Try to do a calculation with the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions. Whether on paper, or on the ground, can you do it? — ucarr

Effortless actually since I utilize a number line in almost no calculations. They're handy for graphs though. — noAxioms

You mis-understand the question. With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. This reality translates to not being able to do the four big math operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. Numbers and their symbols have no meaning without movement through space which is physical. Saying numbers are not physical equals denying their foundational meaning as nodes for relationships between positions in space. Abstract thought doesn't establish independence from movement through space and time because it's supported by neuronal activity traveling through space and time.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. — ucarr

I could count the number of times the light blinks. 3 blinks, all in the same physical space. I don't conclude that 3 has a physical location from this. — noAxioms

In this example, 3 has a temporal motion.

When you count objects, you're counting objects with distinct positions in space. When two objects in space become one object in space, as in the case of chemical bonding, we say that’s one object in space, a compound. — ucarr

Two objects becoming one seems to be an ideal, not anything physical. I did a topic on it here. You seem to have commented on that topic. — noAxioms

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical?

You imply your body holds no distinct position in space. Please explain your denial. — ucarr

My body has extension. It is physically present at events (events are physical) but the spatial location of those events varies from frame to frame, and frames are abstractions. So for instance you talked about me going to the kitchen, but maybe the kitchen goes to me when I need a drink. It changes location, not me, since I am at all times 'here' (also an abstraction). Anyway, I said I knew what you meant. — noAxioms

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. Change of context implies change of position, which is motion. Where you are bodily is not an abstraction.

Something in total isolation (not possible) has no meaning. — ucarr

If we're talking about a symbol, then sure, a symbol in isolation is meaningless. But an encyclopedia in isolation does not seem meaningless, even in the absence of something that knows what the symbols mean. The meaning is there and can be gleaned. — noAxioms

A book, when read, is the extreme opposite of isolation. The words in the book are signs with referents that might be flung to the four corners and beyond. — ucarr

Yea, but I didn't say anything was reading it. It's in isolation we said. — noAxioms

In our context here, isolation and meaning are opposites. Isolation, as in the case of non-existence, has no connection to meaning, so written words in such theoretical isolation (which isolation is already noted as absurd) cannot have meaning because they cannot have referents. What you say is true if the isolation is really spatial and temporal separation from context, not discontinuity from context. A book is a portable point-of-view, viz., point of reference, for a spatially and temporally non-local context. This non-local context is made local by decoding of the word-signs, viz., by reading.

Existence has no explanation. It's axiomatic as the starting point for phenomena, observation, analysis and understanding. — ucarr

And here I am looking for one. Yes, it's axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason. — noAxioms

So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? So proving EPP strengthens your commitment to what you know to be axiomatic? So proving ¬EPP, with predication of non-existent things, gives license to your aversion to axioms? So proving ¬EPP vindicates your website name of noAxioms?

Can you stand independent of existence while you make your study of it? — ucarr

Sure. Just don't posit EPP. — noAxioms

If you're independent of existence, you can't posit EPP.

Your volition balks at the assumption, but your ability to balk establishes your existence.

I don't assume that. I said it in the OP. 'I think therefore I am' is a non-sequitur without EPP. But 'I think, therefore I decide Io posit that I am' seems to work far better. There is no fallacy to that, just as there is no fallacy in saying "'I balk, yet I decline Io posit that I am'. It becomes a personal choice instead of a logical conclusion. There is a pragmatic utility to making the first choice, but logic seems not to forbid the second choice. As you said, it's an axiom, an assumed thing, not something necessarily the case. — noAxioms

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of."

With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. — ucarr

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment.

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical?

It being an object (compound in this case) seems to be an ideal. Physics seems to have no mind-independent test for where an object is bounded, per the topic I linked. It is off topic for this ontology discussion. You posted to that other topic. Re-read if you're interested.

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context.

This contradicts your description of my going to the kitchen, which utilizes an abstract choice of frame different from the one determined by my body.

Yes, [existence is] axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason. — noAxioms
So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic?

It's axiomatic to others, not to me, per stated aversion to such axioms.

If you're independent of existence, you can't posit EPP.

