Provide a link to the person who made this classification and where you can read more about it — Astorre

As a start, there is the SEP article on Idealism and the SEP article on Realism.

Right, but these are peculiar forms of Idealism. — Joshs

Yes, Idealism is an extensive topic, as the SEP article on Idealism indicates.

Heidegger has "Being-in-the-World", but this may be a similar problem with Wittgenstein and the world. Where does this world exist, within the mind (Idealism) or external to the mind (Realism). Wittgenstein never says.

As the Wikipedia article on Ontology notes:

According to philosopher Rudolf Carnap, for example, ontological statements are relative to language and depend on the ontological framework of the speaker. This means that there are no framework-independent ontological facts since different frameworks provide different views while there is no objectively right or wrong framework

First of all, I want to say that I was not impressed by the approach of the author you cited. "Realism vs. idealism” in their presentation is a mixture of ontology and epistemology, while phenomenology and existentialism, in principle, work on a different plane.In my opinion, this classification of ontological approaches was obviously carried out by the author for educational purposes. For me, as the author of the topic, it does not matter where the lovers of classification will place me. Creating something new is a process of going beyond any existing classifications, at least I want to believe in it.

As for your comments:

Husserl's phenomenology is certainly that of ontological idealism, where any belief in the world's independent existence is put aside to focus on human experiences. — RussellA

Heidegger's Dasein is also about ontological Idealism. It is about "being-in-the-world", in that we are not detached observers of the world but embedded in our experiences. — RussellA

The text you provided says:

...Although insofar as Neo-Kantianism was a reaction mainly to absolute idealism it could not entirely reject epistemological arguments of the kind that had traditionally led to idealism, especially in its Kantian variety. Hence idealistic tendencies can be found in Neo-Kantianism too, and Martin Heidegger’s later version of realism can be interpreted as a response to the idealism in Neo-Kantianism....

....In so-called “continental” philosophy, we might suggest, the main alternative to the idealism of the nineteenth century and lingering tendencies to idealism in both Neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology has not been any straightforward form of realism, but rather the “life philosophy” (Lebensphilosophie) pioneered by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1916), then extensively developed by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and, without Heidegger’s political baggage, by the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961).... https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/

In my opinion, this is written quite accurately and agrees with the comment:

Heidegger’s Idealism puts into question the priority of mind, reason and consciousness, associating all of these with the Cartesian subject, which is still operative in Kant and Hegel. Dasein is more radically in the world than any notion of a conscious subjectivity perceiving objects can convey. — Joshs

In my opinion, we have gone too far, wandering in all sorts of classifications or approaches. Before you is the text of my work. Did you like it or not like it? What do you agree or disagree with? Destroy my arguments or approve them. My text is here precisely for this

In my opinion, we have gone too far, wandering in all sorts of classifications or approaches. — Astorre

Yes, fixing one's definitions adds complexity to an already complicated topic, such as establishing the differences between being and becoming, ontology and epistemology, realism and idealism, static and dynamic, substance and process, presence and absence, mind and world.

Even if we agreed that "Dasein is more radically in the world" we may not agree as to where this world is. Does this world exist within the mind or external to the mind? Is our world the construction of our mind. As Schopenhauer wrote "The world is my representation". As Abai Qunanbaiuly wrote “A person’s mind is the mirror of the world. If the mirror is clouded, the world appears distorted.” Wittgenstein avoided such a problem by never giving his opinion where his "world" exists. A strategic decision that does not seem to have affected his reputation.

As you say "And since philosophy speaks about the world relying solely on language, this creates difficulties for both the researcher and the reader."

I will try to be more specific to your text.

Does this world exist within the mind or external to the mind? Is our world the construction of our mind. As Schopenhauer wrote "The world is my representation". As Abai Qunanbaiuly wrote “A person’s mind is the mirror of the world. If the mirror is clouded, the world appears distorted.” Wittgenstein avoided such a problem by never giving his opinion where his "world" exists. A strategic decision that does not seem to have affected his reputation — RussellA

Is it that he never gave his opinion, or that his answer is implicit in his later work, but has been missed by many because they are still looking for answers within the old binary:either mind or world, either inside or outside? Merleau-Ponty directs us to this way beyond the inside-outside trap:

” “[t]he world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject who is nothing but a project of the world; and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world that it itself projects.” (Phenomenology of Perception)

Even if we agreed that "Dasein is more radically in the world" we may not agree as to where this world is. Does this world exist within the mind or external to the mind? Is our world the construction of our mind.

