1. Homosexuality is a natural deviation. — Agustino

This is the naturalistic fallacy, Agustino. The idea there is a such thing as "deviation" in human nature, as that must a priori, suppose what humans are meant to be. Like any trait of human, being gay is not a "natural deviation," it is just something some humans are.

Where the naturalistic fallacy is defined IS NOT in making the explicit claim than some state of humanity is better than another, but rather in the basic understanding of something before we even begin to make any explicit comments on its worth.

I accept 1 and deny 2. Therefore there is no possibility of a naturalistic fallacy whatsoever. It is you who is seeing a naturalistic fallacy there, because you are the one making it. Out of your irrational fear that there could be an argument showing homosexuality is wrong (and how dare there be, because a priori you have decided there's nothing wrong with homosexuality), you want to deny even this possibility. But you can't. Because to do it, you have to establish a necessary connection between 1 and 2. And if you manage to do that, then you yourself commit the naturalistic fallacy. — Agustino

Since 1 is the naturalistic fallacy, this doesn't help you on bit. Nor does your argument make sense here. No moral case is made by nature. Nothing about "nature" would ever tell us about the morality or immorality of homosexuality.

That's always an argument given by ethics, not the nature of something's existence. The form of argument you are considering might show homosexuality to be wrong is impossible. Nothing about the existence of gay people would ever show being gay was moral or immoral. Any argument which show homosexuality to be right or wrong is given on the basis of ethics, not that some state of the world exists. Examining what is "natural" doesn't answer the question. That's is why I reject your premise (1) and and explicit arguments (i.e. the method of examining what is "natural" and then supposing it might give an ethical answer) about worth which are drawn out of it.

This is the naturalistic fallacy, Agustino. The idea there is a such thing as "deviation" in human nature, as that must a priori, suppose what humans are meant to be. Like any trait of human, being gay is not a "natural deviation," it is just something some humans are. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Nope. This is not what a naturalistic fallacy is. Neither is my idea supposing that a particular human being ought to be in any way. That's your addition, which is indeed the naturalistic fallacy.

Where the naturalistic fallacy is defined IS NOT in making the explicit claim than some state of humanity is better than another, but rather in the basic understanding of something before we even begin to make any explicit comments on its worth. — TheWillowOfDarkness

G.E. Moore, David Hume, Philippa Foot et al. all disagree with this :)

The form of argument you are considering might show homosexuality to be wrong is impossible. Nothing about the existence of gay people would ever show being gay was moral or immoral. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Bingo. These are your blind spots. You assume these to be necessary. Why? Because you seek to justify your own personal sensibilities.

Since 1 is the naturalistic fallacy, this doesn't help you on bit. — TheWillowOfDarkness

One cannot be the naturalistic fallacy - you have to point to one of the three versions of the naturalistic fallacy and tell me which one is it. Don't make up your own definitions. These are the definitions that philosophers have used through history, so if you make a claim using their language, please defend it using commonly accepted definitions instead of special pleading.

The problem is not that that you are claiming a person ought to be some way, Agustino. Rather it is the very terms of the discourse you are using don't accept that gay people are a state which make sense for humans. This runs far deeper than any explicit value claim. It's a definition of how we understand the world (in this case gay people), which sets up what we can and can't think about their value. The naturalistic fallacy that gay people are "deviant" humans, for example, former places them outside what is understood to make sense for a human. It treats them like there some weird occurrence which, logically, makes no sense, for the don't meet a priori idea (not gay) of what makes a human.

Bingo. These are your blind spots. You assume these to be necessary. Why? Because you seek to justify your own personal sensibilities. — Agustino

No... it is necessary because of the distinction of "is" and "ought." No observation of an empirical state is a moral justification. Logically, the "natural" arguments you are so proud of examining do not form an ethical argument.

No... it is necessary because of the distinction of "is" and "ought." No observation of an empirical state is a moral justification. Logically, the "natural" arguments you are so proud of examining do not form an ethical argument. — TheWillowOfDarkness

They could. If you grant and make explicit all the premises. I don't intend them to in my discourse. But you could read something like Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness :) The distinction of "is" and "ought" doesn't necessarily imply that an "ought" can never be derived from an "is" (while it does necessarily imply that an "is" cannot be derived from an "ought"). Just that this requires other premises to be justified.

