiresome.

Simply stating 'unborn babies don't exist' doesn't solve anything. — Shevek

Hear, hear!

Obviously. I said as much myself in the next part of what you quoted. — Sapientia

That is not what you say. What you say is:

The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

If the issue is that of being born (and what else could it be, given that we are discussing anti-natalism), there is no way to give such an opportunity, since there is no one to give such an opportunity to. In other words, the qualification 'once they're able to do so' does not make any sense.

Hopefully you can see from this what I mean by your numerous confusions.

And that is where we disagree. This is where the disagreement is substantial, and can't be resolved merely by correcting a trivial misunderstanding, unlike the other issue, although apparently I haven't been able to get through to you on that one, and it has grown tiresome. — Sapientia

You claimed, falsely, that the only option was... (well, what Im not sure, since as I just pointed out, your suggestion is literally incoherent). You are simply wrong that there is no other option, since there is one, viz. not procreating. Perhaps you think such an option is not 'reasonable?' But okay, why? And why should I care?

It's unfortunate that no one else would get the opportunity to live a worthwhile life. To say that it's unfortunate is not to suggest that there are disappointed non-existent people or anything like that. That would be an idiotic interpretation. — Sapientia

Okay, then answer this: unfortunate for who? Can something be unfortunate simpliciter, without being unfortunate for anyone? Think carefully, and consider what you yourself have said, before you call something 'idiotic.'

Also, just to shove this in your face again, because you keep doing it:

than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

No opportunities are being taken away by not procreating. There is nobody to take such opportunities away from. Get it?

That is not what you say. What you say is:
— The Great Whatever

The answer to your question, to reiterate an earlier point, is that it's better, in my view, to give them the opportunity to decide for themselves, once they're able to do so, than to take away the opportunity altogether. — Sapientia

What I said was that we cannot consult non-existent people or babies. What you said was that it is not possible to give someone the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they want to be born. I'll leave it at that. The audience can see for themselves.

And just to clarify, in that quote, I was talking about the opportunity for people to judge the worth of their lives and whether or not to continue to live, not the opportunity to decide whether or not they want to be born.

If the issue is that of being born (and what else could it be, given that we are discussing anti-natalism), there is no way to give such an opportunity, since there is no one to give such an opportunity to. In other words, the qualification 'once they're able to do so' does not make any sense. — The Great Whatever

I've already acknowledged that non-existent people and babies don't have such an opportunity. They get the opportunity some time after being born when they're old enough. Possible generations can become actual and babies don't remain babies forever. That's consistent with what I said. They're not initially capable of making that decision, so it's nonsense to even bring it up, as if there were some realistic alternative in that situation. Either one gets the opportunity at some point or that opportunity never arises. There's a difference between allowing that opportunity to arise and preventing it. That was what I was getting at. Try reading between the lines rather than trying to superficially catch me out on my wording. Stop being such a sophist and try a little charity. When talking about all of humankind, I think that it's better for that opportunity to naturally arise than to artificially take it away.

Hopefully you can see from this what I mean by your numerous confusions. — The Great Whatever

I understand what you're saying, but you're only showing your own confusions.

You claimed, falsely, that the only option was... (well, what Im not sure, since as I just pointed out, your suggestion is literally incoherent). You are simply wrong that there is no other option, since there is one, viz. not procreating. Perhaps you think such an option is not 'reasonable?' But okay, why? And why should I care? — The Great Whatever

And that's another example, or so it seems. I'm not sure whether your misrepresentation is due to lack of understanding or whether you're intentionally twisting my words. Again, I'll leave it at that. The audience can see for themselves what I claimed, and judge for themselves whether you're being charitable.

No opportunities are being taken away by not procreating. There is nobody to take such opportunities away from. Get it? — The Great Whatever

I get that you're too stubborn to let this go, despite my repeated clarifications, and that you're hell bent on picking the most uncharitable of interpretations. I didn't say that the opportunity is being taken away from anyone, let alone anyone that doesn't exist. The opportunity, or at least it's possibility, would simply be taken away: post-extinction, it would no longer be a possibility for anyone to live a worthwhile life. They would never get the opportunity, and could never take advantage of it. Without taking global anti-natalist action, all things being equal, this opportunity will remain, as will its possibility, and it will likely be actualised over multiple generations.

You want to eradicate suffering, despite the great cost of doing so. — Sapientia

I do admit that the lack of pleasure is an unfortunate thing. If, for example, we could perfectly forsee how someone's life would turn out, and we saw that they would just experience pleasure all the time with a negligible amount of pain, I would not be opposed to their birth. In fact, if they go on to help other people, I might even urge the parents to have the child.

But that is entirely hypothetical. The ethical responsibility we have is to not bring harm upon another individual. By not giving birth to a person, you are avoiding imposing harm upon the individual. And by not giving birth to them, they are not deprived nor benefited by anything (this is where I disagree with Benatar).

You make it seem as though the suffering that is occurring here on planet Earth has some purpose. The "great cost" of minimizing suffering is a cost that affects nobody but ourselves and our ultimately short-sighted desire for the continuation of the human race (i.e. the continuation of the cosmic drama).

If there's nothing wrong with an empty desert island, then there's nothing wrong with an empty desert cosmos.

I do admit that the lack of pleasure is an unfortunate thing. — darthbarracuda

Unfortunate for who?! The unborn don't exist! Hurr durr.

Guess who?

What I meant was that it is unfortunate that pleasure only exists when in couple with suffering. I didn't actually mean that lack of pleasure is an unfortunate thing for an unborn person, as I actually said later on in my post.

Look, I think that your intentions are good. The goal to reduce suffering seems like a good one, but I think that you go too far by endorsing extinction, which would eradicate suffering altogether as well as all other life experiences.

And yes, I've never disputed the fact that it doesn't affect the non-existent, despite some people in this discussion trying to make out that I have. But, like you say, it does (or rather would) effect the continuation of the human race, and this effect isn't one that I approve of. I do think that that's what it boils down to: the subjectivity of approval or disapproval. Perhaps others think that it's more of an objective matter, but I think that they'd be mistaken.

What I meant was that it is unfortunate that pleasure only exists when in couple with suffering. I didn't actually mean that lack of pleasure is an unfortunate thing for an unborn person, as I actually said later on in my post. — darthbarracuda

I know. It was tongue-in-cheek. I was mimicing the criticism that keeps being directed at me by others in this discussion, and by one person in particular. Hence the "Guess who?".

I didn't say that the opportunity is being taken away from anyone, let alone anyone that doesn't exist. The opportunity, or at least it's possibility, would simply be taken away: post-extinction, it would no longer be a possibility for anyone to live a worthwhile life. — Sapientia

You cannot take away an opportunity to live, without taking it away from someone. It makes no sense to say it is just 'taken away.' What does that even mean?

And just to clarify, in that quote, I was talking about the opportunity for people to judge the worth of their lives and whether or not to continue to live, not the opportunity to decide whether or not they want to be born. — Sapientia

This is not what anti-natalism is about. It is about birth.

You cannot take away an opportunity to live, without taking it away from someone. It makes no sense to say it is just 'taken away.' What does that even mean? — The Great Whatever

At the same time, though, if you can't take away the opportunity to live from a potential person, then neither can you save them from future suffering. This was Cabrera's criticism of Benatar's misuse of counterfactuals.