a recognition that a solution is neither possible not required. — Ludwig V

Good point. One of the key differences he makes between philosophical investigations and scientific investigations is that science can solve problems and yield answers.

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there.

(Culture and Value)

You can wave it, or grab a cup with the hand? You cannot deny the fact that you have a hand by that time? — Corvus

An Indirect Realist and an Idealist would deny the fact that in a mind-independent world there is a hand.

An Indirect Realist and an Idealist would deny the fact that in a mind-independent world there is a hand. — RussellA

2 questions.
1) Do they also deny the fact that their own body exists in a mind-independent world?
2) Whose mind are they talking about here?

I tried to track down some of the scholars mentioned by you and Sam. I was surprised to learn that there are different readings that one book called: Framework, Transcendental, Epistemic, and Therapeutic.

The academic sources are expensive for an old stone mason with aching knees. Do any of them give a leg up from simply comparing what is written by Wittgenstein in different places?

I googled the names and found the articles I cited free online.

Wright

Coliva

What do you think? Do they offer support for my reading of Wittgenstein?

Probably the most over looked conclusion of PI, PI 307 “‘Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?’-If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction. — Richard B

What do you take to be the conclusion? The question of whether he is a behaviorist is not answered. He does not affirm or deny that everything except human behavior is a fiction. — Fooloso4

Wittgenstein does not subscribe to metaphysical behaviorism; he does not say that our "internal" feelings or pains are unreal; the sensation is not a "nothing."

However, Wittgenstein is a grammatical behaviorist and our "inner life" is a grammatical fiction. His claim is not that our feelings don't exist (metaphysically). Instead, he argues that they have no bearing on how the meaning of our words is determined.

This is apparent in many of the tools @Sam26 has already mentioned in this post, such as "look and see", "meaning is use", and language games, which all rely on examining the behaviours associated with language use.

This grammatical behaviourism is perhaps most evident in Wittgenstein's beetle: "If we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." The object, here, is one's private sensation, which plays no role in the meaning of the word (e.g. "pain"). If the object is private, it "cancels out" and leaves us only with the public use of the word.

@Sam26: very good discussion. I agree with much of what you've said here.

Well, as you have just demonstrated, we can invent as many language games as we like, and then amalgamate them. — Ludwig V

There is a quandary

On the one hand, Wittgenstein is effectively saying that hinges are part of the framework of our language, our language game within our Form of Life, and are as such non-epistemic, indubitable.

But on the other hand, Wittgenstein can only talk about hinges if they are epistemic, and thereby doubtable.

The quandary is, how can Wittgenstein talk about things that he agrees cannot be talked about?
=====================================================================

I may be mistaken, but I had the impression that Wittgenstein did not actually accept Moore's argument. He seems to allow that, under suitable circumstances, in an appropriate context, "here is a hand" could be called into question......................Moore does not justify what he sees by justifying each proposition individually, but by demonstrating that he can see things in general. Which he does by his behaviour, verbal and non-verbal. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein disagreed with Morre effectively saying “I know that here is one hand because I can see it”

Moore is saying that the evidence for knowing that I have one hand is because I can see one hand.

Wittgenstein points out the logical regression, and asks where is the evidence that Moore can see one hand.

For Wittgenstein, the only way out of this regression is for Moore to say “Here is one hand”.

2 questions.
1) Do they also deny the fact that their own body exists in a mind-independent world?
2) Whose mind are they talking about here? — Corvus

1) Yes
2) Their own

"If we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." — Luke

How does Wittgenstein overcome the problem that the expression “I am in pain” would be meaningless if the speaker never had the inner feeling of pain.

I know the speaker could pretend that they are in pain, but if every expression in language is based on a pretence about inner feelings, then again, language would be meaningless.

I think the point of the Tractatus is that philosophical problems are (usually) a misuse of language, in the sense that language is meaningful to the extent that it's about events within the world we live in. Asking questions about the world as if you're outside it will create nonsense. Btw, Plato makes this same point in Crito.

With the PI, the focus is on how language gains meaning in social interaction. Trying to find some exalted meaning is mistaken.

In both cases, he's wrong because he's neglecting to account for the way philosophical problems are a veil for cultural and psychological issues.

An Indirect Realist and an Idealist would deny the fact that in a mind-independent world there is a hand. — RussellA

1) Yes
2) Their own — RussellA

1) The fact that they deny the fact proves they do exist. One cannot deny something without existing. When their body exists, naturally their hand exist too. Therefore the IRist and Idealist didn't understand the hand exists?

2) One's own mind can always fall into illusion and misunderstanding. The above not only proves, but also confirms that they were under misunderstanding and illusion about the world and existence of their hand?