The problem is not that that you are claiming a person ought to be some way, Agustino. Rather it is the very terms of the discourse you are using don't accept that gay people are a state which make sense for humans. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is wrong. The natural explanation accepts that gay people are inevitable and necessary, as I've argued in response to BC.

No, they really can't, Agustino. It's logically incoherent.

There are plenty of ethical arguments made on the grounds of existing states. We do it all the time. In fact, it's the entire point of ethics. Ethics are about dealing with states of existence. But these are about the "natural (i.e. that which exists)" which is moral or immoral, NOT the good and bad which is immoral or immoral because "nature." (Foot's arguments pretty much fall under this).

This is wrong. The natural explanation accepts that gay people are inevitable and necessary, as I've argued in response to BC. — Agustino

Missing the point. The problem has never been that your argument hasn't accepted gay people as necessary or inevitable. Rather, it is that it holds they don't make sense, for, supposedly, they do not fit what makes a human (and so are "deviants," as opposed to merely other humans with a different trait).

There are plenty of ethical arguments made on the grounds of existing states. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yep -> deriving an "ought" (ethics) from a set of "is"'s (facts) :)

Rather, it is that it holds they don't make sense, for, supposedly, they do not fit what makes a human (and so are "deviants," as opposed to merely other humans with a different trait). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Nope, it doesn't hold this. Gay people make sense as they are an inevitable occurence. That's what something making sense means. It means that it fits in with the rest, and there is a necessary connection established.

That's not deriving an "ought" for "is." It describing an ought expressed in an is. Morality is not coming out of existence, as your naturalistic nonsense proclaims. It is immanent within it. When we look at, for example, whether being gay is moral or immoral, we may examine states of the world for any relevant information, as we may do for any question about the morality of an action.

Anything we find though, as ethical important not because it is "natural" , but rather because it is the "natural" state with (im)moral significance. Your arguments get this backwards. You think it is nature which is important to ethics when it, in fact, it is ethics which are important to nature.

That's exactly what it holds. Gay people don't just make sense as a inevitable occurrence, Agustino. They make sense as humans. They are not "deviant" humans because they are gay. — Agustino

"Making sense" does not mean that it merely fits with the rest. It means understanding it amounts to knowing it makes sense, that it not in conflict with what is logical, what is appropriate, what is to be expected, of the world. It is to know that being gay is not "deviant," but rather that human, like any other trait we might possess.

That's not deriving an "ought" for "is." It describing and ought expressed in an is. Morality is not coming out of existence, as your naturalistic nonsense proclaims. It is immanent within it. When we look at, for example, whether being gay is moral or immoral, we may examine states of the world for any relevant information, as we may do for any question about the morality of an action. — TheWillowOfDarkness

My natural theory has nothing to do with immanence or transcendence - therefore this is nonsense.

Anything we find though, as ethical important not because it is "natural" — TheWillowOfDarkness

Sure. So what? I never said the opposite.

It means understanding it amounts to knowing it makes sense, that it not in conflict with what is logical, what is appropriate, what is to be expected, of the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, it is not in conflict with what is expected of the world. I agree. Neither does my theory say that it is in conflict :)

You aren't thinking clearly. My point with "immanence" was to point out how ethical significance is an expression of states of the world (i.e. an "is" which has (im)moral significance), rather than something determined by states of the world (i.e."ought" derived from "is" ). We might, indeed, say your natural theory has nothing to do with immanence.

That's the problem. You treated ethical significance as if it was something defined from outside itself (i.e. (Im)moral by "nature," by the "is"), rather than understanding it to be an immanent expression of some states of existence (i.e. some "nature" is moral or immoral ).

Sure. So what? I never said the opposite. — "

You literally said the opposite TWO POSTS ago (not to mention all the other ones before that which were expressing the same idea), when you insisted my arguments about (im)moral states of existence were a case of deriving an "ought" for an "is."

Let me remind you:

Yep -> deriving an "ought" (ethics) from a set of "is"'s (facts) — Agustino

Nope. That's not how it works. We have description of ethical significance (ought) expressed by states of the world (is). It is the exact opposite of deriving an "ought" from an "is."

Yes, it is not in conflict with what is expected of the world. I agree. Neither does my theory say that it is in conflict — Agustino

It's not question of saying they are in conflict though. Rather it is question of whether the understanding IS in conflict. And it is. It considers gay people don't make sense as humans. It holds them to be "Other," to be "deviant." It might not say gay people are in conflict with what makes sense for humans, but it understands them to be.

