But if you can imagine a dog does not need to think to yelp and leap from being burnt, why can't we imagine the dog is behaving according to the exact same impulses in everything the dog does? Like a plant cell photosynthesizing - wherefore belief as a component of these motions? — Fire Ologist
I think part of the motivation for deflation arises from the position that truth applies only to sentences. Such a position seems to lead down that path. Perhaps the idea that knowledge is just belief that happens to be justified and true also leads down this way. Earlier eras distinguished between many types of knowledge. Continental philosophy also tends to be more likely to differentiate many types of knowledge. Plato had four, Aristotle five (and arguably more). "Knowing how to ride a bike," sense knowledge, noeisis, etc. However, if knowledge, the grasp of truth, is always propositional, then it makes more sense for sentences to be the primary bearers of truth, and also for what is "known" or "true" to vary by language game.
Anyhow, an interesting consequence of sentences being true "of themselves" without relation to the intellect is that a random text generator "contains" all truths. There is some interesting stuff to unpack there. From an information theoretic perspective, a random text generator only provides information about its randomization process, the semantic meaning of any output being accidental (and highly unlikely). — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think part of the motivation for deflation arises from the position that truth applies only to sentences — Count Timothy von Icarus
Why does it have to be so black and white? — Apustimelogist
Mostly to help us make sense of the Dog — Moliere
The animal is serving as a kind of "substitute" for our animal side in trying to separate out what makes human language different. — Moliere
Or, on the other hand, it's a counter-example if we believe that the dog can refer or have true beliefs. — Moliere
But you obviously still cannot talk about that without words - the intellectual activity of truthing is then asserting 'what is the case' with words.
I see attraction to deflationary theories because I don't like to decide metaphysical questions on the epistemic side -- there's going to be implications no matter what, but the epistemic side is attempting to minimize the number of implications a given theory of truth will have.
When one quotes, it is a common courtesy not to remove the automatic link that is created. That enables readers to check on context.My post: — Count Timothy von Icarus
The deflationary account is based on the observation that "P is true" is truth- functionally equivalent to "P".It's debatable if deflationary theories of truth "do not say there are no truths." — Count Timothy von Icarus
remains unjustified.(indeed you ridiculed the notion of anything being "actually true") — Count Timothy von Icarus
"we can assert or deny any part/whole relation as true of false... based on what is useful," is an approach, but it's hardly a serious one. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The appropriate path would be for you to mark the offending posts for consideration by the mods.Let's have no more use of "sky daddy," — Count Timothy von Icarus
Yep. One of the advantages of Davidson's approach is that it takes truth as fundamental. That's a pretty cool move, since any theorising or ratiocination is a seeking for truth, and so presupposes that we might recognise it if we saw it....a theory of truth cannot tell us what is true, except perhaps for what is true about truth. — Moliere
Cool. And yes, the next step is the iterative and constructive aspect of language, allowing the construction of our social world.That's pretty close to how I think of language — Moliere
We can't tell what is actually happening in another person's head, or our own head, when we are believing or are knowing. Why would we think invoking dog-beliefs would help clarify anything? — Fire Ologist
That's bang on.I think its more the fact that we cannot talk about truth without using sentences and words. — Apustimelogist
I see. From my point of view, "nothing is really true tout court, but this varies by context," seems like a very consequential metaphysical position. It claims that most metaphysical outlooks (certainly historically, but also likely in contemporary thought) are crucially mistaken. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Likewise, what is the status of moral realism when the truth values of moral facts are allowed to vary based on "whim," as you put it? — Count Timothy von Icarus
One can bracket the question of "what is truth," and investigate how the term is used in language, mathematics, etc. without having to commit to deflation however. I do not agree that it is a position that comes with fewer commitments. Agnosticism would be a position that comes with fewer commitments. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Deflation is at least a position though, and I respect it for that. The only approach that really irks me is the methodology of trying to present every significant philosophical problem as a "pseudoproblem." Some problems are pseudoproblems of course, but these folks are like someone who thinks every problem must be a nail because they have discovered a hammer.
Cool. And yes, the next step is the iterative and constructive aspect of language, allowing the construction of our social world. — Banno
Yes, there is something of the deflationary account in ↪Count Timothy von Icarus's reply. Although ""truth is the adequacy of thought to being" is pretty obtuse, and might look a bit like correspondence. — Banno
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