Perhaps what these people are talking about is always skirting around the edge of the truth of the matter. Whenever one takes aim, the attempt glances of in a tangent and never reaches the target. This would suggest a return, or synthesis with, the alternative approach of the East. The apophatic, or realisation of the route of stillness.
If one is not addressing the target, or not addressing that which always misses the target, one is not wrong. Not as wrong as the person who addresses it, but misses.

Is it that he never gave his opinion, or that his answer is implicit in his later work, but has been missed by many because they are still looking for answers within the old binary: either mind or world, either inside or outside? — Joshs

I cannot accept that there are no binaries, and everything is a formless soup of amorphousness.

I cannot accept that Tyrannosaurus rex did not have an existence outside the human mind, a real, living and breathing existence outside of our concept of it.

I cannot accept that there is no binary between the mind and a mind-independent world, even if I accept that discovering it is philosophically difficult.

I cannot accept that there are no binaries, and everything is a formless soup of amorphousness.

I cannot accept that Tyrannosaurus rex did not have an existence outside the human mind, a real, living and breathing existence outside of our concept of it.

I cannot accept that there is no binary between the mind and a mind-independent world, even if I accept that discovering it is philosophically difficult. — RussellA

The issue isn’t whether the dinosaur existed before humans. It’s that the meaning of ‘T. rex’, it’s place in our world, is a product of our engagement now. That’s the intertwining I’m pointing to. Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there. Discovering the world always also involves inventing new ways of doing things with it. As Evan Thompson wrote:

I would give up both realism and anti-realism, then, in favour of what could be called a pluralist pragmatism. What the pluralist insists on is that there is no foundational version, one which anchors all the rest or to which all others can be reduced. The pragmatist insists that the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making. To erase the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way in the world gives us a fresh appreciation of the world. That world, however, is not given, waiting to be represented. We find the world, but only in the many incommensurable cognitive domains we devise in our attempt to know our way around. The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other.

The issue isn’t whether the dinosaur existed before humans. It’s that the meaning of ‘T. rex’, it’s place in our world, is a product of our engagement now. That’s the intertwining I’m pointing to. Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there. — Joshs

Introduction
As a supporter of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I agree that "Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there."

I also agree with Enactivism, the idea that the human brain has evolved in synergy with its environment (Wikipedia - Enactivism)

I am also an Indirect Realist, in that I don't believe that I experience the external world as it really is, but only through representations of how the external world really is.

It follows that I believe in Realism, in that there is a realty that exists independently of the mind.

It also follows that I believe in Anti-Realism, the idea that what we perceive as the world is dependent upon and has been constructed by our minds, whether in language or concept.

Therefore, believing in both Realism and Anti-Realism, my approach is similar to the pragmatism as described by Evan Thompson, who wrote that "the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making". In the terms of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, the world is found in Realism, in his belief that a world exists independently of the mind, and the world is made in Idealism, through a priori pure intuitions of space and time and a priori pure concepts of understanding.

Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World"
The story goes back to Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World", a statement that I have no trouble with. My question is, where does this world exist, something Wittgenstein avoided engaging with.

There are two worlds, the world as we perceive it and the world that has caused the world we perceive.

The world we perceive is a representation of the world that has caused the world we perceive, not a mirror image.

We perceive the colour red even though the colour red does not exist in a mind-independent world. However, there must be something in a mind-independent world that has caused us to perceive the colour red. This something in a mind-independent world may be different to what we perceive, but it would be invalid to argue that because it is different it cannot exist.

Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World" agrees with our everyday experiences, but ignores the obvious question. Does "world" refer to the world as we perceive it to be or does "world" refer to a world that has caused the world we perceive.

Something has caused the world we perceive, and even though it may be very different to the world we actually perceive, whatever it is, it is still a world.

To ignore this fundamental question, what caused the world we perceive, as Wittgenstein did, may be pragmatic, but not very philosophical.

I cannot accept that Tyrannosaurus rex did not have an existence outside the human mind, a real, living and breathing existence outside of our concept of it.