My point with "immanence" was to point out how ethical significance is an expression of states of the world (i.e. an "is" which has (im)moral significance), rather than something determined by states of the world (i.e."ought" derived form "is" ). We might, indeed, say your natural theory has nothing to do with immanence. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is again a very complicated way of trying to get away with it. Ethical significance is an expression of states of the world = "ought" derived from "is", and it also necessarily follows that tis is something determined by the states of the world. What you wrote above is logically contradictory.

That's the problem. You treated ethical significance as if it was something defined form an outside itself (i.e. (Im)moral by "nature," by the "is"), rather than understanding it to be an immanent expression of some states of existence (i.e. some "nature" is moral or immoral ). — TheWillowOfDarkness

No. Ethical significance is in the relation of things. Your ontology of "states of existence" is nonsense as well, and cannot be used to derive anything from it. Existence is dynamic... there's no question of "states" here. It's a flow, a relation amongst states.

You literally said the opposite TWO POSTS ago (not to mention all the other ones before that which were expressing the same idea), when you insisted my arguments about (im)moral states of existence were a case of deriving an "ought" for an "is." — TheWillowOfDarkness

That's because they are.

We have description of ethical significance (ought) expressed by states of the world (is). It is the exact opposite of deriving an "ought" from an "is." — TheWillowOfDarkness

The exact opposite of deriving an "ought" from an "is", is deriving an "is" from an "ought". Is this what you mean? If you don't, then you're misusing language.

Ethical significance expressed by "states of the world", is exactly the same as deriving (an intellectual activity of abstraction) the "ought" out of the "is". Of course the "ought" is inside the "is", otherwise how the fuck can you derive it from it? Again this is nonsense. Why is it impossible to derive an "is" from an "ought"??? Precisely because the "ought" is in the "is" and not the other way around. But I don't need to make this statement, because to begin with you are going along the wrong lines, and your thinking lacks rigor and clarity.

Rather it is question of whether the understanding IS in conflict. And it is. It considers gay people don't make sense as humans. It holds them to be "Other," to be "deviant." — TheWillowOfDarkness

You are conflating "deviant" with "natural deviation". The meanings are different - the former has a moral meaning, the latter has a purely descriptive meaning.

It might not say gay people are in conflict with what makes sense for humans, but it understands them to be. — TheWillowOfDarkness

lol. No, it actually doesn't. I think I have repeated this to you a million times. You are misusing language, and are just trapped by this mis-use.

I'm not using states of existence to derive anything though, Agustino. Nowhere am I claiming something is good or bad because it exists. Rather, I'm saying there exist states which are good and bad.

So I literally mean it is the opposite. When someone tries to define an "ought" from an "is," they attempt to define ethics in terms of existence. Something is, supposedly, good or bad because it exists. My argument is the reverse, the opposite. It argues there is good and bad, defined on its own terms, the ethical. It says there is good and bad, for no reasons other than itself, which exists.

Of course the "ought" is inside the "is", otherwise how the fuck can you derive it from it? Again this is nonsense. Why is it impossible to derive an "is" from an "ought"??? Precisely because the "ought" is in the "is" and not the other way around. But I don't need to make this statement, because to begin with you are going along the wrong lines, and your thinking lacks rigor and clarity. — Agustino

This is nonsensical. If the ought is "in" the "is" and, so to speak, already there, no-one is deriving anything. The ought is expressed on its own terms and doesn't need any justification from the "is" at all. When the "ought" is in the "is," there is no deriving work to do. We only need to derive when what we are looking for isn't present.

Your thinking lacks rigour and clarity here. You are supposing extra work people supposedly need to do, even though the presence of ethical significance is already staring them right in the face.

We can't derive an "is" from "ought" for a similar reason to why we can't derive an "ought from an "is." They are difference significance. To say something exists doesn't comment on whether it is ethical. To say something is ethical doesn't mean it exists.

You are conflating "deviant" with "natural deviation". The meanings are different - the former has a moral meaning, the latter has a purely descriptive meaning. — Agustino

They really don't. The point of "natural deviation" is to mark being gay as something unusual,something strange, for a human. It is an understanding which treats being gay as "Other." We don't use this when talking about any other human trait, at least the ones which are considered "normal." We don't, for example, say the human with two arms is a "natural deviation" of a human born with one arm.

