• Echogem222
    86
    (I understand this post may seem difficult to understand what I'm getting at, at first, but the "Possible counter arguments" section near the bottom, I believe explains enough [especially the first one])

    Introduction:

    The Liar’s Paradox can be understood by the following statement “This statement is false”. This is a self-referential statement that leads to a logical contradiction when we try to assign a truth value to it. The paradox happens because the statement refers to itself in a way that creates an infinite loop of reference. If we assume the statement is true, then it must be false, but if it is false, then it must be true, leading to a paradox where it is neither true nor false.

    To understand this paradox, we can consider words and statements as mirrors that reflect our attempts to understand them (by themselves). Just as a mirror reflects our image but does not contain the actual image, words and statements reflect meaning but do not inherently contain meaning. When we try to understand the statement “This statement is false” by thinking that the statement itself contains meaning, we fall into a trap of trying to find meaning where there is none. Therefore, the Liar’s Paradox can only be considered valid from a “logical seeming” standpoint if we ignore all of the true values and give into the illusion that the mirror is a window and not a mirror by oversimplifying things.

    Implications for Language and Truth:

    The perspective that words and letters are like mirrors has great implications for our understanding of language and truth. Firstly, it challenges the traditional view that words and sentences have inherent truth values. Instead, it suggests that truth is a product of our interpretation of language, rather than an inherent value of language itself.

    This view also highlights the subjective nature of truth. Since truth is dependent on our interpretation of language, different individuals may interpret the same statement differently, leading to different truths. This challenges the notion of objective truth and emphasizes the importance of context and perspective in determining what is true.

    Furthermore, viewing words as mirrors suggests that our understanding of the world is limited by our own understanding, not the words we use. Words and symbols can only reflect our understanding up to a certain point, beyond which they will fail to accurately represent reality (due to our own lack of understanding), thus the reason why the Liar Paradox forms in our minds because we're trying to use words for things they can't be used for.

    Application to the Sorites Paradox:

    Applying this perspective to the Sorites Paradox helps us understand our struggle with defining a heap. In this paradox, the term “heap” seems simple on the surface, but as we examine it more closely, we realize that our understanding of what constitutes a heap is vague and subjective.

    The word “heap” is merely a linguistic construct, a symbol that represents a concept. This symbol acts as a mirror, reflecting our attempt to understand the concept of a heap through the word alone. Our inability to define the boundaries of a heap is not a limitation of the concept itself, but rather a reflection of our limited understanding. Just as a mirror can only reflect what is placed in front of it, our understanding of a heap can only reflect our current level of knowledge and perception. As our understanding grows and becomes clearer, the reflection in the mirror becomes sharper, allowing us to better grasp the concept of a heap.

    In this light, the Sorites Paradox is not a flaw in the concept of a heap, but rather a reflection of our own limitations in understanding and defining abstract concepts. It serves as a reminder of the complexity and subjectivity of language and our ongoing quest to understand the world around us.

    Application to Russel's Paradox:

    The Russel's paradox, "a set that contains all sets that do not contain themselves" is only a paradox to those who think that the word "set" is not a mirror. Those that understand it is a mirror understand that "a set that contains all sets that do not contain themselves" is a set that cannot exist, but instead relies on the assumption that words are absolute, and not mirrors, thus you can arrange them all in a way which creates a paradox that must seem to exist to someone who doesn't understand that words are mirrors.

    Conclusion:

    In reconsidering the Liar’s Paradox through the lens of words as mirrors of understanding, we uncover a shift in our perception of language/truth. This perspective challenges us to see that words and letters are not carriers of truth or falsehood, but symbols that reflect our own understanding in a way that others can understand. This realization leads us to question the traditional view of truth as an objective and fixed concept, highlighting instead its subjective nature, dependent on our interpretations.

    Ultimately, we must acknowledge that our logical frameworks are constructed upon the foundation of our subjective interpretations and agreements about the meanings of words and statements. In this sense, logic requires a certain degree of faith in the validity and consistency of our interpretations. Yes, faith, meaning that even logic is a faith-based system of reasoning.

