So does emergence work from the mental to the mental I wonder. Perhaps you can say how, or why not? Tell me more about the nature of this "mental". — apokrisis

Subject is wrapped up in object so intrinsically that there is no one without the other. But this does not say anything in favor of physicalism. In fact, if anything, it works against it.

It's like the entirety of philosophy just passes you by.

Subject is wrapped up in object so intrinsically that there is no one without the other. But this does not say anything in favor of physicalism. In fact, if anything, it works against it. — schopenhauer1

You might have to go through that one step by step.

But back to my question. Is emergence something that happens on the mental side of your equation or not. If so, how? If not, why not?

Help us understand what you mean by "mind" here.

Philosophy has an ancient tradition of observing life and nature as it is experienced and understanding it to build life navigational skills, not some storytelling in some academic classroom. Storytelling is easy and provides no value to understanding life though it is amusing around campfires.

But back to my question. Is emergence something that happens on the mental side of your equation or not. If so, how? If not, why not?

Help us understand what you mean by "mind" here. — apokrisis

No, as I said, mental is wrapped up in physical. I can say green is a certain wavelength of light. It is measured as this, I can measure it, quantify, it explain its math, but the concept of wavelength, light, and the actual experience of green is mind.

Does anyone seriously, I mean seriously, doubt they have a mind or do they think it is a matter of Cosmic Thermodynamic Destiny to enjoy hot dogs with mustard and sauerkraut? — Rich

I find it hard to imagine having a mind without any body or other sensory input. In particular not even concepts such as simple numbers would be obtainable by "pure mentality". Such a thing is surely unimaginable.

Do dogs have souls? How about the most recent common ancestor of dogs and us? Yes? What about spiders? What about the most recent common ancestor of us, dogs, and spiders? Or the most recent common ancestor of us, dogs, spiders, and sawgrass?

Do dogs have souls? How about the most recent common ancestor of dogs and us? Yes? What about spiders? What about the most recent common ancestor of us, dogs, and spiders? Or the most recent common ancestor of us, dogs, spiders, and sawgrass? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know, but I'm sure at least all the animals you mentioned have a "what it's like aspect", a subjective point of view which I guess is mind or at least experiential.

No, as I said, mental is wrapped up in physical. — schopenhauer1

So now you are saying the mental is "wrapped up" in the physical. But somehow, that ain't causal?

So where are we headed? Mondalogy? Correlationism? And could that even work in a post-determinism physicalism where the physics is not clockwork any longer?

Define what it is to be "wrapped up".

But there's not something it's like to be sawgrass, right?

Is there something it's like to be E. Coli?

I find it hard to imagine having a mind without any body or other sensory input. In particular not even concepts such as simple numbers would be unobtainable by "pure mentality". Such a thing is surely unimaginable. — Jake Tarragon

Of course, it is all as we experience it. Exactly and precisely. No illusions. No supernatural forces of any kind.

If one wishes to understand the nature of transformation, it is necessary to continue to peer deeper. Exactly what is quanta and how does the mind interact with it too create the sense of solidity where there is only the quantum cloud? There is much more to discover but mind is not an illusion and it is in constant play throughout our life, and it is most certainly not a soup of chemicals dining at a McDonald's.

So now you are saying the mental is "wrapped up" in the physical. But somehow, that ain't causal?

So where are we headed? Mondalogy? Correlationism? And could that even work in a post-determinism physicalism where the physics is not clockwork any longer?

Define what it is to be "wrapped up". — apokrisis

I'm not sure about causal- mental events perceive the causal. I guess it could be a correlationalism. Mental events are correlated with physical. Physical can build up into more complex parts, meanwhile, mental is not accounted for. As I said before, the radical difference of experience from other phenomena makes it so that it is nearly impossible to bridge that gap of how objects cause experience. Though they are correlated.

But there's not something it's like to be sawgrass, right?

Is there something it's like to be E. Coli? — Srap Tasmaner

I entertain the notion of panexperientialism such as Whitehead's notion as experience does not seem to come de novo from physical parts but seems in the mix all along. I don't necessarily like the answer, but it is only one that seems to work to solve that problem without getting experience from magical fiat.

