Regarding the first quotation from the secondary literature I think William Connolly is right that Heidegger’s Being and Time presumes

a close alignment between the identity the self seeks to realize and socially available possibilities of self-formation — StreetlightX

how else, for example, could one be a Father if Fathers were not a socially available possibility. However, Connolly is wrong to further claim that Heidegger presumes that we have

a shared sense of confidence in the world we are building, a confidence that links the present to the future through effort and anticipation at one time and memory and appreciation at another. — StreetlightX

Nothing Heidegger says in Being and Time suggests anything like this. On the contrary, Heidegger describes the world as something we are thrown into, not something we are building. The world is structured by angst, not appreciation. Connolly goes on to describe Heidegger's phenomenology as

the serene phenomenology of freedom... — StreetlightX

This statement is blatantly false and misleading. I find it hard to believe that the author was actually referring to Heidegger when they were writing this because Heidegger was not interested in freedom at all.

Regarding the second quotation from the secondary literature I think Alphonso Lingis also misses the mark. You quote him as stating that Heidegger suggests that

the sense of the irreversible propulsion of a life toward its end precedes and makes possible every unilateral array of means toward particular ends and every determinate action. But can death, which has no front lines and no dimensions, assign a determinate direction to one's life, and thereby impart a unilateral direction to the connections in the instrumental field? — StreetlightX

Heidegger does suggest something like this of an authentic being toward death, but only something like this. It is not anything like a condition of possibility as the quotation implies. Moreover, I doubt Lingis even understands what Heidegger is getting at when he ontologises death. It seems to me that Lingis understands death in its everyday sense, which for Heidegger is denoted by the term demise, not death. Heidegger is not ontologising demise. Lingis is therefore misinformed.

Lingis further seems to attempt to critique Heidegger by arguing that Water and Berries are not tools. Well of course not. This, quite simply, is not a critique of Heidegger's thought.

I appreciate your reply, but will note that the quotations are only part of larger readings which make their cases in more detail. I quoted them simply as signposts for further exploration, especially with respect to the question of whether or not Heidi's phenomenology more easily aligns to our spontaneous 'everyday' approaches to things.

That's cool sorry if I came across as attacking you...

I'm super, super hesitant to concede that there is anything like a singular 'common sense' to begin with that Heidegger's views would align with. — StreetlightX

In retrospect, "common sense" was a poor choice of words. If we twist Sellars "scientific image" a little into a "metaphysical" image, then what I had in mind was Heidegger unveiling the shallowness of this metaphysical image. "Common sense" enters the picture implicitly via the fact that most humans these days (and probably in his) have no interest at all in the professional version of the metaphysical image. They seem far more impressed by Hawking than Aristotle, probably because the power of technology is so visible in the manifest image. This gives the little-studied but respectable scientific image a weight for common sense that "mere opinions" do not have. Since we could call a vague scientism "common sense" just as easily, I suppose Heidegger is just as much anti-"common sense."