One cannot deny something without existing. — Corvus

I can deny that ghosts exist.
=====================================

You can wave it, or grab a cup with the hand? You cannot deny the fact that you have a hand by that time? — Corvus

Moore says that he knows that here is one hand because he can see one hand.

But as you say:

One's own mind can always fall into illusion and misunderstanding — Corvus

Just because he sees one hand, it that proof that there is one hand?

I can deny that ghosts exist. — RussellA

You just proved you exist.

Just because he sees one hand, it that proof that there is one hand? — RussellA

Yes.

Moore says that he knows that here is one hand because he can see one hand. — RussellA

Unless you can prove you were in the state of illusion, delusion, hallucination or dream during your visual perception, if you see X, then X exists.

Unless you can prove you were in the state of illusion, delusion, hallucination or dream during your visual perception, if you see X, then X exists. — Corvus

Suppose you think you see a cup. How can you prove that you are not hallucinating a cup?

Suppose you think you see a cup. How can you prove that you are not hallucinating a cup? — RussellA

You just make coffee in the cup, and drink it. If the cup was hallucinatory, then coffee will spill onto the table. If it holds coffee, and you cant drink the coffee out of it, then it is the real cup.

While drinking the coffee out of the cup, you can make a statement. "Here is a cup, and it is the real cup. Because I see it, made coffee in it, and drinking the coffee out of it."

How does Wittgenstein overcome the problem that the expression “I am in pain” would be meaningless if the speaker never had the inner feeling of pain. — RussellA

If a blind person were to say "What a beautiful sunset", it would not make the phrase meaningless. Everyone else could still use the phrase meaningfully. Even the blind person could use it meaningfully. The blind person might be e.g. saying it as a joke, or in a self-deprecating way, or responding to someone else's story about a sunset, or in any number of ways.

The point is that no individual's inner experience determines linguistic meaning.

You just make coffee in the cup, and drink it. If the cup was hallucinatory, then coffee will spill onto the table. If it holds coffee, and you cant drink the coffee out of it, then it is the real cup. — Corvus

How can you prove that you are not hallucinating drinking a cup of coffee?

If a blind person were to say "What a beautiful sunset", it would not make the phrase meaningless. Everyone else could still use the phrase meaningfully. Even the blind person could use it meaningfully. The blind person might be e.g. saying it as a joke, or in a self-deprecating way, or responding to someone else's story about a sunset, or in any number of ways................The point is that no individual's inner experience determines linguistic meaning. — Luke

Suppose a blind person said “what a beautiful sunset”, which is a possible scenario, even though they have never seen a sunset.

Yes, they could be saying it ironically, acknowledging that they have never seen a sunset.

If the word “sunset” means for the blind person “something I have never seen”, then “sunset” does have an inner meaning to the blind person, ie, something they have never seen.

Similarly, I could say “what a beautiful xyz”, even if I don’t know what “xyz” refers to.

I can successfully use “xyz” in a linguistic expression even if I don't know what “xyz” means.

Even though “xyz” can be successfully used within a language game, if no one within the linguistic community knows what “xyz” means, then “what a beautiful xyz” becomes a meaningless expression.

“What a beautiful xyz” doesn’t gain a meaning because it can be successfully used within a language game.

“What a beautiful xyz” only gains meaning if at least one of the linguistic community knows what “xyz” refers to, i.e. knows what it means.

How can you prove that you are not hallucinating drinking a cup of coffee? — RussellA

At this point, we can only assume and conclude that the questioner is engaging in "Argument by Refusal, Stubbornness or Denial", which means that the questioner refuses accept the rational logical conclusion from the evidence provided by the real events in the real world.

There is an aspect to this problem that is untouched by grammar. Real problems, not fictions, having to do with both behavior and feelings.

Notebooks 1914-1916

Living in agreement with the world is living in accord with one’s conscience, which is the voice of God.
To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning

Lecture on Ethics

Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics

The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was
possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of
thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual.

Culture and Value

It is not by any means clear to me, that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in the way we live, making all these questions superfluous. (For this reason I could never found a school).

If the word “sunset” means for the blind person “something I have never seen” — RussellA

I'm trying hard to think of a reason why the blind person would understand the particular word "sunset" to mean "something I have never seen", but I cannot imagine such a scenario. Blind people can learn to speak English.

I can successfully use “xyz” in a linguistic expression even if I don't know what “xyz” means. — RussellA

How do you measure or determine a "successful use" of "xyz" here? How could "xyz" be used correctly or incorrectly in this example? I don't doubt that you could say or use the string of letters "xyz", but what does it mean?

if no one within the linguistic community knows what “xyz” means, then “what a beautiful xyz” becomes a meaningless expression. — RussellA

It is a meaningless expression. You introduced the string "xyz" and stated that you don't know what it means. You are intentionally using it as an example of a meaningless symbol/word.