Is "panexperientialism" going to include, say, rocks? Clouds? Neutrinos?

Supposing it does, does that solve your problem? Maybe you allow something "experience-ish" to be attributed to a grain of sand. Fine. What about the "what it's like to be an X"? Are you extending that to everything, or still reserving that to some smaller class?

Is "panexperientialism" going to include, say, rocks? Clouds? Neutrinos?

Supposing it does, does that solve your problem? Maybe you allow something "experience-ish" to be attributed to a grain of sand. Fine. What about the "what it's like to be an X"? Are you extending that to everything, or still reserving that to some smaller class? — Srap Tasmaner

Good questions. I don't know. If Whitehead was anywhere near right with his speculation, it might be something like this (from http://www.iep.utm.edu/processp/#SH1b):

Although the system is a monistic one, which is characterized by experience going “all the way down” to the simplest and most basic actualities, there is a duality between the types of organizational patterns to which societies of actual occasions might conform. In some instances, actual occasions will come together and give rise to a “regnant” or dominant society of occasions. The most obvious example of this is when the molecule-occasions and cell-occasions in a body produce, by means of a central nervous system, a mind or soul. This mind or soul prehends all the feeling and experience of the billions of other bodily occasions and coordinates and integrates them into higher and more complex forms of experience. The entire society that supports and includes a dominant member is, to use Hartshorne’s term, a compound individual.

Other times, however, a bodily society of occasions lacks a dominant member to organize and integrate the experiences of others. Rocks, trees, and other non-sentient objects are examples of these aggregate or corpuscular societies. In this case, the diverse experiences of the multitude of actual occasions conflict, compete, and are for the most part lost and cancel each other out. Whereas the society of occasions that comprises a compound individual is a monarchy, Whitehead describes corpuscular societies as “democracies.” This duality accounts for how, at the macroscopic phenomenal level, we experience a duality between the mental and physical despite the fundamentally and uniformly experiential nature of reality. Those things that seem to be purely physical are corpuscular societies of occasions, while those objects that seem to possess consciousness, intelligence, or subjectivity are compound individuals.

Wow. Thanks for the very thorough answer, since I don't know Whitehead at all.

Here's what I don't get right off though: we're trying to understand the difference between stuff that's A and stuff that's ¬A (speaking, ahem, loosely); Whitehead tells us that stuff that's A is B, and stuff that's ¬A is ¬B, the two different sorts of organization you describe. Could be helpful. Science does this. Why does this rock move the needle of my compass but this other one doesn't? Because one of them's a lodestone, and here's how that works, and here's how you can test it to see if it's true, and so on. If you posit an explanatory B, that gives you the opportunity to test for the presence of B by means that don't involve A, predict A when you've got B and then see if A turns up.

But in Whitehead's case, I assume we deduce the presence of the B-style organization only and everywhere we would before have just said we have something A. The description you give is evocative, it's interesting to think about, but it just piggybacks on what we already know. There will never come a time when you can say, here's something with B organization, let's see if it's got a soul.

There will never come a time when you can say, here's something with B organization, let's see if it's got a soul. — Srap Tasmaner

Correct. It's speculative metaphysics. I don't necessarily expect it to be tested.

To be clear, Whitehead was intellectually honest to himself and concluded that there is a God that can be considered one with creative transformation. His philosophy was directly influenced by Bergson.

Correct. It's speculative metaphysics. I don't necessarily expect it to be tested. — schopenhauer1

Admittedly, not my cup of tea, so I appreciate your patience with me.

From my point of view, it looks like a change in vocabulary. Does it look like something else to you? For instance, does it help you answer the question why there's something it's like to be a bat but not something it's like to be a rock? (Assuming there isn't.) Do we say it's because the constituent occasions of bats and rocks are organized differently? That looks to me like saying the sleeping potion works because it has a soporific power.

