Theoretically, perhaps.

In fact, the issue is in reality a bit more complicated, as you might know. First, we don't know if our facts are the whole truth and nothing but the truth, hence we use the term 'theory' in science. And then of course there are the things that are subjective, which you cannot find an objective answer. Like what is beautiful, what is morally right or wrong etc.

Wittgenstein once said that the totality of facts makes up the world. Now, facts are determined from the sum total of counterfactuals determining what are "facts". — Shawn

There are positive facts, such as this apple is in front of me, and there are negative facts, such as this apple is not on the Moon.

Bertrand Russell thought that there were negative facts, whereas Wittgenstein didn't think that there were negative facts.

Assuming that a negative fact is a counter-factual, as Wittgenstein didn't think that there were negative facts, for Wittgenstein, a positive fact, ie, a fact, cannot therefore be either defined or determined by a negative fact, ie, a counter-factual.

Yes, I understand. Yet, counterfactuals nowadays are envisioned in modal logic. So, by defining a state of affairs, you can resort to the actualism of a state of affairs only by what it is not.

Or in other words, the logical space of events or state of affairs, that which is, defined, by, again, what something is not. Positive facts are mutually related by negative facts in logical space, since everything is unitary.

Hope that makes sense...

Or in other words, the logical space of events or state of affairs, that which is, defined, by, again, what something is not. Positive facts are mutually related by negative facts in logical space. — Shawn

Yes. If the apple is not on the Moon, then it could be in Australia, it could be on Mars or it could be in New York, where "could" is a modal verb showing possibility.

There is a logical space of modal possibilities, possible states of affairs. Then a fact is a state of affairs that obtains (though this is not necessarily what is given in the Tractatus).

The negative fact, such as the apple is not on the Moon, can be related to a positive fact by the modal possibility in logical space that the apple could be in front of me.

And then of course there are the things that are subjective, which you cannot find an objective answer. Like what is beautiful, what is morally right or wrong etc. — ssu

Good point, ssu.

Honestly, when I have exchanges on aesthetics here in TPF, I don't really expect an answer with facts but to read different perspectives on the same topic. Poetry is probably one of the main subjective-notion-like topics. I did an experiment a few weeks ago with my thread about Kundera and how this author used the adjective 'unbearable', attaching it to other words. I precisely referred to nostalgia. So, how do we understand nostalgia when it is unbearable? It is impossible to articulate and explain 'unbearable' and 'nostalgia' using facts, yet that is how I feel after reading poems.

It is better to trust more our emotions than reason sometimes. :smile:

The world cannot be made up of counterfactuals just by the numbers alone.

If it is the case that what is in front of me is an apple, then that is one out of an uncountably high number of other things I would have to tick through if I were to define that merely in terms of counterfactuals.

What is more pertinent, is we compare what is within the realm of plausible, possible, and probable to narrow down the amount of counterfactuals we cycle though. Thus we don't even consider the possibility that the apple is actually a hologram disguising a small grape. We don't consider that its an elephant that has been transformed into what looks like an apple. We use both the assertion that is is an apple, and a limited number of counterfactuals to what that assertion could also apply to with higher probability in the situation we're presented with.

If it is the case that what is in front of me is an apple, then that is one out of an uncountably high number of other things I would have to tick through if I were to define that merely in terms of counterfactuals. — Philosophim

Modality in counterfactual definitiveness preserves unitary values. By doing CFD in modal logic preserves unity in outcomes as defined by the counterfactuals in logic alone.

But, the point with this thread is to imagine CFD in logical space, where in logical space everything is simply necessary.

Hope that makes better sense.

But, the point with this thread is to imagine CFD in logical space, where in logical space everything is simply necessary. — Shawn

Logical space to my knowledge is the space of all possibilities, not necessities. Its a possible world logic, where anything that is not impossible can happen.

Modality in counterfactual definitiveness preserves unitary values. By doing CFD in modal logic preserves unity in outcomes as defined by the counterfactuals in logic alone. — Shawn

Can you go into more detail in how this applies to your idea? I'm not understanding how this addresses the point I made. Perhaps you're only noting what Wittgenstein said, which if that's all you wanted to explore, then to my understanding of the man, "Yes". If you want to discuss whether this is a practical way of thinking about knowledge, then it doesn't matter if we have a logical space in which all counterfactuals are open to us. To ascertain that one knows a fact, one would have to go through every single possible counterfactual, opposed to another person simply pointing out, "That's an apple because of X, Y, and Z"

Thus, does it follow that if the world is the totality of facts, and counterfactual definiteness defines what the sum total of what a picture of a state of affairs is, then facts are composed of what things aren't, again being counterfactuals.

Sounds similar to the idea of participation in existence through limiting essence in scholastic thought. Essence is a limit on the fullness of being; in an important sense things are what they aren't.

Philosophy that relies heavily on information theory also tends to make this point. The game of "Twenty Questions" is a common example, the entire world of being narrowed to one particular with just a few questions because knowing what a thing is implies all that it is not.

But then we might consider that the positive "is" of things also refers outside of itself in another way, e.g. as the concept "red," to be fully intelligible ,must include an understanding of "color." So, aside from the idea that essence (what a thing is) doesn't explain existence (that a thing is), there is also a sense in which things rely on relations to other things for their identity. This is sort of the engine of Hegel's Logic when it comes to the doctrines of essence and concept, the inability of anything to be complete in-itself except for the true infinite. And you see the same sort of thing in Aristotle's Physics, with the insistence the motion/becoming be intelligible. Such a view is obviously at odds with Wittgenstein's (and much of modern philosophy's) atomism in TLP.

Logical space to my knowledge is the space of all possibilities, not necessities. Its a possible world logic, where anything that is not impossible can happen. — Philosophim

Yes, so since counterfactuals subsist on time, then the chain of events of the world or logical space are associated with history. As an example, if Richard Nixon hasn't been the 37th president of the United States, then Hubert Humphrey would have been the United States president. I think that this is the only way a counterfactual could or would make sense with respect to what I am saying.

Such a view is obviously at odds with Wittgenstein's (and much of modern philosophy's) atomism in TLP. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Well, if possible world semantics, which counterfactuals through existential quantification obtains, then such a system of logic would make better sense with respect to what I have already said.

Hope the relations are now more clear...

This is my hypothesis, for anyone to interpret. Had Wittgenstein heard about existential quantification through possible worlds, and thus the resulting state of affairs between them arising, meaning facts, then in my opinion he would have advocated for an analysis of positive and negative state of affairs through counterfactual analysis.

Now, with that said, I think that if Wittgenstein were to state that the world is the totality of facts, he might just add also that the world is the totality of facts and counterfactuals which define facts.

Such a view is obviously at odds with Wittgenstein's (and much of modern philosophy's) atomism in TLP. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you agree that most of logical atomism is a form of Leibnizian logic about how events and the corresponding chain events could or do happen?