To the quote from Roark, I do wonder if "parasitic reference" is the right solution here. It seems possible to also frame it as a sort of mental bracketing. So, one can consider the idea of God and affirm that it implies its own affirmation, but then, outside the bracketing, deny that any concept should be able to imply its own affirmation. — Count Timothy von Icarus
[The atheist] does not himself think of God as the thing than which nothing greater can be thought. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 9
I don't see how this is at odds with what Klima has said. — Count Timothy von Icarus
And then this:
"But throughout this process, the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer, without knowing under what description or name the answerer identifies this thought object."
The issue here is clear enough: how could we know that "the questioner thinks of the same thought object as the answerer"? And further, how can the "thought-object" in the mind of the saint be said to be the same as the "thought-object" in the head of the fool - and indeed, how could they be said to be different? — Banno
The following appears mistaken — Banno
20 “So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” Kripke, S. 1991, p.173. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4
The speaker's reference, given by pointing to Kaplan, is Kaplan. The intended reference, given by the name "Kripke", is Kripke. Hence it is not always the case that the speaker's reference is the one that satisfies the speaker's intent. — Banno
Kripke showed that speaker's reference may differ from semantic reference. However, he also showed that a name may refer to it's referent regardless of any description, and indeed in the absence of any description. — Banno
Her semantic reference is to Kripke. Hence it is not true the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies her description. — Banno
Suppose a speaker takes it that a certain object a fulfills the conditions for being the semantic reference of a designator, "d." Then, wishing to say something about a, he uses "d" to speak about a; say, he says "Φ(d)." Then, he said, of a, on that occasion, that it Φ'd; in the appropriate Gricean sense (explicated above), he meant that a Φ'd. This is true even if a is not really the semantic referent of "d." If it is not, then that a Φ's is included in what he meant (on that occasion), but not in the meaning of his words (on that occasion).
So, we may tentatively define the speaker's referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator. — Kripke, Meaning and Truth: Essential Readings in Modern Semantics, 173
The speaker's reference may succeed when description is not satisfied by the referent, or if the belief of the speaker is in error. — Banno
This is in defence of:“So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.”
In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.
You and Klima both appear to have read "the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator" as implying the presence of a description. But the phrase is chosen so as to be neutral. The "conditions" can of course as well be those causal conditions that are the basis of Kripke's theory of reference. — Banno
This theory agrees with the recent “historical explanation”[19]—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4
You have still not said what you think parasitic reference is. — Banno
no one seems to want to give an argument for their claims — Leontiskos
I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se. — Janus
For me a far more telling argument would be that God should be able to create a perfect world but hasn't. That throws in doubt either omnibenevolence, omniscience or omnipotence. On that point it seems that the latter two must go together, or at least if Gord were omnipotent he must be omniscient, but neither require omnibenevolence. — Janus
This is pretty stupid. A real Porsche may well be greater than the idea of a Porsche for someone who wants a Porsche. But there are people who appreciate their idea of a Porsche but are quite sure a real Porsche would be less "great" for lots of reasons. So much for the real being "greater" than the idea.Yes, it's pretty basic. A real Porsche is greater than the idea of a Porsche. I haven't seen anyone present an argument against this. — Leontiskos
For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description
So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator. He uses the designator with the intention of making an assertion about the object in question (which may not really be the semantic referent, if the speaker’s belief that it fulfills the appropriate semantic conditions is in error). The speaker’s referent is the thing the speaker referred to by the designator, though it may not be the referent of the designator, in his idiolect. In the example above, Jones, the man named by the name, is the semantic referent. Smith is the speaker’s referent, the correct answer to the question, “To whom were you referring?”22
Who is the sentence "He did not write "Naming and Necessity" about?
The point, as I have said, is that that home (the Empyrean) is nowhere at all. It does not exist in space or time; thus neither does the spatiotemporal world it “contains.” The Empyrean is the subject of all experience, it is what does the experiencing. As pure awareness or conscious being, its relation to creation, that is, to everything that can be described or talked about, may be metaphorically conceived in one of two ways: It may be imagined as an infinite reality containing the entire universe of every possible object of experience (this cosmological picture is the framework of the Paradiso) or it may be conceived as a point with no extension in either space or time, which projects the world of space and time around itself, as a light paints a halo onto mist. In the Primo Mobile, the ninth sphere, which is the nexus between the Empyrean and the world of multiplicity, between the subject of experience and every possible object of experience, Dante takes both these tacks.
Christian Moevs - The Metaphysics of Dante's Comedy - Introduction: Non-Duality and Self-Knowledge - pg. 6
Two definitions from our friend:ens reale and ens rationis — Count Timothy von Icarus
againstbelieves satisfies his description
believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.
What do we make of this? If god sees what we have done, and so cannot change it, then there is something god cannot do. Or god does not know what we will choose, in which case there is stuff he doesn't know. — Banno
Did you see the argument, from a recent Philosophy Now paper, proposing that this was the perfect world, but not for us?
The Best Possible World, But Not For Us — Banno
Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions. — Banno
In any case is God compelled to fix our mistakes? This comes back to the obvious fact that he has no created a perfect world, not if a world, to be perfect involves no suffering for any creature. — Janus
Notice "...leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent".2. On the causal model, words refer in virtue of being associated with chains of use leading back to an initiating use or ‘baptism’ of the referent. Extending this model beyond names has proven difficult, but one option is to insist that it is really the perceptual connection that underlies most baptismal events that runs the show. In that case, perceptually-grounded uses of demonstratives, deictic pronouns, and definite descriptions can be folded into the picture relatively easily, with anaphoric uses treated as something akin to links in a chain of reference-borrowing — Reference (SEP)
Actually, looking at that again, it's much too strong. The casual chain argument is not at all central to N&N. It is offered as an example of the sort of thing that might serve as an alternative. The main line of argument is against the necessity of a reference being associated with a description, and how possible world semantics shows this to be fraught with contradiction.Kripke’s entire argument in Naming and Necessity is that names refer via causal chains, not definite descriptions. — Banno
So it is an error to claim that Kripke thinks a description is needed in order to fix speaker's reference.