    Note:

    While I do not deny the existence of objective truths, the nature of truth itself raises questions about our ability to definitively prove or disprove the existence of such truths. Objective truths, if they exist, are independent of individual beliefs or interpretations. However, our access to and understanding of these truths are understood through our subjective perceptions and interpretations of the world. Therefore, while we may have faith in the existence of objective truths, our understanding and certainty regarding these truths require our subjective experiences and interpretations.

    Possible Counter Arguments:

    1 - "To understand this paradox, we can consider words and statements as mirrors that reflect our attempts to understand them (by themselves)."

    Argument: It's not clear what this means.

    Counter argument: A word itself doesn't have meaning, we just pick words to reflect meaning (hence a mirror). But where did that meaning first come from? It didn't come from words, it came from thoughts in our mind. A basic example of this is a tree. At first, we only thought of a tree via images from our memories/senses, not words. We drew images of trees to express to someone what we were talking about (poorly drawn images usually), and then we changed images to words to save time and effort.

    The origin of a statement was our own senses. We saw the form of a statement after arranging words a certain way, and created a word to [reflect] what we saw. But when have we ever truly sensed the liar's paradox? "This statement is false" This statement has two aspects to it, first, it's a statement, and second, it conveys a specific meaning. So let's break it down:

    The statement, "This statement is false" doesn't have meaning in the same way the statement, "The sky is blue" has meaning. This is because the statement, "The sky is blue" reflects knowledge of the blue sky, but the statement, "This statement is false" reflects knowledge of words which are "mirrors". When you place two mirrors facing each other, it creates an image of infinity, of the reflections reflecting the reflections back and forth forever (if the light aspect in that situation were able to continue on forever, but it doesn't, so eventually the image gets darker and darker until you can't see it anymore. Still, the image is in a state where it would continue forever if the source of light were endless). So, in this context, the Liar's paradox doesn't actually go on forever, because its value is a reflection of our own thoughts, and we can't keep thinking about the Liar's paradox forever (just like how a source of light doesn't go on forever).

    So, the real value of, "This statement is false" is the "image" of a statement, set up to reflect the meaning of a normal statement for as long as we can keep thinking about it. In other words, the statement, "This statement is false" is just an illusion of a greater than normal statement due to where the "mirrors" are set up, for those who understand that words are indeed mirrors.

    +++

    2 - Argument: This is much more of a philosophy of language problem. Logic is the study of correct reasoning.

    Counter Argument: In the case of the Liar's Paradox, the assumption that creates it is that language inherently contains meaning and that statements can be categorized as true or false in a more straightforward manner. Through my solution that words are mirrors reflecting our understanding rather than carriers of inherent meaning, I'm offering a solution that requires a shift in how people think about language, truth, and logic. So yes, the solution to this paradox cannot be solved through just traditional logic due to the need to re-frame things.

    However, logic requires awareness of the full scope of a situation to be accurate. Take this for example:

    The Paradox of the Literal and Figurative

    Imagine someone says, "I'm so hungry I could eat a horse." In traditional logic, if we take this statement literally, we might analyze it as follows:

    A. Premise 1: The person claims they could eat a horse.

    B. Premise 2: Eating an entire horse is humanly impossible due to its size and the limitations of human appetite and digestion.

    C. Logical Conclusion: The statement is false or absurd.

    However, this analysis falls apart when we recognize that the statement is not meant to be taken literally. It's a hyperbolic way of expressing extreme hunger. The real meaning isn't about eating a horse but conveying the intensity of hunger. Traditional logic, without considering the non-literal use of language, leads to a misinterpretation. Hence the reason why awareness of how things are is required for logic to be useful. And so, by gaining awareness of what causes the Liar Paradox to form, a solution can take form due to the pieces of information then available to work from.
  • TonesInDeepFreeze
    3.3k
    The Russel's paradox, "a set that contains all sets that do not contain themselves" is only a paradox to those who think that the word "set" is not a mirror. Those that understand it is a mirror understand that "a set that contains all sets that do not contain themselves" is a set that cannot existEchogem222

    (1) Russell's paradox is couched in terms of sets, but that is not necessary, as it is not necessary even to couch in terms of the relation of elementhood. Rather, the we can couch in greatest generality regarding any 2-place relation R to derive:

    There is no x such that for all y, y bears R to x if and only if y does not bear R to y.

