Meaningful experiences don't tend to be about something else, it only seems that way due to the chemicals in us. — Darkneos

Nah, you are looking at things far too simplistically. There is a whole lot of structure to how those chemical are arranged. That structuring results in information processing occurring. That information processing is about things.

Nah, you are looking at things far too simplistically. There is a whole lot of structure to how those chemical are arranged. That structuring results in information processing occurring. That information processing is about things. — wonderer1

That’s the illusion, it’s really just the chemicals. It is that simple and our stories making it to be more than what it really is.

Without those chemicals it doesn’t matter what the information is.

That’s the illusion, it’s really just the chemicals. It is that simple and our stories making it to be more than what it really is.

Without those chemicals it doesn’t matter what the information is. — Darkneos

I suggest you consider the possibility that your perspective is self contradictory. How do you know anything about chemicals?

I suggest you consider the possibility that your perspective is self contradictory. How do you know anything about chemicals? — wonderer1

Does it matter? Doesn't change how they impact us and how they are the reason we feel what we feel.

I suggest you consider the possibility that your perspective is self contradictory. How do you know anything about chemicals?
— wonderer1

Does it matter? — Darkneos

Does it matter to you, whether your thinking is incoherent or not? Your thinking about the answer to my question might help you see that at present your thinking isn't coherent.

Doesn't change [...] how they are the reason we feel what we feel. — Darkneos

Again, you are looking at things in an overly simplistic way. The reasons we feel what we feel are quite complicated. You certainly aren't going to find any scientific backing for 'it's just chemicals'.

Does it matter to you, whether your thinking is incoherent or not? Your thinking about the answer to my question might help you see that at present your thinking isn't coherent. — wonderer1

You're not though, you're implying that knowing about chemicals is due to information processing but that's not what's going on here. The reason you feel emotions is due to chemicals, hence why I said it doesn't matter what the information is it's the chemicals that make you feel.

Again, you are looking at things in an overly simplistic way. The reasons we feel what we feel are quite complicated. You certainly aren't going to find any scientific backing for 'it's just chemicals'. — wonderer1

There is actually plenty of backing for the just chemicals thing.

I found this thread but the argument advanced in it is pretty weak: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9577/the-experience-machine-and-preference-satisfaction

Preference satisfaction doesn't exactly lead to choosing the Experience machine.

Meaningful experiences don't tend to be about something else, it only seems that way due to the chemicals in us. You don't actually have love for your dog or anyone else, that's only the chemical flashes happening. Your love is already not accurate. — Darkneos

I don't understand the jump you're making. Let us say I accept that my affection is constituted by chemical flashes in my brain. Why does that imply my affection cannot be about another being, place or object? I don't see how that follows.

It's not striking widely, it's referring to pleasure which appears to be the main motivation behind us doing anything. And if that good feeling can be replicated there is no reason to partake in life. — Darkneos

I'm not sure that is true. Pleasure can often be a strong motivator, but I think it fails to be the main one in many important cases.

To illustrate my point, let us imagine that my dog is about to be put down due to illness. The veterinarian gives me an offer: their daughter wants to practice vivisection and my dog is perfect for this. They know it would be very upsetting for me to live with this fact, so they offer to use a hypnotist to make me forget the ordeal and make me instead believe that my dog died peacefully in my arms as a comforting memory. Furthermore, they will also pay me 100 dollars for me to spend on whatever pleases me.

I would arguably get more pleasure from taking the deal, but I would not be motivated to take it, nor do I suspect most would. I think this is due to us being motivated to care about what actually happens to the being, in this case, my dog, not just our own pleasurable sensations.

Thinking that it has anything to do with beliefs or reasoning is a strawman and dodging the question. — Darkneos

No, I disagree. I extended what seems to be the underlying assumption of your argument to other mental phenomena. This is not doing a strawman. I'm testing your assumption. I think your assumption faces a dilemma. Either, (A) accept that reasoning, which I guess would also be chemical flashes in your view, can refer to the world and be more or less accurate, but then you need to provide a reason for why other mental phenomena, like our meaningful experiences, cannot have such a reference; or (B) use the same underlying reasoning to reject reasoning itself as chemical flashes but thus ending up in a self-defeating position because your argument relies on the accuracy of reasoning.