For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description
Klima assumes that 'conditions for being the semantic referent' must involve a descriptive element
Is this important? Perhaps not, perhaps it was just a slip on Klima's part. Or perhaps it indicates some reservations he might have towards Kripke's semantics.
so why do you think. ...implies anything to the contrary? — Count Timothy von Icarus
The dialogue is interminable. — Banno
It doesn't say anything about it; it says that when a speaker's does use a description, the "speaker's reference" is that to which they think it applies. — Count Timothy von Icarus
So let's stop for a moment so you can correct any errors of mine. The - my - argument is that given definitions 1 & 2, and Anselm's claims, then the God that in the understanding is that than which & etc. cannot exist in reality. Have at it!
An immediate consequence for Anselm's is that what is in his understanding is an idea, and thereby cannot exist in reality - is not any kind of thing at all.
You apparently do not understand your own terms. Or maybe you do. I should like to see you make the sandwich of which you have an idea. Of course you won't need anything at all from the grocery store, yes? Or for that matter anything at all that can be called real, or that exists, right? It's ideas all the way down that you're somehow going to make real.I don't think the substitution will do. We can have ideas about ens reale. For instance, we have the ideas "man," "fox," etc. Yet presumably these also exist outside the mind. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Parasitic reference to each other’s thought objects between people not sharing each other’s beliefs seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon.
I should have written the last words of the sentnece differently and added something like the underlined: "Looking at the actual conditions in, and nature of, our world and viewed through the lens of the human notion of goodness and justice an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent creator seems to be untenable".
I don't agree that the notions of omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence are logically incompatible per se. — Janus
An immediate consequence for Anselm's is that what is in his understanding is an idea, and thereby cannot exist in reality - is not any kind of thing at all. — tim wood
However, these are also distinctions made throughout philosophy, and all the time in everyday language. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Ok, so why do you think [...] ...implies anything to the contrary? — Count Timothy von Icarus
The first says that Kripke does not think a description is needed in order to fix a referent. The second, that Kripke thinks the speaker has at hand a description in order to fix the referent. — Banno
[The intentional theory of reference] agrees with the recent “historical explanation”19—as opposed to the Russellian—theory of reference on the fundamental insight that speakers may successfully refer to objects by descriptions that do not apply to these objects. For Saul Kripke this indicates that speaker’s reference may diverge from semantic reference. In the Kripkean framework, however, it is also assumed that the speaker’s reference is to that which the speaker at least believes satisfies his description.20 On the intentional theory not even this is always required.
20 “So, we may tentatively define the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator.” Kripke, S. 1991, p.173. — Gyula Klima, St. Anselm's Proof - Section 4
Arguably, the argument simply proves that the atheist cannot deny God (i.e. the being greater than which no being can be thought) without affirming a contradiction. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The upshot of all of this is the following: in order simultaneously to render the sufficiency claim in the third premise plausible and to accommodate (γ), the predicate ‘Ix’ must also be interpreted as including a modal-pistic component: ‘x can be thought to exist only in the intellect’. One obvious consequence of this reinterpretation is the fact that the conclusion of the argument is not that God exists in reality, but rather that one cannot think God to exist only in the intellect. — Tony Roark, Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof, 8
The original interpretation of the predicate ‘I( )’ in the reconstruction was ‘( ) is only in the intellect’, which I expounded further by saying that an x is only in the intellect in this sense if and only if x is thought of, but does not exist in reality. So, this predicate does contain a certain ‘pistic component’, namely, the component that x is thought of, which of course entails the ‘modal-pistic component’ that x can be thought of. Now, if g is only in the intellect in this sense, then it seems clear that something greater than g can be thought of in the sense of Roark’s interpretation (γ) by a thinking subject S who assumes premise (2). For S, by virtue of assuming premise (2), is thinking that g is in the intellect and does not exist in reality. Therefore, S can obviously think of something with ‘a greater cardinality’, whether g itself or anything else, by simply thinking, or counterfactually assuming, that that thing does exist in reality. — Klima, Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to Tony Roark, 132
Accordingly, the argument does have to prove its conclusion for any thinking subject S, provided S assumes all the premises in the required senses, interpreting the phrase ‘x can be thought to be greater than y’ as expounded by Roark. The important point here is that what S has to conclude on the basis of the premises thus interpreted is not that he simply cannot think that g exists only in the intellect, but that it is not true that g exists only in the intellect, from which he further has to conclude that, since g is in the intellect and not only in the intellect, g also has to exist in reality.
To be sure, an external observer E, listening to the reasoning of S, can describe what she observes by saying that S had to conclude that g exists because S cannot consistently think that g does not exist. And E may further claim that she is not thus committed to accepting S’s conclusion, for S can plausibly argue only for himself, since he is the one who makes the comparisons of his own thought objects regarding their assumed cardinalities within his own ‘modal-pistic’ context.
But then, this result seems to make perfect sense in the larger context of the paper. After all, my main argument in the paper is that Anselm’s argument can genuinely work only for those who are willing to make constitutive reference to God. But for them it is indeed an inevitable conclusion that they cannot consistently think of God and think that he does not exist. So they have to conclude without any pistic-modal component in their conclusion that God exists. — Klima, Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof: reply to Tony Roark, 132-3
Banno keeps asserting things without argument. — Leontiskos
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