• jancanc
    73
    Schopenhauer claimed that the world is will (as thing-in-itself) and representation (appearance).
    He does not think the will causes our representations. He thinks that the will and representations are one and the same reality, regarded from different perspectives; "two sides of one coin", so to speak.

    Is this "two-aspect" theory consistent with an ontological dependence relationship? there is an ontological dependence of things in the empirical world representational world) on the will? or is it a mutual/reciprocal ontological dependence?
  • bloodninja
    308
    Two sides of the same coin like subject and object? Will as subject and representations as object. I'm not sure if Heidegger ever critiques Schopenhauer directly but his early writing attempts to demolish the Cartesian/Kantian subject-object ontology at the heart of Schopenhauer's view.
  • jancanc
    73
    Schop said all representations presuppose a subject/object distinction. Yet, through our body we know ourselves as both (representation) object and as will. We have a double knowledge of our body- as representation, but also as will (the driving and willing we feel). we can look at our hand and see it in time and space affected by causality etc, yet we have this inside knowledge of our body to as will. Does that make sense?
  • bloodninja
    308
    How is the will just not subjectivity?
  • jancanc
    73
    we know the will subjectively, but the will itself - as thing-in-itself- exists independent of all thought.
  • T Clark
    4.2k
    Schopenhauer claimed that the world is will (as thing-in-itself) and representation (appearance). He does not think the will causes our representations. He thinks that the will and representations are one and the same reality, regarded from different perspectives; "two sides of one coin", so to speak.jancanc

    You'll find that my arguments always come back to Emerson or Lao Tsu, or both. I looked up "thing-in-itself." Here's what Wikipedia says - "Things-in-themselves would the objects as they are observer-independent, of which we know nothing." I immediately thought of Lao Tsu's Tao. "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao."

    I have seen that many western philosophies include the idea of an ultimate reality that cannot be described or known. It's nothing mystical, it's just an acknowledgement that there is something there before we name it. Before we can think about it.
  • bloodninja
    308
    as thing-in-itselfjancanc

    I think the thing-in-itself belongs to a specific historical context involving specific ontological presuppositions. The concept has no place in a post-metaphysical world.
  • jancanc
    73
    The concept has no place in a post-metaphysical worldbloodninja

    why not?.
  • bloodninja
    308
    I take that back. The thing-in-itself is a brilliant concept that is fundamentally anti-metaphysical.
  • jancanc
    73
    please explain haha
  • bloodninja
    308
    I really liked learning and reading Schopenhauer at Uni. It was so different to everything else that I had encountered at that point. All I was meaning is that, as you know, he was trying to find the metaphysical knowledge that Kant said was impossible since the human subject is structured by a transcendental limitation, you might say. However, I feel like we are now living in a post-metaphysical world, both culturally and philosophically. Or in other words, that God is Dead, as Nietzsche said. Maybe I'm cynical. Maybe don't listen to me.

    Is this "two-aspect" theory consistent with an ontological dependence relationship? there is an ontological dependence of things in the empirical world representational world) on the will? or is it a mutual/reciprocal ontological dependence?jancanc

    I like his use of the word 'manifest' to describe his view that the will is one. It's interesting, his view was that by denying the will to live through asceticism, we could reduce suffering. Didn't he also think that we are ultimately responsible for causing the suffering in the world? This is because we are the Kantian transcendentally ideal subjects, and thus we are the conditions of possibility (e.g. space, time, etc) for the one will to 'individuate' and feed upon itself. From this it seems suffering is not reciprocal at all but requires the Kantian subject in order to be.
  • jancanc
    73
    Didn't he also think that we are ultimately responsible for causing the suffering in the world? This is because we are the Kantian transcendentally ideal subjects, and thus we are the conditions of possibility (e.g. space, time, etc) for the one will to 'individuate' and feed upon itself.bloodninja

    Pretty much, yes. But more specifically because we "affirm the will-to-live", instead of trying to detach from this cosmic drive. The whole idea of denying the will-to-live is kind of dubious for me....it actually signifies an affirmation of the will (as contrary as that sounds)- we deny the will-to-live to escape suffering...but this denial require willing-- willing to deny the will!
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