I don't usually think of the Gettier cases as all alike. — Ludwig V

Yes, generally speaking.

I would further say that there are significant differences between some and others. However, all of them, I think, directly involve and/or work from the idea/notion of epistemic luck, which is usually taken as a problem with the justification aspect of JTB. However, as you may remember from our past conversation(s), I think that that grants too much to begin with by asserting that they are indeed cases of justified true belief, or assenting to such claims/conclusions. I find them to be cases of misattributing belief to S, including Russell's clock.

Many of the objections to my account of that case involve the idea/claim that S cannot believe that a broken clock is working. Yet, my account lends itself very well to experiment in which S will admit to believing exactly that after becoming aware of it. By my lights, that supersedes any and all objections based upon past conventional belief attribution practices. In addition, the experiment supports the idea that we cannot knowingly believe a falsehood and/or contradiction. It also supports the idea that we do not always know what we believe at the time we believe it, and hence when it comes to a difference between an 'objective' account of another's belief and a believer's own account, the believer's account does not always warrant deference/preference regarding which account is more accurate just because it's their own account. This, in turn, supports the idea that we cannot recognize our own mistakes and/or false belief at the time. It highlights the need for another to point them out to us, as well as underscores the need to be able to trust others enough to do so. Such is one way to manage the recognition of our own fallibility.

If we treat Smith’s belief as a justified false belief (because at the point of justification, the actual truthmaker is not in view), JTC interprets this as a prime example of epistemic fragility. The justification is disconnected from the actual truth conditions — and once the fuller context is revealed (i.e., the crisis occurs), the belief’s epistemic validity collapses. — DasGegenmittel

This presupposes that the belief had epistemic validity to begin with. "It is three o'clock" does not follow from believing that a broken clock is working. "There is a barn" does not follow from mistaking a barn facade for a barn(believing that a fake barn is a real one). "There is a sheep in the field" does not follow from believing that a sheet is a sheep.

Anyway, I'm okay with our views being different. I wasn't okay with being invited to criticize and then being given the response that was given to what was/is valid critique. I've said enough to support that criticism.

I'll leave you to it now. Pardon the interruption.

What we have are competing explanations for the Gettier problem. One grants that Gettier has showed a problem with the justification aspect of JTB. That is the basis of the project. Another argues that both Gettier cases are examples of justified false belief, and thus pose no problem for JTB; case closed. You're arguing in the vein of the former, and I, the latter.
— creativesoul

I accept your suggestion—if indeed there is a way back to actual arguments—and I welcome it.

Please take another careful look at what the Gettier problem entails according to my position, and what must be concluded from it.

In brief: in contingent scenarios—such as our dynamic reality—there is no fixed truth. We are subject to possible perceptual errors, and the concepts that underpin our assertions are therefore not absolute. Dynamic reality is an infinite game played with incomplete information.

This is precisely where the JTB concept fails: it assumes that truth is already determined, that it is static. But in dynamic contexts, truth can change unexpectedly—due to what we might call epistemic good or bad luck. JTB presumes one can reliably assert truths about the future based on current justification and belief. Crude as it may sound, this becomes evident in everyday application scenarios.

Moreover, there are at least two epistemically relevant time points: (1) the moment of justification and belief, and (2) the moment when the truth value of the proposition becomes (retrospectively) evident. The failure of JTB lies in its temporal indifference—it does not account for the possibility that a justified belief at t₁ might turn out to be false at t₂, even though no irrationality occurred.

Any JTB that is currently accepted in a dynamic scenario may turn out to be false. This is epistemologically paradoxical: JTB is meant to define knowledge strictly—but definitions, by their nature, must offer consistent and temporally robust criteria. They should fix what something is once and for all. But that doesn’t happen here.

This implies: any dynamic scenario in which one makes a justified assertion according to JTB—and in which the circumstances then change—produces a counterexample: a “justified false belief,” such as in the broken bottle or the “fastest way to work” cases. These are not marginal exceptions; they are systematic results of a conceptual flaw.

The fatal weakness of JTB is its lack of temporal precision. If it were to incorporate temporal dimensions, it would have to make them explicit. It does not. Thus, at the very least, it is imprecise—and for a definition, this imprecision is fatal, because definitions are meant to offer definitive and stable characterizations of the concept they define.

I simply wanted to highlight these core issues once more. — DasGegenmittel

I may be inclined, if you like, to offer candidates of JTB that are not Gettier cases. We could then apply your concepts/reasoning to them and see what that looks like, and/or how well the criticism you levy fits a case of JTB. That could be interesting. I'm much less interested in applying criticism of JTB to cases that are not.

