No, I'm suggesting that for Aquinas, (following the lead of Aristotle), the human intellect is not purely immaterial, it is dependent on the material body. This is actually the reason Aquinas gives for why human beings cannot adequately know God, and separate Forms. The human intellect is deficient in this sense, and that is why we cannot adequately know God until the soul is disunited from the body.

Aquinas, as far as I understand, did think the mind is immaterial. It is not half material and half immaterial (or something like that). In fact, he forwards many arguments for why it is immaterial. Aristotle vaguely alluded to it being immaterial in De Anima, but didn't explicate it like Aquinas did.

I would say that this is a misunderstanding of Aristotle, and Aquinas.

Why? Aquinas thought that, e.g., Angels are pure form and not purely actual.

All matter is potential, but not all potential is matter.

Agreed. To be precise: matter is that which has passive potency, and not that which has potency simpliciter. An, e.g., Angel has active potency but no passive potency; and this is because an Angel has no matter which can be affected; but they still can learn.

The reason why the mind must be immaterial, is illustrated with the tinted glass analogy.

That is a very interesting analogy and I am inclined to agree; but it contradicts your point that humans cannot adequately separate forms. The whole point of the analogy is that if we have a proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity), then it cannot be material AT ALL. Aquinas uses similar arguments to affirm that the mind is completely immaterial; others, as you noted, will use it to deny we have a proper intellect (like Hume).

I think you are going to deny this on grounds that I am implicitly thinking in terms of reverse mereology again; — Bob Ross

Right.

but if an unsubstantial form, like that of a chair, is reducible to way the material and organization of parts suit the natural end(s) of 'chairness', then a substantial form is the same but the addition that it is organized to self-organize: this doesn't seem to entail some sort of subsistent unity that directs the self-movement. Let me know what you think. — Bob Ross

Without trying to parse your argument too closely, what I would say is that "chairness" is not a natural end. It is an artificial end, imposed by humans. On the other hand, the acorn's end of oakness is a natural end, given that acorns are ordered to oak trees whether or not humans decide that they are.

Regarding premise 5:

5. A material thing and an immaterial thing cannot interact. — Bob Ross

Feser's point seems appropriate:

in fact Descartes’ account of matter as pure extension makes causal interaction even between corporeal substances themselves problematic — Edward Feser, Mind-body interaction: What’s the problem?

On Cartesian thinking it is no more obvious how corporeal things could interact with one another, than how corporeal things could interact with incorporeal things.

To clarify, are you saying that a robot that has an inward self-actualizing principle towards specific ends (which provide its whatness) does not thereby have a soul?

Do you believe, then, that the soul, even in material souls (viz., non-subsistent souls), is a unity that directs the organism (and this unity is not merely how the parts behave in unison together)? If so, then how does, e.g., an oak tree produce another oak tree with an oak tree soul? I was thinking it would just provide it with the intial spark to get it's parts self-actualizing towards the natural ends of an oak tree.

To clarify, are you saying that a robot that has an inward self-actualizing principle towards specific ends (which provide its whatness) does not thereby have a soul? — Bob Ross

I would say that a robot has no inward self-actualizing principle towards specific ends. It has no substantial form because it is not a substance. It is a mere aggregate of parts and instructions.

Do you believe, then, that the soul, even in material souls (viz., non-subsistent souls), is a unity that directs the organism (and this unity is not merely how the parts behave in unison together)? — Bob Ross

Yes, I think so.

If so, then how does, e.g., an oak tree produce another oak tree with an oak tree soul? I was thinking it would just provide it with the intial spark to get it's parts self-actualizing towards the natural ends of an oak tree. — Bob Ross

Let's call the act of procreating "begetting." I don't know precisely how an oak tree begets an acorn. Does it bear on your point about whether the soul is a unity?

I would say that a robot has no inward self-actualizing principle towards specific ends. It has no substantial form because it is not a substance. It is a mere aggregate of parts and instructions. — Leontiskos

But wouldn't a robot that could mechanistically grow, heal, etc. be self-unified towards certain ends?

Let's call the act of procreating "begetting." I don't know precisely how an oak tree begets an acorn. Does it bear on your point about whether the soul is a unity? — Leontiskos

What I wondering is how would a material soul ever be begotton by another material soul if the soul is a unity which is not merely received by the matter in the same way a chair's matter receives unity from the form bestowed onto it by its creator.