When someone tries to define an "ought" from an "is," they attempt to define ethics in terms of existence. Something is, supposedly, good or bad because it exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No - that argument is incoherent, and that is not the argument that I have made. The operation of derivation is an intellectual operation of extracting in propositional form something that represents a relation amongst existents. An "ought" isn't in the same class as "existents" ; the fact that I ought to be nice to people as opposed to kill them does not exist in the same sense as black swans exist. The former are derived from the latter (as it were) via the intellectual operation called derivation. But for the intellect to be able to derive it, a priori, it must be found in that from which the intellect derives it. Thus the "ought" necessarily is found in the "is". However - it is not the same as the "is", because the two of them exist in different meanings of the word exist. Thus - something cannot be good or bad because it exists. Existence is prior to those adjectives.

This is nonsensical. If the ought is "in" the "is" and, so to speak, already there, no-one is deriving anything. The ought is expressed on its own terms and doesn't need any justification from the "is" at all. When the "ought" is in the "is," there is no deriving work to do. We only need to derive when what we are looking for isn't present. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's an intellectual operation. Without the intellect, no "ought" can be derived. It may be lurking among the "is", but it doesn't exist in the same way that the "is" does. That's why it requires the intellect to reveal it.

The point of "natural deviation" is to mark being gay as something unusual,something strange, for a human — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, this is what you think. I never said this, nor do any of my statements imply this.

Well, even in statistics, what is deviant, is being defined in relation to what is expected (a mean value for example). — Πετροκότσυφας

No. What is deviant is defined as what is unlikely to occur in a standard distribution (it's more than two standard deviations from the mean). Homosexuality is unlikely to occur in a randomly chosen human being. Both the deviant and the mean are defined in themselves.

All this has to do is with their probability of occurring, it has nothing to do with their identity (which isn't one in terms of the other as both you and WoD mistakenly think).

If you and WoD think that given a random individual, he is more likely to be homosexual than not - then you're just fooling yourselves. The fact that homosexuality is not as frequent as heterosexuality demands an explanation. Why is it that there are fewer homosexuals through history? The explanation available is the evolutionary one, which explains why heterosexuality is the natural tendency of the human being in the most general sense (this does not refer to any particular human being; that's why it is an abstraction), and why homosexuality must necessarily be a natural deviation of the human being in the most general sense. These are evolutionary and undeniable explanations.

Some Y being a natural tendency denotes merely that population X, on average, will tend to have more members having the characteristic Y than other incompatible characteristics. This natural tendency has a natural origin in this case. It is the result of evolution, combined with the biological constraints imposed on population X.

It's a fact that man in general has a natural tendency towards heterosexuality. That, in itself, is undeniable. The only question that there ever was, was what causes this tendency - or in other words, why doesn't he have an equal tendency towards an incompatible characteristic such as homosexuality? And the answer is the one I have given.

Given evolution and the biological constraints currently existing, it is logically impossible for homosexuality to ever be a natural tendency - to ever form the majority of the population.

It's an intellectual operation. Without the intellect, no "ought" can be derived. It may be lurking among the "is", but it doesn't exist in the same way that the "is" does. That's why it requires the intellect to reveal it. — Agustino

In which case "deriving" is irrelevant. Ethics doesn't require it. Understanding it doesn't require it, for the moment we pick-up on ethical expression in our intellect, we have it. We have no extra step to take. We just see the good or bad thing as it is. "Deriving" is useless, unnecessary and doing absolutely no work in accounting for ethics.

The problem here is not that we don't need our intellect to pick-up on ethical significance to understand it, but rather "deriving" has no place in this process. When we "reveal" ethical significance, we notice some state is good or bad. There is no "deriving." You are confusing coming to understand the ethical significance of a state, which we can't do without noticing a state of existence, for deriving an "ought" from an "is."

