So? It is uncontroversially true that a zygote is dependent on the mother to nourish it into viability. Are you suggesting that a person that is dependent on another human to survive is thereby no longer a human being---or never was?

Are you suggesting that a person that is dependent on another human to survive is thereby no longer a human being---or never was? — Bob Ross

Uh, no. I'm pointing out that you believe a skin cell is not a human and that a skin cell can be cloned to produce a human being. Both skin and zygote are alive and have human DNA.

Never once did I agree to that. A skin cell absolutely cannot be cloned, and then magically is a zygote. Think about how patently incoherent that is praxis: you are saying that an exact duplicate of X which is not Y is Y.

, I'll again point out that the interests and preferences of the person carrying are much more apparent than those of the zygot or cyst or foetus. We do not need an agreed definition of personhood in order to understand that while the mother can tell us what she wants, the conceptus' needs are only ever inferred. They are not of equal standing.

Sloppy language, sorry. I’ll reiterate.

Over a thousand dogs have been cloned. They typically use skin cells from the pooches to make clones of them.

Dog skin cells are alive and contain doggy DNA.

You’ve said that human skin cells are not a human so I assume you’d say that dog skin cells are not a dog.

You’ve said that a fertilized human egg is a human so I assume you’d say that a fertilized dog egg is a dog.

My point is that if the genetic material in a fertilized egg is what defines it as ‘a dog’ or ‘a human’ then the genetic material in a skin cell is also ‘a dog’ or ‘a human’ being that it can be used to reproduce a dog or human instead of the genetic material in eggs and sperm.

To me it’s no weirder to say that a skin cell is a human than it is to say a freshly fertilized egg is a human.

To me it’s no weirder to say that a skin cell is a human than it is to say a fertilized egg is a human. — praxis

I think, for me, the problem is that a skin cell comes from a 'living human', but a Zygote hasn't reached that stage. What are you cloning? Obviously, they're the exact same process genetically, but practically speaking, cloning a Zygote is extremely weird given we have no 'person' to which the 'clone' could be subsequent at that point.
With the skin cell, we do. Point not missed, just found this interesting.

I didn’t mean to say anything about cloning a zygote. Imagine if you did and it turned out to be a sociopath. You’d have two sociopaths to deal with instead of one. :scream:

Sure LOL. The weirdness I find so interesting there, would be - can the clone be 'more aged' than the (eventual) person from which the clone came? That's very interesting, if it's possible.
There's no weirdness like that with the skin cell.

the conceptus' needs are only ever inferred — Banno

So it is with a new born baby, yet we give a baby at least enough standing to outweigh the mother’s choice of life or death at that point of development, much sooner than that usually.

A person that is temporarily knocked out (from getting punched) can't tell us what they want us to do and a person next to them that wants to rape them while they are unconscious can: is this "unequal standing" of communication morally relevant to you?!? What you just argued is that we don't give as much moral weight to people that can't communicate with us. What about deaf and mute people? Do they have less rights?!?

Not quite, although I appreciate the elaboration. Dogs are cloned by conjoining a dog egg with a dog cell, which is a synthetic version of egg fertilization. What you are thinking, is that somehow a dog's cell can just become a dog---that's not how that works. Even in cloning dogs, my view is the correct one: a new living dog is created upon fertilizing the egg of the surrogate mother with an artificially manipulated tissue sample from the dog that one wants to clone.

I'll again point out that the interests and preferences of the person carrying are much more apparent than those of the zygot or cyst or foetus. We do not need an agreed definition of personhood in order to understand that while the mother can tell us what she wants, the conceptus' needs are only ever inferred. They are not of equal standing. — Banno

That logic doesn't work because it would support infanticide. The obligations imposed upon parents to support their children are real whether the child is in utero or not and an infant's wants can only be inferred as well.

That is, there is no basis for treating some people as second class citizens if they are indeed people. What is a "person" is a either based upon empirically based observations or it's socially constructed. As has been argued in the transsexual related threads, the argument from the left was pretty solidly that what is a man or woman is a social construct and from there we create laws that protect those socially created classifications.