This is not a strawman. If we were discussing act-utilitarianism and you used the trolley problem to justify your position, it would not be a strawman to bring up the transplant-surgeon case, or the utility-monster to test the position. If the underlying assumption has problems, that spells problems for the specific argument too.

Even if we did grant your point it would only serve to reinforce the argument, not undermine it. — Darkneos

Does it? How?

Also no one is talking about accuracy here. — Darkneos

Is this not one of the most important aspects of the experience machine thought experiment? People seem to care about their meaningful experiences being accurate to reality. I get that you reject this, but I think this is what is under debate and should not be dismissed.

I don't understand the jump you're making. Let us say I accept that my affection is constituted by chemical flashes in my brain. Why does that imply my affection cannot be about another being, place or object? I don't see how that follows. — GazingGecko

Because it's the chemicals causing the feeling, not the thing.

I'm not sure that is true. Pleasure can often be a strong motivator, but I think it fails to be the main one in many important cases.

To illustrate my point, let us imagine that my dog is about to be put down due to illness. The veterinarian gives me an offer: their daughter wants to practice vivisection and my dog is perfect for this. They know it would be very upsetting for me to live with this fact, so they offer to use a hypnotist to make me forget the ordeal and make me instead believe that my dog died peacefully in my arms as a comforting memory. Furthermore, they will also pay me 100 dollars for me to spend on whatever pleases me.

I would arguably get more pleasure from taking the deal, but I would not be motivated to take it, nor do I suspect most would. I think this is due to us being motivated to care about what actually happens to the being, in this case, my dog, not just our own pleasurable sensations. — GazingGecko

That could be due to status quo bias, emotions seem to be getting in the way when the result in the end would be the same.

https://iep.utm.edu/experience-machine/#H5

Is this not one of the most important aspects of the experience machine thought experiment? People seem to care about their meaningful experiences being accurate to reality. I get that you reject this, but I think this is what is under debate and should not be dismissed. — GazingGecko

That's status quo bias.

No, I disagree. I extended what seems to be the underlying assumption of your argument to other mental phenomena. This is not doing a strawman. I'm testing your assumption. I think your assumption faces a dilemma. Either, (A) accept that reasoning, which I guess would also be chemical flashes in your view, can refer to the world and be more or less accurate, but then you need to provide a reason for why other mental phenomena, like our meaningful experiences, cannot have such a reference; or (B) use the same underlying reasoning to reject reasoning itself as chemical flashes but thus ending up in a self-defeating position because your argument relies on the accuracy of reasoning.

This is not a strawman. If we were discussing act-utilitarianism and you used the trolley problem to justify your position, it would not be a strawman to bring up the transplant-surgeon case, or the utility-monster to test the position. If the underlying assumption has problems, that spells problems for the specific argument too. — GazingGecko

We aren't talking about reasoning, but the sensation of pleasure, the emotion. Reasoning isn't really due to chemicals.

Or to put it bluntly, if we do things we like because it feels good and we enjoy it then why not plug in and skip having to do the thing? Just get the feeling guaranteed?

From this Quora post:

If we do not determine the unambiguous goal of human existence post haste, then a machine superintelligence will. Is it to survive? Then we will be made into Wowbagger the Infinitely Prolonged. Is it to breed? Then the hatcheries of the Brave New World will overflow. Is it to know blissful pleasure? Then a matrix of cannabinoid and dopaminergic drivel will envelop us.