Think about it like this. If life had not evolved at all on earth, today the planet would be just rock and sand with sterile oceans. There would not have been a T Rex. The existence of TRex is as a result of the endeavours of life, living organisms. Same with Sartre.
So everything in our world except for rock, water and gas, was created by our cousins and ancestors. Their minds literally created/caused these things.

So everything in our world except for rock, water and gas, was created by our cousins and ancestors. Their minds literally created/caused these things. — Punshhh

The first living organisms on Earth were bacteria, which had no minds, so It cannot be that life was created by the mind.

The first living organisms on Earth were one-celled organisms known as prokaryotes, which emerged between 3.5 and 4.1 billion years ago.
https://www.naturalhistory.si.edu/education/teaching-resources/life-science/early-life-earth-animal-origins

The first living organisms on Earth were bacteria, which had no minds, so It cannot be that life was created by the mind.

Well maybe we need to look at our definition of mind again. Because there was some kind of intelligence going on. An intelligent and strategic response to the environment of these single cell organisms, which led to the T Rex and Sartre.

An intelligent and strategic response to the environment of these single cell organisms, which led to the T Rex and Sartre. — Punshhh

That's certainly true. The real genius of Darwin was that he managed to create or identify a purely causal, unthinking system which achieved the results of an intelligent system. There's no need to posit any minds - unless you want to include them for other reasons than explaining the phenomena.

There's no need to posit any minds - unless you want to include them for other reasons than explaining the phenomena.

Not minds in the usual sense of the word. But an agency, which wouldn’t be present if there were no life at all. Even with natural selection there wouldn’t have been a T Rex without that agency.
I accept that the effect of natural selection played a formative role in this process. But so too did the living entities and their capacity to develop along with the resultant effects.

It was a dance so to speak, these organisms found the world and somehow were able to alter it and themselves to their benefit. While the world somehow lead them (shaped them) on an evolutionary path.

Both the organisms and the world as they found it were necessary for this lineage to happen.

Not minds in the usual sense of the word. But an agency, — Punshhh

Would that, perhaps, be the sort of agency that has enabled us to warm the climate and devastate much of the world?

Yes, but the lineage hasn’t finished yet. Who knows where it will go in the future.
Although, when it comes to the devastation of the planet, that turn of events happened when we had used intellect to subvert natural selection. Become too big for our boots.

Both the organisms and the world as they found it were necessary for this lineage to happen. — Punshhh

Absolutely.

Although, when it comes to the devastation of the planet, that turn of events happened when we had used intellect to subvert natural selection. — Punshhh

It seems to be true. Though one could also argue that the ability to do that was conferred by evolution and it looks as if the planet is taking action to restore balance.

The task of the philosopher is not to extract a common conceptual scheme from these myriad domains and to determine its faithfulness to some uncorrupted reality; it is, rather, to learn to navigate among the domains, and so to clarify their concerns in relation to each other. — Evan Thompson

I can sign up for that project. It makes sense to me.

It seems to be true. Though one could also argue that the ability to do that was conferred by evolution and it looks as if the planet is taking action to restore balance.

Yes, but I would draw back to the idea of the organism and natural selection working in lockstep. And that of the two, the one which was adapting was the organism. But in humanity’s case, we abandoned the adaptation, broke the lockstep and adapted to what we thought rather than what natural selection dictated.

That humanity has broken free from the constraints of natural selection and is endangering the whole endeavour. Going off on an ego trip and trashing the ecosystem which brought her into being. So perhaps the planet is now taking action. But is that the inorganic planet, or the organic planet (the ecosystem) or both?

We can illustrate the problem of “mistranslation” with the example of Parmenides’ statement: “Being is, non-being is not.” In a language with an obligatory copula, this phrase sounds like a final statement fixing being. In contrast, the translation of the same phrase into Kazakh and Chinese, suggested at the beginning of our discussion, completely changes its meaning: “Becoming is, non-becoming is not” (Bolý bar, bolmaý joq) or “The Way exists, the non-Way does not” (dào yǒu, fēi dào wŭ). These translations turn a statement about a static entity into a dynamic statement about a process and a relationship. This is a clear example of “mistranslation” as a conceptual act, not a grammatical error. — Astorre

Theoretically, it is possible to translate anything from any natural language to any other natural language. The formulation might be clumsy, but it should be possible.

