Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?

Quk

I think there's no universal moral, and that makes the whole morality question superfluous. Yes, there are certain moral elements that are very popular, like "save the children", for example, but they are not universal; there are millions of child abuse cases every day, and calling them "psychopaths" is just a linguistic filter to keep the universalism cosmetically clean. Morality is just an artificial construction. For every act you do and that others find ugly, you can construct a moral excuse. This is possible because life is infinitely complex. It contains so many parameters that can be put on one side of the moral scale, and on the other side you can put whatever compensational weight you need. There's always an excuse for everything.

↪Quk

Well, that's a clear statement of moral relativism and/or the incoherence of allegedly moral values.

Do you think there's a worthwhile purpose for the "artificial construction" of morality, or is that just sending the question back in a circle ("worthwhile" = "of moral value")?

Quk

Do you think there's a worthwhile purpose ... — J

My hypothesis: Within a group there are usually a few alphas and many betas. The betas are unsure about how to behave. The alphas give the betas the instructions and they call them moral rules, given by an alleged higher power the alphas invented (religion or ideology), and the alphas act as self-proclaimed bearers of those higher moral rules. The alphas have optimized these rules for their purposes. They are worthwhile insofar as they maintain the alphas' power. Fact is: Rules are constructions. The alphas must hide this fact, for example, by telling great religious or ideological stories which are fictitious, of course -- or by referring to certain nature observations: There are many hens on the ground and one cock on the fence. This shall be the rule in our town as well. It shall be "right" that one man is at the top, controlling many women that do the main work. Why? Because we see this rule in nature. -- I think this is nonsense. The truth is: This so-called moral rule is just the result of cherry picking. Here they pick the chickens. Why not the bonobos? Bonobos behave differently. And even if all creatures on earth were in fact behaving the same, proclaiming this fact as a "rule" is a naturalistic fallacy. I mean, there's no reason to behave like this just because this has been the way until now. Evolution is here for experiments. Unfortunately, conservative minds don't like experiments.

unenlightened

I think morality is qualitatively overrated. The normative "should" lies in the feelings and not in those man-made books. — Quk

Ah, mere feelings? Are feelings overrated? I think they might be underrated, myself, by philosophy and her bastard child science alike.

We share common senses - hearing, colour vision, etc, and the fact that some people may be deaf and/or blind, does not lead us to dismiss vision and hearing as subjective. Why should we do so with the moral sense? Perhaps you are morally blind, or perhaps you have been persuaded to ignore your sensibilities, or perhaps I am full of shit. But if you don't have a moral commitment to truth, then I find you are not worth talking to because you will say anything that suits you.

Quk

The scientific hypothesis Morality as Cooperation, which is about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, makes no claims about what ought to be. — Mark S

Then it is inadequate. Nazis cooperate. Mafias cooperate. That is not what anyone wants to mean by morality — well that's too strong, it's not what anyone ought to mean by morality. — unenlightened

Cooperation includes several dimensions and magnitudes, I think. It's not a "yes/no".

• Short-term cooperation: Do just the bare necessities, forced by the tyrant (nazis, mafias)
• Long-term cooperation: Do more than necessary, do it because you like it (trust, reliability)

• Minimal cooperation (nazis, mafias)
• Great cooperation (trust, reliability)

By these parameters the paradoxon gets resolved.

Bob Ross

↪Mark S

You continue to confuse moral facticity with inter-subjective agreement. A moral fact is not traditionally an 'imperative ought' where we ought to do something indpendently of our needs. A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.

A million people socially accepting norms is not a source of facticity about anything. It would be a fact that they accepted it and that it is a norm, but the norm itself would be non-factual.

Quk

Perhaps you are morally blind, or perhaps you have been persuaded to ignore your sensibilities, or perhaps I am full of shit. But if you don't have a moral commitment to truth, then I find you are not worth talking to because you will say anything that suits you. — unenlightened

Is this "you" addressing me personally or is it a general rhetorical "you"? I'm not sure what you are arguing for or against -- or whether your comment is just descriptive, -- and what the purpose of that fecal sarcasm is.

unenlightened

↪Quk

The argument is very simple and it is addressed to you as an individual who has made the quoted statement. But it applies equally to anyone who participates in these discussions. We only share our talk here, so nothing is at stake but the truth. And if there is no truth, then there is no meaning. Therefore our discourse has to presume a moral commitment to truth. even when, as now, it is painful. There is no sarcasm; I am in deadly earnest. We owe each other honesty, or we are not communicating at all.

unenlightened

I submit this as evidence:

AmadeusD

So finding moral conscience awareness in evolution or survival, finding moral facts outside of human beings, overlooks the fact that only a human mind can sense or detect the difference between what is and what ought to be. — Fire Ologist

Yep, at least empirically. Once we find non-human minds, this is going to get very interesting.