If you and WoD think that given a random individual, he is more likely to be homosexual than not - then you're just fooling yourselves. The fact that homosexuality is not as frequent as heterosexuality demands an explanation. Why is it that there are fewer homosexuals through history? The explanation available is the evolutionary one, which explains why heterosexuality is the natural tendency of the human being in the most general sense (this does not refer to any particular human being; that's why it is an abstraction), and why homosexuality must necessarily be a natural deviation of the human being in the most general sense. These are evolutionary and undeniable explanations. — Agustino

This is the "Othering" I'm talking about. No-one here thinks a genuinely randomly selected individual will likely be gay. The point is that lesser numbers are not an excuse for something to "need" extra explanation. There is no "general sense" to a human. Just the presence of every human as they are. Any human makes sense without resorting to classification of "natural deviation," as there is no a priori standard for what makes one person a human and another not.

The entire point here is against the "general sense" and it relevance to describing humans. Since no existing human is "abstract" or "general," as there is no a prior standard for what makes an empirical state, such "general sense" abstractions are an incoherent category error.

In which case "deriving" is irrelevant. Ethics doesn't require it. Understanding it doesn't require it, for the moment we pick-up on ethical expression in our intellect, we have it. We have no extra step to take. We just see the good or bad thing as it is. "Deriving" is useless, unnecessary and doing absolutely no work in accounting for ethics.

The problem here is not that we don't need our intellect to pick-up on ethical significance to understand it, but rather "deriving" has no place in this process. When we "reveal" ethical significance, we notice some state is good or bad. There is no "deriving." You are confusing coming to understand the ethical significance of a state, which we can't do without noticing a state of existence, for deriving an "ought" from an "is." — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes there is deriving. Because whether something is good or not is not a property of the thing itself, but rather of how it relates to everything else. It's in the relation. Thus it has to be derived by the intellect - it's not sufficient to just look because you cannot see a relation with your eyes. If you could - we would all be sages.

Since no existing human is "abstract" or "general," as there is no a prior standard for what makes an empirical state, such "general sense" abstractions are an incoherent category error. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is a non-sequitur. The problem only arises because you don't understand what the purpose of abstract and general final causes is - and so you misinterpret it.

You are making the mistake of thinking everything about a thing must be related in the intellect. It doesn't. People may know about something and, while they notice what is, not pick-up on the fact it is good or bad. Ethical significance IS a property (an ethical one) expressed by the things itself (it is things which are good or bad)f. Human intellect just doesn't always pick-up on it.

This is a non-sequitur. The problem only arises because you don't understand what the purpose of abstract and general final causes is - and so you misinterpret it. — Agustino

Nope. I know perfectly well what those are: acts of mistaking features expressed by a large group of individuals for the rule that (supposedly) what define a rule which governs the nature of existence. Their "purpose" is to ignore the nature of the world in favour of the comfort of an "origin" rule. It's God/PSR all over again.

hasn't offered much of an argument, if any at all, so in the interests of discussing the topic, I will supply an argument to Agustino and respond to that argument. Agustino, feel free to interject if my characterisation of your position is uncharitable.

The underlying jurisprudential claim is that i) if an action is immoral and harms the society in which it occurs, the society ought to legislate against that action. The jurisprudential claim is two-fold: immoral and harmful to the society. In the interests of this argument, I will concede both to Agustino. Sexual relationships outside a closed marriage arrangement is immoral (harms the trust of the participants in the marriage) and is harmful to society (weakens marriage rights and obligations).

But the discussion here isn't whether adultery should be illegal, it's whether websites that explicitly offer services to enable that activity should be illegal. Prima facie the illegality of the websites doesn't go through on the same jurisprudential claim (the websites are not in themselves immoral or harmful), but requires another claim as an extension to that claim, a facilitation claim. We can state the facilitation claim as ii) if tools or services facilitate illegal action as established by i), then said tools or services ought to be legislated against because of the indirect harm such tools present by virtue of the action of i). We might want to make a reasonable condition to pre-empt semantic distinctions, such as: if tools or services facilitate illegal action as established by i), and is a reasonable and foreseeable outcome, then such tools ought to be legislated against.

The facilitation claim with or without the reasonable condition is problematic especially when the tools are designed in a way to mitigate the harms established in i). The illegality of adultery is premised on the harm caused when a spouse is made aware of the infidelity, but a tool that offers to reduce that harm by protecting information alleviates the jurisprudential claim. The website isn't fool-proof (evidenced by the hack), but if such activity is bound to happen, it might be better for a society to allow and encourage it to happen in a safe and secretive forum such as the websites.

