there seems to be a lot of normative political theory of 'ought to be' rather than any concern for 'what is' or at least no division from ethics as part of our political evaluations. — TimeLine

What standards (other than morality) are available as a basis for political evaluations?

What standards (other than morality) are available as a basis for political evaluations? — Galuchat

That is the very problem here. Moral standards confuse the suggestion that discourse on political legitimacy in virtue of political systems and institutions cannot be detached in order to take a more descriptive approach to the subject. The subject in the contemporary arena appears more applied moral philosophy rather than political philosophy.

Heh, you're not alone in this concern. Raymond Geuss, among other others, has basically made his career out of criticizing what he calls 'ethics first' political philosophy, and it helps that he is probably among the best and most erudite writers in the English language (check out in particular his little book, Philosophy and Real Politics). And there are others too: Bonnie Honig, Chantal Mouffe, William Connolly, Wendy Brown, Hannah Arendt, Sheldon Wolin, Linda Zerilli - many of these associated with the Foucadian wing of political science, with concerns closer to notions of power and freedom over justice (of this list, the one read I'd say you have to read is Honig's Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics).

Or you can look to the capability theories like Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, 'difference' theorists like Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young, recognition theorists like Axel Honneth and Patchen Markell; or if you like your theorists more radical (and Italian), there's Hardt and Negri, Franco Berardi, Maurizio Lazzarato - but these last are pretty high brow. Basically there's alot out there if you know where to look. Mainstream Poli P still tends to labour under the more or less awful influence of Rawls and is indeed a whole of bunch of applied moral theory.

What standards (other than morality) are available as a basis for political evaluations? — Galuchat

That is the very problem here. — TimeLine

I agree. Hopefully, after reading Streetlight's recommendations, you will be able to answer my question.

The most basic source, now that I think about it, would be Machiavelli, who wisely counseled that one of the principal lessons the Prince ought to learn is how not to be good.

Rousseau thought that The Prince was satirical. There's debate about it, but Machiavelli does say outright that republics are better in the Discourses on Livy. He was after all tortured, and had his republic dissolved by the Medici family.

Who knows though.

Heh, you're not alone in this concern. Raymond Geuss, among other others, has basically made his career out of criticizing what he calls 'ethics first' political philosophy, and it helps that he is probably among the best and most erudite writers in the English language (check out in particular his little book, Philosophy and Real Politics). — StreetlightX

I just bought it online. This occurred to me after just finishing Contemporary Political Philosophy by Will Kymlicka and call me a logical positivist, but moral questions applied to political concerns has somehow put the subject of 'politics' as a human activity at a stand still, particularly from Rawls. I get that it is just as implausible to campaign for a more detached approach to normative concepts entirely, but I feel that conversely we narrow a satisfactory vision of 'real politics' that restricts a broader appreciation of the contemporary dynamics of political activities that we are experiencing today at a global level. Once I receive and read the book, I may prompt this thread up again if I have any questions. I can also see where you are going with the Foucauldian discourse analysis from a political philosophy, but the historical angle once again narrows a critique toward a more ontological reading.

Mainstream Poli P still tends to labour under the more or less awful influence of Rawls and is indeed a whole of bunch of applied moral theory. — StreetlightX

(Y) That made me laugh.

The most basic source, now that I think about it, would be Machiavelli, who wisely counseled that one of the principal lessons the Prince ought to learn is how not to be good. — StreetlightX

Ah, preceding him, perhaps Thrasymachus? It is realistic to accept that political decisions have been made that contradict intent for what is best for the people. Any realistic qualitatative observation of social and political affairs would be amorphous when we neglect the possibility that political systems and institutions are not contained within such singular attributes of what they ought to be but are in fact not good intentionally, since those who try "to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are not good."

Isn't democracy the political form of justice. and legitimacy the normative (and descriptive) the form of the justification of order. I like Rainier Frost's ideas especially about arbitrariness.

How I see it, politics is about controlling human activity. Control enables social goods, including infrastructure, law and order, economics, policing. In order to maintain control over civilization, there needs to be public acceptance, and where this is lacking, coercive force is required. Coercive force most obviously included armies and weapons, but conceptual coercion is, I think, the foundation of society. Looking specifically at justice and morality, these are concepts, and they only hold any force so long as people give them power, either through voluntary knowing agreement or by the "you ought to do it" argument.

