What is motivation? — Gotterdammerung

A mental stimulus correlated with affect which leads to problem-solving, decision-making, intention, planning, volition, and action.

What's "A mental stimulus"

Check here:
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/mental?s=t
And here:
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/stimulus?s=t
And combine them.

What is motivation? Where does it come from? Why do we do what we do? — Gotterdammerung

I wrote this similarly about goals:

Goal: the object of a person's ambition or effort; an aim or desired result (Google)

1) Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit?

2) Do the origins of goal-directed behavior come from evolutionary forces of biology/psychology or are they social conventions that ride on top of some more basic component? Related, If animals have goals are they different than human-directed goals?

3) If goals are more on the nominal side of the spectrum, what does that mean in terms of ethical implications? If ethics aims at goals, and goals are nominal, does this invalidate certain ethical standards that are goal-directed?

4) Are some goals better than others? If so, how do justify a weighting to the goals such that one takes priority over the other? Are goals related to survival self-evident, for example? If goals of survival are superior than other goals, does this have implications for ethics? For example, can one say that since there is a de facto goal of not being hungry, humans must do X action to accomplish not going hungry?

1) Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit? — schopenhauer1

Inasmuch as "goal" is synonymous with "intention", it is a psychological expression of a subjective experience which can be observed by others, hence; a natural phenomenon. And inasmuch as people discuss "goals", "goal" is a nominal label.

2) Do the origins of goal-directed behavior come from evolutionary forces of biology/psychology or are they social conventions that ride on top of some more basic component? Related, If animals have goals are they different than human-directed goals? — schopenhauer1

Human behaviour is a product of human nature (the genetically predisposed capacity to develop and exercise human functions). That animals have goals is evident based on criteria of goal-directed behaviour. If the criteria for goal-directed behaviour are different for animals than they are for humans, their goals are different.

3) If goals are more on the nominal side of the spectrum, what does that mean in terms of ethical implications? If ethics aims at goals, and goals are nominal, does this invalidate certain ethical standards that are goal-directed? — schopenhauer1

It is because goals are "real" phenomena, with "real" effects, that we name them and decide that they are relevant to a theory of ethics.

4) Are some goals better than others? If so, how do justify a weighting to the goals such that one takes priority over the other? Are goals related to survival self-evident, for example? If goals of survival are superior than other goals, does this have implications for ethics? For example, can one say that since there is a de facto goal of not being hungry, humans must do X action to accomplish not going hungry? — schopenhauer1

Great questions, but off-topic. I would certainly enjoy discussing them in another thread.

I think motivation is another wayof saying that either one desires a change in circumstances expedient of what one experiences or a persistence to a given state of affairs. Whether or not one thinks they are responsible for either case is debatable.

Sucrose.

What is motivation? Where does it come from? Why do we do what we do? — Gotterdammerung

Motivation is what I don't feel first thing in the morning. :P

But really, I think it is the will of a person. It comes from the mind, for the most part. Some chemicals are likely released based on the impulses of the brain for short term motivation. Long term motivation would have to be something that one truly felt passionate about, allowing those chemicals to release often.

I think it is necessary to distinguish between intentions, or goals, and motivation which is the ambition that aids in successfully achieving ones goals.

Inasmuch as "goal" is synonymous with "intention", it is a psychological expression of a subjective experience which can be observed by others, hence; a natural phenomenon. And inasmuch as people discuss "goals", "goal" is a nominal label. — Galuchat

I don't see how a goal, or intention, could be observed by another. We can discuss our goals with others using language, but this is to offer a representation of the goal, so it is not the case that the goal is observed. Also, we can observe the actions of others, and using some premises, we can make some logical conclusion concerning the person's goal, but again this is not the same as observing the goal. I think that we can only really observe our own goals, and this is an internal observation.

I think it is necessary to distinguish between intentions, or goals, and motivation which is the ambition that aids in successfully achieving ones goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree.

I don't see how a goal, or intention, could be observed by another...I think that we can only really observe our own goals, and this is an internal observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a logical dualist objection (i.e., the mind is hidden, accessible only to the person who owns it, etc.), and the subject of another current thread.