↪unenlightened

The endlessly running policeman represents Wittgenstein, coming to the aid of these poor language users who haven't agree on their game . . . Notice how long it takes him to get there. But once there, he's stern!

Quk

↪AmadeusD

Robert Macfarlane asks seriously if rivers have rights. I think this is an interesting question. If they do, are rivers non-human moral beings? Honest question. Of course, rivers can't speak for themselves. They need human attorneys.

Fire Ologist

Once we find non-human minds, this is going to get very interesting. — AmadeusD

If we do.

But once we do, aside from tons of interesting differences, my sense is they will have to have the same ultimate questions and problems with these concepts. I don’t think there is a God who can sort things out any differently. It’s the fabric of personhood and moral existence. IMO.

T Clark

The bad news is, he thought this was another way of stating the categorical imperative! — J

Yeah, what's up with that? Here are the three formulations.

Kant says they're just different ways of saying the same thing. The first is the one that is most often talked about - the one that says it's not ok to lie to Nazis. I certainly like the second better and I have no idea what the third means.

Mark S

Now you have every right to describe morality and immorality in this way, and you are scrupulous in calling the behaviors "descriptively moral" rather than just "moral." If there is nothing further to the idea of the moral than a certain group of behaviors that assist humans in cooperating, such a description sounds plausible to me.

But what I'm claiming, along with a few others here, I think, is that this misses entirely what "moral" means, except as a sociological or biological description. When I ask, "Is X the right thing to do?" I'm not posing a question about whether X is consistent with the evolutionary strategy you describe. Of course, nine times out of ten -- perhaps 99 out of 100 -- it may well be. Cooperation, the Golden Rule, etc. are usually very consonant with what I will decide is the right thing to do.

......

I'm trying to avoid putting this in terms of "is can't generate ought," but that's what it comes down to. Mother Nature is what she is, but ethical questions are about what I ought to do. It takes an independent argument to establish that the two are the same. — J

J, thanks for your careful response.

I thought I was clear in my OP that the subject was the usefulness of understanding the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense (what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’) and NOT what we imperatively ought to do.

I then proposed that, even lacking any imperative oughts, this kind of ‘moral fact” could help resolve disputes about:

• The relevance of moral intuitions.

• Enforcement of cultural moral norms by revealing the shameful, to modern sensibilities, origins of cultural moral norms such as “women must be submissive to men”, “homosexuality is evil”, and “abortion is always immoral”.

• Morality when blindly acting according to moral principles such as the Golden Rule, Kant’s moral imperative, or simple Utilitarianism is intuitively immoral.

I was hoping responses would focus on whether this knowledge could help resolve such disputes.
Any opinions?

I sympathize with the urge to fall back to standard ought questions like “But why ought I avoid exploiting other people (causing cooperation problems) just because solving cooperation problems is the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?”

The answer was clearly not as obvious as I had assumed.

You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice.

Why might it be your preferred moral means as a rational choice? It is

1) Arguably the most effective means for achieving common shared goals.

2) Universal to all cultures (and, in its game theory roots, arguably the one moral theory that is as innate to our universe as mathematics)

3) The moral theory that is most harmonious with our moral sense.

Mark S

Tom, it is not a Hobbesian view, but there are two categories of descriptively moral behaviors.
— Mark S

It is. In Chapter 28 of Leviathan, Of Punishments, and Reward, he writes that without fear of punishment people would simply follow their own interests and ignore the common good. It's a view held by many. But so what? So you share a view with Hobbes (and you like game theory). — Tom Storm

Tom, Hobbes is correct that purely self-interested agents will, without punishment, simply follow their own interests, leading to his description of pre-civilization life as nasty, brutish, and short. This necessity for punishment is why the feeling that moral violations deserve punishment is encoded as one of part of the cooperation strategies in our moral sense. Indeed, moral norms can be distinguished from other norms by the common feeling that violators deserve punishment.