Thus, I define politics simply as the art of manipulation. I wouldn't define politics as "good." It can either be a necessary evil or an evil. As long as politics is necessary, culture will Always promote a form of ideological slavery (indoctrination). Acting morally and being led to believe one must act morally are very different.

I just bought it online. This occurred to me after just finishing Contemporary Political Philosophy by Will Kymlicka — TimeLine

Ahhh you're in for a treat : D. And I know Kymlicka's text - it's an undergrad standard - and you'd definitely come away with the impression that you have re: applied moral theory having read it. One thing I will say, regarding Rawls, and if you're just getting into the field, is that his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy is fantastic. It super readable, and even though his readings are palpably colored by his own concerns, he really knows his shit and how to communicate it.

Ah, preceding him, perhaps Thrasymachus? It is realistic to accept that political decisions have been made that contradict intent for what is best for the people. Any realistic qualitatative observation of social and political affairs would be amorphous when we neglect the possibility that political systems and institutions are not contained within such singular attributes of what they ought to be but are in fact not good intentionally, since those who try "to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are not good." — TimeLine

Hah, if we're going back that far then the primordial split would be between Plato and Thucydides/Pericles/Homer. Boiling it down, Plato basically is contemptuous of human, worldly affairs, preferring to fix his eye on the eternal and the contemplative life. As such, politics becomes a kind of dirty business for him, and insofar as it remains necessary, is oriented toward ideals to which people ought to conform - regardless actual reality of human affairs, as it were. Plato basically is the beginning of politics as applied moral theory. Thucydides, Pericles and Homer, on the other hand (and recall that Plato fucking hates Homer), all pay alot more attention to human affairs and the specificity of politics that is not simply subordinated to a kind of wider ethical project. This is in fact something that Geuss talks about in one of his essays which opens with the wonderfully stark question:

"Who is a better guide to human life, Plato or Thucydides? Given this choice, virtually all European philosophers for the past two thousand years would have chosen Plato." Invoking Nietzsche, Geuss continues, "[Yet for philosophers like Neitzsche,] Thucydides had an unprejudiced theoretical sympathy for, and hence understanding of, a much wider spectrum of possible human motivations than Plato had. All the characters in his history are allowed to exhibit the highest possible intelligence, clarity, and rationality in pursuing their respective enterprises, regardless of the judgments representatives of conventional morality would make on them. Socrates, however, “dragged moralizing into science,” and Plato followed in his wake. Such moralizing, Nietzsche thought, was a result of weakness, of a deep seated inability to bear looking the facts of the world in the face; it crippled Plato intellectually and prevented him from ever developing that most highly prized of Nietzschean traits: “Tatsachen-Sinn,” a “sense for the facts,” that steely realism that is so abundantly evident on every page of Thucydides." (Guess, Outside Ethics)

Hannah Arendt went as far as saying that the trajectory of political philosophy itself has been characterized by the attempt to reverse Plato: "Our tradition of political thought had its definite beginning in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle.... The beginning was made when, in The Republic's allegory of the cave, Plato described the sphere of human affairs all that belongs to the living together of men in a common world in terms of darkness, confusion, and deception which those aspiring to true being must turn away from and abandon if they want to discover the clear sky of eternal ideas. The end came with Marx's declaration that philosophy and its truth are located not outside the affairs of men and their common world but precisely in them, and can be "realized" only in the sphere of living together ... Political philosophy necessarily implies the attitude of the philosopher toward politics; its tradition began with the philosopher's turning away from politics and then returning in order to impose his standards on human affairs." (Arendt, Between Past and Future).

The point of course being that we need a new tradition of political philosophy altogether. Rawls and his ilk haven't, basically, heeded the call.

Also, re: Machiavelli and Thrasymachus: one thing that is often forgotten is that Machiavelli was not, himself, 'Machiavellian' in the sense of simply being a power-hungry schemer. The goal for Machiavelli was never simply power but the cultivation of virtù, the achievement of greatness or excellence (not unlike, by the way, the great deeds of the Homeric heroes). This in turn meant paying attention to the winds of fortuna, those opportune moments that arose for the taking (again, not unlike the Greek notion of kairos, which, unsurprisingly, Plato was supremely suspicious of).

