It seems like truth and actuality are conceptually distinct. Statements that describe non-actual states of affairs can be true (e.g. "Harry Potter is married to Ginny Weasley"), and things can be actual without being true (e.g. I would not describe the actual tree in my back yard as being "true"). Seems like a category error to equate the two. — Aaron R

I think you're illustrating why truth as a property of statements is a confusing way to think of it.

The actuality is that a story is told involving a character named Harry Potter. In the story, he marries somebody (I assume? I never got that far.) There's the way the story is actually told, and the way it could have been... for instance the story could have been told that Harry Potter emigrated to Zaire and became a malachite dealer.

If you want to know the truth about the story.. look for the way it's actually told.

If you describe a tree in your backyard as "actual," what do you mean by that? I would assume you mean what is (as opposed to what could have been.)

I think you're illustrating why truth as a property of statements is a confusing way to think of it. — Mongrel

I agree that thinking about truth as a property of statements is confusing. Nevertheless, truth is something that is most commonly ascribed to statements/propositions. There's ways of accommodating this fact without theorizing truth as a property. That's what deflationary approaches are all about, right?

The actuality is that a story is told involving a character named Harry Potter. In the story, he marries somebody (I assume? I never got that far.) There's the way the story is actually told, and the way it could have been... for instance the story could have been told that Harry Potter emigrated to Zaire and became a malachite dealer. — Mongrel

Yes, but the events described by the both the actual Harry Potter story and the non-actual Harry Potter story are non-actual events.

If you describe a tree in your backyard as "actual," what do you mean by that? I would assume you mean what is (as opposed to what could have been.) — Mongrel

I am being a little loose here. In philosophy/modal logic the word "actual" is commonly used in opposition to "possible", but the word is also commonly used in opposition to "fake", "fictional", "imaginary", "abstract", "deontic", etc. So the actual tree in my yard is the one that I believe to be "there right now" as opposed to trees I might plant in the future, or trees that I might have dreamt about last night, or the plastic tree that my neighbor discarded in my yard while I was out getting groceries, etc.

I agree that thinking about truth as a property of statements is confusing. Nevertheless, truth is something that is most commonly ascribed to statements/propositions. There's ways of accommodating this fact without theorizing truth as a property. That's what deflationary approaches are all about, right? — Aaron R

Most common among philosophers? Yea. Most common in everyday speech? I don't know. When you speak of truth outside a philosophical discussion are you thinking of speech acts? Or the way things are?

A deflationist is likely to admit that truth is a property of statements. They just don't attempt to define truth.

Yes, but the events described by the both the actual Harry Potter story and the non-actual Harry Potter story are non-actual events. — Aaron R

This issue can easily be resolved without rejecting truth as a property of statements.

What's interesting to me is that if we insist that truth is a property of statements, then it appears that there are statements which have never been stated which are true. The unstated statement problem is a plague to a realist.

I am being a little loose here. In philosophy/modal logic the word "actual" is commonly used in opposition to "possible", but the word is also commonly used in opposition to "fake", "fictional", "imaginary", "abstract", "deontic", etc. So the actual tree in my yard is the one that I believe to be "there right now" as opposed to trees I might plant in the future, or trees that I might have dreamt about last night, or the plastic tree that my neighbor discarded in my yard while I was out getting groceries, etc. — Aaron R

Of all the possible worlds, the actual world is the most possible. :)

Someone who says that the aesthetic doesn't matter isn't making an aesthetic claim, they're claiming that aesthetics lacks importance in a schema involving various other things which presumably are more important. — mcdoodle

I don't understand this objection in the slightest. Do you have a subject connected to a predicate? Well, congratulations, you've just made a truth claim. "The truth (subject) doesn't (copula) matter (predicate)." One has just asserted as true that the truth does not matter. Ergo, the person making such a claim does value the truth, inasmuch as it is necessary to make such a statement at all.

it seems like a residue that will never evaporate :) — mcdoodle

No, it won't, so long as you continue to make truth claims such as this. All language would have to cease for truth not to matter.

Most common among philosophers? Yea. Most common in everyday speech? I don't know. When you speak of truth outside a philosophical discussion are you thinking of speech acts? Or the way things are? — Mongrel

In every day speech I most commonly hear the word truth being used in sentences such as "well, yes, I suppose that's true", "that is so true!", "you tell me the truth, or else!", "but if that were true, then...", "is that really true?", etc., in which the referent is some claim that has been made. That's not the only way to use the word, but I find these to be very common indeed.

A deflationist is likely to admit that truth is a property of statements. They just don't attempt to define truth. — Mongrel

Yes and no. A deflationist will say that truth is a property only in the "thinnest" possible sense. SEP explains this better than I can:

It is commonly said that, according to the deflationary theory, truth is not a property and therefore that, according to the theory, if a proposition is true, it is mistaken to say that the proposition has a property, the property of being true. There is something right and something wrong about this view, and to see what is wrong and right about it will help us to understand the deflationary theory.