I was envisioning that all Aristotle meant by a material soul (viz., non-subsisting soul), like a vegetative soul, is that it is analogous to how a chair receives its form but that it is a form when received that self-actualizes.

I was thinking the material soul is baked into the matter like the form of a chair is baked into a chair; but it sounds like in your view that is not true. The material soul is not merely baked into the matter as a way materials are arranged to self-actualize: instead, there's a quasi-subsistent unity that directs its self-actualization.

But wouldn't a robot that could mechanistically grow, heal, etc. be self-unified towards certain ends? — Bob Ross

If I write a computer program that starts with an integer and adds 1 every second, is it self-unified towards the end of larger sums? The crucial point here is that the program or the robot is not self-moving, given that it is a human artifact which is being moved by the instructions given to it by a human.

What I wondering is how would a material soul ever be begotton by another material soul if the soul is a unity which is not merely received by the matter in the same way a chair's matter receives unity from the form bestowed onto it by its creator. — Bob Ross

Put differently, you seem to be saying, <If the soul is a unity which is not merely received by the matter in the same way a chair's matter receives unity from the form bestowed onto it by its creator, then it is hard to see how a (non-human) substance could ever beget another substance>.

I don't follow. I don't understand why that would make the possibility of begetting "hard to see."

I was envisioning that all Aristotle meant by a material soul (viz., non-subsisting soul), like a vegetative soul, is that it is analogous to how a chair receives its form but that it is a form when received that self-actualizes. — Bob Ross

I suspect not. Aristotle would see quite a difference between an artifact and a substance. The generation of a new substance is a rather mysterious thing, I grant you that. But I think it is mysterious on any account, not just Aristotle's.

I was thinking the material soul is baked into the matter like the form of a chair is baked into a chair; but it sounds like in your view that is not true. The material soul is not merely baked into the matter as a way materials are arranged to self-actualize: instead, there's a quasi-subsistent unity that directs its self-actualization. — Bob Ross

Yes, I think that's right. First I don't want to deny that a plant is subsistent. It is. Substances are precisely subsistent, and a plant is a substance. By "subsistent" you apparently mean, "subsistent apart from matter," and it is true that this does not occur with plants. Second, I'm not sure I would want to call a plant's substantial form "material." Forms in general are not material. Presumably this again comes back to the fact that the plant's form does not subsist apart from matter.

The more general difficulty here is the question of whether and how the human soul exists apart from the body. For Aquinas this gets rather complicated. He would basically say that the human soul can exist apart from the body, but only unnaturally and imperfectly. The eventual resurrection of the body remedies the imperfect situation for him.

Aquinas, as far as I understand, did think the mind is immaterial. It is not half material and half immaterial (or something like that). In fact, he forwards many arguments for why it is immaterial. Aristotle vaguely alluded to it being immaterial in De Anima, but didn't explicate it like Aquinas did. — Bob Ross

I don't think the answer is as simple as you make it out to be. As a power of the soul, the intellect is immaterial, as the soul is immaterial. However, the human soul is united with the material body, and the human intellect is dependent on this union.

The whole point of the analogy is that if we have a proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity), then it cannot be material AT ALL. — Bob Ross

The problem is that the human intellect is deficient, due to its dependence on the material body. Therefore it is not a "proper intellect (that can apprehend forms with clarity)". Human beings understand forms by abstracting from "phantasms", which are sense impressions derived through corporeal organs. So our understanding of the immaterial is derived from the phantasms produced by corporeal organs.

Q 85 Art 1

I answer that, As stated above (I:84:7), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above (I:76:1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

Aristotle seems to be regarding the mind (viz., the thinking aspect of the soul) as 'unmixed' with the matter and that, for some reason, this mind is not real prior to knowing something. — Bob Ross

Not what I got from the passage... Aristotle is saying before a thought is SHAPED and comes into the mind... it has no form. Not that the two are seperate.