In the example above, it's comes down to a well-known problem of trying to translate the specifics of grammatical and lexical aspect esp. from a Slavic language to other languages that don't have simple equivalents.

As a speaker of both two Slavic languages as well as two Germanic languages, I wouldn't make too much of this, though. What Slavic languages can do with aspect, other languages can make up for with tense. (My native language has an elaborate system of verbal aspect and 4 tenses. English has 16 tenses.)

Sort of like the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis for philosophy? It's an interesting though. However, it seems to me like Sapir-Whorf has fallen into ill repute in its stronger forms and the empirical support mustered for its weaker forms is, from what I can tell, is quite modest. Certainly, a lot of people have wanted it to be true, and I can see why, as it would suggest that merely speaking differently would open up all sorts of new horizons, but I am a bit skeptical. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Becoming fluent in a few languages, understanding the grammar theoretically for each of those languages, and having some knowledge of grammar in general kills the magic, in my experience.
And makes it harder to relate to ordinary monolingual people! Oy vey!

This is very important. This is exactly what I am talking about at the start: Not "what I am," but "how I being." It is in this act that our above-mentioned reflections are realized: Substantia is not a noun. Being is not a noun. (which, in my opinion, is a given for languages that do not require a copula)

Is it possible to identify a process? Rather than identify, it is more accurate to compare. Compare, but not with a thing, but with a process. — Astorre

I don't want to sound too simplistic, but this topic seems to conflate questions about at least a few grammatical phenomena:

full verbs vs. auxiliary verbs
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auxiliary_verb

grammatical aspect and lexical aspect
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_aspect

deverbal nouns/gerundiums
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verbal_noun

analytic vs. synthetic languages
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_language

It would be too much to go into each of these topics here in one post. And while studying general grammar theory doesn't necessarily resolve these questions, it can take away their mystique, or at least some of it.

For example, "being" is a noun; it's a noun derived from a verb, and as such it retains the semantic characteristics of the verb from which it derives, hence its verb-like meaning, even though grammatically, it's a noun.

Great, thank you, I'll check it out first and come back later.

Thanks again, I've studied the links you provided.
When writing the text, I used linguistic differences as an illustration to show that being is not necessarily a fixed entity ("substantia"). I used this chapter as an introduction to the main body of the work, where linguistic differences help us see being as a process, a becoming, a network of interactions.
The linguistic examples are not intended to imply that one language cannot be translated into another or that languages ​​create insurmountable gaps in thinking or worldviews. I am also a supporter of the "weak" Sapir-Whorf theory. Here, the goal was to show how linguistic structures highlight different aspects of being, which allows us to rethink the concept itself. This is not about linguistic barriers, but about philosophical potential.
Your remark about "being" as a gerund reinforces the thesis that even in English, "being" carries a connotation of process, not just essence. And that's wonderful. It's a shame it's been somewhat forgotten.

I found this draft I hadn’t finished before, but thought I would revive this post.

to understand the assertion "Being is”, — Astorre

I think we all grapple with this here on TPF, whether we talk about it or avoid it, an understanding of 'being/becoming' is under every surface, attached to every question. And you apply a very precise lens, namely, the difference between the structure of eastern and western languages surrounding how we think and speak, about this 'being/becoming'.

Although I don't think this is the main point of your post, what may be a theme, and something I agree with, is that "becoming" is a more descriptive definition, or better word for the concept or function of "being" (if we could truly divorce becoming from the thing becoming that ever-newer thing, and still define its being qua being, we would see “becoming” not something dead). Being and becoming have "ing" in common, and "ing" is moving, changing, living, not fixed and immobile.

Being is a sense of becoming. Becoming is the definition or essence of being.

We struggle "to understand the assertion 'Being is'" because substantively, "what being is" bumps immediately up against the "what" of things and not just their "being". Words like "what", or words like "things being things" put things in the way, obfuscating and distracting from the ‘being’ we seek to focus on. It forces being to keep becoming, to become elusive.

And western language makes this even more obfuscated. That is interesting to me.

Yet simultaneously, being remains simple, at the same time. We are always just sitting here, breathing, and we continue becoming, right now, as you are reading words such as "words" and "reading". Being is somehow simply always here, always immediate, and always simple.