What is observed is goal behaviour, described by criteria, and constituting criterial evidence of another's goal experience.

A goal is not an entity, it is a psychological function of human beings. So, a person cannot even observe their own goal; they experience it.

Also, we can observe the actions of others, and using some premises, we can make some logical conclusion concerning the person's goal, but again this is not the same as observing the goal. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, but it is the same as observing that a person has a goal.

A goal is not an entity, it is a psychological function of human beings. So, a person cannot even observe their own goal; they experience it. — Galuchat

OK, so all you have done here is distinguished between two types of objects, objects which are entities and objects which are goals. You claim that only entities can be observed, thus restricting the use and meaning of "observe". I do not agree with this restriction. I think that a person's own goals may be apprehended with one's own mind, and the person may observe and follow one's own goals.

Also. it appears like you want to restrict the use of "experience", such that one experiences one's goals, but does not experience entities. Unless you adopt some dualist premises, I do not believe that such restrictions can be justified.

What is observed is goal behaviour, described by criteria, and constituting criterial evidence of another's goal experience.

...I agree, but it is the same as observing that a person has a goal. — Galuchat

What is observed is goal behaviour. And if we associate this behaviour with a premise, we can deduce that the person has a goal. But making the logical conclusion that the person has a goal is not the same thing as observing that the person has a goal. The goal is not observed. According to your restrictions, observations are of entities, not of goals. So no matter how well you observe the goal behaviour, you are not observing the goal (which can only be experienced according to your restrictions). Nor have you observed that the person has a goal, you have deduced this.

Why do we do what we do? — Gotterdammerung

Sometimes I doodle. For no reason.

A goal is an image projected into an imagined future, and identified with. Goals are imaginary until they are realised. If I am motivated to make a cup of tea, it is because there is no cup of tea ready, but I imagine a cup of tea would be pleasant. It would be odd to say that I experience the goal, if the goal is to experience a cup of tea, but reasonable to say I experience imagining experiencing a cup of tea. Then I make the tea, and my goal is realised.

What an exciting life I lead. ;)

It would be odd to say that I experience the goal, if the goal is to experience a cup of tea... — unenlightened

Then you can say that you experience intent which directs planning, informs volition, and results in action. Planning, volition and action being behaviour which is criterial evidence of intent.

Is there a contemporary theory about sublimation (Freud's idea) that works or is relevant to explaining motivation? Hunger, sexual or social desire, status seeking, and pain avoidance could all be very fundamental to what moves us to do anything.

We play games where the pathway of reward is intelligible (we know what folks expect from us in this setting). The dopaminergic reward system helps to habituate patterns of conduct that help us satisfy instinctual needs in a socially acceptable way.

The variable reward (ratio) schedule of the forum might explain why folks here are attracted to come back. There must be a dopaminergic reward in worthy types of positive feedback relative to the expectations or needs of the poster.

you experience intent — Galuchat

Yes. An intent is an imagined act, the act itself is behaviour. A plan is also an imagined act; as an architect plans an imaginary building, and the brickeys and plasterers behave it into existence. We hope they can read the architects intent.

A plan is also an imagined act... — unenlightened

Review the RIBA Plan of Work 2013, and tell me that its required tasks are imaginary and not behaviour which can be observed. https://www.ribaplanofwork.com/PlanOfWork.aspx

As an engineer or architect, the preparation of design calculations and working drawings (i.e., planning acts) are concrete evidence of my intent (a psychological function/act) to build something.

Since the date is 2013, I imagine the plan has been realised. But a plan is an imagined building, and a building is a realised plan. I don't think this is controversial.

Motivation is the impulse (will) from the mind towards some action. Depending upon the action there may more or less will. For example the mind is more likely to create a significant impulse in order to breathe, maybe not so significant to make the bed.

A goal is an image projected into an imagined future, and identified with. Goals are imaginary until they are realised. — unenlightened

I wonder if a goal is necessarily an image, or "imagined". I suppose it depends on what is meant by "imagined", but it seems to me that often a goal is just some sort of vague notion, not an image at all. I want to be satisfied, and happy, what kind of image is that? It appears to be easier to put words to a goal than it is to put an image to a goal. Why? These words don't produce any particular images, just vague notions.