“What a beautiful xyz” doesn’t gain a meaning because it can be successfully used within a language game. — RussellA

What counts as a "successful" use of "xyz"?

There is an aspect to this problem that is untouched by grammar. Real problems, not fictions, having to do with both behavior and feelings. — Fooloso4

I was offering my 2 cents on PI 307 and W's remark about behaviourism there. I may need you to explain how your quotes relate to that.

At this point, we can only assume and conclude that the questioner is engaging in "Argument by Refusal, Stubbornness or Denial", which means that the questioner refuses accept the rational logical conclusion from the evidence provided by the real events in the real world. — Corvus

What you say leads into a circular argument.

You are assuming there are real events in a real world, from which we discover evidence that there are real events in a real world.

You introduced the string "xyz" and stated that you don't know what it means. You are intentionally using it as an example of a meaningless symbol/word......................The point is that no individual's inner experience determines linguistic meaning. — Luke

Exactly, when hearing “what a beautiful xyz”, our first reaction is to ask what “xyz” means. If we don’t know what “xyz” means the expression is meaningless.

If there were no inner experiences, then where does the meaning of “sunset” come from?

The meaning of “xyz” cannot come from the language itself, otherwise we would know what “xyz” meant.

The quotes were intended to address the interlocutor's question of whether everything except human behavior is a fiction. The point is to show that the scope of Wittgenstein's concerns go beyond grammatical analysis.

I don't think Wittgenstein agrees that our inner life is a grammatical fiction. In rejecting the claim that the meaning of a word is determined by our inner life, he is not denying that we have an inner life.
That inner life involves more than having feelings or sensations.

In addition to linguistic meaning there is the meaning experienced in living. A meaningful life is not one that has untangled our grammatical confusion, although that may be involved. It can't be denied that his work centered around this problem, but as quoted:

It is not by any means clear to me, that I wish for a continuation of my work by others, more than a change in the way we live

Philosophical therapy, as opposed the the psychological therapy of the behaviorist, aims at

a changed mode of thought and of life

What you say leads into a circular argument.

You are assuming there are real events in a real world, from which we discover evidence that there are real events in a real world. — RussellA

The evidence was submitted to support the event in the real world as true statements which had taken place in the real world. It is an independent verification statement for the conclusion, not a circular argument.

The series discussing "grammatical" behaviorism does end with:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise?——The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them—we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)—And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them. — PI, 308

The different formulations of privacy are found wanting but not toward the goal of cancelling it. There are numerous characterizations such as:

Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot? — PI, 297

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body. (Which would also be possible.)
Pain-behaviour can point to a painful place—but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression. — PI, 302

References to "subject" appear in related contexts at PI 398, 571, and 618.

In PI part 2, there is a lot of discussion of deception in our statements. In section X, we can hide from others and maybe even ourselves:

One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own belief.

If there were a verb meaning 'to believe falsely', it would not have any significant first person present indicative.

Don't look at it as a matter of course, but as a most remarkable thing, that the verbs "believe", "wish", "will" display all the inflexions possessed by "cut", "chew", "run".

The language-game of reporting can be given such a turn that a report is not meant to inform the hearer about its subject matter but about the person making the report. — P2 section x

I will end by pointing at the discussion of sincerity in section XI. Here are two slices:

I can be as certain of someone else's sensations as of any fact. But this does not make the propositions "He is much depressed", "25 x 25 = 625" and "I am sixty years old" into similar instruments. The explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different kind.— This seems to point to a psychological difference. But the difference is logical.

"But, if you are certain, isn't it that you are shutting your eyes in face
of doubt?"—They are shut.

Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four?—Does this shew the former to be mathematical certainty?——'Mathematical certainty' is not a psychological concept.
The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game.

"He alone knows his motives"—that is an expression of the fact that we ask him what his motives are. If he is sincere he will tell us them; but I need more than sincerity to guess his motives. This is where there is a kinship with the case of knowing. — ibid PI2 xi

Ask yourself: How does a man learn to get a 'nose' for something? And how can this nose be used?

Pretending is, of course, only a special case of someone's producing (say) expressions of pain when he is not in pain. For if this is possible at all, why should it always be pretending that is taking place—this
very special pattern in the weave of our lives?

A child has much to learn before it can pretend. (A dog cannot be a
hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere.)

There might actually occur a case where we should say "This man
believes he is pretending." — ibid. PI2, xi