Here is a comedy, or maybe a tragedy, of what happens when you try to say what being is:

John and Paul are in a room talking with each other and John says, “I don't know what a dog is, but I understand they are animals that make a sound called ‘barking’. What is this 'barking dog' all about?”
Paul says, “Oh sure, wow, you really have had a sheltered life. I can explain what a dog barking is.” And as he begins to explain, immediately three dogs rush into the room, barking loudly, jumping up and running around - barking and barking. Paul yells, “Ignore that and listen to me.” He yells, “A barking dog creates a loud, agitating, repetitive shout.” John, trying to understand says, “Did you say shout?” Paul says, “Yes. And I’m sorry about the noise, but ignore it, and I’ll talk louder. I can give you a clearer description, starting with a succinct definition of ‘dog’ and ‘barking’.” John says, “Maybe if you define ‘barking’ first or ‘dog’ first I think I might be able to understand.” And Paul yells, “What?....Please ignore the noises and the animals." And John yells “what is it that is that is making it impossible to understand what a dog barking is??”
Defining being is like that. The very words used to make clear what 'being' is, draw the understanding away from the object it is trying to understand, and all the while, in every same instant, ‘being’ is right there already understood, in every utterance, screaming in your ear, a perfect apprehension of what it means 'to be'?”

But I digress, because your question sits at one of the great crossroads, where "being" intersects with its language or its concept, and with all and nothing, or just every ‘thing’. So it is no wonder it is so easy to catch ourselves digressing - confused by our own language at how we cannot say something so ubiquitous as what 'being is'.

I agree with you that understanding being is hampered by the language we use to think and speak of being, and this is more so in the western language. But our agreement, if it is truly an agreement, is like a fixed, unchanging, thing. We have objectified something about 'being'. It is not becoming so much. So our agreement being fixed is at odds with my prior conclusion that becoming and the unfixed are better estimations of how we should "fix" being. This reflects again that speaking about being puts us at cross purposes, set between you and me communicating with each other in language, and each one of us trying to understand and think and speak about "being in the world" individually.

As Heraclitus says "the path of writing is both crooked and straight." - Fragment 59

Words get in the way here. And the words from the east that are in the way are in the way differently than the words from the west that are in the way. And these two distinct grammars “getting in the way” of the same being/becoming, lend a new insight or provide more tools to measure being/becoming.

since philosophy speaks about the world relying solely on language, this creates difficulties for both the researcher and the reader. — Astorre

I agree. If you think of lived experience like an onion, to look directly at “being,” it seems to me one must discard too many layers to continue speaking very well, and the last layer is language itself. It is there, after this last layer, when one wants to speak to point and say "being is". But as we get closer and closer to saying what ‘being’ is, we start to lose sight of anything solid from which to form a word clarifying such solid thing, because to say what being is, we need to remove all such solid things (being they are things and not being), and just speak of their being. To say “what is being” we need to leave “what” behind. But then it again becomes impossible to speak.

(The path of writing about being, without simply writing "being," and nothing else, is both crooked and straight, but mostly crooked.)

grammar is crucial… For native speakers of these languages, "is" is not just a word, but a mode of thought. It's woven into consciousness like a thread into fabric. To say "Socrates philosopher" without "is" is impossible… — Astorre

Yes - being still impregnates anything that doesn't expressly say "is". 'Socrates philosopher', captures the same experience as 'Socrates is philosopher', but the more eastern way allows one to move more quickly from 'Socrates philosopher' to some other thing towards which Socrates or Socrates philosopher moves and relates. The eastern grammar animates a motion from within the subject by begging the unspoken predicate, calling from elsewhere in the information being provided. Whereas the western grammar, by expressly saying "is", the pregnancy of becoming and urgency of being in motion that are built naturally into the eastern grammar is halted, fixing the motion of the sentence in stillness, hovering at best around 'Socrates' and the 'philosopher', two nouns with no needed further predication, or even context, not begging for any more motion.

'Socrates is a philosopher' - this focuses attention on a fixed Socrates, who could simultaneously be may other things, and then entices you with a fixed ‘a philosopher’.
'Socrates philosopher' - this immediately focuses more on a Socrates doing philosophy - it turns a noun into a verb, like a gerund - Socrates philosophizing - and immediately we are already carried along with the becoming of it, looking ahead beyond for what is becoming of Socrates philosopher unfixed by "is", just like any conceptualized, fixed being is really already becoming next and next ahead...