Well, what you say is not wrong, of course. But I would have put it differently. That I prefer to say that "2+2=4" is a statement in what grammarians call the timeless present just shows that I'm uncomfortable with metaphysics. So let that pass. When I said it signified nothing, I was taking advantage of an ambiguity in the meaning of "signified". The traditional structure of signifier and signified articulates the two terms as inherently relational - two objects in a relationship. I don't think it necessarily is. For example, does a road sign saying "Road closed" stand in any necessary relation to anything that you would want to call an object, in the sense that the sign itself is an object. I don't think so. But the sign has a clear meaning, nonetheless. — Ludwig V

I agree with this in principle, but I would not fuss over the meaning of "signified" like that. There is no reason to think that "the signified" must be an object. In fact, we should think the opposite, what is signified is meaning, not an object. To "signify" only means to be a sign of something, or to mean something. If a person takes a name to represent a particular thing, then that is the meaning the person associates with that sign. So we are not talking about a relationship between two objects, we are talking about a relationship between an object (the sign), and what the sign means (what is signified).

We can say that, but we do well to pause for a moment and work out the meaning of what we just said. If we post the meaning (significance) of a term as an object and think things through, we may realize that no object could possibly do the things that we require meaning to do. So we have to park that idea and think more carefully about what we actually mean by meaning. — Ludwig V

Yes, this would be the problem with standard Platonism. Platonism assumes objects of meaning, ideas. These objects are supposed to be eternal unchanging objects. So, for example, in Platonism the sign we know as the numeral 2, signifies an eternal and unchanging idea commonly called "the number two". The number two is supposed to be an eternal unchanging object of meaning, an idea.

The difficulty with this proposal of Platonism, is that when we consider most instances of meaning, it is easy to recognize that the meaning signified by a word, is not very often fixed and unchanging. So Plato looked at the ideas signified by many different words, love, just, good, for example, and found that especially in words related to ethical ideas, the meaning is far from fixed, but varies from person to person, and therefore is free to evolve over time.

Now, I've read a good portion of the essay linked by @DasGegenmittel in the op, and I think the intention is to divide knowledge into two distinct types, the eternal, unchanging type (static knowledge), and the evolving type (dynamic knowledge). I would not make a division in this way. I would say that all knowledge, just like all meaning is evolving, but there are differences of degree in the rate of change. Some might propose "ideals", which would be eternal unchanging objects of meaning, but these are imaginary, fictional, because we do not have any such unchanging ideas. So "ideals" are self-defeating, as fictions which are supposed to be eternal truths. And even ideas like that signified by "2", are changing, having come into existence at some time. And we see that there are a number of different numbering systems, like natural, rational, real, etc., and the sign has a different meaning depending on the conceptual structure of the system which provides the context of usage.

So we are not talking about a relationship between two objects, we are talking about a relationship between an object (the sign), and what the sign means (what is signified). — Metaphysician Undercover

OK. Then I want to say that when we know what the sign means, what we know is how to use it. That means not only understanding the conceptual structure that gives is meaning, but what it requires us to do (and not to do).

Many of the objections to my account of that case involve the idea/claim that S cannot believe that a broken clock is working. Yet, my account lends itself very well to experiment in which S will admit to believing exactly that after becoming aware of it. — creativesoul

Well, the idea that S cannot believe that a broken clock is working is a play on the intentionality of belief. "Broken clock" is an inappropriate description to use to articulate what S believes.

If we treat Smith’s belief as a justified false belief (because at the point of justification, the actual truthmaker is not in view), JTC interprets this as a prime example of epistemic fragility. The justification is disconnected from the actual truth conditions — DasGegenmittel

But surely, if Smith's belief is a justified false belief, it is not going to count as knowledge. So what is fragile is not Smith's knowledge, but his belief. That's not a problem.

To say, “S cannot believe that a broken clock is working,” misrepresents the belief. “Broken clock” is an external diagnosis, not necessarily part of S’s belief content. — DasGegenmittel

I think it is important to say more about this. My view is a trifle unorthodox. It comes down to what description works for different characters in the story. Smith is thinking ot the clock, as a (working) clock. Who wouldn't? But we readers who are in the know, are thinking of it as a broken clock. Of course we are - the author of the story has told us so and authors are never wrong about what is happening in their own stories. Smith obviously cannot possibly be describing (thinking of) the clock as broken and it makes nonsense of the story to attribute such a belief to them. In order to understand the story, we have to be capable of grasping the difference and its significance. There is, so far as I can see, there is no way round that.

It follows that the context of belief is not fully intentional. I've never seen such a concept elsewhere in philosophy, but the facts are clear. In some circumstances, we must respect the believer's description of their own belief. In others, we need to understand (and use) another description - the truth (as we see it, of course).

@“creativesoul” I’ll respond in more depth later—time is a bit scarce right now, but I will get back to you.

@“Metaphysician Undercover” @“Ludwig V”
Do we really need a full representational theory to make sense of 2 + 2 = 4?

I don’t think so. “2 + 2 = 4” isn’t a statement about reality as such, but about a perceptual pattern abstracted by the mind. Numbers aren’t part of the world in the same way as, say, rocks or trees. They’re tools—mental instruments that help us structure and process sensory input. They emerge after perception, not before it.

Perception introduces difference. Without difference, there’s no concept of “two.” Numbers are thus not touchable objects, but operational categories—modalities of cognition.