You seem to be doing that just fine. Positing things is easy. Justifying them not so much.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind?

An information processor need not be implemented by what is considered to be a biological body, brain or mind. The 'mind' word seems to reference the information processing itself rather than the hardware implementing the process.

How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg?

I don't think sperms and eggs and such do a whole lot of thinking. Sure, people do thinking. I only fail to accept the necessity of any objective ontology to them.

I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of."

Even this assumes that there is such a thing as 'objective existence', perhaps completely empty as the nihilists suggest. But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence.

With the number line collapsed to a theoretical point in space of zero dimensions, there is no distance between one number and any other number. You can't move along the linear space of the number line. — ucarr

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment. — noAxioms

Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional?

Why do you claim the chemical bonding of elements (Na + Cl = NaCl (salt)) into a compound is not physical? — ucarr

It being an object (compound in this case) seems to be an ideal. Physics seems to have no mind-independent test for where an object is bounded, per the topic I linked. It is off topic for this ontology discussion. You posted to that other topic. Re-read if you're interested. — noAxioms

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? You think NaCl results from minds performing alchemy?

Your body, as a point of reference (a location in space), determines your frame of reference, viz., your context. — ucarr

This contradicts your description of my going to the kitchen, which utilizes an abstract choice of frame different from the one determined by my body. — noAxioms

You might access memory to imagine yourself sitting in your study while you stand in the kitchen, but these two brain circuits are independent and your bedroom frame is virtual while your kitchen frame is empirical. Any higher sentient with memory supports a virtual frame portable simultaneous with an empirical frame. Where is the contradiction?

Yes, [existence is] axiomatic precisely because it cannot be justified. I have a strong aversion to assuming things for no reason.

So, you seek to contradict your own belief existence is axiomatic? — ucarr

It's axiomatic to others, not to me, per stated aversion to such axioms. — noAxioms

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic. Proof it's not axiomatic depends on your ability to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to you without you pre-existing your examination of your existence.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being.

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? — ucarr

An information processor need not be implemented by what is considered to be a biological body, brain or mind. The 'mind' word seems to reference the information processing itself rather than the hardware implementing the process. — noAxioms

You think binary computing machines are self-willed info processors?

How does thinking occur in the absence of egg, sperm and fertilized egg? — ucarr

I don't think sperms and eggs and such do a whole lot of thinking. Sure, people do thinking. I only fail to accept the necessity of any objective ontology to them. — noAxioms

You believe a man thinks without proactive support of his fertilized egg?

I assume all of these absences as part of independence from existence. This with independent defined as "not a part of. — ucarr

Even this assumes that there is such a thing as 'objective existence', perhaps completely empty as the nihilists suggest. But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. — noAxioms

If lack of objective existence equals non-existence, then I agree.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. — ucarr

Not discussing purpose of life though.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional?

Dunno. Who posits such a point of contact?

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent?

A field has no location or bounds and is thus not the same category as an object.

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic..

Wow, we think so differently. I find it unnecessary precisely because it cannot be justified.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being.

No, it doesn't mean I can demonstrate it any more than your premise can be demonstrated.

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something.

But I do exist, by the usual reasoning, and it is even justified. It just isn't objective. That's the part that holds no water.

Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive.

We do not agree. I don't exist in Moscow, but I exist in some other town. No contradiction there.

How does thinking occur in the absence of body, brain and mind? — ucarr

You think binary computing machines are self-willed info processors?

No, not any more than I am self-willed into one.

But an empty existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. — noAxioms
If lack of objective existence equals non-existence, then I agree.

I meant empty objective existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. Lacking objective existence doesn't imply lack of other kinds (relational say) of existence.


All that aside, I was referred to an interesting bit about the Eleatic Principle, which seems on-topic.
It says "An entity is to be counted as real iff it is capable of participating in causal processes".

Of significant note, it says 'counted as real' which is support for my notion that existence might just be a concept without a thing in itself.

The principle as given is mind-independent, but only applies to causal structures. So the states of Conway's game of life exist, but 14 does not. That game and our universe might supervene on numbers and mathematics, but it is a gray area as to whether such supervention constitutes participation in causal processes.