There's a deep attention to political reality in Machiavelli, which sets him very much against the 'ideal-theory' orientation of Plato and Rawls. But importantly this doesn't mean that the only thing to be concerned about is power and it's pursuit, even as they at least now become important considerations. Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus.

Also, re: Machiavelli and Thrasymachus: one thing that is often forgotten is that Machiavelli was not, himself, 'Machiavellian' in the sense of simply being a power-hungry schemer. The goal for Machiavelli was never simply power but the cultivation of virtù, the achievement of greatness or excellence (not unlike, by the way, the great deeds of the Homeric heroes). This in turn meant paying attention to the winds of forunta, those opportune moments that arose for the taking (again, not unlike the Greek notion of kairos, which, unsurprisingly, Plato was supremely suspicious of).

There's a deep attention to political reality in Machiavelli, which sets him very much against the 'ideal-theory' orientation of Plato and Rawls. But importantly this doesn't mean that the only thing to be concerned about is power and it's pursuit, even as they at least now become important considerations. Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus. — StreetlightX

I am a Platonist to a certain extent but I am at the same time a believer that unless the stars have aligned, so to speak, you will fail in your endeavours. So on the contrary, I absolutely believe in Machiavelli's notion of Fortuna, but that doesn't guide my morality.

I think you are misinterpreting Plato. Afterall, it was also Plato who said:

"The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior to yourself" - Plato

You must also remember that Plato was different from Socrates, precisely because Plato wanted to avoid what happened to Socrates.

Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus. — StreetlightX

Thrasymachus wants to argue that conventional morality (the morality of Homer) is true morality, and Plato soundly refutes him.

All the characters in his history are allowed to exhibit the highest possible intelligence, clarity, and rationality in pursuing their respective enterprises, regardless of the judgments representatives of conventional morality would make on them. Socrates, however, “dragged moralizing into science,” and Plato followed in his wake. — StreetlightX

This right here is false. Conventional morality IS the morality of Thrasymachus, not that of Socrates and Plato. Conventional morality does say to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. If you can grab power by assasinating your political opponents without getting caught, then you should do it. That's what conventional morality says, and that's what it has always said. Now people don't speak openly about it (because they think it's better to appear moral), but it doesn't change the fact that this is the morality that governs their soul (meaning their behaviour).

Plato's Republic is not a political work, but rather a work of ethics. The Republic seeks to understand how to harmonize man's psyche in order to produce inner unity and strength, which is necessary before you can take advantage of the winds of fortune. And Plato finds that that is achievable through morality.

The reason why Plato discusses a society, instead of a human being is given by Socrates early on. Since society is man writ large, it is easier to perceive the effects of morality on society (since they're larger, they're amplified), than it is to perceive them on the soul of man. They can only be perceived inside yourself, after you have perceived them outside.

Also, re: Machiavelli and Thrasymachus: one thing that is often forgotten is that Machiavelli was not, himself, 'Machiavellian' in the sense of simply being a power-hungry schemer. The goal for Machiavelli was never simply power but the cultivation of virtù, the achievement of greatness or excellence (not unlike, by the way, the great deeds of the Homeric heroes). This in turn meant paying attention to the winds of forunta, those opportune moments that arose for the taking (again, not unlike the Greek notion of kairos, which, unsurprisingly, Plato was supremely suspicious of).

There's a deep attention to political reality in Machiavelli, which sets him very much against the 'ideal-theory' orientation of Plato and Rawls. But importantly this doesn't mean that the only thing to be concerned about is power and it's pursuit, even as they at least now become important considerations. Thrasymachus in this sense is a caricature of Machiavelli, who is far more subtle in his understanding of politics than either Plato or Thrasymachus. — StreetlightX

Indeed, a philosopher seeks to articulate moral standards in an attempt to ascertain the most effective political system, but there appears some hesitation to confront legitimacy within these standards imposed. The Nazi regime were also imposing moral standards, clearly the fabric of their intent was domination and the death of millions were the outcome of a necessity to motivate human mobilisation for this very intention [they needed an 'Other']. Modernity itself is rife with a plethora of examples that have almost institutionalised injustice, but with a smile - hence why I thought of Thrasymachus.