Sure, the architect is capable of associating an image with the goal, but this is not an easy task, and it takes training. So I wonder why it is that we all seem to have goals, but to associate an image with that goal, which may be required in order to bring the goal into reality, doesn't seem to be something which we all have the capacity to do.

Motivation is a drive that results in behavior. You are sitting in a car. The car gets uncomfortably hot or cold (depending on where the car is). eventually it becomes so uncomfortable that you are driven to do something about the temperature (get out of the car to escape the heat, turn on the heater to escape the cold.

If you were in a building which seemed to be about to experience a Gotterdammerung you would be motivated to get the hell out before the building collapsed on top of you.

Motivation is driven by your emotions, both being of the same root, and both referencing what moves you, both physically and emotionally.

Motivation is driven by your emotions, both being of the same root, and both referencing what moves you, both physically and emotionally. — Hanover

Affect produces moods and emotions; has dimensions of valence, arousal, and motivational intensity, and is correlated with motivational direction.

I wonder if a goal is necessarily an image, or "imagined". I suppose it depends on what is meant by "imagined", but it seems to me that often a goal is just some sort of vague notion, not an image at all. I want to be satisfied, and happy, what kind of image is that? It appears to be easier to put words to a goal than it is to put an image to a goal. Why? These words don't produce any particular images, just vague notions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I don't suppose it has to be a visual image; a composer might have a very nebulous sense of his goal as a piece of music on this sort of scale, that conveys that sort of feeling. Something that can hardly be put into words or images. That is the nature of creativity, that one does not know the goal because it is something new that has never been, and that is true of architects too. In the end, all i mean by imagined is that it is something in one's head that is not in the world.

On the small scale, my goal is the cup of tea that I do not have, that does not exist because it hasn't been made, and the logic is that if it had been made I wouldn't possibly have it as a goal, I'd already have it, just as my goal was to write some kind of reply to you, but now it is written, it is a goal no longer.

In more traditional language, perhaps, my desire is always for something that is not, something lacking. What can we call something that is not? An image, a fiction, a notion? The source of such is the past, one's experience - it can only be the past since it is not present, and it is projected onto the future as a goal.

In the end, I think one can only intend something to the extent that it is known, so a creative act is necessarily the interplay of the intentional and the accidental, and that is what I alluded to above when I mentioned doodles. One can act without motive.

One can act without motive.

But not without desire, which is pleasurable or painful in some mixture (physical/ or imaginary) at some intensity, as necessary for all actions, including doodling.

I think if you examine this dogma, it doesn't stand up. In the first instance, it is an experience that is painful or pleasurable in some degree, or petty much neutral perhaps.

So I desire a cup of tea. This implies that I take pleasure in tea and pain in thirst. But at the moment, there is no tea, and therefore no pleasure. The pleasure that has not yet happened cannot be the cause of its own production. It can only then be the pain of thirst. But the pain of thirst can be assuaged by tap water; no need to wait for the kettle to boil.

What motivates me to make tea is the imagined pleasure that will ensue. And the image of pleasure comes from memory of times I have taken pleasure in drinking tea in the past, and is projected - thrown forward in time, and that is what we call 'desire', the imagined repetition of past pleasure, or the imagined relief from present pain.

There is of course the desire for novelty, but this is again either the projected image of past novelties, or the imagined escape from the pain of repetition. Now it may seem that there is no escape from this world of images that direct every move, but it is not so. There is in the real, as distinct from the imaginary world, spontaneous movement.

I agree with what you said.

What motivates me to make tea is the imagined pleasure that will ensue. And the image of pleasure comes from memory of times I have taken pleasure in drinking tea in the past, and is projected - thrown forward in time, and that is what we call 'desire', the imagined repetition of past pleasure, or the imagined relief from present pain.

Many times I find that I make my coffee in the AM without very much thought (6 AM or so), but the first cup is very pleasureful, even if the initial effort was habitual and not actively imagined, just something I do.