In truth, I think the left does the same with regard to what a person is, although there seems to be this struggle to try to support it with science. It's not going to be supportable in science though because the essence of personhood is far too nebulous a concept.

That is, let's leave to the right the hard and fast rules: A man is XY and a person is the product of conception. Let's leave to the left the social constructs: A man is a person who so declares himself to be and a person is who society declares them to be. Your basis for not protecting certain fetuses seems wrapped up in protecting certain societal interests consistent with your views on protecting women. That's not a bad thing, but I don't think it needs to be further supported by ad hoc arguments related to science where we try to prove through a microscope that a fetus isn't a person.

My own take is that for the most part essentialism is false. There's no such thing as the essence of personhood; there's just the social fact that we use the word "person" to refer to certain types of organisms and not to others, based on some general characteristics (much like the word "game").

It happens to be the case that the general characteristics that prompt our use of the word "person" also also happen to be the general characteristics that 'grant' the appropriate moral rights.

So it's not exactly the case that we ought not kill someone because they are a person, but that someone is a person and we ought not kill them because they have thoughts and feelings and wants and so on.

Saying "we ought not kill him because he's a person" is just a more succinct phrasing.

What are these "same reasons"?

Because I would say that it is wrong to kill other humans because it is wrong to kill humans with thoughts and feelings and wants. Embryos and (early stage) foetuses don't have thoughts or feelings or wants. They are more like the brain dead living on life support.

It deprives her of life, a future, and the world of her presence. It devalues life, it inflicts unnecessary harm…but mostly it’s unjust. She innocent. She doesn’t deserve to be killed.

Having more or less thoughts and feelings doesn’t make anyone more or less deserving of life or death. So in my mind any such distinction only serves to comfort the killer, not the one who is having his life snuffed out. That’s why the whole ordeal is a purely selfish one.

a) "X is a human" means "X has human DNA"
b) It is never acceptable to kill a human
c) Therefore, it is never acceptable to kill something with human DNA

That’s not my argument, nor have I ever heard it before. Here it is: it is wrong to kill an innocent human being. A fetus is an innocent human being. Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus. Which premise would you disagree with?

Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus. — NOS4A2

Is this something you think should be outlawed? Or are you just expressing your sentiment?

I don’t think anything should be outlawed.

I don’t think anything should be outlawed. — NOS4A2

Cool.

So it's not exactly the case that we ought not kill them because they are a person, but that they are a person and we ought not kill them because they have thoughts and feelings and wants and so on. — Michael

The moral claim is that persons are sacred, endowed with certain rights. The claim would be, to the moral realist, that in this reality, persons have those rights.

There are also people as well. The claim is that within reality, there are people walking around.

Ergo, don't murder the people.

But denying essentialism does not deny that there are people or that every example of a person is ambiguous and might not be a person. Denying essentialism only means there is no one element that every person has, but instead perhaps that there are a number of criteria that if existing within certain combinations will result in a person.

So it's not that entity X with attributes a, d, l, and q ought not be killed. It's that if entity X has the attributes that satisify what a person is then entity X should not be killed.

I do follow what you're saying, and maybe we're not saying anything terribly different, but you seem to be saying that "Person" is shorthand for saying "entity X with attributes a, d, l, and q," so we needn't elevate the term "Person" to mean something more or different. My view though is that entity Y with attributes a, d, l, and c and not q might also be a "Person," so it serves an important function to place entities X and Y into the "Person" catagorization because in our moral universe, People have special rights.

She doesn’t deserve to be killed. — NOS4A2

That someone doesn't deserve to die isn't that they deserve to live. Embryos and foetuses don't deserve anything.

Here it is: it is wrong to kill an innocent human being. A fetus is an innocent human being. Therefore, it is wrong to kill a fetus. Which premise would you disagree with? — NOS4A2

You equivocate.

The premise "it is wrong to kill an innocent human being" is being interpreted as "it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being", but then if I were to deny this premise you would misinterpret my counter-premise as "it is never wrong to kill an innocent human being".