The war in Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, was littered with crystal clear examples of the manipulation of public opinion where injustice hid behind the appearance of justice, with the US public appearing to exemplify the farcical concept of 'individualism' though blindly moved in masses. At the time they teared down anyone that questioned the legitimacy behind these decisions. How profitable was the war? Are governments managing the drug-trade? Why does it seem to always occur when the Conservatives are in power? Is the US really a democracy? And here we are again with North Korea and at the cost of how many potential lives? Then you have Rawls all ladida and while I wholeheartedly agree that notwithstanding the brilliance of his work, it has put a stain on philosophical progress at a time where political progress is eroding globally at an exponential rate.

Ultimately, it is about deconstructing the conceptualisation of actual or present experiences without the motivation to identify where morality could be imposed as Arendt almost clinically articulated, because the fact of the matter is the world is shit right now and we need to actualise realistically as to why. Everyone demonised Machiavelli because our role is to impose moral standards, we are supposed to avoid unjust power and rightly so, but it obscures reality, the very fabric of how injustice continues. The just-war theory perhaps touches this to a degree. Morality itself is not entirely coherent - for instance power during emergency situations - and so this reliance is concerning. Even in criminal activity like the mafia there are 'rules'.

Ahhh you're in for a treat : D. And I know Kymlicka's text - it's an undergrad standard - and you'd definitely come away with the impression that you have re: applied moral theory having read it. — StreetlightX

Yeah, I actually purchased it a number of years back when I was completing my studies in political science, but I never got around to it and then a number of years doing law made me forget my love for politics. But my recent decision to start applying for some international positions in human rights and my passion for injustice led me back the desire to focus on the subject and thus returned to Klymika, which affords a good introduction for undergrads, but also a really good recap for people like myself. I really can't wait now!

"The heaviest penalty for declining to rule is to be ruled by someone inferior to yourself" - Plato — Agustino

The consequences of cowardice is irrelevant to one willing to be enslaved or to follow the herd; I have heard grown men who inject themselves with steroids to appear masculine retort "yep, I am a coward!" and though that disgusts me, the reality is that the masses prefer to follow, hence knowledge makes a man unfit to be a slave. This returns back to the problem of what good leadership entails and the Platonic 'philosopher-King' is nothing more than a moral ideation and the very source of what I am having trouble with. In everything that I remember reading in the Republic, Thrasymachus was indeed the most appealing to me and particularly the position of religion and tradition in authoritarian forms of so-called 'justice' where domination is stronger and more sustainable in the event that the people are manipulated to believe that it is for the right reasons.

Conventional morality does say to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. — Agustino

Where?

Regardless of the specifics, the point was simply to mark a line of bifurcation or divergence between Plato on the one hand, and Thucydides, Pericles, and Homer on the other, with respect to their treatment of politics. To the extent that you read the Republic as a text on ethics, I've no strong objection - indeed the larger point is that Plato subordinates politics to ethics, or, if you please, sees them as operating in harmony. My suggestion is that Thucydides and the like are more attentive to the autonomy of the political, decoupling it from any necessary link to ethics, and as such stand at the beginning of a philosophical lineage that Machiavelli also belongs to.

I have heard grown men who inject themselves with steroids to appear masculine retort "yep, I am a coward!" — TimeLine

Hmm, that is indeed an interesting scenario. There are two kinds of men who would declare that. Those who really don't care that they are cowards, and want to go on living in that way, and those who do not think they are cowards but reply so nevertheless just to shut up the one who accuses them that they are cowards since they do not want to engage in discussion. They really have no preference whether they appear as cowards, their concern is solely with the reality.

hence knowledge makes a man unfit to be a slave. — TimeLine

I agree.

The consequences of cowardice is irrelevant to one willing to be enslaved or to follow the herd — TimeLine

Yes, for the most part. But the exceptions would be if the consequences of following the herd or being enslaved were more fearsome than those of rebelling.