OK, so all you have done here is distinguished between two types of objects, objects which are entities and objects which are goals. You claim that only entities can be observed, thus restricting the use and meaning of "observe". — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct.

Also. it appears like you want to restrict the use of "experience", such that one experiences one's goals, but does not experience entities. Unless you adopt some dualist premises, I do not believe that such restrictions can be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct again. This is a misconception on my part.

What is observed is goal behaviour. And if we associate this behaviour with a premise, we can deduce that the person has a goal. But making the logical conclusion that the person has a goal is not the same thing as observing that the person has a goal. The goal is not observed. According to your restrictions, observations are of entities, not of goals. So no matter how well you observe the goal behaviour, you are not observing the goal (which can only be experienced according to your restrictions). Nor have you observed that the person has a goal, you have deduced this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct a third time. I have discovered my error: psychological functions are not experienced, they are performed.

Pursuant to the following two points:
1)

I think that a person's own goals may be apprehended with one's own mind, and the person may observe and follow one's own goals. — Metaphysician Undercover

2)

...all i mean by imagined is that it is something in one's head that is not in the world. — unenlightened

Is a goal or imagination a phenomenon in one's mind or head which can be experienced and perceived? If so, by what is it experienced and perceived? What and where is one's mind (it's intuitively obvious that heads can be perceived, but can minds be perceived)?

Is a goal or imagination something concrete which can be located in one's mind or head (i.e., either as a part of brain anatomy or neurophysiology)? Do anatomical and neurophysiological correlations (inductive evidence) of intent or imagination establish their location in one's mind or head?

Or are intent and imagination psychological functions (i.e., events or processes) or conditions which brain anatomy and neurophysiology facilitate? If so, how are they perceived by others and known to ourselves?

I think that others perceive one's goal and imagination behaviour (criterial evidence of one's intent and imagination), and that our psychological functions or conditions are known to ourselves in terms of verbal expressions which are socially learned. We perform psychological functions; they require no evidence to be known to ourselves. We do not experience them, but we may experience their cause(s) and effect(s).

So, to revise my answer to schopenhauer1's first question:

Are goals "real" in that they are a natural phenomena that are a part of certain animal biological/psychological make-up, or a nominal label for a very pervasive social convention/habit? — schopenhauer1

Psychological functions and conditions are socially learned verbal constructs which explain types of natural and acculturated behaviour.

But at the moment, there is no tea, and therefore no pleasure. The pleasure that has not yet happened cannot be the cause of its own production. It can only then be the pain of thirst. — unenlightened

Likely you're lacking a bit here. Dopamine peaks at a much higher level to get you to make tea than when you're actually drinking it. Desire/anticipation is pleasurable(?) or motivating. Apparently worn out amphetamine users get high before the drug enters their system by anticipation and a conditioned reward circuit.

Psychological functions and conditions are socially learned verbal constructs which explain types of natural and acculturated behaviour. — Galuchat

How would "natural" be included in the explanation when "socially learned verbal constructs" usually falls under social and not instinctual, unless "natural" is used in a different way than a synonym for strict biologically determined behavior. If goals then are social constructs, is essentially everything we hold dear as humans in terms of our "supposed" desires, wants, hopes, motivations, etc. just a socially taught mechanism that has simply been one useful way for our species to survive? Are there alternatives for humans, or does the social construct of goals go along with having a general processor brains that have lost goal-oriented behaviors (instincts) of other animals? In other words, is the social construct just an exaptation- something that just so happened to arise but was not the reason for our unique evolution, or was it actually an adaptation- something that was specifically selected for? I'm pretty sure @unenlightened's desire for tea, for example, was not selected for :D.

Ooh, yummy dopamine peaks, just what I always wanted. :D

If I desire tea because it is pleasant to desire tea, then what's the tea for, and why would I ruin the pleasure of desire by fulfilling it?

It may well be that real tea cannot live up to the standard of imaginary tea - which can very easily be 'just like the best tea you ever tasted, only even better'. But I don't think this requires a radical reworking