It is sometimes wrong to kill an innocent human being and sometimes not wrong. It is wrong if the innocent human being is an adult, a child, a baby, or a sufficiently developed foetus. It is not wrong if the innocent human being is an embryo or sufficiently underdeveloped foetus.

So it's not that entity X with attributes a, d, l, and q ought not be killed. It's that if entity X has the attributes that satisify what a person is then entity X should not be killed.

I do follow what you're saying, and maybe we're not saying anything terribly different, but you seem to be saying that "Person" is shorthand for saying "entity X with attributes a, d, l, and q," so we needn't elevate the term "Person" to mean something more or different. My view though is that entity Y with attributes a, d, l, and c and not q might also be a "Person," so it serves an important function to place entities X and Y into the "Person" catagorization because in our moral universe, People have special rights. — Hanover

Whether or not something "satisfies what a person is" depends on what the word "person" means which depends on how we use it. How we use the word "person" is a contingent fact about the customs of the English language and unrelated to whether or not it is morally acceptable to kill the things that we happen to describe as a person.

Unless you want to say "morally wrong to kill" is part of the definition of "person", in which case to say that we ought (not) kill something because it is (not) a person is to beg the question.

What you are thinking, is that somehow a dog's cell can just become a dog---that's not how that works. — Bob Ross

Believe it or not I’m not quite that stupid. Definitely close but not that dumb.

I briefly reviewed the process before posting. The essence of it is that the DNA in skin cells replaces the genetic material in the normal reproductive process. Canine eggs are used of course but their genetic material is replaced with the genetic material from skin cells. Hence my point, if the genetic material in a fertilized egg is what defines it as ‘a dog’ or ‘a human’ then the genetic material in a skin cell is also ‘a dog’ or ‘a human’ being that it can be used to reproduce a dog or human instead of the genetic material in eggs and sperm.

Maybe you disagree that it is the genetic material in fertilized eggs that defines them as ‘a dog’ or ‘a human’. Is that the case?

Yes, it is always wrong to kill an innocent human being; that’s what such a principle entails. But contrary to your assumption, I wouldn’t think that you believe it is never wrong to kill an innocent human being. You’ve clearly stated otherwise: it is fine to kill an innocent human being if he doesn’t have thoughts and feelings, or isn’t a person.

The differences are, as far as I can tell, you place moral value on what human beings can do, while I place moral value on what a human being is. Is that fair?

The differences are, as far as I can tell, you place moral value on what human beings can do, while I place moral value on what a human being is. Is that fair? — NOS4A2

Yes. As related to my reply to Hanover above, what a human is depends on how we use the word "human", and how we use the word "human" is a contingent fact about the English language, open to change. If we use the word "human" to refer to anything with human DNA then embryos are human. If we use the word "human" only to refer to sufficiently developed organisms with human DNA then embryos are not human. It is a mistake to commit to some kind of essentialist view of being human such that we can be wrong in (not) using the word "human" to refer to embryos.

And whether or not it is morally acceptable to kill an embryo does not depend on whether or not it is conventional in the English language for the word "human" to refer also to embryos.

We need to look to more concrete facts. These concrete facts are biological, neurological, and psychological. Simply having human DNA is not sufficient biological grounds to entail that the thing "deserves" to live. Whereas being able to think and feel and so on is sufficient biological, neurological, and psychological grounds.

If I grant your view, then every single cell in my body is its own human being. Do you see how absurd that is?

A cell of a human is not the same as a human. A fertilized egg is a human being because it is the earliest stage of development of a completely separate organism of the human species. This is no different than how a nourished seed in the ground is the first stage of a continual process of development for a plant. The seed is not a plant; the water is not a plant; the oxygen is not a plant; the soil is not a plant; but seed in combination with these things produces a seed which begins to grow, and this growing seed is a plant.

If you deny this, then you have to arbitrarily define a point in the process, which has begun, to say "that's exactly where the developing seed is now a plant". That's what a pro-choice person is trying to do when they deny that human life begins at conception.

