Freedom can't be compromised and still be freedom, such a person cannot be a free agent, and any resultant action can't be construed as moral or immoral. I think this follows from Kant's system. — Cavacava
Ask [someone] whether, if his prince demanded, on pain of ... immediate execution, that he give false testimony against an honorable man who the prince would like to destroy under a plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love of life ... He would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.
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