Yes, that's kind of what I was saying. The scientific method contradicts all (that I know of) religious commitments. Science only contradicts itself insofar as it gets pretty quickly updated by new information. That's a basic tenet of that method. I'm sure you'll agree.

Religions contradict each other and are not amenable to update in that way. That's the issue in comparison. The fact that various philosophical commitments run into each other is mediated by assessment of the results of the scientific method (Excluding outliers(i have been explicit about this)). Religious thinking is not (excluding outliers). So even if you want to move on to 'secular' rather than 'scientific' that's cool, I understand but the above stands.

It feels to me like you're purposefully not quite contacting the point you initially wanted to talk about. If the issue is that secular views are incompatible, sure. But I don't know anyone who would kill someone over their belief in Direct Realism or Incompatibilism (hehehe). This is what I mean by metaphysical primacy. If you think Islam and physicalism are on the same level in this way, I smell a whiff of dishonesty.

— this clarifies things, and it also exposes the remaining mistake.

First, I agree with you about the scientific method: it is corrigible, self-updating, and does not claim metaphysical primacy. No dispute there.

But that concession actually concedes my point. The moment you say “the scientific method contradicts religious commitments,” you are no longer comparing worldviews; you are comparing a method to a doctrinal system. Methods don’t contradict each other or anything else — they constrain belief-formation. That’s not the same category.

Second, the claim that religions are “not amenable to update at all” is simply false. They update slowly, unevenly, often contentiously — but so do institutions built around science once power, identity, and moral stakes are involved. The difference is degree and mechanism, not kind. Calling religious reformers “outliers” just builds the conclusion into the premise.

Third, the violence point doesn’t track the issue you think it does. People don’t kill each other over direct realism because it isn’t socially sacralized. When secular commitments are sacralized — nation, race, history, party, progress — people absolutely do kill over them. That’s exactly the structural point I’ve been making.

So the disagreement isn’t whether science-as-method is superior (it is). It’s whether religion uniquely introduces metaphysical primacy and insulation, or whether those features emerge whenever any worldview — religious or secular — is absolutized and socially enforced.

On that question, I still think the clean line is: the danger lies in sacralization, not in religion per se.

And no, pointing that out isn’t dishonesty — it’s refusing to conflate method, worldview, and institution in order to make the comparison come out one way by definition.

Thank you for your reply. I never claimed in any of my posts: "religion bad, secular good". In fact, I clarified in one of my posts that I am NOT saying: "religion bad, secular good". Both religious and secular people have caused suffering and death in massive amounts. My thesis is that sacralized authority structures are risky wherever they appear.

Both religious and secular people have caused suffering and death in massive amounts. My thesis is that sacralized authority structures are risky wherever they appear. — Truth Seeker

Sounds like we're on the same page then. Cheers.

What is a "scientific worldview"? A "worldview" is "a way of thinking about the world." If we think about the world "scientifically", we ignore (or at least undervalue) history, philosophy and all the other Humanities. In fact, we are moving in that direction. In court, DNA evidence has supplanted eye-witness testimony. Indeed, some of the "scientific" evidence used in court has been questioned: lie detectors and fingerprints have the aura of "scientific" but often produce dubious results. DNA evidence is the sin qua non, but the inferences derived from it are often unjustified (or at least unproven).

Truth Seeker's analysis of the ("evil") fable of Eden ignores the symbolic and metaphoric value of the story. Is "knowledge" and the quest for knowledge worth suffering for? Was Eve's eating of the apple a "sin" or a noble refusal to abide by arbitrary rules, and a desire to know and understand? I've been reading "Paradise Lost", and in that epic, that appears to be her motive. Does she "seduce" Adam into sin? Yes, in a way. Adam (in the poem) knows he will die if he eats the apple but remembers how lonely he was before Eve was created. He chooses to suffer and die in order to be with her, because he loves her. Without suffering, such nobility would be impossible. Also, arbitrary (non-scientific) rules and regulations abound in myths and fairy tales. Blow this horn, and the castle walls will topple. Ring this bell and disaster will ensue. Perhaps this socializes people into obedience, or perhaps it highlights the arbitrary nature of the scientific "laws of nature", which lead inevitably to suffering and death.

Of course humans suffer and die. That is the reality of the human condition. All animals share that fate. The "scientific worldview" can explain this but cannot tell us how to deal with it. In the Christian worldview, we are redeemed by love; in "Paradise Lost", Adam is redeemed by love. Perhaps there is a transcendence in love that can make even suffering and death seem pale shadows, even for us agnostics and atheists.

