and logic can be used as rhetoric. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then you do not understand what rhetoric is or what it's for or how it differs from logic. Which is unaccountable since Aristotle is credited with a book called Rhetoric.

Then you do not understand what rhetoric is or what it's for or how it differs from logic. — tim wood

You are the one who said "the right logic for this is Rhetoric", implying that rhetoric is a form of logic. It's clearly not.

And, as I said, logic can be used as rhetoric, because "rhetoric" is a use of language intended to persuade. What do you believe rhetoric to be?

because "rhetoric" is a use of language intended to persuade. What do you believe rhetoric to be? — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly that. Can you say enthymeme? As to rhetoric not being logic/dialectic, true. But not to be a kind of logic, false, as a casual perusal of the first few pages of Rhetoric show. Because the matter of rhetoric and logic/dialectic are usually different, rhetoric provides its own appropriate logic. We can call it rhetorical logic if you like, but just plain rhetoric works for most people. And as they are different things for different purposes, I hold that rhetoric and logic/dialectic form a tree with two trunks - they share some roots in common.

Because the matter of rhetoric and logic/dialectic are usually different, rhetoric provides its own appropriate logic. We can call it rhetorical logic if you like... — tim wood

As you can see, I don't like.

Rhetoric employs a number of different means, some logic, some not, depending on the circumstances. We cannot class appealing to another's emotions "logic".

Excellent!

I'd still argue that adding the mode "possibly" does not violate the law of excluded middle (LEM). LEM says "either P or not P, and no third option". Granted, we can have "possibly P" or "possibly not P". But this is different than "P" or "not P" because "P" and "not P" are saying different things, where as "possibly P" and "possibly not P" are saying the same thing in different ways. E.g., the statements "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" and "there will possibly not be a sea battle tomorrow" have the same meaning.

I don't get your point. Of course "P" and "not P" say different things, they are opposed in meaning. And, LEM says one or the other must be true.

Yes, "possibly P" has the same meaning as "possibly not P". And, this meaning is that neither P nor not P is true, which is a violation of the LEM.

Consider, what is known by us as "possibility" could be understood in another way. It appears as an aspect of reality which violates those three fundamental laws. It could be understood as a violation of the law of non-contradiction. Then when someone says "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" we would understand it as both "there will be a sea battle tomorrow", and "there will not be a sea battle tomorrow" are true. But this is not the way that we are taught to understand it. We are taught to understand it as neither one is true. If we understand them both as true the result is unintelligibility. If we understand neither as true, the result is a new form of logic, modal logic, which deals with those aspects of reality which violate the LEM. This indicates that when something appears like it might be unintelligible, we might just need to look at it in another way.

I'd still argue that adding the mode "possibly" does not violate the law of excluded middle (LEM). LEM says "either P or not P, and no third option". Granted, we can have "possibly P" or "possibly not P". But this is different than "P" or "not P" because "P" and "not P" are saying different things, where as "possibly P" and "possibly not P" are saying the same thing in different ways. E.g., the statements "there will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow" and "there will possibly not be a sea battle tomorrow" have the same meaning. — A Christian Philosophy

Both statements are either true or false. — A Christian Philosophy

Both statements,regardless of the outcome, tell us what? The statement ought to explain itself, if the outcome t or f [which for it requires the question to be asked-the measurement is occurring] means nothing...What we can get out of the t or f result except more intel? More input, updating our knowledge using what we know now from experience or memory in order to organize thoughts in our mind*. Our beliefs, intuition, and faith in statements alone mean nothing but in statements to be true....we ought to give everything, even our word. What is a statement without connection to who it matters to and how so? It's connection to truth?

This extra level of info comes from the statement/s which as is should be informative enough alone in them, in how such statements provides the sufficient reason to believe but with t or f outcome we may use that intel to confirm or link a source to the time and state / condition / credibility of it while making statements and how they figure such statement is relevant to anything besides their knowings.