A more precise example than the sorites might be this:
Imagine a smartphone you bought five years ago. Over time, it receives software updates, loses battery life, perhaps even gets scratches. It’s clearly changed. Yet, at which point does it become “not the same phone”? The numerical identity depends on perceptual thresholds. If the changes are too subtle to be noticed, the “one phone” remains “one phone” in perception, even though materially, it may be quite different. The number “one” here is not describing reality per se, but summarizing a perceptual judgment.

⸻

As for the broken clock case:

To say, “S cannot believe that a broken clock is working,” misrepresents the belief. “Broken clock” is an external diagnosis, not necessarily part of S’s belief content.

If S looks at the clock at 2:00 p.m., and the clock (stuck at 2:00) shows 2:00, S forms the belief “It’s 2:00.” That belief is justified (the clock appears fine), true (it is 2:00), and believed. The Gettier problem arises here.

What this reveals: knowledge isn’t just about outcome (is the belief true?), but also about the context of assertion—the epistemic status at the moment the subject forms the belief.

This suggests: all worldly assertions are contingent—their truth may not be fully accessible even in the present. The broken clock case illustrates this: an event that matches reality (truth) intersects with a defective process of knowing. Thus, the contrast between specific event and general epistemic practice is key.

we must respect the believer's description of their own belief. — Ludwig V

After they become aware that they believed a broken clock was working or before?

:wink:

Broken clocks are not reliable time tellers.

That's about the J part.

The content of belief is not equivalent to a report of it.

That's about the B part.

Then I want to say that when we know what the sign means, what we know is how to use it. That means not only understanding the conceptual structure that gives is meaning, but what it requires us to do (and not to do). — Ludwig V

This is obviously incorrect. Use is fundamentally subjective. I can use a sign in a way which serves my purpose, and you might use the same sign in a completely different way to serve your purpose. To say that knowing the meaning is knowing how to use the sign is a very one sided way of looking at a multifaceted thing. This completely ignores the intersubjective (communicative) aspect of meaning. To include this supposedly "objective" aspect into your definition of meaning, we would need to consider "correct" usage.

And this exposes the real problem. What constitutes "correct" usage? Therefore referring to knowing how to use a sign, as an indication of knowing the meaning of a sign does nothing for us toward defining meaning, because "correctly" is implied by "knowing how to use", and this provides no guidelines for how to judge one's usage as "correct". So we really do not even approach the true nature of meaning in this way, because it is hidden by not including "correctly" within "knowing how to use". This is the issue exposed by Plato in The Republic, when he asked different individuals to describe how each would use the word "just". Each person had a different way of using the word, and debate was required to demonstrate that any individual's way was incorrect. This argumentation proved that the person really did not know how to use the sign "correctly", even though they could actually use it the way that they did. This indicates that "knowing how to use" implies some form of justification as implicit.

I don’t think so. “2 + 2 = 4” isn’t a statement about reality as such, but about a perceptual pattern abstracted by the mind. Numbers aren’t part of the world in the same way as, say, rocks or trees. They’re tools—mental instruments that help us structure and process sensory input. They emerge after perception, not before it. — DasGegenmittel

This is very doubtful, and that's the point of Kant's "a priori". Some form of abstractive power, or capacity, is necessary for, therefore prior to, sensory perception. And, since the difference between the thing-in-itself, and the perception of the thing (as a type of abstraction in the mind), is fundamental to the nature of knowledge, especially the fallibility of knowledge, we need to pay close attention to the nature of this difference in any epistemology.

This is the point of Aristotle's law of identity, "a thing is the same as itself". This law locates the identity of the thing directly within the thing itself rather than what we say about the thing, or how we symbolize the thing, thus creating a separation between the thing and the abstraction. When we adhere to this principle of separation, we notice that the so-called abstraction which corresponds with the symbol does not necessarily have any identity at all, as a thing. This allows for the reality of the fictive, imaginative, creative capacity of the mind. Therefore the real meaning of mathematical symbols such as "2" may be entirely imaginary, creations of the mind which are not at all based in perceptual patterns. And I really think that this is the true nature of what is known as "pure mathematics". The mind creates categories which are not based in abstractions produced from sensory perception, but based in its own intentions. The "empty set" for example.

Perception introduces difference. Without difference, there’s no concept of “two.” Numbers are thus not touchable objects, but operational categories—modalities of cognition. — DasGegenmittel

The problem with this approach is that we must allow that there is a means by which perception apprehends difference. This fundamental "mechanism" if we can call it that, determines which types of differences will be perceived. And, we need to take account of this mechanism, the a priori, to have a true understanding of the way that living beings come to know things. If we include this mechanism, then we see that the living being creates freely, through imagination, its own operational categories through the influence of forces such as intentions. Then through some trial and error process, experimentation etc., the successful, useful ones are maintained through time. If we do not include this fundamental principle, we wrongly presume that "correctness" is forced onto the living being by its environment, rather than something chosen by the being through its activities of application.