Yes. As related to my reply to Hanover above, what a human is depends on how we use the word "human", and how we use the word "human" is a contingent fact about the English language, open to change. If we use the word "human" to refer to anything with human DNA then embryos are human. If we use the word "human" only to refer to sufficiently developed organisms with human DNA then embryos are not human. It is a mistake to commit to some kind of essentialist view of being human such that we can be wrong in (not) using the word "human" to refer to embryos.

And whether or not it is morally acceptable to kill an embryo does not depend on whether or not it is conventional in the English language for the word "human" to refer also to embryos.

We need to look to more concrete facts. These concrete facts are biological, neurological, and psychological. Simply having human DNA is not sufficient biological grounds to entail that the thing "deserves" to live. Whereas being able to think and feel and so on is sufficient biological, neurological, and psychological grounds.

I use the term "human being" in the sense that it is a member of species homo sapiens, whether it is developed or not. A fetus is not of some other species. If a human lifecycle begins at conception, then we are speaking of human life and no other. This is an existentialist and "animalist" view rather than an essentialist view.

The essentialist view would be the personhood one. One is a person so long as she has the essential psychological traits. It implies that persons were never embryos, never in a coma, and other absurdities.

A "sufficiently developed" member of the species homo sapien is no definition of human being that I've ever heard.

I use the term "human being" in the sense that it is a member of species homo sapiens, whether it is developed or not. A fetus is not of some other species. If a human lifecycle begins at conception, then we are speaking of human life and no other. This is an existentialist and "animalist" view rather than an essentialist view. — NOS4A2

And to be a member of the species homo sapiens is to have the appropriate ("human") DNA? So when you say that it is wrong to kill a foetus because it is human you are simply saying that it is wrong to kill a foetus because it has human DNA.

I fail to see how you get from "the foetus has human DNA" to "therefore it is wrong to kill a foetus".

You’d need as a premise “it is wrong to kill anything with human DNA” but I see no reason to accept such a premise.

And to be a member of the species homo sapiens is to have the appropriate ("human") DNA? So when you say that it is wrong to kill a foetus because it is human you are simply saying that it is wrong to kill a foetus because it has human DNA.

I fail to see how you get from "the foetus has human DNA" to "therefore it is wrong to kill a foetus".

Many things have human DNA, like sperm or a pool of saliva. Human beings have more than DNA.

Many things have human DNA, like sperm or a pool of saliva. Human beings have more than DNA. — NOS4A2

So what distinguishes a human organism with human DNA and a non-human organism with human DNA, and why is this distinction the measure of whether or not it is wrong to kill it?

If I grant your view, then every single cell in my body is its own human being. Do you see how absurd that is? — Bob Ross

You're not following. I agree with you that it's absurd, or "weird" as I previously said, and to me just as weird as saying that a zygote is "a human."

The seed is not a plant — Bob Ross

I was hoping that you would say something like this because I think it goes to the heart of the matter. You grant a human zygote fully developed human status but don't grant a seed fully developed plant status. Why? Because you don't care about seeds nearly as much as you care about your own species. A million seeds could be destroyed and you wouldn't bat an eye.

Abortion feels wrong. I don't think that anyone would deny that, but the fact remains that a zygote is a zygote and a seed is a seed.

Here’s an interesting paper:

Could a zygote be a human being?

This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing with cases of fission and fusion and both seem to be available to the conceptionist. One is the Replacement View according to which objects cease to exist when they fission or fuse. The other is the Multiple Occupancy View - both twins may be present already in the zygote and both persist in a chimera. So, is the conceptionist position tenable after all? I argue that it is not. A zygote gives rise not only to a human being but also to a placenta - it cannot already be both a human being and a placenta. Neither approach to fission and fusion can help the conceptionist with this problem. But worse is in store. Both fission and fusion can occur before and after the development of the inner cell mass of the blastocyst - the entity which becomes the embryo proper. The idea that we become human beings with the arrival of the inner cell mass leads to bizarre results however we choose to accommodate fission and fusion.