From my point of view, it looks like a change in vocabulary. Does it look like something else to you? For instance, does it help you answer the question why there's something it's like to be a bat but not something it's like to be a rock? (Assuming there isn't.) Do we say it's because the constituent occasions of bats and rocks are organized differently? That looks to me like saying the sleeping potion works because it has a soporific power. — Srap Tasmaner

I am not completely satisfied with the answer, but again, at least it accounts for mental occasions and does not get it from magical fiat. Thus, though fantastical in one way, it is more plausible in relative comparison. Like I said, I'd rather an elegant physical theory, but just because I want it, does not mean that it must be so. I do think the radical difference in categories of mental events and physical events makes it incoherent to have mental events emerge from physical without there being some sort of "sleight of hand" where mental is really not accounted for- it just "shows up on the scene" with enough physical interactions going on.

I guess it could be a correlationalism. Mental events are correlated with physical. Physical can build up into more complex parts, meanwhile, mental is not accounted for. — schopenhauer1

So your argument here says the physical parts can evolve complexity. We have the functional circuitry that is a brain connected to sensory organs and muscle systems. A machinery that is "computing" in some general sense we can understand. And then the mental is just there as a correlation? It is not caused by any of the functional goings-on, but it somehow completely mirrors them in a non-caused fashion?

And when I ask if this mind has any causal structure of its own, you don't even attempt to answer? It is enough to say the mind seems "wrapped up" in that physical process. We just somehow find the two things in the same place, but you "know" there isn't a causal connection, even if can't offer any reason to arrive at that strong conclusion.

In some instances, actual occasions will come together and give rise to a “regnant” or dominant society of occasions. — schopenhauer1

Other times, however, a bodily society of occasions lacks a dominant member to organize and integrate the experiences of others. Rocks, trees, and other non-sentient objects are examples of these aggregate or corpuscular societies. In this case, the diverse experiences of the multitude of actual occasions conflict, compete, and are for the most part lost and cancel each other out. Whereas the society of occasions that comprises a compound individual is a monarchy, — schopenhauer1

So now we have Whitehead. Isn't this a claim about emergence? If there is organisation of the actual occasions of experience, then this gives rise to full consciousness. And if there is instead disorder and conflict, then emergence does not take place, as fulll consciousness depends on a further global level of integration.

If your answer isn't monadology, then is it now emergence? So you might find mental emergence a valid causal story. And perhaps you then are happy with physical emergence on the same grounds. The form of the Whiteheadian explanation certainly follows the usual physicalist account of emergence.

Yet for some reason you refuse the idea of the emergence of the mental from the physical, where many others might just say the mental is the name we give to this particular physically emergent property.

Does this sum it up so far?

So your argument here says the physical parts can evolve complexity. We have the functional circuitry that is a brain connected to sensory organs and muscle systems. A machinery that is "computing" in some general sense we can understand. And then the mental is just there as a correlation? It is not caused by any of the functional goings-on, but it somehow completely mirrors them in a non-caused fashion? — apokrisis

I'll be willing to say that the mental is "caused" by the physical, but the question is, what is this mental that is being caused? That is what does not make sense. It is correlated with such-and-such interactions, but to say that "thus mental emerges from interactions" is tantamount to a magical process of dualism is going on.. Something you would seem to be against if you were scientifically minded.

So now we have Whitehead. Isn't this a claim about emergence? If there is organisation of the actual occasions of experience, then this gives rise to full consciousness. And if there is instead disorder and conflict, then emergence does not take place, as fulll consciousness depends on a further global level of integration. — apokrisis

Correct, some emergence may be going on here, so I guess it does answer the question "do mental events have emergent properties?" But notice, mental events don't just "come on the scene" based on non-mental interactions- they are there to begin with, so the emergence is happening at the mental level with the mental substrate being his idea of "actual occasions". There is some sort of experiencing regarding the non-hierarchical arranged actual occasions. What a non-hierarchical "democratic" arrangement is like in its experiential nature, I have no idea of course.