In other words, if we assume that difference is forced upon us by perception, as you propose, rather than something created by us for the purpose of judgement, we avoid having to understand the true nature of justification. We simply take justification for granted, as something given by the differences within perception. But this is fundamentally incorrect, as Plato demonstrates, justification is actually the means by which we get beyond the deceptions which the senses serve us. (Take the clock example for instance.) True justification requires that we establish a priori principles, real principles of difference, not just the apparent differences which the senses show us. Notice that we have five different senses. Within each sense there are differences which we notice, but we also need principles to account for the differences between one sense and another, which is a much deeper type of difference.

As for the broken clock case:

To say, “S cannot believe that a broken clock is working,” misrepresents the belief. “Broken clock” is an external diagnosis, not necessarily part of S’s belief content.

If S looks at the clock at 2:00 p.m., and the clock (stuck at 2:00) shows 2:00, S forms the belief “It’s 2:00.” That belief is justified (the clock appears fine), true (it is 2:00), and believed. The Gettier problem arises here. — DasGegenmittel

This is Plato's point with justification. The senses deceive us, and cannot be the source for true justification. The idea that sense evidence is what justifies, is itself misleading, guiding us toward faulty justifications. We must establish principles of comparison derived from the creative, imaginative mind, which form the real basis for justification. These principle are derived from concepts of sameness rather than concepts of difference. This is why it is very important to have a very rigorous definition of "same", to start from, as that provided by the law of identity.

The fatal weakness of JTB is its lack of temporal precision. — DasGegenmittel

Smith obviously cannot possibly be describing (thinking of) the clock as broken and it makes nonsense of the story to attribute such a belief to them. — Ludwig V

Seems to me that that's a tad too strongly put. Conventional belief attribution practices may end that way, but that's a flaw born of conflating propositions and belief in addition to not keeping in mind that our knowledge base evolves over time, knowledge about our own past belief notwithstanding.

What if the individual under our consideration while pointing towards the broken clock said something like, "Hey guys! Yesterday, at exactly 2 o'clock, do you know that I believed that that broken clock was working. Yeah. Isn't that crazy? I just looked at it like I normally do and then went on about my business as usual. :lol: I even made it home on time!"

I don't see the nonsense in this, or my account of it. If it's there, could you set it out and show it to me?

But it is not unfair to say that they turn on a proposition (belief) which is ambiguous and is interpreted (applied) differently in two different contexts - the subject's belief/knowledge and the context of what we might call objectivity. — Ludwig V

At time t1(the duration of trusting the broken clock) S cannot admit of believing that a broken clock is working. They don't know they do. At time t2(after becoming aware of the clock's working condition), then and only then, can they readily admit/acknowledge/realize that at time t1 they believed a broken clock was working.

Which account warrants/garners deference/preference here, before or after becoming aware?

This is precisely where the JTB concept fails: it assumes that truth is already determined, that it is static. — DasGegenmittel

I argue in favor of JTB. The account differs tremendously from historical convention though, in that I do not treat belief and propositions as equivalent. Nor do I treat belief and reports thereof as equivalent, self-reporting notwithstanding. Perhaps it may be a result of those differences that I can say that the characterization above fails. It's also odd for me to see another treat JTB as though it has agency.

If his cases are examples of justified false belief, then his challenge to those formulations fails to hit the target. <-------Can we agree on that much, for now? — creativesoul

Since these are statements about future events, they do not constitute knowledge but rather speculation (credence), and the result is not knowledge either, as it does not necessarily and sufficiently follow from the premises. Luck is a temporal phenomenon; the outcome could have been different: good luck (JTB) & bad luck (JFB).

As the key meaningful part of Smith's own belief articulation, "The man with ten coins in his pocket" picks out one and only one individual. Jones is the ONLY man that Smith believes will get the job, regardless of pocket content. Thus, Smith's belief, as Gettier articulated, is true if and only if, Jones gets the job and has ten coins in his pocket.
On the contrary, when P is examined as a proposition that is completely divorced from Smith's inference, "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", is true if/when any man with ten coins in his pocket gets the job. This reasoning shows that there are very different sets of truth conditions regarding P, depending on whether P is considered in isolation from the believer(Smith) or examined with consideration of that.
Hence, the first case rests on judging Smith's belief using truth conditions of what is not(as does the second case). It is only as a result of not noticing and highlighting that conflation, that it seemed/seems okay to say that Smith's belief was/is true. When the inference of Smith is rightly taken into consideration "The man with ten coins in his pocket" means Jones and only Jones. Jones does not get the job. Hence, Smith's belief is justified and false. — creativesoul

At this point, deductive reasoning is conflated with inductive reasoning, as if temporality didn’t exist. However, there are two distinct moments in time: the scenario of the original assumption (t1), and the new information that Smith also (unknowingly) has ten coins in his pocket (t2; quasi-empirical). This thematic complex refers to what I call conceptual coincidence and further break down with reference to truth-makers. But there’s a lot more going on in this example: e.g., the non-parallel construction of definiendum and definiens & the Leibniz Law violation.