You are making the mistake of thinking everything about a thing must be related in the intellect. It doesn't. People may know about something and, while they notice what is, not pick-up on the fact it is good or bad. Ethical significance IS a property (an ethical one) expressed by the things itself (it is things which are good or bad)f. Human intellect just doesn't always pick-up on it. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No. Ethical significance is not expressed by a thing itself, but rather by its connections to everything else. A relation is not something one sees with their eyes - therefore it is something derived from what one sees with their eyes. It requires the powers of the intellect to extract. You are making a category error by assuming that one sees a relation the same way one sees a chair.

Nope. I know perfectly well what those are: acts of mistaking features expressed by a large group of individuals for the rule that (supposedly) what define a rule which governs the nature of existence. Their "purpose" is to ignore the nature of the world in favour of the comfort of an "origin" rule. It's God/PSR all over again. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Nope. This is just your unfounded opinion. I suggest you pick up Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics and start reading them. Perhaps you will realise that you're nowhere near Aristotle's definition nor use with regard to final causes. Therefore what you are talking about is a straw-man.

A misrepresentation, which suggests you have not read the thread Soylent. I expected better from you. An argument is fleshed out through out the thread.

Furthermore, your post ignores that the people using AM must be punished as well. You just have failed to understand what the argument is about since you've read nothing but the first post.

Obviously the people using AM ought to be punished by virtue of i). That claim is uncontroversial by my argument. I concede that adultery ought to be illegal. The question is what legal liability does the website have in facilitating the actions of the users.

Any human makes sense without resorting to classification of "natural deviation," as there is no a priori standard for what makes one person a human and another not. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Also, I might add. Any human makes sense. But ALL humans don't, without this explanation. A fallacy of composition WoD, which assumes that if any individual human makes sense, nothing else is missing. Maybe "all humans" have properties which individual humans don't, just like how every single grain of sand is hard, while a pile of sand is soft. How much more embarassing do you want this to get?

That claim is uncontroversial by my argument. I concede that adultery ought to be illegal. The question is what legal liability does the website have in facilitating the actions of the users. — Soylent

The liability of encouraging and facilitating access to illegal activity. That in itself is culpable.

The liability of encouraging and facilitating access to illegal activity. That in itself is culpable. — Agustino

Except where the facilitation of illegal activity mitigates the jurisprudential claim, is my rebuttal. If the facilitation of the activity alleviates the harms, it removes the impetus to outlaw such activity.

No it doesn't. The harm still exists, even if the victims are unaware of it. The harm is in the breaking of the marriage vows which already happens as soon as adultery is committed, regardless of whether the victim knows this or not. Being unaware of the harm is not equivalent with there not being any harm in the first place.

What harm is that? You conceded open marriages are permissible, so I took that to mean on your account that marriage vows are not harmed per se by extramarital relationships. You seemed to indicate the harm was confined only to extramarital relationships in a closed marriage. That implies the harm is in the information and knowledge of the relationships outside marriage and not a harm in breaking the vows. For consistency, if the harm is to the vows themselves, the openness of the relationship shouldn't have any affect on the harms.

For consistency, if the harm is to the vows themselves, the openness of the relationship shouldn't have any affect on the harms. — Soylent

Yes it should. In open marriages people agree not to request the other to be faithful. In closed marriages, people make vows of faithfulness to each other. In open marriages there is no vow to be broken. In closed marriages there is. Hence the difference.

That doesn't make it clear what the harm is and how it can still be a harm without the "victim" knowing it. Marriage vows can be open or closed by your admission, and both are permissible. We are not arguing the harm is to marriage vows such that marriage vows ought to restrict sexual activity and the harm is to the vow itself insofar as sexual activity outside marriage is harmful to marriage vows. It is the harm done to the trust of the participants in a closed marriage that have agreed to remain faithful.

It is the harm done to the trust of the participants in a closed marriage that have agreed to remain faithful. — Soylent

If we have a contract together and I break it, without you knowing it, have I harmed you?

If we have a contract together and I break it, without you knowing it, have I harmed you? — Agustino

Presumably not if I don't know about it. Would you say you have harmed me? I wouldn't even know where to begin to quantify a harm that I am unaware of. I don't know what would be the point of a contract you can break without my knowledge.

I'll weigh in on this: it's wrong to lie, but we shouldn't outlaw lying.

The government need not intervene every time you are wronged.