Ever since Charles Babbage proposed his difference engine we have seen that the ‘best’ solutions to every problem have always been the simplest ones. This is not merely a matter of philosophy but one of thermodynamics. Mark my words, AGI will cut the Gordian Knot of human existence….unless we unravel the tortuosity of our teleology in time.

https://www.quora.com/What-ethical-dilemmas-should-we-consider-as-technology-evolves-rapidly/answer/David-Moore-408?ch=15&oid=1477743839367290&share=118d711a&srid=3lrYEM&target_type=answer

Though I'm pretty sure Thermodynamics doesn't say anything about the simplest answer, I checked. If anything it argues against the notion of endless because entropy increases in a system...

Because it's the chemicals causing the feeling, not the thing. — Darkneos

I still don't see what you mean.

Firstly, I think it is quite arguable that the chemical reactions that cause our feelings are often themselves caused by external events, like the love I feel when I'm petting my dog. So I think my dog plays a causal role in my feelings of love towards him.

Secondly, once again, I don't see the jump. For example, my visual experience of watching my computer screen typing this reply is caused by my brain's neurochemistry and my optical system, but I don't see why that would mean that my visual experience is not about my computer screen. If one accepts that visual experiences could be about external things even if caused by our brains and optical systems, I don't see why my meaningful experiences of loving my dog that are caused by my brain and sensory systems as I interact with my dog, can't be about my dog.

That could be due to status quo bias, emotions seem to be getting in the way when the result in the end would be the same. — Darkneos

And:

That's status quo bias. — Darkneos

Status quo bias is a fair worry, particularly in the experience machine example. Still, it is less clear in the example with my dog.

Even if the results of our intuitions are biased to some extent concerning the experience machine, that is not enough to conclude that they are biased to the extent that these judgments are invalid. Status quo bias seems to influence how people respond to the thought experiment to some degree, but that does not mean it is only bias. Magnus Carlsen may have self-interest bias if he judges himself the best human chess-player in the world, but that judgment would still be valid.

Furthermore, your phrasing makes it seem like it is only bias that prevents people from accepting pure hedonism. That could be the case, but I don't think that has been established by experimental philosophy yet.

Reasoning isn't really due to chemicals. — Darkneos

Sure, that could solve the dilemma by pointing out a difference between emotions and reasoning. However, this fix seems a bit ad hoc to me. Our reasoning is dependent on our brains, no?

Firstly, I think it is quite arguable that the chemical reactions that cause our feelings are often themselves caused by external events, like the love I feel when I'm petting my dog. So I think my dog plays a causal role in my feelings of love towards him. — GazingGecko

That would still be the chemicals causing that love you have for your dog.

Secondly, once again, I don't see the jump. For example, my visual experience of watching my computer screen typing this reply is caused by my brain's neurochemistry and my optical system, but I don't see why that would mean that my visual experience is not about my computer screen. If one accepts that visual experiences could be about external things even if caused by our brains and optical systems, I don't see why my meaningful experiences of loving my dog that are caused by my brain and sensory systems as I interact with my dog, can't be about my dog. — GazingGecko

I mean you can just look at people who use recreational drugs to see that those kinda feelings don't have to be about something else.

Furthermore, your phrasing makes it seem like it is only bias that prevents people from accepting pure hedonism. That could be the case, but I don't think that has been established by experimental philosophy yet. — GazingGecko

It's illustrated in the link I gave to IEP.

Sure, that could solve the dilemma by pointing out a difference between emotions and reasoning. However, this fix seems a bit ad hoc to me. Our reasoning is dependent on our brains, no? — GazingGecko

Yeah, but that's got nothing to do with the thought experiment. It's like the Quora post I mentioned was trying to argue in regards to the simplest solution.

The idea does bug me, the thought that if it's all just chemicals then there would be no real reason to not plug into it. What difference is there if we can just replicate everything? — Darkneos

It bugs me too. It's as if neurologists claim to have direct access to what it is to be me as "just chemicals" when they are only aware of this via their own subjective experiences of other people and their brains. It's as if neurologists are claiming to have some special power that the rest of us do not, in seeing everything as it is, even though they have the same limitations as everyone else in that we are prisoners of our subjectivity.

It's as if people are claiming that the view through their window is true, but the window isn't.