    (2) There is no set whose members are all and only those sets that are not members of themselves. You left out the bolded part.
  • TonesInDeepFreeze
    3.3k
    Traditional logic, without considering the non-literal use of languageEchogem222

    Logic doesn't require that we don't accommodate for the non-literal. If "I can eat a horse" is meant to mean only that I am extremely hungry, then logic doesn't disallow us from considering "I am extremely hungry" in the argument rather than "I can eat a horse". That is, when we input the statements into our logic meat grinder ("meat grinder" not literal, by the way) we may choose to first adjust our inputs so that the logic meat grinder handles them as we want it to; logic doesn't disallow us from doing that.

    However, yes, if it is a formal logic, then either we must input only statements that adhere to the forms we rely upon for deductions or have yet an additional system that translates informalisms into formalisms, such as translating hyperbolic statements.
  • T Clark
    13.5k
    we can consider words and statements as mirrors that reflect our attempts to understand them (by themselves).Echogem222

    I don't understand you metaphor of words as mirrors.

    words and sentences have inherent truth values. Instead, it suggests that truth is a product of our interpretation of language, rather than an inherent value of language itself.

    This view also highlights the subjective nature of truth. Since truth is dependent on our interpretation of language,
    Echogem222

    The liars statement is a grammatically correct proposition with a very clear meaning. Our difficulties have nothing to do with problem with our interpretation of language. You and I both know what it means, but we can't figure out how it fits into our system of classification of truth and falsehood.

    The Russel's paradox, "a set that contains all sets that do not contain themselves"Echogem222

    Russell's paradox is considered identical to the liar's paradox and some mathematicians think it undermines the basis of all mathematics. I've never understood that. It has always seemed to me both are just tricks - playing around with language. This is a quote I've always liked from Tom Robbin's "Even Cowgirls Get the Blues." I think it's funny, goofy. It just shows how easy it is to come up with sentences which, while easy to interpret, are meaningless.

    This sentence is made of lead (and a sentence of lead gives a reader an entirely different sensation from one made of magnesium). This sentence is made of yak wool. This sentence is made of sunlight and plums. This sentence is made of ice. This sentence is made from the blood of the poet. This sentence was made in Japan. This sentence glows in the dark. This sentence was born with a caul. This sentence has a crush on Norman Mailer. This sentence is a wino and doesn't care who knows it. Like many italic sentences, this one has Mafia connections. This sentence is a double Cancer with Pisces rising. This sentence lost its mind searching for the perfect paragraph. This sentence refuses to be diagramed. This sentence ran off with an adverb clause. This sentence is 100 percent organic: it will not retain a facsimile of freshness like those sentences of Homer, Shakespeare, Goethe et al., which are loaded with preservatives. This sentence leaks. This sentence doesn't look Jewish . . . This sentence has accepted Jesus Christ as its personal savior. This sentence once spit in a book reviewer's eye. This sentence can do the funky chicken. This sentence has seen too much and forgotten too little. This sentence is called “Speedoo” but its real name is Mr. Earl. This sentence may be pregnant, it missed its period. This sentence suffered a split infinitive—and survived. If this sentence had been a snake you'd have bitten it. This sentence went to jail with Clifford Irving. This sentence went to Woodstock. And this little sentence went wee wee wee all the way home. This sentence is proud to be a part of the team here at Even Cowgirls Get the Blues. This sentence is rather confounded by the whole damn thing. — Tom Robbins - Even Cowgirls Get the Blues
  • Echogem222
    86
    The liars statement is a grammatically correct proposition with a very clear meaning. Our difficulties have nothing to do with problem with our interpretation of language. You and I both know what it means, but we can't figure out how it fits into our system of classification of truth and falsehood.T Clark