On my view, predictions of future events (belief about what will happen later) are capable of neither being true or false at the time they're made. — creativesoul

Exactly. And what does that mean? There can be no such thing as knowledge in cases involving temporality and change, unless we adopt a different perspective. Gettier, and all those seeking a monastic definition of knowledge, are doomed to fail. It’s an attempt to achieve the impossible with outdated tools. We must think fundamentally differently.

This presupposes that the belief had epistemic validity to begin with. "It is three o'clock" does not follow from believing that a broken clock is working. "There is a barn" does not follow from mistaking a barn facade for a barn (believing that a fake barn is a real one). "There is a sheep in the field" does not follow from believing that a sheet is a sheep. — creativesoul

And in that sense, this must also be considered. There is no absolute certainty in the perception of the world. The person who sees the clock and draws an assertion from it doesn’t know at first that the clock is broken, but relies on their previously reliable everyday experience. Yet that, too, can be unreliable—comparable to the fake barn cases. Perception of reality is always only an approximation, never an absolute.

I may be inclined, if you like, to offer candidates of JTB that are not Gettier cases. We could then apply your concepts/reasoning to them and see what that looks like, and/or how well the criticism you levy fits a case of JTB. That could be interesting. I'm much less interested in applying criticism of JTB to cases that are not. — creativesoul

Sure, gladly—but I’m not criticizing JTB itself, but rather the use of JTB in modern contexts. My paper rehabilitates JTB for static scenarios and demonstrates why JTB must fail in dynamic ones.

Now, I've read a good portion of the essay linked by DasGegenmittel in the op, and I think the intention is to divide knowledge into two distinct types, the eternal, unchanging type (static knowledge), and the evolving type (dynamic knowledge). I would not make a division in this way. I would say that all knowledge, just like all meaning is evolving, but there are differences of degree in the rate of change. Some might propose "ideals", which would be eternal unchanging objects of meaning, but these are imaginary, fictional, because we do not have any such unchanging ideas. So "ideals" are self-defeating, as fictions which are supposed to be eternal truths. And even ideas like that signified by "2", are changing, having come into existence at some time. And we see that there are a number of different numbering systems, like natural, rational, real, etc., and the sign has a different meaning depending on the conceptual structure of the system which provides the context of usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

That’s very close to how I think about it. However, I also point out that the two types of knowledge are not independent from each other, but have points of integration and application: for example, rounding rules & epistemic standards and stakes.

But surely, if Smith's belief is a justified false belief, it is not going to count as knowledge. So what is fragile is not Smith's knowledge, but his belief. That's not a problem. — Ludwig V

The problem here is that JTB is normally conceived as static, but in this case, it is procedural. The expectation is not fulfilled, even though a JTB can initially be assumed, which then, due to its contingency, becomes a JFB, yet may still be labeled JTB due to conceptual coincidence within the framework of the truth-maker: Leibniz-law violation.

I think it is important to say more about this. My view is a trifle unorthodox. It comes down to what description works for different characters in the story. Smith is thinking of the clock, as a (working) clock. Who wouldn't? But we readers who are in the know, are thinking of it as a broken clock. Of course we are - the author of the story has told us so and authors are never wrong about what is happening in their own stories. Smith obviously cannot possibly be describing (thinking of) the clock as broken and it makes nonsense of the story to attribute such a belief to them. In order to understand the story, we have to be capable of grasping the difference and its significance. There is, so far as I can see, no way around that.
It follows that the context of belief is not fully intentional. I've never seen such a concept elsewhere in philosophy, but the facts are clear. In some circumstances, we must respect the believer's description of their own belief. In others, we need to understand (and use) another description - the truth (as we see it, of course). — Ludwig V

Correct—JTB is already refuted by the mere existence of competing JTBs as counterexamples, which I illustrate more clearly using the Rashomon effect.

This is very doubtful, and that's the point of Kant's "a priori". Some form of abstractive power, or capacity, is necessary for, therefore prior to, sensory perception. And, since the difference between the thing-in-itself, and the perception of the thing (as a type of abstraction in the mind), is fundamental to the nature of knowledge, especially the fallibility of knowledge, we need to pay close attention to the nature of this difference in any epistemology. — Metaphysician Undercover

My point was not about the truthful perception of a thing, but about differences in general. A thing can never be perceived absolutely; there are no 1:1 real-time representations.

Therefore the real meaning of mathematical symbols such as "2" may be entirely imaginary, creations of the mind which are not at all based in perceptual patterns. And I really think that this is the true nature of what is known as "pure mathematics". The mind creates categories which are not based in abstractions produced from sensory perception, but based in its own intentions. The "empty set" for example. — Metaphysician Undercover

I suspect we think quite similarly here, though we start from different positions. I understand perception not only as a worldly, but also as a mental process—the recognition of a boundary between two things or numbers as a set (of numbers).

This is Plato's point with justification. The senses deceive us, and cannot be the source for true justification. The idea that sense evidence is what justifies, is itself misleading, guiding us toward faulty justifications. We must establish principles of comparison derived from the creative, imaginative mind, which form the real basis for justification. These principles are derived from concepts of sameness rather than concepts of difference. This is why it is very important to have a very rigorous definition of "same", to start from, as that provided by the law of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, but I would add that both sameness and difference are equally important to emphasize the definitional core of the matter. There is no delimitation without differentiation.