In everything that I remember reading in the Republic, Thrasymachus was indeed the most appealing to me — TimeLine

Can you expand on what you mean?

Where? — TimeLine

Oh, in the behavior of the many who follow it :P . Thrasymachus, in fact, explains this at the beginning of the Republic. Most people know this truth, but maintain a different façade. This truth is in fact part of the behaviour that is considered acceptable in society.

For example, to a certain extent our society considers it acceptable to divorce your husband for a richer one, especially if you are a poor woman. Then your relatives who a second ago were preaching virtue will come to you, and will encourage you to divorce, because this man has a lot more money, it will be great for your kids, you'll be able to provide them with the best education - as soon as power, fame or money enters into the equation, you can almost see how their behaviour suddenly changes, and their opinions revert to what they were truly thinking beyond the façade.

To a certain extent (but not completely) this is the tactical approach advocated by Homer, Thrasymachus, etc. Seeking to profit - in socially acceptable ways - from such matters. And it is socially acceptable because in the back of our minds we accept it in others, and even expect it from them, even if we don't speak of it. Because we accept it, and even expect it in ourselves, so to not accept it, even in an underhanded way in others, would be to not accept it in ourselves, and that we cannot bear.

Regardless of the specifics, the point was simply to mark a line of bifurcation or divergence between Plato on the one hand, and Thucydides, Pericles, and Homer on the other, with respect to their treatment of politics. — StreetlightX

Okay. However please note that politics isn't much the right word, their main difference runs along their ethics. Plato has an ethical disagreement with Thrasymachus - and by extension Thucydides, Pericles, Homer, etc. - and he outlines the bifurcation at the beginning of the Republic as well. This ethical disagreement does have political consequences.

My suggestion is that Thucydides and the like are more attentive to the autonomy of the political, decoupling it from any necessary link to ethics, and as such stand at the beginning of a philosophical lineage that Machiavelli also belongs to. — StreetlightX

So do you think Plato assumes a necessary link between politics and ethics? I don't think Plato is that naive.

And of course, the ultimate Socratic irony of the Republic is that the good man wins in this life as much as in the next, so really, Plato's point is that the Machiavellian (using this in a modern sense) who sits and plots regardless of the ethics involved ultimately comes out on the short end of the stick, not only in the afterlife, but in this very life also.

So I think politics is absolutely independent of ethics. That is clear by having a look at our politicians. Furthermore, Plato is actually quite subversive of politics. Plato does not value politics. The only reason why anyone wants to rule is to prevent others worse than them from holding power. It is much like how Frodo holds the One Ring until it can be destroyed to prevent someone worse than him from getting ahold of it ;) - that's why they are 'guardians'.

Hmm, that is indeed an interesting scenario. There are two kinds of men who would declare that. Those who really don't care that they are cowards, and want to go on living in that way, and those who do not think they are cowards but reply so nevertheless just to shut up the one who accuses them that they are cowards since they do not want to engage in discussion. They really have no preference whether they appear as cowards, their concern is solely with the reality. — Agustino

To me cowardice is a type of feeble-mindedness, a person who lacks will and prefers others to think on his behalf and a man who needs to bulk up by taking steroids is a coward because they are following a false image, what makes one in the Thrasymachian sense appear as a 'man' when subjectively they are worms. It is no different to those women who use botox and get implants etc because it is all a game, a competition of who can pull off the best lie. Add a touch of superficial kindness to that mask and everyone applauds and congratulates it - look at the Kardashians, a bunch of psychotic people that everyone defends tooth and nail. Being cowardly does not mean being scared or afraid in the way that we often interpret it, but succumbing to that lack of self-esteem that makes one enslaved by the need to garner other people's approval. They sacrifice their own identity and hand their souls over for others to think on their behalf. It disgusts me.

In everything that I remember reading in the Republic, Thrasymachus was indeed the most appealing to me
— TimeLine
Can you expand on what you mean? — Agustino

Why do you need me to expand? Thrasymachus was most appealing because of his interpretation of injustice hiding behind the appearance of justice, the very purpose of this thread in that he did not impose moral ideals but rather interpreted politics through a realism of human motivation.

Where?
— TimeLine
Oh, in the behavior of the many who follow it :P — Agustino

No, I meant where or who states that conventional morality is to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. As in, why conventional morality?