    No, I understand how it fits into our system of classification of truth and falsehood just fine since my solution provides that answer. Really think about how words are mirrors from my post, how they're just symbols we decided to represent the meaning that they do... If you have done this, I believe you should understand just fine that the statement, "The sky is blue" reflects the meaning of the blue sky, it would be like a person pointing up at the sky and saying the word blue, which would be like them then pointing to another blue colored thing. And then a statement is like someone pointing to a collection of words typed out on a screen or written out on a piece of paper, not the words themselves, but their subjective perspective of it they want us to understand, so that we will use words arranged a certain way for statements in the future.

    So when we see the statement, "The sky is blue" we then remember an image of the blue sky, because that's what that stament, what those arrangement of words reflect. But what happens when we see the statement, "This statement is false"? We understand that the reflection does not reflect an outward meaning, but an inward one, but the only thing inward is mirrors. This then causes the reflection to reflect the reflection, which then causes that reflection to reflect the reflection, etc. The same thing occurs with real mirrors when you face them at each other with enough light, it creates an illusion of infinity. In other words, the liar paradox creates an illusion of infinity, but not with light, but our own thoughts.
  • T Clark
    13.5k
    I understand how it fits into our system of classification of truth and falsehood just fine since my solution provides that answer. Really think about how words are mirrors from my post, how they're just symbols we decided to represent the meaning that they do... If you have done this, I believe you should understand just fine that the statement,Echogem222

    As I noted, I don't see how the fact that word meanings are matters of convention, symbols, is relevant in this context.
  • Echogem222
    86
    I don't know what to tell you then, I've explained this as clearly as I can.
  • T Clark
    13.5k
    I don't know what to tell you then, I've explained this as clearly as I can.Echogem222

    Alas.
  • TonesInDeepFreeze
    3.3k
    some mathematicians think [Russell’s paradox] undermines the basis of all mathematicsT Clark

    Who are some of the mathematicians you have in mind?
  • T Clark
    13.5k
    Who are some of the mathematicians you have in mind?TonesInDeepFreeze

    If I remember correctly, Russell, Wittgenstein, and others.
  • TonesInDeepFreeze
    3.3k


    Russell correctly saw that it undermined unrestricted comprehension (as underlying Frege’s system, even if not called ‘unrestricted comprehension’) as a basis for mathematics. So he went on to formulate a basis that does not have unrestricted comprehension. To say that Russell’s paradox undermines the basis of mathematics is overstatement since it is not required to base mathematics on unrestricted comprehension, and I don't know who has made that overstatement.

    And I don't know what passages by Wittgenstein say that Russell's paradox undermines the basis of all mathematics.
  • T Clark
    13.5k
    To say that Russell’s paradox undermines the basis of mathematics is overstatement since it is not required to base mathematics on unrestricted comprehension, and I don't know who has made that overstatement.TonesInDeepFreeze

    This is certainly nowhere near my area of expertise, so I'll punt:

    From the principle of explosion of classical logic, any proposition can be proved from a contradiction. Therefore, the presence of contradictions like Russell's paradox in an axiomatic set theory is disastrous; since if any formula can be proved true it destroys the conventional meaning of truth and falsity. Further, since set theory was seen as the basis for an axiomatic development of all other branches of mathematics, Russell's paradox threatened the foundations of mathematics as a whole. This motivated a great deal of research around the turn of the 20th century to develop a consistent (contradiction-free) set theory.Wikipedia - Russell's Paradox

    Also, this is from an article that describes a more radical interpretation.