Consider the two true propositions (5) and (6):

(5) Caracas is the capital of Venezuela.
(6) The earth revolves around the sun.

Do these propositions share a property of being true? Well, in one sense of course they do: since they are both true, we can say that there both have the property of being true. In this sense, the deflationary theory is not denying that truth is a property: truth is the property that all true propositions have.

On the other hand, when we say that two things share a property F, we often mean more than simply that they are both F; we mean in addition that there is intuitively a common explanation as to why they are both F. It is in this second sense in which deflationists are denying that truth is a property. Thus, in the case of our example, what explains the truth of (5) is that Caracas is the capital of Venezuela; and what explains this is the political history of Venezuela. On the other hand, what explains the truth of (6) is that the earth revolves around the sun; and what explains this is the nature of the solar system. The nature of the solar system, however, has nothing to do with the political history of Venezuela (or if it does the connections are completely accidental!) and to that extent there is no shared explanation as to why (5) and (6) are both true. Therefore, in this stronger sense, they have no property in common. — http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-deflationary/#TruPro

This issue can easily be resolved without rejecting truth as a property of statements. — Mongrel

Perhaps, but my point was more that a statement can be true even if what it is about is not actual. I can't see how that would be possible if truth and actuality were equivalent.

What's interesting to me is that if we insist that truth is a property of statements, then it appears that there are statements which have never been stated which are true. The unstated statement problem is a plague to a realist. — Mongrel

This is a peculiar claim:"there are statements which have never been stated which are true" (emphasis mine). To my mind, a statement that has never been stated does not and has never existed, by definition. If truth is a property (ontological) of statements, then there are no true statements that have never been stated.

Of all the possible worlds, the actual world is the most possible. — Mongrel

Ha! How does one measure possibility, anyway? :)

In every day speech I most commonly hear the word truth being used in sentences such as "well, yes, I suppose that's true", "that is so true!", "you tell me the truth, or else!", "but if that were true, then...", "is that really true?", etc., in which the referent is some claim that has been made. That's not the only way to use the word, but I find these to be very common indeed. — Aaron R

So let's cut to the chase, Aaron. Do you adhere to Correspondence Theory?

Yes and no. A deflationist will say that truth is a property only in the "thinnest" possible sense. SEP explains this better than I can: — Aaron R

What we can do is just credit one another with some familiarity with the topic. I wouldn't insult you by suggesting otherwise.

Perhaps, but my point was more that a statement can be true even if what it is about is not actual. I can't see how that would be possible if truth and actuality were equivalent. — Aaron R

You're pressing this point, so I'll press back. If you assert that Harry Potter married someone, I would answer that this can't be true because Harry Potter doesn't exist.

This is a peculiar claim:"there are statements which have never been stated which are true" (emphasis mine). To my mind, a statement that has never been stated does not and has never existed, by definition. If truth is a property (ontological) of statements, then there are no true statements that have never been stated. — Aaron R

The claim that there are unstated statements is peculiar to realism. It's a very odd metaphysics that suggests that there are no truths which have not yet been stated.

Ha! How does one measure possibility, anyway? — Aaron R

What I was pointing out to you is that the actual world is considered to be a possible world. This is uncontroversial.

So let's cut to the chase, Aaron. Do you adhere to Correspondence Theory? — Mongrel

I'm undecided. I tend to think that correspondence has some role to play in the theory of truth, but I don't think it works on its own.

You're pressing this point, so I'll press back. If you assert that Harry Potter married someone, I would answer that this can't be true because Harry Potter doesn't exist. — Mongrel

So you don't acknowledge a difference in truth-value between "Harry Potter married Ginny Weasley" and "Harry Potter married Lord Voldemort"? How could you ever hold a discussion about a fictional story?

The claim that there are unstated statements is peculiar to realism. It's a very odd metaphysics that suggests that there are no truths which have not yet been stated. — Mongrel

How so?

So let's cut to the chase, Aaron. Do you adhere to Correspondence Theory?
— Mongrel

I'm undecided. I tend to think that correspondence has some role to play in the theory of truth, but I don't think it works on its own. — Aaron R

You're expressing some ambivalence. What I'll say is that if you accept that the proper way to think of truth is as a property of statements, then Frege's argument is a brick shit-house. There's no room for being undecided. There's no addition to Correspondence that's going to redeem it. End of story.

So you don't acknowledge a difference in truth-value between "Harry Potter married Ginny Weasley" and "Harry Potter married Lord Voldemort"? How could you ever hold a discussion about a fictional story? — Aaron R

In the actual world, there is a way the Harry Potter story is told. I think you know that.

The claim that there are unstated statements is peculiar to realism. It's a very odd metaphysics that suggests that there are no truths which have not yet been stated.
— Mongrel

How so? — Aaron R

I think we're done here. Thanks!