We know the tense of statement and its truth value, but what of that needed/ought to be questioned? Judgement call, do you trust your judgement? Or is it whom is making the statements, sentences, themselves ought to be what is questioned, despite what it is the statements are made about. Statements that are said aimlessly, for open ended answers vs said to be determined one or the other, a definite answer out of options? how many possibilities exist for this multiple choice and were they specifically chosen on purpose? We can boil it down to two, t or f? "IF" instead of "either, or" changes everything. If needing to prove a statement by disproving another, including "if" or "when" with the true or false outcome, if true...this (when true, this), if false...that (when false, that), therefore means, this and that are neither t or f, but t and f is because this and that. The answer is reached for, we make statements as a tool in uncertainty to predict future potentials and in that use, shows that they doubt the very judgement they have made,ought to be making and are lacking faith in that very judgement. [to a certain degree/s.]

Patterns to be noticed in this from t or f result are bound to the type of character or of the source/person making statements. Now, do they know they are being measured aka questioned? Indirectly measuring & the secret awareness of this is of personal interest, entertaining past ideas now...thankful for the reminder.

*I began thinking about this here, continuing an existing thought from before-- how brain organizes thoughts vs how we as people are at organizing or being organized in general as opposed to being scatter brained, clutter prone, messy, etc. Some are better than others at organization, at multiple levels. Work, home, balancing the two in your personal space. Room, car, desk-- is it clean or messy? Do you task yourself with organizing to avoid the real work? Is it a waste of time organizing the space of someone who is scattered brained as it wont last a week being organized? Is this a form of procrastination? I am curious at how I may be able to link procrastinating to organization to learning styles to the brain

I think you've got your Ps and Qs a little wrong(that is jest).

As I understand:

"◊P" = P might be true.
"◊¬P" = P might be false.

Which of course, often tell us hte same thing but are do not mean the same thing.

We were talking about "possibly P", and "possibly not P" as having the same meaning. Each means that neither "P" nor "not P" is true.

Which of course, often tell us hte same thing but are do not mean the same thing. — AmadeusD

How can two phrases tell us the same thing without meaning the same thing?

But they say different things... Certain contexts will give us the same information from each, but they mean different things as explicitly set out above. Is that translation of the logic above wrong?

The same way "its not raining" and "its not not raining" do.

Things tell us things in orthogonal ways all the time. A certain smirk might tell me the same thing as a sentence. A statement about the shape of a knife might tell me the same thing as the shape of the smiths anvil etc... Transitivity, I guess, bluntly.

Here is my point again in a syllogism:

P1: LEM says one or the other must be true when "P" and "not P" contradict.
P2: "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not contradict.
C: Therefore, "possibly P" and "possibly not P" both being true does not violate the LEM.

But they say different things... Certain contexts will give us the same information from each, but they mean different things as explicitly set out above. Is that translation of the logic above wrong? — AmadeusD

I really don't see the difference. By the fundamental laws, there are only two possibilities, true or false. Therefore "P might be false" means the very same thing as "P might be true". They both imply that there is a correct answer, (as there must be by the laws) but we do not know which is the case. So in the context of those laws they both mean the very same thing.

However, if we allow that there actually is no correct answer (as in the case of the sea battle), then we allow violation of those laws. It is only after we allow this violation that we can say that the two mean different things. But then we've put them into a different context, where the fundamental laws are not relevant, because we've allowed violation to put them into that context.

P1: LEM says one or the other must be true when "P" and "not P" contradict.
P2: "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not contradict.
C: Therefore, "possibly P" and "possibly not P" both being true does not violate the LEM. — A Christian Philosophy

Ok, I see what you're saying, but I don't see the relevance. Each, "possibly P", and also "possibly not P", both inherently contradict LEM. Therefore to allow that they say something meaningful we must remove them from the context of the fundamental laws, as explained in my reply to Amadeus above. Since those laws must be violated to make the statements meaningful, placing them back into the context of those laws is pointless. We've already declared that the laws are inapplicable, in order to make sense of those propositions. So it's a demonstration of arbitrary application of the laws.

"P might be false" means the very same thing as "P might be true" — Metaphysician Undercover

Ah, I don't think that's right. The former is about the possible failure and the latter is about the possible success of the proposition (orthogonality!)

I understand what you're saying though, as i noted - they tell us the same thing (in practice).