But contrary to Hobbes, people are not purely self- interested agents. In the long-term company of small groups, particularly kin, people can act in highly unselfish ways with little punishment of immoral behavior required. Social punishment becomes more important for preserving cooperation when there are ingroups and outsiders (exploitable outgroups).

Morality as cooperation contradicts Hobbes understanding of our pre-civilization nature. It is not Hobbesian.

Mark S

You continue to confuse moral facticity with inter-subjective agreement. A moral fact is not traditionally an 'imperative ought' where we ought to do something indpendently of our needs. A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.

A million people socially accepting norms is not a source of facticity about anything. It would be a fact that they accepted it and that it is a norm, but the norm itself would be non-factual. — Bob Ross

Hi Bob, I see a lot of ambiguity about what people mean by the term moral facts. I’ll take your word for it that imperative oughts are not as common an assumption as I have perceived it to be. I expect we agree that such strange things are unlikely to exist.

Let’s consider your definition: “A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality.”

Do you believe that someone has come up with a widely convincing argument that such a moral fact exists? Have I missed a revolution in moral philosophy?

The function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense, solving cooperation problems, is a statement about reality.

It is grounded in reality in two ways: 1) It explains why our moral sense and virtually ALL cultural moral norms exist and 2) its origin is in the simple mathematics underlying game theory which can be argued to be innate to our physical reality. It is the universality of this function and its innate to our universe origins that give it its power. How many people recognize it is irrelevant.

But even with that ‘power’, no oughts are attached to it yet.

But we could logically say “We ought (instrumental) to use the criterion, does it solve or create cooperation problems, to refine our cultural moral norms with the goal of increasing the benefits of cooperation in our society.”

I would appreciate your explanation of why you might think that understanding the function of what virtually all people (except philosophy majors) everywhere and everywhen consider ‘morality’ is not useful or relevant.

Mark S

But of course, claims about anything come from people, and this claim comes from you, but I don't think much of it. I think we ought to have a shared goal in discussion to get as close as we can to the truth, and this shared aim is what grounds the morality of our interaction. Now if someone does not share this aim, there is nothing to be done, but to ignore what they say, and move on, unless we can somehow persuade them that the truth must be their goal in communication in general or communication loses its meaning, value, and function. — unenlightened

This is a discussion forum about ethics.

Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms.

Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy.

My main goals here are to clarify why “morality” as moral ‘means’ (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) exists so we can 1) refine cultural moralities to better meet our need and preferences, 2) separate out the search for moral ‘ends’ that are the other part of the larger subject, ethics.

What is your goal here?

Tom Storm

Morality as cooperation contradicts Hobbes understanding of our pre-civilization nature. It is not Hobbesian. — Mark S

I wasn’t arguing your whole model was Hobbesian.

AmadeusD

↪Quk

Rivers aren't moral beings. I do not think anything non-conscious has 'rights'. Conscious beings have obligations (on that model. Not sure where I fall).

↪Fire Ologist

I certainly generally agree with all that!

Quk

We only share our talk here, so nothing is at stake but the truth. And if there is no truth, then there is no meaning. Therefore our discourse has to presume a moral commitment to truth. — unenlightened

Only a statement can be true (or false). You're talking about truth. In your comment I'm literally missing the statement that needs to be true. What statement needs to be true?

Or are you confusing the term "truth" with the term "reality"?

unenlightened

Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms. — Mark S

I really like this. It makes a great starting place by indicating that we have intuitions and make moral judgements not only with them but also of them.

Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy. — Mark S

I don't. Here for random example, we discover that infants have intuitions about fairness that relate closely to the needs of a cooperating social animal for mutual trust. Clearly this can give rise to some internalised conflict with the appetites of the individual, and so sets up the endless psychodrama between the individual and society, and explains why conflict sociologists find that the more internalised conflict in a society, the less external conflict, such that a polarised society tends to descend into violence, whereas one of individuals with conflicting loyalties will be more peaceful.

My main goals here are to clarify why “morality” as moral ‘means’ (cultural moral norms and our moral sense) exists so we can 1) refine cultural moralities to better meet our need and preferences, 2) separate out the search for moral ‘ends’ that are the other part of the larger subject, ethics.

What is your goal here? — Mark S

My goal in this discussion is the same as my goal in every discussion, to arrive at the truth together. But particularly to this topic it is important to me to point out that our communication is necessarily a moral endeavour. And thus I close the circle back to those intuitions by which we judge the very investigative discourse on which we are embarked. Are our goals moral?

It is this circularity that allows ethics to take flight and transcend mere biology to become that which can stand in judgement of nature itself.

J, thanks for your careful response. — Mark S

And thanks for yours.

I definitely want to reply in depth to your points -- you're right, for one thing, that I'd forgotten the thrust of your OP -- but will shortly be offline probably till "my" tomorrow. (it's 8:45 am EDT, USA, now, where I live). So, since I don't want to do a hasty job .. . till then.

I have no idea what the third means. — T Clark

Yes, and it's the third one that connects with a "pure" good will that does not consider ends to be reasons for acting.

Mark S

A moral fact is a statement about reality that describes how it ought to be that corresponds appropriately to reality. — Bob Ross

Bob, your definition of moral fact is ambiguous with respect to the kind of ought it refers to.

You assured me that this ought does not refer to “What we ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences.”.

It also obviously does not refer to an instrumental or intuitive ought. Right?

Perhaps it refers to “What we ought to do as a universal rule with a motivating source of bindingness.” And that motivating source of bindingness could be rational thought.

But its universality, as required of a “fact”, would then be equivalent to what is imperatively moral.

What do you say the ought in your definition refers to?

Mark S

↪J

I definitely want to reply in depth to your points -- you're right, for one thing, that I'd forgotten the thrust of your OP -- but will shortly be offline probably till "my" tomorrow. (it's 8:45 am EDT, USA, now, where I live). So, since I don't want to do a hasty job .. . till then. — J

J, no rush. I find that the quality of discussions on complex issues improves if I refrain from replying immediately. My responses to you may often be delayed by a day or two, and sometimes more.

I thought I was clear in my OP that the subject was the usefulness of understanding the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense (what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’) and NOT what we imperatively ought to do. — Mark S

You were. Thanks for pointing me back to it. You're doing a careful job of trying to find a way to separate out the idea of a "moral fact" as a universal fact about humans, from the idea of a "moral fact" as a value about what is right and wrong. If I'm right that this is your program, I don't think it quite succeeds.

You argue that "moral sense" equates to "what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’." I think you mean that it follows that therefore, if anyone refers to their moral sense, they are referring not to actual questions of right and wrong as usually discussed in ethics, but rather to the built-in behaviors that our species is endowed with, both biologically and culturally. OK, fair enough.

So when we return to the question of individual behavior, you rightly ask why one should choose to adopt these built-in cooperation strategies -- since, however hardwired they may be, we know we can act against them

You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice. — Mark S

But now we're right back in the middle of ethics as usually discussed. Here are the good reasons for following a particular maxim, and here's Ornery Joe saying, "Well, I don't prefer the consequences." Is there something further that Morality as Cooperation can say to Joe? Is he "wrong"? I don't see how he can be. He sees the universal "moral fact" about cooperation and claims he doesn't give a toss.

So . . . the question I'd put to you is, Does this matter? Can we get the most out of "moral facts" and use the Cooperation thesis to point a path forward, without worrying about the likes of Joe, and the usual disputes about ethical reasons? You could, for instance, say something like, "Look, we understand how 'morality' came about -- it's a way of improving cooperation and helping cultures thrive -- and that's plenty good enough. Some people will never get it, and insist on a different kind of reason for what they call moral behavior, but that's irrelevant. We can still use the 'moral fact' of a universal cooperative strategy to help us decide many important questions about how we ought to behave. When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation."

I put a lot of words in your mouth, but is that close to your position?

Mark S

Ethics includes the morality, or lack of it, of our moral sense’s intuitions and past and present cultural moral norms.
— Mark S

I really like this. It makes a great starting place by indicating that we have intuitions and make moral judgements not only with them but also of them.

Our moral intuitions are foundational to moral philosophy. I am interested to hear how you defend the idea that understanding why our specific moral intuitions exist is not relevant to moral philosophy.
— Mark S

I don't.

...

My goal in this discussion is the same as my goal in every discussion, to arrive at the truth together. But particularly to this topic it is important to me to point out that our communication is necessarily a moral endeavour. And thus I close the circle back to those intuitions by which we judge the very investigative discourse on which we are embarked. Are our goals moral? — unenlightened

Of course, my goal here is also to arrive at truth. In aid of that, I am doing my best to honestly portray the data, as I understand it, about cultural moral norms and our moral sense, and how it can be explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

My intermediate goal is to identify how understanding cultural moral norms and our moral sense, as parts of cooperation strategies, can be a useful reference for refining cultural moral norms with the ultimate goal of increasing flourishing – my ultimate utilitarian goal.

So yes, my goal, and I assume yours, is moral. Also, specifically, my means of achieving that goal is moral by Morality as Cooperation.

Mark S

You argue that "moral sense" equates to "what moral behaviors socially and biologically ‘are’." I think you mean that it follows that therefore, if anyone refers to their moral sense, they are referring not to actual questions of right and wrong as usually discussed in ethics, but rather to the built-in behaviors that our species is endowed with, both biologically and culturally. OK, fair enough. — J

Not quite right about “not referring to actual rights and wrong”. If anyone refers to their moral sense’s judgments, they are referring to what is at least descriptively right and wrong. If one does not like the consequences of conforming to those judgments, they can violate those judgments without acting irrationally. When you say “actual questions of right and wrong” are you thinking of judgements justified by rational thought and violating them would be irrational?

You ought do so if you prefer following Morality as Cooperation’s prescription for moral ‘means’. And "prefer" would usually be because you prefer the consequences as an instrumental choice.
— Mark S

But now we're right back in the middle of ethics as usually discussed. Here are the good reasons for following a particular maxim, and here's Ornery Joe saying, "Well, I don't prefer the consequences." Is there something further that Morality as Cooperation can say to Joe? Is he "wrong"? I don't see how he can be. He sees the universal "moral fact" about cooperation and claims he doesn't give a toss. — J

If Joe does not prefer the consequences of acting morally (according to Morality as Cooperation) or using it to refine cultural moral norms in his culture, then there is not much to be done. I can add that Joe is morally “wrong” to violate what is inherently moral in our universe (the cooperation strategies underlying cultural moral norms and moral sense that solve cooperation problems without creating cooperation problems with outgroups). However, I cannot say that his choice is irrational.

Could Joe’s rationality or irrationality when he acts’ immorally’ be a distinguishing characteristic (along with moral ‘means’ vs moral ‘ends”) between the two kinds of ‘morality’ under consideration: Cooperation Morality and traditional moral philosophy’s moral systems?

So . . . the question I'd put to you is, Does this matter? Can we get the most out of "moral facts" and use the Cooperation thesis to point a path forward, without worrying about the likes of Joe, and the usual disputes about ethical reasons? You could, for instance, say something like, "Look, we understand how 'morality' came about -- it's a way of improving cooperation and helping cultures thrive -- and that's plenty good enough. Some people will never get it, and insist on a different kind of reason for what they call moral behavior, but that's irrelevant. We can still use the 'moral fact' of a universal cooperative strategy to help us decide many important questions about how we ought to behave. When uncertain, we'll try to discover which choice will most advance cooperation." — J

Yes, you have captured what I am proposing. Continuing my above thought, I am not proposing that it is irrational to violate Morality as Cooperation if you don’t like the consequences of following it.

I put a lot of words in your mouth, but is that close to your position? — J

Yes, that is close to my position. Thanks for your comment.

unenlightened

Morality as Cooperation. — Mark S

Have you thought about cooperation in nature, apart from between humans? Bees and flowers, the symbiotic relationship that produces lichens, ant colonies, and so on; it seems there is in every aspect of relations between an organism and its environment elements of cooperation and of exploitation.

A tiger creeps through the long grass towards its prey, and the vertical stripes and slow sinuous movement convey its absence - 'just the grass rustling in the breeze'. Or the reverse deceit of the prey, as a stick insect stands immobile at just the right angle and in the right place to appear to be a dry twig. Examples of an evolved form that cooperates with the general environment to deceive, on the one side its prey, and on the other, its predator.

Or the icon of immorality - the cuckoo; that lays its eggs in another bird's nest and whose offspring will kill all the chicks of its host, and be fed by the unhappy parents 'til it is bigger than them and they are exhausted.

Is there a “moral fact” about the function of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?

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