Just as Nietzsche details in Aphorism 17 of BGE. Thoughts come from this unformed place that we call "I" when really it's just that the unconscious body thinks. "I think" ... yet the thought came to you ... it was unformed, but within the multiplicity of the will. "I" is just the ego, the mask the body wears, but certainly "I" doesn't do the thinking. "I" is the form projected from the tyranny of that multiplicity of undercurrents. Perhaps you think "seperate" because of how dialectical your approach is? It seems a mistake to say Aristotle would seperate a dual orbit... when he is quite a famous case of "too little too much" between two opposites. But to even call these two opposites is too much also as they're one in the same, as Nietzsche details in BGE 2. It's more of a growth out of.

"I" is like the metaphysical attack surface of a person, it's a place where forms go to thrive or die. Hence why pluralism has become so big these days... because there are, in reality, so many fucking forms, anything is possible...

Wait, whats that, Schizo Analysis? a form of unformed forms formulating over different forms of a form in an unformulated manner? My gosh what will that do other than give a multiplicity of perspectives! Osh Kosh By Gosh! Perspective seems to be a fundamental condition of life... oh wait also in BGE.

And a mod can see how many times I edit and Update because all the forms of these words were mostly formless a moment ago before I spooled up the good old "I" for churning mental butter.

I agree with you, but I do see the form of an alive being as analogous to how a form is baked into the chair. I think the robot example is going to further the discussion best, so let's dive in.

If I write a computer program that starts with an integer and adds 1 every second, is it self-unified towards the end of larger sums? The crucial point here is that the program or the robot is not self-moving, given that it is a human artifact which is being moved by the instructions given to it by a human. — Leontiskos

Imagine you made a robot that was not hardcoded to move in certain ways, but was comprised of an elastic algorithm that facilitated its ability to will in accord with its ends (e.g., survival, reproduction, regeneration, etc.). Would you not consider that analogous to an non-subsistent, substantial form (viz., a material soul like a zebra's)? If so, then why not?

This isn't like a hardcoded machine program. It is programmed to be self-unified towards its ends and to will towards it.

I agree with you, but I do see the form of an alive being as analogous to how a form is baked into the chair. — Bob Ross

A substantial form is analogous to an artificial form in one sense, just as a car tire is analogous to an airplane wing in one sense. What remains to be seen is whether that sparse analogy is sufficient for the argument at hand.

Imagine you made a robot that was not hardcoded to move in certain ways, but was comprised of an elastic algorithm — Bob Ross

Is the elastic algorithm hardcoded or not? Given that it is, the robot is hardcoded to move in certain ways. It's just that the "ways" are a bit more subtle than someone doing a robot dance.

This isn't like a hardcoded machine program. It is programmed to be self-unified towards its ends and to will towards it. — Bob Ross

It has no intrinsic ends. It has no will. It is just blindly following the hardcoded algorithm. There is no extra-algorithmic aspect to its principles of motion.

Is the elastic algorithm hardcoded or not? Given that it is, the robot is hardcoded to move in certain ways. It's just that the "ways" are a bit more subtle than someone doing a robot dance. — Leontiskos

The algorithm is hardcoded, but it only dictates the structure for the being to will towards its ends. We aren't talking about a being that has a proper intellect (as that would require an immaterial soul): we are talking about a robot akin to a mechanical zebra.

It has no intrinsic ends. It has no will. It is just blindly following the hardcoded algorithm. There is no extra-algorithmic aspect to its principles of motion — Leontiskos

Notwithstanding persons, organisms blindly follow how its soul is programmed to will towards in the sense you described: the soul moves towards the ends it is supposed to have relative to its nature. There's nothing absolutely free about it: wouldn't you agree?

In the case of improper intellects (like a zebra's) that just pattern matches, it is just the processing of sense-data without abstraction of the form; and so it does also abide by whatever natural algorithm is in place for it to think. This doesn't mean the zebra cannot will against its nature whatsoever: it might will against avoiding an injury to preserve itself from a predator.

The algorithm is hardcoded, but it only dictates the structure for the being to will towards its ends. — Bob Ross

I don't think that is true. I think the algorithm dictates, deterministically, the movements of the mechanical zebra. That's how computer code works.

Notwithstanding persons, organisms blindly follow how its soul is programmed to will towards in the sense you described: the soul moves towards the ends it is supposed to have relative to its nature. There's nothing absolutely free about it: wouldn't you agree? — Bob Ross

A plant has no will, that's true. But your claim that a plant is "programmed" in the same sense that a mechanical zebra is "programmed" is not at all evident.