What if the individual under our consideration while pointing towards the broken clock said something like, "Hey guys! Yesterday, at exactly 2 o'clock, do you know that I believed that that broken clock was working. Yeah. Isn't that crazy? I just looked at it like I normally do and then went on about my business as usual. :lol: I even made it home on time!"
I don't see the nonsense in this, or my account of it. If it's there, could you set it out and show it to me? — creativesoul

He didn’t know it, but if we assume that, then he would be surprised—and according to the currently prevailing view of JTB, would have had knowledge by accident. And that’s exactly what you're describing.

I argue in favor of JTB. The account differs tremendously from historical convention though, in that I do not treat belief and propositions as equivalent. Nor do I treat belief and reports thereof as equivalent, self-reporting notwithstanding. Perhaps it may be a result of those differences that I can say that the characterization above fails. It's also odd for me to see another treat JTB as though it has agency. — creativesoul

That would indeed be strange. In the end, knowledge is—among other things and essentially—an attribution, meant to express certainty/trust so that one can act with little or no risk. JTB, in my view—as I’ve said—is rehabilitated for static scenarios within a dualistic conception of knowledge.

How do you handle this in your view of JTB as monistic, without running into problems with contingency? After all, you yourself say that no knowledge about the future is possible.

If his cases are examples of justified false belief, then his challenge to those formulations fails to hit the target. <-------Can we agree on that much, for now?
— creativesoul
Since these are statements about future events, they do not constitute knowledge but rather speculation (credence), and the result is not knowledge either, as it does not necessarily and sufficiently follow from the premises. Luck is a temporal phenomenon; the outcome could have been different: good luck (JTB) & bad luck (JFB) — DasGegenmittel

On my view, as it pertains to the temporal aspect, the first case is quite different from the second in that he former is the sort of claim that cannot be either true or false at the time the statement is made, while the latter is the sort of claim that can.

You seem to want to say that the first case cannot be knowledge because it cannot be true or false at the time it's made. However, we do find out that his belief turns out to be false, because Jones does not get the job. Hence, on my view, at the time S made the claim, it was well grounded and unknowable. It ended up being justified false belief. That just follows from my own framework regarding what kinds of things can be true/false(in the sense relevant to the paper) and how they become so.

I suspect we're in at least some agreement on that.

The second case is another matter altogether when it comes to the temporal aspect. It's false when made because "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" was true at the time because Brown was in Barcelona. Whereas S believed it was true because Jones owned a Ford.

On my view, predictions of future events (belief about what will happen later) are capable of neither being true or false at the time they're made.
— creativesoul
Exactly. And what does that mean? — DasGegenmittel

It means that belief about what's happened and/or is happening can be true/false, whereas belief about what will happen later can only be capable of becoming true/false later.

There can be no such thing as knowledge in cases involving temporality and change — DasGegenmittel

It does not follow from the fact that predictions are incapable of being true/false at the time they're made, that there can be no such thing as knowledge in cases involving temporality and change. Assuming they're justified and believed, predictions can become true despite being incapable of being so at the time they're articulated/made. They become JTB by virtue of turning out to be true. If they turn out to be false, then they cannot be knowledge, because knowledge cannot be false.

Time in the Car Case:
T1: At the moment Smith forms his belief, he is justified in thinking that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is true because he believes that Jones owns a Ford. His evidence and reasoning at this time are entirely centered on the assumption regarding Jones, which forms the basis of his justification.

T2: However, when we consider the truth of the proposition at a later point, it turns out that the disjunction is actually true solely because Brown is in Barcelona—a fact completely independent of Smith’s initial evidence. Thus, while at T1 Smith’s belief was justified by his reasoning about Jones, at T2 the truth of the statement is secured by an unrelated, coincidental circumstance.

It does not follow from the fact that predictions are incapable of being true/false at the time they're made, that there can be no such thing as knowledge in cases involving temporality and change. Assuming they're justified and believed, predictions can become true despite being incapable of being so at the time they're articulated/made. They become JTB by virtue of turning out to be true. If they turn out to be false, then they cannot be knowledge, because knowledge cannot be false. — creativesoul

If it is not necessary and sufficient to be the assertion it defines then its not knowledge but (bad/good)luck; credence (speculation which might be virtues but even that does not guaranty knowledge but only a more reliable process).

What if the individual under our consideration while pointing towards the broken clock said something like, "Hey guys! Yesterday, at exactly 2 o'clock, do you know that I believed that that broken clock was working. Yeah. Isn't that crazy? I just looked at it like I normally do and then went on about my business as usual. :lol: I even made it home on time!"
I don't see the nonsense in this, or my account of it. If it's there, could you set it out and show it to me?
— creativesoul
He didn’t know it, but if we assume that, then he would be surprised—and according to the currently prevailing view of JTB, would have had knowledge by accident. And that’s exactly what you're describing. — DasGegenmittel

No, it's not. I don't think you understand. I'll elaborate a bit more.