I understand what you're saying though, as i noted - they tell us the same thing (in practice). — AmadeusD

I don't think you quite get what I\m saying. In the context of applying the fundamental laws, the phrases tell us the same thing. That's theory, not practice. Theoretically they say the same thing, if the fundamental laws provide the theoretical context. In practice they tell us something different, depending on the context of the practice. In one context it might be something about success and failure of action, as in your example. In another context it could mean something different, like statements about what a person believes.

In the context of applying the fundamental laws, the phrases tell us the same thing. That's theory, not practice — Metaphysician Undercover

I have explicitly pointed out why this is not the case. The speak about two different things, so could not, in theory, tell us hte same thing. In practice they do. If you don't agree, fine. I cannot understand how. We need not labour htis further. I understood what you were saying, responded in kind. I don't see furthering the discussion happening..

I have explicitly pointed out why this is not the case. The speak about two different things, so could not, in theory, tell us hte same thing. — AmadeusD

They don't speak about different things, they both speak about the very same thing, P. One says P might be false, the other says P might be true. Within the context of the fundamental laws of logic, they both say the same thing about P.

Hmm... I still suspect this whole thing is just a play on words, where "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not fit the desired format for the LNC and LEM to apply. I'll try one last example and then I'll leave it alone.

As per the LNC, we cannot have "P" and "not P" at the same time.
But we can have "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" at the same time.
Does this example violate the LNC? Surely not; it is merely a play on words because the propositions "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" say the same thing in different words.

Hmm... I still suspect this whole thing is just a play on words, where "possibly P" and "possibly not P" do not fit the desired format for the LNC and LEM to apply. I'll try one last example and then I'll leave it alone. — A Christian Philosophy

We are taking about P and not P therefore the LNC and LEM apply. The qualification of "possibly" creates an exception, a violation. Why do you see the need to persistently argue against this? I don't understand, it's a very simple matter. There is an aspect of reality, which we call "possibility", which those laws do not apply to. So we've developed a different type of logic, modal logic, to deal with this aspect.

And, like I explained to Banno, it's not the case that any specific system of logic is inconsistent, but it is the case that they are inconsistent with each other. This ought not be surprising because there are aspects of reality which are incommensurable with each other. That is why there is a need for dualism in ontology. The problem is that many people are inclined to reject dualism and attempt to reduce everything to a form of monism, and this is impossible because the two aspects are incompatible.

As per the LNC, we cannot have "P" and "not P" at the same time.
But we can have "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" at the same time.
Does this example violate the LNC? Surely not; it is merely a play on words because the propositions "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half not full" say the same thing in different words. — A Christian Philosophy

I can't see the relevance. To make the example comparable you'd have to say "half full" and "not half full". What you present, "half not full", is meaningless. Either the glass is full or not full, and half full qualifies as not full. "Half not full" is nonsensical, meaningless, as if there could be half of nothing.

I really do not understand this drive to make all aspects of reality fit into one category, so much so that you would make up nonsensical phrases in an attempt to justify this motivation.

Right. My last comment could have been clearer. What I meant was "the glass is half full" and "the glass is half empty", where empty is contradictory with full.

Anyway, I don't want to linger on this topic for too long, so I'll leave it here. Thanks for the chat!

Your new example, "empty" and "full", only shows that these two do not properly qualify as contradictory terms, in the context of those fundamental laws we've been discussing. If those two qualified as contradictory, in that sense, then the glass would have to be either full or empty, excluding any middle terms like "half".

This reality is readily understood by recognizing that there is a multitude of states of "not-empty" which also qualify as "not-full", these are the degrees of the intermediate. Because of this, the contrary of "empty", "not-empty", cannot be truthfully said to be "full". Nor can the contrary of "full", "not-full", be said to be empty. Empty and full are distinct concepts which cannot be defined as opposite to each other.

We find this in every case of ideals which act as the extreme limits to a scale, hot and cold, big and small, good and bad, etc.. Each of these is not actually the contrary of the other, in the sense expressed by the law of non-contradiction. They all allow a range of intermediates and the degree may be measured by some sort of scale, warm, medium sized, indifferent acts, etc.. These ideal extremes are the defining boundaries of categories, and this is completely different from "contradictory" as employed by those laws.