Indeed, a philosopher seeks to articulate moral standards in an attempt to ascertain the most effective political system, but there appears some hesitation to confront legitimacy within these standards imposed. — TimeLine

You should actually check out the video that @cavacava posted above by Reiner Forst. Forst has written extensively about questions of legitimacy and justification, and the debate he has in the video with his respondents flesh out very nicely some of the issues involved. One thing to watch out for when considering questions of legitimacy is to what extent any discussion remains at the level of procedures and rules. One has to always consider to what extent one can/should make a so-called 'illegitimate' claim to governmental redress - think about the sit in protests during the civil rights era, or the occupation of public space during the recent Occupy protests and so on. Certain forms or conceptions of illigitimacy (because not done though the 'right' channels of political participation) may serve as covers for the denial of political representation or redress and undermine democratic expression.

In fact one of the major problems with ideal-theory projects is their inability (or unwillingness) to conceptualize political action beyond or in excess of official mechanisms of 'legitimate' political process. Because the idea is to construct perfect models of political regulation/represnetation which are simply meant to be 'instantiated' in real life, they tend to find it very hard to deal with what might be called democratic 'eruptions' - civil movements, protest action, labour organization, etc etc. There are generally two ways to approach this: say that we need more ideal mechanisms so that we don't need such eruptive moments, or to accept that these eruptions are part and parcel of politics and need to be afforded a place. If it isn't obvious I think the former is quite obviously an utterly naive approach to things.

So the/one way to connect questions of ideality to reality is this: who has access to mechanisms of politics? Can the poor afford to participate? What about those who don't speak the predominant language of the state? Or the uneducated who are simply entirely unfamiliar with the system? In other words: look at operations of power. It is never a given who 'the people' are in any political process, and just having mechanisms in place is never enough. The constitution of 'the people' is - for me anyway - the key problem to be worked though in political theory. It also nicely mediates between 'real politics' and philosophical approaches quite nicely.

One thing to watch out for when considering questions of legitimacy is to what extent any discussion remains at the level of procedures and rules. One has to always consider to what extent one can/should make a so-called 'illegitimate' claim to governmental redress - think about the sit in protests during the civil rights era, or the occupation of public space during the recent Occupy protests and so on. Certain forms or conceptions of illigitimacy (because not done though the 'right' channels of political participation) may serve as covers for the denial of political representation or redress and undermine democratic expression. — StreetlightX

I agree that the subject of legitimacy is both descriptive with a normative core as legitimacy is a property that supplants conditions to the quality of an outcome; any sphere of influence without these standards contains a risk of lacking such quality and it was indeed why I questioned earlier whether the US is even a democracy. I doubt there exists any mechanisms that can demonstrate equal fairness in the decision-making process since majority rule and a two-party system of governance undermines the conditions that satisfy 'legitimacy' that we all just seem to presuppose because we vote (or choose not to) and other participatory procedures. The epistemic part that forms this sociopolitical will is interesting (have you heard of Condorcet Jury Theorem)? Justice and Democracy are in disagreement when procedural legitimacy is used as an instrument to communicate presuppositions in this sphere of influence, so we can approach a descriptive analysis of the procedural values that citizens and governments hold.

There are generally two ways to approach this: say that we need more ideal mechanisms so that we don't need such eruptive moments, or to accept that these eruptions are part and parcel of politics and need to be afforded a place. If it isn't obvious I think the former is quite obviously an utterly naive approach to things. — StreetlightX

The latter momentum or fluidity may be an inevitable requisite that contests the standards that form our understanding of the properties or quality of legitimacy, but in doing so would mean that there is no legitimacy in legitimacy and that therein would contain no properties or quality at all. How do we draw the line?

The constitution of 'the people' is - for me anyway - the key problem to be worked though in political theory. It also nicely mediates between 'real politics' and philosophical approaches quite nicely. — StreetlightX

What is your take on referendums?

I've read through all the posts on this thread. As someone who hasn't paid much attention to political philosophy, I really enjoyed it. I see myself as the boy sitting on the floor by the fire while grownups drink their scotch and talk about important things. A couple of thoughts.