I am trying my best here to make any sense. (So tightly have you placed us in between language and what language does to conceptualize "being").

The verb "to be" in Russian is not a frozen snapshot of a state, but a process, movement, becoming. — Astorre

The absence of the copula "is" makes the question "What is being?" alien. Instead of seeking substance, the Chinese language emphasizes relationships and processes. — Astorre

This is truly interesting. Thanks for pointing this out.

My sense is this. Both the eastern and western minds, or somewhere in both eastern and western thought, all of the distinctions we are making have been recognized - however, the point you are noticing might be that the eastern way of thinking and speaking leaves being/becoming more room to keep breathing, whereas the western way of thinking and speaking makes things express, but by doing so, expressing something less than what the 'becoming' actually is.

The west scrutinizes and strangles still photos; the east leaves hands off and beholds motion pictures.

The western fixes what the eastern allows to continue becoming. And never fixing, but continuing to become, more aptly describes 'being', than fixing a concept does.

This means, to me, that the west is suited best for explicating essence, whereas the east is suited best for acknowledging becoming/being/existence.

A person does not "exist"; they become—a scientist, a father, themselves. — Astorre

Right, so we never fix the 'being' qua 'being' of the scientist. The scientist, being a scientist, is really an act of becoming a scientist. The best way to say this in western language might be: "Scientist becoming," is what is happening.

But here I think I digress again, away from discussing existence or becoming and its language, and instead starting to discuss essences or things, like "Scientist" is a fixed thing we can divorce from any particular being. Where I always end up at this digression point is that, language, or the concepts we have to make of otherwise moving/becoming things, language always re-fixes them, in order to facilitate communicating our thoughts with each other.

Words are the only fixed thing in the universe. They are the possibility of being, in a universe that otherwise becomes.

We can't, between us, speak of becoming if we do not also fix something. So we end up discovering things that are becoming, but in order to speak of them, we fix them as if they are not becoming but are just being. We say "Socrates is a philosopher" even though we are meaning that "Socrates philosophizing makes philosophy come to be" We speak of a conceptualized fixed version of things for sake of speaking, and it is often to the detriment of the things spoken about.

"The path of writing is crooked and straight."

Philosophy deals not with an object, but with its concept. — Astorre

This is a key clarifying insight. Philosophy, by objectifying, fixes something that was previously moving, and still becoming an “object”. A focus on moving/becoming is always forced to refocus on objectifying a snapshot instant of being, and this snapshot, this now fixed and immobile thing, the concept, is the object of philosophy, not the living, becoming moment of the thing anymore, but its concept.

And we are back, hovering around the crossroads again.

The absence of the copula "is" makes the question "What is being?" alien. Instead of seeking substance... — Astorre

That remains interesting. I wish I the capacity really learn Chinese and Russian. I'd love to try to think through these things with a whole new set of tools and grammatical boundaries.

the linguistic structure with the obligatory copula "is" often directed thought towards the search for substance. — Astorre

This seems to recognize the essence-existence struggle through language I mentioned above.

It's like the west pushes you into brick walls to fix predicates on top of subjects. And the east won't let you sit still to finish identifying where the walls are fixed. Is that something you would say?

It also leaves the eastern mind more amenable and open and receptive to, and immediately grasping of, the more mystical aphoristic expressions in language of becoming. In the west, when faced with the contradictions of becoming, the west either dismisses the line of reasoning too quickly, or seeks to resolve the contradiction in an idealism. (Parmenides) The east is more willing to 'rest' with a paradox, to strain linear logic for sake of something more dynamic (Heraclitus), and say what isn't easily said.

the Chinese language emphasizes relationships and processes. — Astorre

In the end, the fixed and its becoming, are both always there. East and West have always shared this same experience and this same struggle to express it in their languages. But it is really interesting to see how their leanings (fixed versus moving) may have been driven by how the languages are structured.

“It is the same thing to think, and speak thoughts, as it is to be” - to paraphrase Parmenides. It is a messy struggle of of permanence with motion. “It rests with change.” - to paraphrase Heraclitus.

This is a fantastic comment. It feels like I have no answer to what you asked, because you so accurately captured the essence of what lies beneath the words of my post. You are already there, within your questions, within the answers. The answers will simply come.

I am so inspired and grateful for your response. It encourages me to continue my research!