I don't think he hopes to apply it to reality as much as he's making a point about logic.

It's a subtle point, but he wasn't talking about reality as much as how we talk about reality -- logic.

I don't think this is a good way to do philosophy, or what most people do in philosophy -- but he wasn't claiming a conspiracy theory as much as speaking a false assumption. — Moliere

Even if that is true, the mountain of quibbles does not actually succeed in showing that water is not H2O. When chemists or philosophers say that water is H2O they are not claiming that every natural body of liquid that anyone labels 'water' is pure, undiluted H2O. :worry:

My example would be Kripke’s attempt to show “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth. This is not a demonstration of something true of realty but a construction of his imagination that he hopes applies to something in reality. — Richard B

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water.

I get what you saying, but he should stick with symbols, a = a. But as soon as you step into this messy world and use words like “water” and “H2O”, the gloves come off.

I don't think he hopes to apply it to reality as much as he's making a point about logic. — Moliere

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point.

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water. — Leontiskos

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point. — Leontiskos

Certainly, signs used in expression like "a = a" will express their meaning through their use. Where I find Kripke lacking is the usefulness of applying such an idea to the real world. He believes that once science, our knowledge, sets up this identity up, it is an a posteriori truth. But as I explained examining our common usage of the word "water", and how science in practice uses the concept "H20". This identity is not set up. On one side, "water" need not refer to any single thing, and on the other side refers to a scientific construct that currently has some predictive value when particular technology is applied to determine what a observable liquid may contain.

When you are reading Kripke on this issue, if you don't begin with an interest in developing the notion of rigid designation, then his whole project will be opaque to you. In general you first have to understand what a philosopher is really doing if you are to understand their reasoning. And if you provide a critique of a philosopher which has no relation to what he is really doing then the critique will fall away without anyone taking notice.

(What a philosopher is really doing = that philosopher's proximate telos. It is "What they are really up to." The percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water has nothing to do with Kripke's telos.)

From Naming and Necessity Kripke says, "Let's consider how this applies to the types of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about before-say, that water is H2O. It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O. We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not. We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water."

He says "It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O." This is incorrect. Science did not discover that "water is H20". By applying scientific theory, we discovered that liquids we typically call "water" we can detect molecules we call "H2O". "Water is H2O" is more of a philosophical construction, striped of its meaning from ordinary and scientific use. Consequently, we are just left bare with a the logical expression, "a = a".

He says, "We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not." I think so, this is called D2O.

He says "We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water." Well in fact, D2O is called heavy water, so some water is H2O and some water is D2O."

I will end by quoting Norman Malcom in his article "Kripke and The Standard Meter",

"Kripke presents acute criticisms of theories about names, references, designations, and so, that have been put forward by other philosophers. Judging, however, by two of the principal illustrations of his own theory, namely, heat and the standard meter, that theory too won't hold much water. One may be reminded here of Kripke's nice observation that being wrong "is probably common to all philosophical theories."

I was saying much the same thing. — J

Good, good. So we might have some agreement that there is no paradox in talking about the "pre-linguistic" world.

So back to

Essentially, what we want to know is whether "a reason" must cash out to "an obligatory cause" of holding a particular belief. This is troubling, as discussed on the thread. — J

So, not so sure about the "obligatory".

I agree.

What we discussed in that thread isn't Aristotle's answer to the question Wittgenstein took up, just an ancillary point that the positive skeptic's position is self-undermining. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Which, of course, was Wittgenstein's response. So I remain puzzled as to what it is you are actually proposing. However, it's a big topic and as you say, peripheral to this thread, so we might leave it there.

unless you have more to add?

Deuterium is, of course, an isotope of hydrogen. It follows then that D₂O is a isotopologue of H₂O.

Hence, heavy water is water.

It seems odd to say that science did not discover that water is H₂O. We used the terms "water", "Hydrogen" and "Oxygen" prior to the discovery. There's two ways to think about it. In the first, "water" refers to a particular substance, and science uncovered its deeper essence. On this view, water = H₂O is a necessary truth, discovered empirically. Profound metaphysical stuff. The other way to think about it, the meaning of "water" is based on its place in our dealings with it — that it is clear, potable, etc. On this view, saying water is H₂O is just a shift in how we describe it.

Different ways of talking about the same stuff. Are we obligated to say one is right, the other wrong? I don't see why.

Another interesting aside.

However, it's a big topic and as you say, peripheral to this thread, so we might leave it there. — Banno

:up: :up:

On this view, water = H₂O is a necessary truth, discovered empirically. Profound metaphysical stuff. — Banno

To keep whittling away, or should I say quibbling away, at this idea that "water is H20", I like to provide a quote from Sketches of Landscapes by Avrum Stroll,

"The discussion brings us to the category mistake argument. To simplify the discussion, I shall speak only about the collection of H2O molecules. The most important point to be made in this connection is that not all collections of such molecules are water. It depends on the nature of the collection, and this to a considerable degree is determined by such factors as air temperature and atmospheric pressure. Some collections are rigid, hard, and cold to the touch (ice I through ice VII). Some are liquid, tepid, and not solid. Ordinary persons call the latter aggregations "water" and the former "ice". It is a category mistake to infer from the fact that a particular collection of H2O molecules is water that every such collection is water. This seems to be the mistake that Putnam and Kripke have made throughout their discussion of water.

It leads to another. "Water' does not mean H2O, as they assert. For if it did and because water and ice are both composed of H2O, it would then follow that the meaning of "water" would be ice. But this is clearly false. Since ice and water have different properties, the former being rigid and the latter nonrigid, the two are not identical. Therefore, if "water" meant "ice, "water" could not mean water. Once again, we see that Kripke and Putnam are misled by their identity thesis into an incorrect linguistic theory."

I think Kripke and Putnam seem to be saying that each and every water molecule is H2O. But express like this seems tautologous and insignificant, not profound metaphysically. I am reminded of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus,

"5.5303 Roughly speaking, to say of two things that are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all."

To keep whittling away... — Richard B

I'm happy to join in. Is ice still water? Good question.

I don't find Stroll convincing. Ordinary people do say things such as "Take care, the water froze to ice overnight". And here they might be puzzled if you suggested that the water and the ice are different things. Freezing is the sort of thing that water does in the cold, after all. It's not utterly improper to say that ice is frozen water, and thereby mean that ice is one type of water amongst others.

We might, of course, simply choose to use "water" to refer only to the liquid, and "ice" to refer only to the solid. We might equally choose or stipulate that "water" is the genus of which "ice" is a species.

And there is the alternate mentioned above - to accept that either view is valid, and the choice discretionary. That there is no fact of the matter, but just two slightly different wats of using the words "water" and "ice".

It's this anti-essentialist last that I take as the better account.

Btu I am also happy to go along with Kripke and say ice is one of the various states in which we can find water, and that necessarily, all water is H₂O, as might suit the circumstances. This seems to me the better way to think about essentialism, if one must. Perhaps by keeping what's useful in essentialism, and let go of what’s dogmatic.