First - the quality of the discussion on this thread is much higher than in most of the threads on this forum. Everyone is well educated on the subject, civil, and seems committed to working together to reach an understanding. I'm not sure why that is, but it is a pleasure just to read.

Second - I have never thought about the distinction TimeLine makes at the beginning of the thread:

the central discourse ....being the subject of justice rather than legitimacy — TimeLine

there seems to be a lot of normative political theory of 'ought to be' rather than any concern for 'what is' — TimeLine

I'm not sure where I come down on this, so here is a question to help me decide. Where does what comes next fall in terms of legitimacy vs. justice; what is vs. what ought to be?

"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men people are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men the People, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed"

To me cowardice is a type of feeble-mindedness, a person who lacks will and prefers others to think on his behalf and a man who needs to bulk up by taking steroids is a coward because they are following a false image, what makes one in the Thrasymachian sense appear as a 'man' when subjectively they are worms. It is no different to those women who use botox and get implants etc because it is all a game, a competition of who can pull off the best lie. Add a touch of superficial kindness to that mask and everyone applauds and congratulates it - look at the Kardashians, a bunch of psychotic people that everyone defends tooth and nail. Being cowardly does not mean being scared or afraid in the way that we often interpret it, but succumbing to that lack of self-esteem that makes one enslaved by the need to garner other people's approval. They sacrifice their own identity and hand their souls over for others to think on their behalf. It disgusts me. — TimeLine

Hmm, yes I see your meaning now, and I would agree.

Why do you need me to expand? Thrasymachus was most appealing because of his interpretation of injustice hiding behind the appearance of justice, the very purpose of this thread in that he did not impose moral ideals but rather interpreted politics through a realism of human motivation. — TimeLine

Oh I see. Well, Plato also knew that that is the case for most people. I'm sure he wasn't that naive, given that Athens was responsible for the unjust death of his master Socrates. That's in fact why he wrote the Republic. If what Thrasymachus said wasn't the conventional morality of the times, Plato wouldn't have bothered.

No, I meant where or who states that conventional morality is to do whatsoever is good for you, regardless of whether it is good for others. As in, why conventional morality? — TimeLine

It is conventional because that's the morality of most people. Not their proclaimed morality, but rather their lived morality. When Plato calls it conventional he asserts his total opposition to what most people think in their souls. Indeed, the Republic is his attempt to prove most people, who think like Thrasymachus, that they are wrong, and that the good man will come out victorious in this life and in the next as well.

The latter momentum or fluidity may be an inevitable requisite that contests the standards that form our understanding of the properties or quality of legitimacy, but in doing so would mean that there is no legitimacy in legitimacy and that therein would contain no properties or quality at all. How do we draw the line? — TimeLine

Perhaps one way to approach this - and this is my inclination anyway - is to give up on thinking of legitimacy in absolute terms. I'd suggest in fact that one of the virtues of democratic systems is that legitimacy itself becomes a site of political contestation such that the shifting boundaries of legitimacy are less a bug than they are a feature. That said, this point of view can only be productive in the presence of strong democratic institutions that allow any such contestation to be robust: separation of powers, mechanisms of transparency and accountability in the drafting of legislation, a well-funded and easily-accessible judiciary, a free press interested in keeping the public informed, conditions of economic security that allow for public participation in the political process, an educated public able to make informed decisions, etc etc.

It's the interlocking of these many systems in operation that allows legitimacy in a democracy to be less than a binary value. Democracy only really works well when it operates in this 'thick' manner; when the quality of these institutions is low, so too is the legitimacy of government which issues from that milieu put into question. Unfortunately, the democratic imaginary has mostly shrunk to the level of 'we have free elections', with everything else being considered more or less incidental. This is, in my opinion, more or less fatal. So with respect to whether or not the US is democracy, I guess I'd say that it is, but a very weak one, and flagging more and more as time goes on. And even then I think it's better than the arbitrary rule found elsewhere.

What is your take on referendums? — TimeLine

I think they can be a useful tool in the democratic arsenal if done on the right terms: was the time enough for debate to occur? How informed is the citizenry? What kind of circumstances have made a referendum necessary? Etc. Practical questions.