God didn't keep his words to Adam and Eve — Truth Seeker

See my post above.

Thank you for your thoughtful reply, Ecurb.

1. “Scientific worldview” ≠ scientism ≠ hostility to the humanities.

A scientific worldview is not the claim that only science matters. It is the claim that when we are making factual claims about reality, causes, consequences, and constraints, we should privilege methods that are publicly testable, corrigible, and non-authoritarian.

History, philosophy, ethics, and literature are indispensable — but they do different work.

Science answers: What is happening? Why does it happen? What follows if we act this way?
Philosophy and ethics answer: What should we value? What is fair? What is compassionate?
Literature explores: What does this feel like? How do humans narrate meaning under constraint?

The problem arises when myth is allowed to dictate ontology or moral authority, rather than being interpreted in light of what we know about sentient beings and suffering.

Your courtroom example actually supports this point:

DNA evidence is favored not because it is “scientific-sounding,” but because it is less dependent on memory distortion, coercion, bias, and power asymmetries.
When “scientific” tools (polygraphs, fingerprints) fail, the solution is better epistemology, not a retreat into symbolism.

That’s not scientism. That’s epistemic humility.

2. Symbolism does not immunize a story from moral evaluation.

Yes, the Eden story has symbolic richness. That does not exempt it from ethical analysis.

Even symbolically, Eden encodes a troubling structure:

Knowledge is forbidden.
Curiosity is punished.
Obedience is valued over understanding.
Suffering is introduced not as a natural tragedy, but as a penalty imposed by authority.

You ask whether Eve’s act was sinful or noble. That ambiguity is precisely the problem: the text treats epistemic awakening as transgression.

Appealing to Paradise Lost does not rescue the framework — it revises it. John Milton humanizes the myth by softening divine justice through romantic sacrifice. But notice what has happened:

The moral center quietly shifts away from God and toward human love.
Adam’s “redemption” is not obedience — it is attachment.

That is a poetic achievement, not a theological vindication.

3. Suffering is not ennobled by being unavoidable.

This is the most dangerous romantic move in the reply.

“Without suffering, such nobility would be impossible.”

This confuses resilience in response to harm with the moral necessity of harm itself.

Yes, humans can display courage, love, and solidarity in spite of suffering.
No, that does not make suffering instrumentally good, necessary, or justified.

If suffering were required for moral depth, then:

Preventing pain would be morally suspect.
Reducing disease, violence, and deprivation would diminish virtue.
Compassion would paradoxically undermine nobility.

That conclusion is absurd — and quietly contradicted by every humane impulse we have.

From a Compassionist perspective:

Virtue is not measured by how much pain one endures, but by how much suffering one prevents or alleviates.
Love that accepts suffering may be tragic and moving.
Love that creates or rationalizes suffering is morally indefensible.

4. “Arbitrary rules” in myth do not illuminate the laws of nature.

Comparing fairy-tale taboos (“blow the horn and disaster ensues”) to physical laws is a category error.

Physical laws do not punish.
They do not issue commands.
They do not assign blame.

Gravity does not condemn you for falling.
Cancer does not punish you for curiosity.

Myths personify contingency as authority. Science does the opposite: it depersonalizes necessity so we can respond with compassion rather than guilt.

That distinction matters — ethically and psychologically.

5. Science doesn’t tell us how to cope — ethics and compassion do.

It’s true: science alone cannot tell us how to live with mortality.
But neither can theology, unless we are willing to accept unjust suffering as divinely meaningful.

As an agnostic atheist, I reject that bargain.

As a Compassionist, I affirm this instead:

Meaning is not discovered in cosmic punishment.
Meaning is created in how we respond to vulnerability.
Redemption is not obedience to mystery, but care for sentient beings who can be harmed.

Love can be transcendent — yes.
But its transcendence lies in reducing suffering, not aestheticizing it.

As a vegan, I extend that logic consistently:

If suffering is bad for humans, it is bad for other sentient beings.
If love redeems, it redeems by protecting the vulnerable, not sanctifying their pain.

Myth and poetry can illuminate human experience.
They cannot override moral responsibility.

A scientific worldview does not flatten meaning — it refuses to outsource ethics to ancient authority.

And compassion, if it is real, does not ask:

“Is suffering meaningful?”

It asks:

“Can this suffering be prevented — and if so, why haven’t we done it?”

That question remains unanswered by Eden, by Milton, and by any worldview that treats pain as a moral prerequisite rather than a moral emergency.