Again, my point is that a human artifact such as a mechanical zebra is merely following the instructions provided by its human creator. It has no substantial form. A plant is not merely following the instructions provided by its human creator. It has an intrinsic essence apart from human will.

and so it does also abide by whatever natural algorithm is in place — Bob Ross

This is another metaphor. A living, breathing zebra does not abide by an algorithm. To say that the zebra and the mechanical zebra are both "algorithmic" is an equivocation.

This is always the crux of the matter with mechanistic philosophy, by the way. Mechanistic philosophers think that natural phenomena are identical to machines. They think there is no qualitative difference between a zebra and a mechanical zebra. That seems to be the working thesis of much of your thought, especially when it comes to the way you give parts priority over wholes. With machines parts really do have priority over wholes, and so if nature is just a machine then reverse mereological essentialism is false.

This doesn't mean the zebra cannot will against its nature whatsoever: it might will against avoiding an injury to preserve itself from a predator. — Bob Ross

Would you say that a reckless and injurious flight from a predator is contrary to a zebra's nature? I wouldn't.

A zebra does have a nature, and a mechanical zebra does have an algorithm. The question is whether the nature and the algorithm are the same thing, and whether we can swap the two terms without loss of truth.

1. What is Aristotle's view of the mind here? Is it a nothingness, a negativity, like Hegel? Is it pure form that is immaterial? — Bob Ross

I'll let Aristotle experts argue about what he means by "pure from all admixture". Maybe he was thinking of Mind/Soul as the Ideal Form (actualizing principle) aspect of HyloMorph, which by analogy, converts amorphous clay into a meaningful or representative sculpture. But the purity specification (unadulterated) sounds like a reference to the 19th century notion of transparent Spiritual Energy (essence ; ectoplasm ; ghost) compared to the opaque Material Body (admixture of many substances).

However, my personal understanding of Mind is as a process (thinking) instead of a thing (physical entity). By that I mean : Mind is the function or purpose of Brain. For example, to coordinate all the various body parts, and to determine its place in space. Again, the material brain has many interacting parts (complexity), but the immaterial Mind, as a singular activity, is no-thing. Perhaps, as A.N. Whitehead suggested, it's a value-creating process. Yet, as in the notion of HyloMorph, Mind & Brain go together like clouds & weather; they are a team. :smile:

Ok, I think I am understanding it better now. My mistake was that I was thinking a substantial form is merely the self-actualizing principle of a being; but it is really the self actualizing principle of a substance. Iron has a substantial form: it's parts are essentially ordered towards the whole whereby if you destroy that ordering so goes the iron itself; whereas a chair has an unsubstantial form: it's parts are unessentially ordered towards the whole whereby if you destroy the ordering the parts remain the same kind of thing it was to begin with (e.g., the metal constituting the chair does not cease to be metal if the chair is taken apart).

A soul, then, is not identical to a substantial form; instead, it is a kind of substantial form that has a self-actualizing principle. This would entail, then, that a robot could never have a soul, even if it were self-actualizing, because it is not a substantial form: the parts are not essentially ordered to the whole.

Likewise, the unity in a robot, even if it were self-actualizing, would be accidental and not an essential one; so it would not be alive proper.

Assuming I am more on-point in this assessment than before, going back to how a soul begets another soul, the parents would have to somehow actualize the matter so that it can receive the soul; but the soul would have to somehow be educed from that process. I guess this chalks up to the basic and mysterious question of how a life-organism can be created; which is not a unique problem for Aristotle.

For the problem of interaction, I would say that Aquinas doesn't have the hard problem (since the soul and body are one substance); however, it does have the soft problem of how something immaterial can interact with something material. I'm not sure if he ever addresses that problem or not.

However, for Aquinas, since the rational soul is immaterial and subsistent and thusly has to be infused by God instead of being educed from a natural process, there is a further soft problem of how organisms which clearly did not have a rational soul could have evolved to have a rational soul (such as is the case with our transitionary species'). What do you think about that?

Assuming I am more on-point in this assessment than before — Bob Ross

I think it's definitely good progress. :up:
The general point is that a substance and an aggregate are two different kinds of things, and therefore it is hard to apply any single word to both of them. The mechanical zebra mimics the zebra, but for Aristotle at bottom they are two very different kinds of things.