    Alan Turing appeared to be interested in the Lair paradox for purely formal reasons. However, he did then state the following:

    The real harm will not come in unless there is an application, in which a bridge may fall down or something of that sort [] You cannot be confident about applying your calculus until you know that there are no hidden contradictions in it
    On the surface at least, it does seem somewhat bizarre that Turing should have even suspected that the Liar paradox could lead to a bridge falling down. That is, Turing believed — if somewhat tangentially — that a bridge may fall down if some of the mathematics used in its design somehow instantiated a paradox (or a contradiction) of the kind exemplified by the Liar paradox.
    When Alan Turing and Ludwig Wittgenstein Discussed the Liar Paradox
  • TonesInDeepFreeze
    3.3k


    I would want to see the paper or talk in which Turing said that. The quote itself does not mention the liar paradox, let alone Russell's paradox. In any case, if a theory without unrestricted comprehension is inconsistent, then unrestricted comprehension is not the cause of inconsistency but rather, if the theory has at least one 2-place predicate, then Russell's paradox is among the "symptoms" (the derivable contradictions). The point of the quote (without other context) seems to concern any theory of mathematics that derives calculus. But for ordinary theories, unrestricted comprehension would not be an axiom schema. Turing came well after unrestricted comprehension had already been eschewed.

    On the other hand, of course, Frege himself viewed Russell's paradox as devastating to the foundational system that Frege himself proposed. And in Frege's reply to Russell, Frege does say "[...] with the loss of my Rule V, not only the foundations of my arithmetic, but also the sole possible foundations of arithmetic, seem to vanish."

    If I understand that correctly, Frege seems to have a quite narrow view that only his system could be a foundation, thus he does overstate the import of Russell's paradox. (1) There may be foundational systems without unrestricted comprehension and (2) even if we agreed that without unrestricted comprehension we could not have mathematics without non-logical axioms, still we can have a foundation for mathematics.

    By the way, Frege proposed a repaired version of comprehension [I'll write it in modern notation]:

    If x does not occur free in P, then:

    ExAy(yex <-> (y not= x & P))

    But that is inconsistent with Exy x not=y, as became known to Russell and Frege. Lesniewski provided a proof that is somewhat involved but still easy to follow.

    /

    The Wikipedia quote doesn't vitiate what I said. Of course, a theory with non-logical axioms, such as set theory, may turn out to be inconsistent, and a theory such as set theory can't be proven consistent by itself. But that doesn't undermine the whole basis of mathematics. It does undermine logicism (pace, defenders of logicism), but we are not required to adhere to logicism. Moreover, there are reasons to have great confidence that set theory is not inconsistent. Moreover, I think we would find it extremely rare that a mathematician would believe that set theory is inconsistent or even pretty rare that a mathematician would have serious concerns that set theory is inconsistent. And again, Russell's paradox was bad news for Frege's system and for the notion of using unrestricted comprehension in general. But pretty quickly systems without unrestricted comprehension were presented (of course with Whitehead-Russell in the lead). Even if we take 'undermines' in a weak sense, it turns out that there is basis for mathematics despite that unrestricted comprehension had to be withdrawn. For that matter, even a couple thousand years before Russell's paradox, people had been doing mathematics and mathematical proofs. We don't consider such theorems as those of the Greeks about numbers to be undermined.
  • T Clark
    13.5k


    My original statement was.

    Russell's paradox is considered identical to the liar's paradox and some mathematicians think it undermines the basis of all mathematics. I've never understood that.T Clark

    That's all I was trying to say, not that I personally thought it undermined mathematics, just that some mathematicians think, or thought, that way. As I mentioned, I'm skeptical, but I am not qualified to make substantive arguments to support that skepticism.
  • TonesInDeepFreeze
    3.3k


    Of course, I never took you to be stating that it is your own view that Russell's paradox undermines the basis of all mathematics.

    My point is that if 'undermines' is taken in more than a quite weak sense, I don't see many, or even a significant number of mathematicians or philosophers (if even any by the time of the systems that came out shortly after the turn of the century) regarding Russell's paradox as undermining the basis of all mathematics. Or are there logicists who said that if logicism fails then there is no, or very little, basis for mathematics?

    By the way, Russell's paradox and the liar paradox are, of course, closely related, but they are also very much not identical. (Though, the barber paradox is just an anecdotal rendering of Russell's paradox.)
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