I found an interesting article that attempts to justify it, but it dismisses other causal structures by several references to 'the world', a very anthropocentric assumption that this world is somehow special over other causal structures, violating the wording of the principle taken from that very article.

I may open a new topic on this.

You make it sound like a number line is something that physical I move along. I don't buy that for a moment. — noAxioms

Body_brain_mind_numbers_material things_empirical measurements_memory-feedback-looping_internalization-of-motion-as-consciousness_abstract thought and_cyclical behavior populate a chain of physical connections.

Remove any one of these links in the chain and the purposeful life of a sentient being collapses into non-functional incoherence. This is why, in our solar system at least, life is rare. — ucarr

Not discussing purpose of life though. — noAxioms

Neither am I discussing the purpose of life. I'm arguing that physical you does move along a number line; it's called the timeline of your personal history, and that's a continuing sequence of positions you occupy physically.

Has anyone established the point of contact that proves the intersection of material and immaterial states of existence coherent and functional? — noAxioms

Dunno. Who posits such a point of contact? — noAxioms

You do.

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? — ucarr

A field has no location or bounds and is thus not the same category as an object. — noAxioms

Quantum fields are measured.

If it cannot be justified, then it's logically deemed axiomatic.. — ucarr

Wow, we think so differently. I find it unnecessary precisely because it cannot be justified. — noAxioms

I should've written, "If it's a necessary premise that cannot be justified - as with a first-order system - it's axiomatic. I think general existence, or the Standard Model, is a necessary first-order system for consciousness. In the presence of consciousness, existence is self-evidently true.

Your position sounds like rationalism. You pivot away from anything suggesting confinement of exploration, but your restless ideation seems rooted in the demand for reasoning to every belief to the exclusion of axioms. This puts you fundamentally at odds with science because all scientific theories are axiomatic to the extent that they cannot be proven. A theory is just a working hypothesis always subject to revision or replacement.

In your examination of predication without existence, your supposition there's non-existence that supports predication means you are able to demonstrate a non-existent thing performing some action, or expressing some state of being. — ucarr

No, it doesn't mean I can demonstrate it any more than your premise can be demonstrated. — noAxioms

Here's my demonstration.

If it's true nothing can be asserted prior to existent mind (MPP), then refuting pre-existent mind with the predication of that selfsame mind (non-existent things - such as is minds - have predications (E2,E4,E5,E6)) is a refutation of EPP that examples a contradiction. — ucarr

Where is yours?

Go ahead and establish your non-existence while being something or doing something. — ucarr

But I do exist, by the usual reasoning, and it is even justified. It just isn't objective. That's the part that holds no water. — noAxioms

If you doubt the objectivity inferable from social interaction, then you've fallen into solipsism.

Partitioning existence into definitions that support or deny existence won't work because that would be simultaneous existence and non-existence, and we've agreed the two modes are mutually exclusive. — ucarr

We do not agree. I don't exist in Moscow, but I exist in some other town. No contradiction there. — noAxioms

You do exist in Moscow because your residence in ¬ Moscow, if true, is a fact in Moscow. This claim sounds like a stretcher that explodes reason, but it doesn't because general existence is the non-local part of every existing thing emergent as a temporal material thing. This means that all material things are tied in with the Standard Model basis for existential symmetries and their conservation laws. Nothing is created or destroyed; only the forms of material things change. General existence is everywhere at all times, and that's a part of your material existence as it is of mine.

QM has thrown open the shudders on omnipresent general existence, and subject-dependent measurement of material things is one of the symmetries of general existence. It's the mirror image of non-locality. Just as we're not completely local to our measurable position, the objects of our perception are not completely local to their perceived (by us) objectivity. This is QM entanglement.

I meant empty objective existence is quite different from the lack of objective existence. Lacking objective existence doesn't imply lack of other kinds (relational say) of existence. — noAxioms

We're either engulfed in solipsism or idealism, and there's no mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, or there is a mind-independent realm of material things perceived indirectly, and we're using our empirical experience of same to generate cognition about reality ambiguously interior/exterior.