For the problem of interaction, I would say that Aquinas doesn't have the hard problem (since the soul and body are one substance); however, it does have the soft problem of how something immaterial can interact with something material. I'm not sure if he ever addresses that problem or not. — Bob Ross

Yes, I don't think the question occurred to him, much like the question of how two corporeal substances interact perhaps never occurred to Descartes. Aquinas is very explicitly beginning with and discovering the whole before he discovers its parts. If he thought he discovered the parts before he discovered the whole, then he might have asked that question.

However, for Aquinas, since the rational soul is immaterial and subsistent and thusly has to be infused by God instead of being educed from a natural process, there is a further soft problem of how organisms which clearly did not have a rational soul could have evolved to have a rational soul (such as is the case with our transitionary species'). What do you think about that? — Bob Ross

Yes, I see that as another mysterious and common problem. It is the question of whether Evolution is sufficient to account for rationality.

:up:

Ah, so you are a functionalist, then?

Functions point to ends; ends point to a form; and a form points to an essence.

A "mind" as a mere function is an abstraction of any being which has those kinds of faculties; but it does not suffice for accounting for what a mind is for such-and-such. E.g., my mind as a human a human mind, instead of an alien mind, because it inheres in my human substance.

The function of a leg may be the same for a human and an ostrich, but they have different kinds of legs in virtue of their nature. It seems like if we define a leg in terms of its function, then human's and ostriches both have legs in the same manner.

then human's and ostriches both have legs in the same manner. — Bob Ross

They do certainly seem to. As with chairs.

Ah, so you are a functionalist, then? — Bob Ross

I suppose you mean a Functionalist*1, as opposed to a Behaviorist or Materialist or some other theory of Consciousness. Technically, a Function is the relationship between Inputs (sensory data) and Outputs (reasoning & acting). Mind is a Process which coordinates multiple physical (running) & metaphysical (thinking) Functions, and seems well designed (by evolution) to serve those disparate Purposes.

But, as a layman, I am not well informed about all those alternative theories of Mind. I simply observe that the primary business of the human brain*2, with its cerebral cortex & frontal lobes, seems to be designed to negotiate our complex social & cultural organizations with Reasoning, Learning, and Predicting the behavior of other minds*3. :chin:


*1. "Functionalist" generally refers to an approach that emphasizes the function or purpose of something in relation to the whole, often in the context of social systems, psychology, or design. In sociology, it describes a theoretical perspective that views society as a complex system with interconnected parts, each playing a role in maintaining stability and order. In psychology, it focuses on the mind's adaptive functions and how mental processes help individuals interact with their environment. Additionally, "functionalist" can describe an approach in architecture and design that prioritizes utility and practicality.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)

*2. The primary function of the brain is to act as the central command center for the body, coordinating and regulating all bodily functions. This includes processing sensory information, initiating movement, controlling emotions, and enabling complex cognitive functions like thinking, learning, and memory.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=primary+function+of+brain

*3. The evolution of large human brains is likely due to a combination of factors, including environmental challenges, social complexity, and dietary changes. These factors likely influenced each other, driving the evolution of larger, more complex brains capable of processing more information and supporting advanced cognitive abilities.
https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=reason+for+big+brain

Functions point to ends; ends point to a form; and a form points to an essence. — Bob Ross

Yes. For example, an engineer designs a machine with a particular Function (end) in mind, and the Form of the machine is organized to serve that end, its Purpose. Yet, the Form of the machine is not the Material it's made of, but the Essential interrelationships of its construction (design). Those inter-acting functions seem to indicate that a human brain was designed (by evolution?) for a different Purpose (function) from that of an Ostrich. The tiny ostrich brain is well suited (designed) for its physical & social habitat : a bunch of long-legged bird-brains.

However, the human brain layout was originally "designed" (by evolution) for an ape's jungle environment. Nevertheless, in only a few generations, it has spawned & adapted to an un-natural cultural habitat --- cars, planes, phones, etc. --- which tend to minimize use of the leg functions, and maximize the brain functions. And yet, the functional flexibility of the human Mind allows a few athletes to run like an ostrich, while others become obese couch potatoes, or nerdy phone swipers. Somehow, evolution seemed to anticipate that, since the 19th century, we homo sapiens would need a body & brain designed for thinking instead of running, and swiping instead of swinging. :joke: