Re Kant, as mentioned before, I didn't have space to really take on many thinkers in depth. But here is why I think Hume is a good model:

- The anthropology of economics holds to this mold. To be sure, in theory the intellectual appetites and irascible appetites are contained in "utility," which encompasses all desire, but this tends towards a deflation towards pleasure/pain. Smith was, of course, a close friend of Hume. But economics has been massively influential in public policy and in the development of the established (now global) social order.

- Computational theory of mind suggests something very much like "all thought is ratio." The model of the Turing Machine does not include any notion of intellectus, quiddity, etc. Obviously, some proponents try to get around this with appeals to emergence. However, CTM tends in this direction and has been the dominant paradigm in cognitive science, etc., for a long time. Bayesian Brain theories would be another example; everything is mere induction. Eliminitive materialism would be another. Marxist anthropology shows some similarities here too.

-The dominant, now hegemonic political ideology of the West, and now the whole global order is liberalism. But liberal theorists tend towards very thin anthropologies that avoid the intellectual appetites (or "bracket them out"). Obviously, there are continental objections to this, I cite Han. Yet while perhaps more widely read, I think they are less influential. The Anglo-empiricist model is influential not through philosophy but through economics, liberal political theory, public policy, cognitive science, etc. Utilitarianism has also had huge influence, and makes similar suppositions.

Just for example, Rawls has a very procedural notion of reason, and his anthropology is still thicker than much earlier utilitarianism. Nozick had a slightly thicker anthropology, but it's still thin. Fukuyama brings in thymos, but not really the intellectual appetites, and arguably he brings it in hamstrung by his other commitments.

Another thing the paper is missing is an expansion on the idea that the more a particular participates in the universal "stream" (to use imagery from Dionysius the Areopagite) the more fully it is particular. The intellect's participation in universals, and intellectual knowledge, makes it more particular, because knowledge And understanding are required for self-determination, which is required for true unity (particularity). Consider that all amoebas are quite similar. All dogs are more similar than all men. Angels are more particular than men, being each an individual species (in Aquinas).

The same idea is in play with knowledge and virtue. All those plagued by vice and ignorance are in some ways similar. Dante is able to respect history and particularity in a way similar Sufi texts like The Conference of the Birds don't, because of the recognition that perfection makes people more fully persons. More perfected persons are more particular because they are more free, more self-determining, and more fully what they are and not a bundle of warring external causes (and idea going back to Plato's psychology). There is a sort of ascent of the particular in the stream of the universal.

This helps Dante's philosophy of history in that Providence is not at odds with freedom and particularity, but its full realization. Solovyov is useful here because he takes some of the insights of Hegel re the rational unfolding of history, and has a similar view to Dante on the telos of history, and yet he isn't committed to a sort of providential over-determination. History is the meeting ground of truth and falsehood, the stage of cosmic drama, and not merely a proving ground for individuals. There is an element of perfection and freedom that involves the communication of goodness to others (agape descending, eros ascending) that is realized in history, through human beings' mutual empowerment of one another in the ascent Dante lays out. This is clearest in the Commedia in the roles of Beatrice, St. Lucy, and Mary. But this can be more or less actualized in the polis, and obviously a thin anthropology would be a barrier to any notion like this, even a secularized one.