What this demonstrates is that our common intuition, or inclination, to judge two terms as opposite, or "contradictory", is not consistent with "contradictory" as stated in those fundamental laws. And, in the activities of the real world, there is a whole slew of intermediates which violate the law of excluded middle, when we assign the contraries to real substance. This is what Aristotle demonstrated as the fact that the physical world of "becoming" is incompatible with the logical opposites of "being and not-being".

To be honest, I still don't fully agree with your view on the fundamental laws of logic. But I enjoyed the chat. Cheers!

This discussion reminds me of this:
[url] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Null_(SQL)[/url]
In particular you might want to check out the section “ Law of the excluded fourth (in WHERE clauses)”

Interesting. Yeah, I can see how excluding the law of excluded middle makes sense in database programming.

And, like I explained to Banno, it's not the case that any specific system of logic is inconsistent, but it is the case that they are inconsistent with each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

The trouble here is that modal logic subsumes propositional logic. They are not inconsistent.

The trouble here is that modal logic subsumes propositional logic. They are not inconsistent. — Banno

I believe this depends on how modal logic is interpreted and applied. So we can say that modal logic doesn't necessarily violate excluded middle. If we assume "it is possible that X" implies that the truth or falsity of X is simply unknown, and there is necessarily a truth or falsity to X, then the law of excluded middle may be upheld, and this use of modal logic would be consistent. This is an epistemic possibility, there is an actual truth which is unknown. It requires that of all possibilities one is necessarily the actual, and true.

But if we allow for the real ontological possibility of future events, such as the sea battle example, then as Aristotle explained, the law of excluded middle must be violated in this case. A proposition about a future event will be neither true nor false because there is real possibility concerning this. To think that there is an actual truth or falsity would necessitate determinism and negate the possibility of any actual choices. To maintain the possibility of choice, excluded middle must be violated.

The problem with modal logic is that it provides no principles to distinguish one type of possibility from the other, and the common possible worlds interpretation does not necessitate that one possible world must be what is actually the case. And if we extend modal logic to deal with the probability of a future event, then the law of excluded middle is clearly violated in this application.

So the possible worlds interpretation, in conjunction with the common belief in the human being's capacity to choose, indicates that most interpretations of modal logic assume a violation of excluded middle. This is regardless of the fact that modal logic doesn't necessarily violate excluded middle, many of its common applications do.

Again, all this shows is your lack of familiarity with modal logic.

You appear to lack an understanding of the different senses of "possible".

I don't think so. Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS) avoids fatalism by allowing multiple possible futures, each with fixed truths, whereas Aristotle avoids fatalism by denying truth values to future contingents, preserving the openness of time. The difference lies in how each treats truth, time, and modality: Aristotle’s logic makes metaphysically assumptions of essence and potentiality, while PWS is a formal, model-theoretic system that treats possibility as quantification over worlds. Aristotle’s modal logic is limited to syllogisms, lacks a general semantics, and relies on essentialist assumptions. PWS, by contrast, provides a precise, neutral, and flexible framework for reasoning about modality.

I don't think so. Possible Worlds Semantics (PWS) avoids fatalism by allowing multiple possible futures, each with fixed truths, whereas Aristotle avoids fatalism by denying truth values to future contingents, preserving the openness of time. — Banno

Are you forgetting the law of identity? A thing is the same as itself. The idea that a thing has "multiple possible futures" is a violation of that law. You are allowing that a thing has a multitude of possible identities, in relation to the future. This is why I say that there is a choice, either violate noncontradiction, or violate excluded middle, when dealing with the future. We can say that a thing has contradictory futures, or we can say "possible futures" and interpret this as a violation of excluded middle. Aristotle insisted we maintain noncontradiction, and violate excluded middle. Therefore the concept of "possible" was developed from study of Aristotle. Some modern philosophies propose a violation of noncontradiction.

The difference lies in how each treats truth, time, and modality: Aristotle’s logic makes metaphysically assumptions of essence and potentiality, while PWS is a formal, model-theoretic system that treats possibility as quantification over worlds. Aristotle’s modal logic is limited to syllogisms, lacks a general semantics, and relies on essentialist assumptions. PWS, by contrast, provides a precise, neutral, and flexible framework for reasoning about modality. — Banno

This appears to be irrelevant. The question is whether the fundamental three laws can be maintained when dealing with future possibility, and the answer is no. Pretending that this is possible is self-deception.