That story shows how/that we can indeed believe a broken clock is working despite not being able to believe "a broken clock is working".

In addition, it forces those who show preference to the self-reporting of S at the time of belief to choose between contrary accounts both offered by S, one at a time when S did not know what they believed, and another at a time when they did.

Time in the Car Case:
T1: At the moment Smith forms his belief, he is justified in thinking that “Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona” is true because he believes that Jones owns a Ford. His evidence and reasoning at this time are entirely centered on the assumption regarding Jones, which forms the basis of his justification.

T2: However, when we consider the truth of the proposition at a later point, it turns out that the disjunction is actually true solely because Brown is in Barcelona—a fact completely independent of Smith’s initial evidence. Thus, while at T1 Smith’s belief was justified by his reasoning about Jones, at T2 the truth of the statement is secured by an unrelated, coincidental circumstance. — DasGegenmittel

What was Smith's belief at the moment he formed it?

He believed "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona" was true because Jones owned a Ford.

I will answer the question above tomorrow. I otherwise get less then 4 hours of sleep.

What is Smith's belief at the moment he forms it? — creativesoul

I know what you mean but the problem with JTB is time and change. The Definition doesnt hold over time as you show yourself. If the observer wouldnt be there it would be knowledge. So as you clarifie yourself whats a problem because it is possible to be false.

Gettier cases are conceptual councidences:

„ Gettier cases, as illustrated in my analysis, can be described as conceptual coincidence. This term captures the phenomenon of accidental knowledge within non-transitive frameworks like JTB that can arise in dynamic scenarios. They occur when an assertion is randomly confirmed by the alignment of relevant aspects, without the original conditions objectively enabling the assertion. This scenario unfolds over at least two points in (epistemic) time and relies on different but similar and not necessarily distinguishable concepts, with the aspect crucial for the confirmation of the assertion changing in such a way that it validates the assertion. In a metaphorical sense they are like a puzzle that can be completed with a piece from a different set. Although the final piece structurally fits, it is incongruous with the overall depicted image.“

Cheers. Sleep. Until next time. Be well.

If it is not necessary and sufficient to be the assertion it defines... — DasGegenmittel

I have no clue what that's supposed to mean.

I have no clue what that's supposed to mean. — creativesoul

Despite popular opinion we do not need Gettier cases to demonstrate that JTB is insufficient for knowledge. Here a small explanation of what the terms mean.

Necessary and sufficient conditions:
- A necessary condition is something that must be true for something else to be true. (e.g., Having fuel is necessary for a car to run.)
- A sufficient condition is something that, if true, guarantees that something else is true. (e.g., Turning the key in a working car is sufficient to start it.)

Applying this to knowledge:
For a definition of knowledge to be valid, the conditions in the definition must be both necessary and sufficient. That is:
-You can’t have knowledge without those conditions (necessary).
- And if those conditions are met, then you do have knowledge (sufficient).

In other words, not every belief that seems reasonable or even true counts as knowledge, unless it fully satisfies all the required philosophical conditions.

Let’s consider a practical case:

Suppose Jane believes that the fastest way to work is via Elm Street. She’s driven that route many times, and it’s consistently been the quickest. She has justification: traffic data, past experience, and perhaps even GPS support. The route is indeed fast, and she believes it truly is the fastest.

Now, by the classical definition, she seems to know that “the fastest way to work is via Elm Street” — her belief is true, she believes it, and she has justification.

But let’s introduce a twist.

Unknown to Jane, a new road was opened yesterday — a bypass that cuts travel time by 15 minutes. As of this morning, that new road is now the fastest way to work. Jane is unaware of this change and continues to believe Elm Street is fastest.

So, what happens?

Her belief, though still justified based on past data, is no longer true. She continues to assert something that was true, but is no longer sufficient to define knowledge, because it doesn’t align with the current facts.

Now, here’s where the original sentence applies:

“If it is not necessary and sufficient to be the assertion it defines, then it’s not knowledge.”

Jane’s belief fails the test of necessity and sufficiency:
- Her justification is no longer sufficient — it doesn’t guarantee truth in the changed context.
- The truth condition is no longer met — the route is no longer fastest.
- So, her belief doesn’t meet the necessary and sufficient conditions to count as knowledge.

What she has, at best, is a reasonable assumption, not knowledge.

This example shows how knowledge is not static — the necessary and sufficient conditions must continue to align with the world. Once they diverge, the belief, no matter how well-justified or sincere, no longer counts as knowledge.

The example of the fastest route to work changing shows that knowledge is not static. The traditional JTB definition (Justified True Belief) assumes that if someone has a belief that is true and justified, they have knowledge.

But in real-life, dynamic situations — like when external facts change (e.g., a new faster route is built) — a belief that was once true and justified can stop being true or lose its justification, without the person realizing it.

Therefore:
The conditions of truth, belief, and justification are not always sufficient for knowledge.

The traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief fails to account for cases where justification no longer tracks truth. This shows that knowledge is not static — it evolves with context and time.