So in one breath, you seem to accept physical to mental causality, but say emergence as a mechanism feels too mysterious. Well that's a good place to start I would say as I agree that "emergence" of the reductionist "pop out global property" kind is rather too simplistic and magical. That is exactly why I then take a systems science or semiotic approach to accounting for the causality involved.

But then in the next breath you are quite taken by panexperientialism, an utterly different ontology. That jumping about from one explanatory basis to another is what makes it hard to have a discussion. It allows you always to deny any attempt to provide a deflationary account of "the mind" as you reserve the right to invoke mystical being at any point.

The most obvious example of this is when the molecule-occasions and cell-occasions in a body produce, by means of a central nervous system, a mind or soul. This mind or soul prehends all the feeling and experience of the billions of other bodily occasions and coordinates and integrates them into higher and more complex forms of experience. The entire society that supports and includes a dominant member is, to use Hartshorne’s term, a compound individual.

Other times, however, a bodily society of occasions lacks a dominant member to organize and integrate the experiences of others. Rocks, trees, and other non-sentient objects are examples of these aggregate or corpuscular societies. In this case, the diverse experiences of the multitude of actual occasions conflict, compete, and are for the most part lost and cancel each other out. — schopenhauer1

Don't tree-occasions, grass-occasions, snake-occasions, and all the other related occasions in a body produce, by means of a network of plant, animal, and mineral interactions, an ecosystem. Or am I misunderstanding what you're trying to say.

Honestly, I don't understand how emergence works in physical states, either. Why not opt out for wholes instead where you have top-down systems. Nothing 'emerges' from the bottom because there would be an explanatory gap between how something greater comes from something lesser.

The entire world would instead operate instead as a totum, to where it determines it's parts as a relationship with itself - as oppose to a composite.

The entire world would instead operate instead as a totum, to where it determines it's parts as a relationship with itself. — Marty

This is the more sophisticated view.

Unfortunately reductionists can point to the liquidity of water or the magnetic field of an iron bar as simple reductionist models of emergence, or collective behaviour.

H2O molecules already have weak electrostatic forces due to their asymmetrical form - a faint polarity. And so when a gaseous collection of molecules cools enough to let this faint attraction become the dominant organising force, you get the new property of a liquid state. But that faint attraction was "always there". So no mystery as to why the liquid state emerges as a global property.

So reductionism has a good theory of emergence in terms of pre-existing, but very faint, material properties. This then allows reductionism to ignore a bigger story involving top-down causes that actually shape those lower level properties.

So "emergence" turns out to be more than just one kind of thing. A thread about emergence has to make it clear which variety it might have in mind.

So "emergence" turns out to be more than just one kind of thing. A thread about emergence has to make it clear which variety it might have in mind. — apokrisis

Isn't the critical fact of emergence that the emergent properties cannot be predicted from or traced back to, the properties of the constituents? The properties of water can be, at least in this case.

That's pretty interesting.

I've recently been bogged down with simple refutations like those to top-down systems. Do you have any books that recommend solutions to these kinds of problems in favor of top-down systems?

It is hard to recommend non-technical books. But there are plenty of systems science or hierarchy theory texts. Ludwig Von Bertalanffy's General Systems Theory is one. Stanley Salthe's Development and Evolution is another.

There are plenty of popularisations, like Arthur Koestler's Ghost in the Machine, Fritjof Capra's Tao of Physics and its follow-ups, Douglas Hofstadter's Gödel, Escher, Bach. Yet they tend to miss the mark for me.

The trick here is that reductionists are right about their version of emergence. That has to be given credit. But then there is still the larger picture which is the kind of emergence that hierarchy thinkers or semiotic theorists would be talking about - where top-down constraints shape the parts.

I have heard of recent work being done by cognitive scientists. They use PET scanners to observe brain activity while the subject thinks of various objects. They build up a vocabulary of brain activity patterns associated with those particular objects and then ask the subject to think of one of the tested objects without telling the scientist what it is. They have found that they can determine what the subject is thinking about, at least in these crude ways.

They speculate that this technology could develop into practical telepathy with much more refined capabilities in the reasonably near future. If that happens, would that change this discussion?