Of significant note, it says 'counted as real' which is support for my notion that existence might just be a concept without a thing in itself. — noAxioms

You suspect general existence has the ontological status of numbers.

The principle as given is mind-independent, but only applies to causal structures. So the states of Conway's game of life exist, but 14 does not. That game and our universe might supervene on numbers and mathematics, but it is a gray area as to whether such supervention constitutes participation in causal processes. — noAxioms

Why do you think position non-causal? Presence, always tied to location, dynamically consumes the material phenomena provided by physics. The symmetry of a dynamic presence drives the rotation and reflection of physics, chemistry and life. The groups supported by position and presence animate nature. This depth of functionality is deep causation.

I'm arguing that physical you does move along a number line; it's called the timeline of your personal history — ucarr

The correct term is 'worldline', and I am everywhere present on it, and thus it is not something along which I move. Yes, that is an example of physical extension, and there are examples of physical motion. The part I'm denying is numbers supervening on physics instead of the other way around.

You're saying quantum fields are mind-dependent? — ucarr

I don't recall saying that, but if the existence of the world in which those fields apply is grounded in human presence in that world, then yes, they, like the rocks, seem pretty mind dependent. I meet few realists who go beyond that bias. Tegmark is one, but he goes to the extent of 'everything exists' or maybe 'everything possible', which is a problematic stance.

Quantum fields are measured.

They probably wouldn't be posited if they were not measured, yes.

I should've written, "If it's a necessary premise that cannot be justified - as with a first-order system - it's axiomatic.

Hence the axioms of mathematics for instance. Without careful selection of axioms, mathematics as a tool would be pretty useless. So better written, yes.
I don't find EPP necessary. 'We need to do something about that asteroid headed for us' works just fine without adding 'only if it objectively exists' to the end. We can see the asteroid coming. It shares the same objective ontology as do we, and exactly what that objective state is doesn't seem to be relevant to the situation at hand.

This puts you fundamentally at odds with science because all scientific theories are axiomatic to the extent that they cannot be proven.

Science doesn't depend much on a specific stance on metaphysics. It pragmatically uses a definition like E4, even if E4 is mind dependent, because science is all about knowing and predicting, which is also mind dependent.

If it's true nothing can be asserted prior to existent mind (MPP) ...

That would be EMPA (existing mind precedes asserting, and also MPA: mind preceding asserting). Predication (a rock being massive) is different than a mind noting a predication. Hence the rock can be massive sans mind (MPP false), but it still takes a mind to conceive of predication (MPCP). This is per my OP where concept of X needs to be explicitly distinguished from X.
None of MPP, MPA, nor MPCP specify an existing mind. It just say mind, which may or may not exist depending on definitions chosen.
I accept MPA and MPCP, and EMPA only with EPP, but not MPP. It seems logical that mind would precede any mental constructs.

Anyway, the bold part of your argument begs the conclusion, so the demonstration says no more than: "If EPP is true, then EPP being false entails a contradiction".

Where is yours?

I'm not making a positive claim. A negative cannot be demonstrated, only falsified by counterexample.

If you doubt the objectivity inferable from social interaction, then you've fallen into solipsism.

You mistake a relation for objectivity. Social interaction establishes a common relation. I'm totally fine with a relational (finite domain) definition of existence, even if EPP doesn't hold under it.

You do exist in Moscow because your residence in ¬ Moscow, if true, is a fact in Moscow.

OK, but you're changing domains to say that, and the existence of something in one domain is not always a fact in another. What about something that resides on a planet near the star Deneb? Its presence there is not a fact in Moscow (it might be under some non-local interpretation of QM where retrocausality is allowed). That example is one of a more disjoint domain, and they get more disjoint than that. The thing residing near Deneb has predicates, and yet said existence is not factual in Moscow. For that matter, Moscow is not factual relative to the described thing.

You suspect general existence has the ontological status of numbers.

You should quote where you think I said or implied that. The bit about the existence of existence seems pretty circular to me.

Why do you think position non-causal?

I don't.remember saying it was.

What I’ve learned from our debate: a) still waters run deep regarding predication of non-existent things; b) I must open up my mind by a great volume regarding the material/immaterial debate.

Thank-you for your time and attention.