If knowledge is not static, but context-sensitive, historically situated, and dynamically linked to changing conditions (like justification evolving with new information), then this challenges the very idea of a fixed, essentialist definition.

The core implication is this:
If the conditions for something to count as knowledge can change over time or across contexts, then any single, timeless definition is inherently limited — or even impossible.

In other words:
- A definition aims to capture the necessary and sufficient conditions of a concept.
- But if those conditions are not stable, then no definition can fully capture what knowledge is in all cases.
- This shifts the project from definition to modeling: from trying to define knowledge in a rigid sense to trying to map how it functions in different contexts.

This is why my JTC approach in relation to DK is relevant. Gettier cases are just one step more complicated but we do not need them to revise JTB for Dynamic scenarios. Every day life is a counterexample already.

I'm afraid that I have some pressing business to take care of. I won't be able to give this the attention it needs for a week or so. So I have to bow out. It's been a good discussion and I'm sorry to have to disappear.

My point was not about the truthful perception of a thing, but about differences in general. A thing can never be perceived absolutely; there are no 1:1 real-time representations. — DasGegenmittel

This can be a starting point. We can say that differences are presented to us through sense perception, and sameness is something designated based on conceptual principles. For example, look around you and notice that there is difference everywhere. Your sense of vision is providing these differences to you. And if you say that things are the same as they were last time you looked around, you are making a comparison in your mind, with the use of memory, and some principle which allows you to ignore tiny changes as insignificant.

From this perspective, we do not perceive "things". A thing is something created by the mind, with the use of sense perception, but not directly perceived as a thing. The mind, abstraction, conception, etc., produces "things" through principles of individuation, and sameness, and this provides the foundation for the conception of numbers and also identity. I believe it is important to recognize and uphold this distinction in order to properly understand the difference between a judgement of "true", and a judgement of "justified". When we judge that "this" is different from "that", through sensation, we have a judgement of truth. But if we judge that "this" is the same as "this", we judge according to some principles which dictate that it is the same word, despite appearing as two different instances, so this is a judgement which is justified.

Now the issue gets very complicated, because with conceptual principles we adopt opposing principles. So the opposite of "same" is "not same", and this is often known as "different". The problem here is that this results in a type of difference which is justified through principles of sameness, but it is not necessarily true by sense perception, it is a conceptual difference. These conceptual principles are applied back against the claimed truths of perception, through the law of noncontradiction, to justify those claims of truth. The point being that the differences of sense perception (supposed truths) may be overruled by principles of sameness (justification), and this is a fundamental aspect of knowledge. In other words justification overrules truth and we create sameness out of things which appear to be different. This is known as equality and equivalence.

Correct, but I would add that both sameness and difference are equally important to emphasize the definitional core of the matter. There is no delimitation without differentiation. — DasGegenmittel

The point now is that we have two types of "difference". One is supported by the truth of sense perception, and the other is supported by the justification of not same. These are very different meanings of the same word. Therefore to avoid equivocation we cannot simply class sameness and difference together as opposing principles, because this would include the "true difference" which is not justified, in with the "justified difference", as if they are both opposed to same. They are not both opposed to same, because the senses do not give us any "same", therefore "difference" by sense perception is completely distinct from "difference" by principles of "not same".

These principles of categorical separation within the use of the same word, are very complicated, and were explored by Plato in books like Parmenides. You may wonder about the importance of maintaining such separations, but it becomes very important to maintain some form of separation between true and justified, to avoid confusion when we consider terms like "possible" and "necessary".

Not a problem. Real life pressing matters are more important than our discussions on this forum

Her belief, though still justified based on past data, is no longer true. — DasGegenmittel

Right. That's it. Her belief is no longer true. Hence, it no longer counts as knowledge even though it once did and was.

What's the problem?

:worry:

JTB has to evolve to a more flexible as definition as data can change which it doesnt account for. It has to account for time and change - we use it only implicitly that way but that doesnt work in the end because it is deterministic; but beliefs change with new information. Otherswise the truth value can change within an unreliable definition as it does as it does as you rightfully claim. It changes from a JTB with a seemingly Foreve correct future prediction to a justified false belief because These predictions are only contingent despite the expectation of a JTB - which is only likely but not necessary an therefore not certain. If knowledge shall be stable thats bad. JTC does account for that; with a stable Definition as JTB (static) and JTC as pragmatic adjustment of Dynamic knowledge as you use it implicitly. Life changes, data changes and knowledge should be able to do so too.

I’m curious… What do you think? I hope it’s not too bad to read. ;D

Since these are statements about future events, they do not constitute knowledge but rather speculation (credence), and the result is not knowledge either, as it does not necessarily and sufficiently follow from the premises. — DasGegenmittel

Well, let's take an easy case: what if I said I know that if A then B, A therefore B will still be valid tomorrow. 2+2 will still = 4 tomorrow. Water will still be wet (and H2O) tomorrow. Are you saying I don't have knowledge of these future events? Are future events, in principle, unknowable?