It is an interesting article. Likely, the method employed by several renowned philosophical projects involved entertaining a form of radical epoché, a suspension or break in the ordinary flow of consciousness. Descartes's argumentation, which forms the foundation for the Cartesian cogito, exemplifies this approach. It entails the systematic suspension of natural perception and common sense. Descartes doubted the reliability of his sensory organs (no eyes, no ears), the existence of external objects or even his own body, as well as sensations beyond those directly necessary for his inquiry. He even doubted memory, and rejected the notion of extension, as both the earth and the sky as mere fictions created by the mind. However, contrary to your central claim that "At the center of this theory is the claim that phenomenal consciousness is accompanied by a breakdown of causal distinctiveness within a recursively interconnected network", Descartes did not appear to fall into a purely affective state. His meditations were clearly directed by a distinct and rigorous clarity in the pursuit of truth. But likely Descartes did not completely postponed the guidance of the pre-meditated foreknowledge of
his method. In general, I agree with your thesis that " a system experiences itself when it can no longer objectify its internal differences.
This "confusion" of the system with its own states creates the sense of self. Consciousness is then not an instance, but a process of constant self-confusion: a structural breakdown that feels itself." Yet, I believe this thesis could benefit from stronger phenomenological grounding.

when you agree with " a system experiences itself when it can no longer objectify its internal differences. The internal differences, differ between ? Physical-mental domain?

From both phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives, it is possible to identify a relatively brief but crucial stages of developmental crises. The transition from primates to early hominids likely involved the period of confusion in integrating emotional states, memories, and social interactions. Psychologist Lev Vygotsky identified five consecutive breaks during which a child loses the ability to clearly differentiate between her internal experiences and the external world. Over time, these periods of existential disorientation become embedded within the routine flow of consciousness. In addition, philosophically, Descartes' 'Meditations on First Philosophy' can be interpreted as an evidence of a self-inflicted existential crisis, where he is no longer certain of what is real, what is external, or even whether he exists as a physical being. The system (the thinking subject) can no longer clearly objectify the external world or its own body, establishing the foundational certainty of the self as a thinking being.